WORLD, METAPHOR, TEXT:

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF 2 CORINTHIANS 3

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This dissertation is an attempt to contribute new insight to the understanding of 2 Corinthians 3. In Chapter One, the general problem of interpreting written texts, especially ancient ones, is discussed, with special attention given to the differences between speaking and writing. Then the particular problems of interpreting 2 Corinthians 3 are presented, and the interpretation theory of Paul Ricoeur is proposed as a method to be utilized for the present investigation.

In Chapter Two, the notion of the 'world of the text', the central category of Ricoeur's hermeneutics, is displayed as a starting point for a contemporary interpretation of the text. Then the 'world' of the text and some its 'characters' - God, Paul, the Corinthians - are described. Certain aspects of Norman Petersen's concept of 'narrative world' are implemented in order to help define the roles, relations, and actions of the characters of 2 Corinthians 3, as they appear in the text.

In Chapter Three, Ricoeur's contribution to the theory of metaphor is presented. Then his theory is applied to the interpretation of several metaphors which occur in the text. The metaphors of 'letters', 'glory', and 'life and death' are analyzed in terms of Ricoeur's tension theory of metaphor. This theory has its classical foundations in certain passages from Aristotle, and it receives its modern elaboration from the impetus of I. A. Richards. Ricoeur expands the contribution of Richards, in one way, by proposing the concepts of 'split sense' and 'split reference' as attributes of the living metaphor. The employment of Ricoeur's theory is intended to spell out more of the surplus of meaning which lies dormant in potentially powerful biblical metaphors.

The results of these investigations are summarized and correlated in Chapter Four. The text of 2 Corinthians 3 does project a world. It is a world in which the living God has created all things. This biblical passage reveals how the creator is made known to men through personal relationships with them.

DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own composition and is, except where specifically stated otherwise, the result of my own research.

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Dedicated to

My Father and Mother

who

taught me to love God

trained me to read the Bible

and helped me grow in grace.

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CHAPTER ONE. 2 CORINTHIANS 3 AND INTERPRETATION.

INTRODUCTION.

This dissertation is an attempt to interpret 2 Corinthians 3 by referring to the interpretation theory of Paul Ricoeur. Nowhere in his writings does Ricoeur exegete or interpret this passage, but reference is made to him because two features of his theory of interpretation are applicable to this passage: his notion of the 'world of the text' and his theory of metaphor. The objective is to explain these two theoretical notions and then apply them to a real text. Chapter One defines some key terms, takes notice of some of the difficulties of interpretation, and presents the method and purpose of this investigation. Chapter Two presents an exposition of Ricoeur's notion of 'the world of the text' and its application to the text of 2 Corinthians 3. Attention will be given to the characters of this world and to their roles and relations. Chapter Three discusses Ricoeur's theory of metaphor and then treats three metaphors according to the principles of that theory. In Chapter Four, the results of the study will be summarized, conclusions will be drawn from the present research, and areas for further research will be suggested.

SECTION A. DEFINITIONS.

Interpretation is the process of expounding the meaning of a text.[1] This provisional definition suggests that interpretation is a process and not an act. It is a process in relation to the *interpreter* in that it involves a combination of mental activities across a period of time. It is a process in relation to the *text* in that new meaning and significance can arise in each new interpretation, and the cumulative effect of these previous interpretations exerts an influence on future attempts. The ultimate and definitive interpretation of 2 Corinthians 3 has not yet been attained. Nor will this study achieve such finality, because 'now we see in a mirror dimly', and now we know only 'in part' (1 Cor 13.12).[2] But this is an attempt to disclose *some* of the meaning and contemporary relevance of this text.

Interpretation is also a process in that a text is complex and intricate. It '... may well include such a variety of data that no one auditor will grasp all of the message.'[3] As new readers encounter it and as new scholars research it, new meanings will emerge. Also, as new evidence is discovered, such as the papyri and the Dead Sea scrolls, and as new methods are developed and applied, such as form criticism and sociological analysis, new significance from the text will arise.[4] The process of interpretation, then, involves the reappraisal and perhaps revision of older attempts as well as the assessment and integration of newer methods.

Interpretation calls for 'expounding', which, according to Ricoeur, is constituted by the dialectical process of understanding and explanation.[5] 'Understanding' (*Verstehen*, in the German hermeneutic tradition) is applied primarily in the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*), and it

functions by means of the principle of empathy, 'the transference of ourselves into another's psychic life.'[6] Understanding seems to be an appropriate method in the human sciences, because they are concerned with events and experiences inscribed in texts by '... other minds similar to our own.'[7] 'Explanation' (*Erklärung*, also a technical term arising in the same tradition), on the other hand, is the method of the natural sciences, and it refers to the processes of accounting for the phenomena of nature by means of empirical methodology. 'In explanation we ex-plicate or unfold the range of propositions and meanings, whereas in understanding we comprehend or grasp as a whole the chain of partial meanings in one act of synthesis.'[8]

In the provisional definition offered above, 'meaning' is perhaps the key word. For what meaning is and where and how it is found are crucial elements in any theory of interpretation. J. M. Soskice, though at variance with Ricoeur at several points, does distinguish between some key terms in a way which is compatible with Ricoeur's approach. Her definitions, summarized below, will be followed in this dissertation.[9] The 'sense' of a word refers to its lexical value in its ordinary, everyday usage. Its 'denotation' is that object, thing, or state of affairs which it designates. At the level of the sentence, 'meaning' is not the sum of the senses of the words in a sentence but rather the message which the sentence conveys, or has the potential to convey. 'Reference' is that function of the sentence in which it says something about reality. More precisely, it is speakers who refer, but they refer by means of sentences. So meaning, then, is the 'what' of the sentence, and reference is the 'about what' of the sentence. Thus, 'meaning' and 'reference' are functions of *sentences*, whereas 'sense' and 'denotation' are characteristics of *words*.

The issue of meaning in relation to biblical texts and modern hermeneutics is discussed briefly in a recent article by W. H. Kelber.[10] Though he focuses particularly on the gospel narratives, his comments may be applied equally well to the interpretation of other forms of biblical discourse as well. He stresses that narrative is a human construction and that life is not 'narrative-like' until a narrator imposes a narrative pattern upon it. Rather than a photograph of a little slice of life, narrative is more like an 'artistic production.'[11] The key question is this: 'How does one come to terms with narrative for what it really is: a poetic emplotment of incidents and agents into a temporal configuration?'[12]

Kelber suggests that current gospel interpretation offers five options, the first of which is to view 'meaning as reference'. This is the option taken up by scholars using the historical critical method. Their underlying presupposition is that the meaning of the narrative exists separately from the plot, and it can be expressed in terms of historical sequence, theological dogma, or ethical counsel. Thus, the narrative framework is a dispensable vehicle, for its purpose is to point beyond itself to the *real* referents: persons, ideas, events. The failure of historical critical scholars to grasp the 'inescapable linguisticality of human understanding'[13] led them to underrate the value of biblical narrative itself.

A second option is to view 'meaning as narrative'. This choice is a reaction against the limitations of the historical critical method, and the critics who have made this choice employ literary criticism instead. Their method is to '... dispense with all extraneous questions of authorship and historical origins... and simply attend to the text.'[14] They seek meaning in the text itself and not in any reference it may make to a reality which

transcends the text.'[15] Kelber cites three weaknesses of the 'meaning as narrative' approach to interpretation. (1) It started with a cultural bias, because its canons of criticism were derived from studies of Anglo-American, French, and Russian novels written in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. These norms were then applied anachronistically to literature generated in a completely different cultural setting. (2) Its notion of a 'stable, self-referential narrative' is increasingly difficult to defend in light of recent critiques.'[16] (3) No narrative is pure and innocent, because all have been mediated through a tradition which has influenced both its form and content during the transmission process.

The third option, 'meaning as consciousness', is adopted by reader-response criticism, which '... views all texts as bundles of rhetorical strategies aimed at persuading recipients, and as communications affecting hearers' or readers' expectations.'[17] The underlying thesis is that readers, not texts, make meaning. This approach must be credited with emphasizing the role of the reader as a subjective participant and with examining the '... effect of the text on its reader.'[18] Reader-response criticism has '... rediscovered the communicative sensibilities of ancient texts.'[19] Its demerit is its tendency to overemphasize the role of the reader and to neglect the role of the interpretative tradition in guiding the formulation of meaning.

Structural analysis presents a fourth option, 'meaning as system', in which meaning is related more to patterns than to plots. 'The structural analysis of narrative discloses both a gradual manifestation of opposites through their repetition, replacement and transformation, as well as their progressive mediation toward a point of mythic integration.'[20] In a radical departure from the historical critical method, structuralism finds

meaning in bundles of relations and in pairs of oppositions narrated in the text.[20] For example, in one structural analysis of the gospel of Mark, the pairs of sacred space/secular space and order/chaos are identified as the two primary systems of opposition, and their ultimate mediation occurs in the passion narrative.[22] In this way, '... meaning is constituted on the basis of this complex interplay which involves the whole of the text.'[23] For structural analysis, the events on the surface level are less important than the relations and oppositions on the depth level.

The fifth and final approach to narrative, 'meaning as deferment', is exemplified by J. Derrida in his philosophy of deconstructionism.[24]

> 'This philosopher's frustrating and obtuse language is designed to show that all linguistic elements in a text are potentially equal... and that there are no stable signifieds to which the chain of signifiers could lead us. The resultant horizontal interplay of words postulates a space of difference and conflict, of postponement and play, never permitting the many meanings to be gathered up into one meaning...[Thus] meaning as deferment postulates the inherently incomplete and fragmentary nature of all writing, including narrative texts.'

Though deconstructionism has some strengths, such as its openness to new meanings in texts and its tolerance of multiple interpretations, it has not yet been widely applied to biblical exegesis. This is possibly a result of its reluctance to engage with the historical and referential aspects of texts and of its insistence on textual indeterminacy.[25]

The five options summarized by Kelber - meaning as reference, meaning as narrative, meaning as consciousness, meaning as system, and meaning as deferment - are certainly distinct, but they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. None of them is fully able to account for the production of meaning. Rather, each one, with its own strengths and weaknesses, can con-

tribute something to the interpretative process. In the present research, however, only the first three options will be utilized. It is possible to correlate these three conceptions of meaning in a way in which they will complement and balance each other.

To think of meaning as *reference* preserves the notion of transcendence, which prevents the text from becoming a 'solipsistic artifact.'[26] The stories told about Jesus in the four gospels are indeed stories *about* Jesus. They point beyond themselves to the person who gave rise to them. Whatever the degree of one's historical scepticism about the gospels, one must acknowledge at least that Jesus of Nazareth lived and died and influenced some of his contemporaries, and that these gospel stories are attempts to recognize Jesus as the catalyst for their religious experiences. The stories presuppose an extra-textual referent. Likewise, Paul's talk about God and the God-man relationship consists of language that points beyond the text to external (in the sense of *extra nos*, at least) realities. While one must recognize the 'inescapable linguisticality of human understanding', one should also remember that language names and, in some ways, reveals the world but does not create it. It is true, though, that language does contribute to the meaningful 'manifestation of the world'.[27] Language mediates reality, but does not constitute it. The notion of meaning as reference, in addition to safeguarding the idea of reference and transcendence, also keeps the critic in touch with the author who encoded the message in the text. Although the author is no longer present in or with the text, the concerns of the author - his situation, his purpose, his intention, to the extent that these can be recovered or reconstructed - must not be ignored.

To think of meaning as *narrative* draws attention to the text itself.

It balances the push toward *transcendence* with a pull toward *immanence*. The critic is reminded that the narrative is important for its own sake - the content is bound up with the form. Furthermore, the quest for the historical factors which lie *behind* the text is displaced by the equally valid quest for the narrative logic *within* the text. Thus, the rights of the text itself are defended.

The third member of the triumvirate, meaning as *consciousness*, is called in to preserve the rights of the reader. The reader of a biblical text is not a neutral observer working in a purely scientific manner on an autonomous object. He is a person fully immersed in a cultural situation. He has his own concerns and interests in reading the text. The results he gets will be guided by the questions he asks and the presuppositions he holds.[28] The reader affects the meaning of a text. The text invites a 'practical collaboration' with the reader,[29] and the result is that meaning is seen as the 'coproduction' of both writer and reader.[30] But Barthes overstates the point when he maintains that the reader is the sole master of meaning.[31] Rather, the text may be seen as a source of *potential* meaning , while the task of the reader is to construe an *actual* meaning. The reader, in addition to guiding the meaning of the text, is himself directed by the text and its agenda. The message encoded in the text is armed with rhetorical strategies which aim to persuade the reader. In this way, interpretation is seen as a debate between text and reader, and meaning is a result of that debate.

Thus, meaning as *consciousness* underscores the role of the reader; meaning as *narrative* guards the rights of the text; and meaning as *reference* recognizes the concerns of the author. Since author, text, and reader are all essential to the interpretation process, the status of all

three must be maintained, and this can be achieved by embracing the threefold conception of meaning - meaning as reference, narrative (text), and consciousness. This triumvirate of meaning will guide the remainder of this investigation.

The final segment of our definition of interpretation concerns the notion of 'text.'[32] There is a debate in hermeneutic circles today about the status of a text. Is it an 'object' or a 'work'?[33] As 'object', a text is seen as a 'thing' in the natural world, something to be analyzed and explained by means of cause and effect or other appropriate methodology. As 'work', a text is viewed as a human expression which mediates a meaning and which beckons for a person to read and understand it. The text may indeed be both object and work, depending upon one's perspective, but the preference of this writer is to see it as work. This choice for text as work accords well with our understanding of meaning as originated by an author, mediated by a text, and actualized by a reader.

In summary, then, interpretation is regarded as an ongoing process which involves the contributions of both past and present readers. This process of expounding is characterized by the dialectical relationship between explanation and understanding. Expounding the meaning entails a regard for the contributions of author, reader, and text. A text may be viewed as an object to be explained, but it must also be seen as a work to be understood and then interpreted. The next section explores some of the difficulties of interpreting an ancient text like the Bible.

SECTION B. THE DIFFICULTY OF INTERPRETING AN ANCIENT TEXT.

In considering the difficulty of interpreting an ancient text, such as the Bible, it will be helpful to consider the problems of interpreting texts generally.

Texts are written documents. That seems obvious, yet many biblical critics have been unaware of the differences between oral communication and written communication.[1] They have proceeded with the interpretation of a written document as if they were involved in a dialogue with its author. The problem with the dialogic model of Romanticist hermeneutics is that the author is no longer present. He is neither in the text nor with the text. He has finished his discourse and departed from the scene. The human voice is silent, and only material marks remain to convey the message.[2] The author is not available for questioning, as in a live dialogue between two persons. In oral discourse, the hearer may question the speaker in order to determine his content and intent. The speaker may reply by using a number of techniques - amending, supplementing, omitting, elaborating, and illustrating - in order to clarify his meaning. But these options are not available for the elucidation of written discourse. The text is a completed 'production'.[3] If the author is dead, then the text is an orphan, with no one to speak up for him and defend his rights and arbitrate the disputes he engenders. When the reader asks him a question, he just keeps on giving the same answer.[4]

In relation to the Pauline corpus in particular,[5] two points may be added. (1) The objection may arise here that, though Paul himself is no longer available for questioning, the question may be answered by reference to his other epistles. Or, Paul can answer through his other writings.

This is partially true. For example, the meaning of an obscure word in an ambiguous context can be sometimes illuminated through a use of that word in an unambiguous context. But it is also true that cross-referencing within the corpus can leave the question unanswered or, in some cases, make matters worse.[6] On the other hand, seeking answers from elsewhere in the corpus is not really an appeal to the author himself, for any such query is addressed to but another orphan text. This process widens the scope of the problem but does not necessarily solve it. (2) It is possible that the first recipients of an epistle would have received amplification and clarification of its contents by the one who delivered the epistle.[7] Paul, in sending the letter by means of a colleague instead of the postal system, could have instructed his messenger to elaborate on certain points which he had left enigmatic while writing. If there was indeed some elaboration by the courier, then this extra information may have been helpful to the first readers. But, on the other hand, one must reckon with the possibility that the letter carrier could have forgotten some of Paul's oral instructions or failed to report them clearly and accurately. In any case, today's reader has no recourse to such a messenger. He must deal only with the written text.

A second but related difference between oral and written communication is in the nature of the medium itself. In oral dialogue, the speaker, in addition to the words themselves, may employ non-linguistic factors to assist him in his delivery. Some of these devices include gestures, facial expressions, tone of voice, and the accentuation and intonation of certain words to indicate emphasis, irony, humour, etc. The writer, it is true, can 'add supplementary distinctive signs such as quotation marks, exclamation marks, and question marks to indicate the physiognomic and

gestural expressions, which disappear when the speaker becomes a writer.'[8] Yet the full force and range of orality can never be transferred to a text. Something is lost in the transition from oral to written.

In the case of the New Testament writings, though, it must be noted that none of these 'supplementary distinctive signs' are in the original text. These are a later invention and were not available to the biblical authors. Other modern devices such as paragraph divisions, periods, and spaces between words were not employed in the earliest manuscripts either. So the inscription of discourse in Hellenistic times was indeed a more radical transformation than it is today.

A third difference between oral and written communication relates to the hearer/reader himself.

> Human consciousness is structured into thought by available forms of communication. Thinking is indebted to the medium through which knowledge is acquired. The oral medium, in which words are managed from mouth to ear, handles information differently from the written medium, which links the eye to visible but silent letters on the page.[9]

Whereas orality often employs 'rhythm, catchword, and succinct phrasing' in order to maintain the listener's attention and to function as mnemonic devices, textuality applies a principle of linearity, which serves to organize the randomness of orality '... by creating the illusion of orderly succession.'[10] So textuality tends to dissipate the power of personal presence in orality and to substitute instead the logic of linear sequence. When one considers that in the ancient world there was some suspicion of things written and that much of the ancient literature was intended to be read aloud and thus *heard* by its audience, it becomes apparent that something is lost by only visualizing the text and contemplating its

sequence of thought instead of hearing it and feeling its power and rhythm.'[11] Martin Luther,[12] and more recently Johannes Weiss,[13] advocated the reading aloud of Scripture so that it might be heard in all its aural force.

But the 'writtenness' of a text is only one area of difficulty in interpretation. Another area is language. The New Testament was written in *koine* Greek, the *lingua franca* of the first century Greco-Roman world. The modern day scholar is at a disadvantage here. If he reads a translation of the New Testament in his first language, then he is already reading an interpretation and not the text itself. If he learns Greek and reads it in the original language, then he is one step nearer. But even then he would not be reading the text as would one whose first language is Greek. Thus he will not have the fluency of understanding that the authors and first readers would have had. He will stumble occasionally over the translation of obscure words, idioms, and constructions. This can be partially overcome by intensive study of lexicons and grammars, but the barrier still remains.

A final area of difficulty in interpreting an ancient text is the problem of distanciation, which refers to '... the actual spatial and temporal gap between us and the appearance of such and such work of art or discourse.'[14] There is a cultural gulf between first century Corinth, for example, and twentieth century Fort Worth. These differences can be expressed politically, socially, economically, religiously, and in other categories of analysis. As the modern reader encounters an ancient text, he may be surprised and perhaps somewhat baffled by some of the customs, manners, structures, thought forms, and world views of ancient society.

Distanciation refers also to the text as already detached from the

author and as not yet 'owned' or 'personalized' by the reader.'[15] The text is estranged from the reader because of the 'otherness' of the person who wrote it. He inscribed his ideas using *his* words in *his* ways. This distinctiveness of style and expression is exactly what individualizes and thereby alienates the text. Furthermore, as a printed text, it has become a *public* text. To become meaningful, the process must be reversed. The publicized text must become privatized or internalized by the reader.

But how is this distanciation to be overcome? It is the work of the interpreter to deal with this issue. At least three strategies have been proposed. The Romantic hermeneutic sought to *eliminate* the distance by means of '... a "congenial" coincidence with the "genius" of the author.'[16] H.-G. Gadamer, recognizing the difficulty of achieving such an intercourse of psyches, suggests instead a *reduction* of the distance by means of a *Horizontverschmelzung*, effected by the overlapping of features common to both the world of the text and the world of the reader.'[17] Ricoeur proposes that the interpreter recognize and maintain the distance and then appropriate it productively.'[18] Appropriation, then, the making of one's own that which was once foreign, is the solution for distanciation which will be employed in this interpretation of 2 Corinthians 3.

In turning now to the difficulty of interpreting 2 Corinthians 3 in particular, it will be helpful to remember these three areas of difficulty in the interpretation of ancient texts in general - their writtenness, language, and distanciation.

SECTION C. THE DIFFICULTY OF INTERPRETING 2 CORINTHIANS 3.

The document known as 'Saint Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians' is an ancient text that has been preserved and passed down through the centuries by the Christian church. It was written by the Apostle Paul in the middle of the first century to the group of Christian believers known as 'the church of God which is at Corinth' (2 Cor 1.1). Why is this document still of interest today? Several reasons may be cited. It is one of only 27 documents of the early Christian era to be made canonical by the church, and it is therefore an authoritative document for its members. As a part of the canonical New Testament, 2 Corinthians helps to describe the nature of early Christianity and to constitute the rule by which the orthodox Christian faith was identified. Also this document contains some information, both explicit and implicit, about the origin and early development of the church. This information can be useful in understanding the historical setting of the early church. Finally, this document is interesting because it reveals much about its author and his religious experiences, and so it can help to shape one's knowledge and experience of God today. For these and other reasons, 2 Corinthians in general (and 2 Corinthians 3 in particular) continues to interest contemporary readers.

Even though the letter is interesting, it is not easily understood. The modern reader, even if he is a serious student of the New Testament, will encounter difficulties in trying to understand this text. In this section, some problems of interpretation will be mentioned. The chapters which follow will attempt to elucidate and illuminate the text by suggesting solutions for the difficulties associated with the text.

In order to establish a starting point, it is assumed that *Paul* wrote 2 Corinthians, and that the epistle as it appears today in the Greek New Testament (Nestle-Aland 26th. ed.) is a literary unity. This was the view of all scholars until the eighteenth century, and some still hold to this position today.[1] The date of the writing of 2 Corinthians is not generally agreed upon, but for this project the date which will be accepted is AD 57, or approximately six months to a year after the sending of 1 Corinthians. The place of writing is thought to be somewhere in Macedonia.[2]

Though there are many valid areas of enquiry into 2 Corinthians 3, the primary area of difficulty to be discussed in this project is the linguistic one. Difficulties in this category include lexical, syntactical, semantic, and contextual problems. The phrase, 'lexical difficulties', refers to the basic problem of translation - finding suitable English equivalents for the Greek words in the text. This suggests that most translating involves one-for-one correspondence, although the denotations and connotations of a word in one language rarely overlap exactly with those of its counterpart in another language. Even so, this is the approach that will be adopted here toward the translating of 2 Corinthians 3, although there are certain instances in which a single English word is either inadequate or non-existent for the Greek word in question. For example, ζῳοποιέω (v.6), is a compound of ζωή and ποιέω. It is intended to contrast with ἀποκτείνω, but there is not a suitable English equivalent. The RSV and NIV render 'gives life'. The Elizabethan term, 'quickeneth', is a fair translation, though it has fallen out of current usage. ζῳοποιέω conveys the idea of calling dead persons to life or making alive that which was dead.[3] 'Makes alive' is probably the best translation, because it is concise. Its brevity, though, axes off part of

the meaning. It is situations like this in 2 Corinthians 3 which call for the work of interpretation, to elucidate further the sense of words which cannot easily and adequately be translated from Greek into English.

Another type of lexical difficulty is deciding which sense of a word is intended by the author. Most Greek words have more than one meaning, and the translator of 2 Corinthians 3 must determine which one of the possibilities Paul contemplated when he wrote the epistle. It is conceivable, though, that occasionally more than one sense of a word is evoked at the same time, or that one sense emerges as primary while others recede without altogether vanishing.

One such example is δόξα. Derived from δοκέω, it originally meant 'opinion' and then 'reputation'. By New Testament times it had acquired an exclusively positive connotation with regard to 'reputation' and could thus be translated 'honour' or 'praise' or 'fame' or 'renown'.[4] Of objects, it means 'brilliance' or 'radiance'.[5] People can also have δόξα in this sense of 'brightness'. In Matthew 6.29, Solomon's δόξα suggests the dazzling splendour of his clothing, wealth, and palace. Some day all Christians will be gloriously radiant when they appear with Christ before God ἐν δόξῃ (Col 3.4). When applied to God, δόξα evokes notions of his 'glory, majesty, sublimity, power, and might (Rom 6.4)'.[6]

Now which of these possible meanings does Paul intend as he writes δόξα eleven times in 2 Corinthians 3? Or does he mean more than one, or even all of them? Surely Schmiedel and Windisch are on the right trail when they say that δόξα incorporates more than one nuance in this passage.[7] 2 Corinthians 3 contains, at the very least, allusions to Exodus 34. In that Old Testament text, it is reported that Moses' face shone when he came down the hill after talking with God. The radiance of his face is

generally thought to be a reflection of the brightness of the δόξα θεοῦ. So in 2 Corinthians 3.7, 13, at least the notion of brilliance or radiance is conveyed. But there is more. Moses' face was shining because he had been talking with God. Because he had been privileged to talk with God, he was a man of respect. He became famous. He was an illustrious person. He was a brilliant lawgiver. He had δόξα. But the source of Moses' δόξα was God and *his* δόξα. So now the 'divine' aspects of δόξα are summoned into the connotations of the text. The God of Israel, for Paul, was the most prestigious of beings, and was not only radiant in appearance but also majestic and powerful. Bultmann holds that δόξα θεοῦ, in Paul, always refers to the mighty manifestation of the power of God.[8] Whereas for Old Testament writers, this δόξα was manifested outwardly, as on the face of Moses and in the pillar of fire, for Paul it is now manifested in the weakness of believers, who are being transformed by the power of God.[9] So in this way, the one word δόξα does not have just one sense, but rather a wide array of connotations. Paul has supercharged his text with meaning.

A third example is κατοπτρίζω, v.18. Translators and commentators alike are divided on the translation of this word.[10] All agree that it is related to κάτοπτρον, a mirror. The problem concerns the verb form. Does it mean 'to reflect as a mirror does' or 'to behold as in a mirror, to contemplate'? It is a *hapax legomenon* in the NT and appears only rarely in classical and *koine* texts.

Since there are few parallels and since they are not convincing either way, one turns next to the context for clues to determine its sense. Sense contributes to context, and context sometimes determines sense. Thus, reference to context would ordinarily cause one meaning to appear more likely than the others. But in this case there are so many problems

associated with the context and its train of thought that the appeal to context is not decisive. Here, though, are three of the options.

First, verse 18 may be read in the light of verse 12: 'We are very bold, not like Moses, who put a veil over his face.' In this case κατοπτρίζω would have the sense of 'reflect'. When Moses was veiled (Ex 34. 33-36), he no longer reflected the glory, or, at least, the Israelites no longer saw the reflected glory. But we Christians do not wear a veil. We are always reflecting the glory of the Lord. Or, rather, since we are not veiled, anyone can look and see the glory of the Lord which we are reflecting. This interpretation is consistent with Paul's contrasting of the two ministries in verses 7-11. But it puts Moses in a bad light, which is not at all the emphasis of the Exodus text. To hold to this positon, one must, along with Paul, re-interpret (or mis-interpret?) the underlying Pentateuchal passage.

Second, verse 18 may be interpreted with respect to verse 16: 'But when a man turns to the Lord the veil is removed.' There is debate as to who is the subject of the verb ἐπιστρέφειν. But it is not totally unreasonable to view Moses as the subject, or at least as the prototype of whomever the subject might be. According to Exodus 34.34, 'whenever Moses went in before the Lord to speak with him, he took the veil off, until he came out.' Moses always wears a veil outside the holy tent. But whenever he is inside talking with the Lord ('face to face', Ex 33.11), he removes the veil and thus can 'behold' the Lord. In this case, the Christian is compared, not contrasted, with Moses. When the Christian turns to the Lord, the veil is removed, and he beholds the Lord, face to face, just as Moses did. This view accords well with the following section (2 Cor 4.1-6), which talks about Christians seeing the glory of God. But such a

favourable comparison of Moses with the apostle is quite out of character with the polemical tones of chapter 3, in which the two ministries are set in opposition to each other.

A third option is to link verse 18 with verse 15: 'Yes, to this day whenever Moses is read a veil lies over their minds.' In this situation, κατοπτρίζω would again be translated 'behold'. The believing Christian is contrasted with unbelieving Israel. The Christian reads the scriptures. He sees Christ in them. He trusts in Christ. The veil of darkness and unbelief is lifted. He now can see the δόξα κυρίου. But the unbelieving Israelites are blinded and hardened. They are unable to see Moses speaking of Christ. They are unwilling to believe in Jesus as messiah. They are veiled. This approach is agreeable with the polemical cast of the preceding verses. But it requires κύριος to be understood as 'Christ' instead of 'Yahweh'. Such a translation is not impossible, but a number of weighty objections have been raised against it, not least of which is that δόξα κυρίου (v. 18) is parallel to τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ (4.6).

So there are lexical difficulties with κατοπτρίζω, no matter which way one turns. This illustrates the problem of trying to clarify the meaning of a word with reference to its context. In order for this procedure to work successfully, a rather clear context is required. But in the case of 2 Corinthians 3 there are *several* contexts to choose from and there are different ways to interpret the thrust of the chapter. The solution proposed here is to accept the ambiguity of κατοπτρίζω and translate it as 'behold/reflect'.

A second type of linguistic difficulty is syntactical. This concerns mainly the structure of sentences and the function of their various parts. For example, in 2 Corinthians 3.1, does the adverb πάλιν modify ἀρχόμεθα or

συνιστάνειν? Should it be translated, 'Are we again beginning to commend ourselves' or 'Are we beginning to commend ourselves again?' According to the former, which is generally accepted, to commend one's self is regarded as an unsavoury practice in which Paul would not participate. Paul's remarks may be construed by some as the commencement of another boast. Paul fears that his detractors in Corinth may raise this charge against him, so he defuses them before they have a chance.'[11] In favour of the latter translation, Hickling suggests that Paul thinks the situation in Corinth may have deteriorated so badly that it is time to start all over again. He and the Corinthians have become as strangers and need to be re-introduced and get re-acquainted with each other.'[12] Perhaps it makes little or no difference,'[13] but a sensitivity to the slight variation of emphasis may affect one's interpretation of Paul's argument in the chapter. It might also point to underlying tensions in the relationship between Paul and the Corinthians.

The appearance of φανερούμενοι (v.3), a passive participle, is also somewhat puzzling. What is its antecedent and how does it function? It is not abundantly clear why it is present in the sentence nor why a finite verb was not used instead. Also in verse 3 there is the troublesome triple dative πλαξὶν καρδίαις σαρκίναις, which has evoked more than once the suggestion that a glossator has been at work here.'[14]

One wonders further whether τοιαύτην (v.4) points back to the preceding paragraph (vv.1-3) or to the remainder of the paragraph at hand (vv.4-6). Also, the noun that goes with γράμματος and πνεύματος in v.6 is not certain. Is it διακόνους'[15] or διαθήκης'[16]?

And finally, verse 18 is a long and bulky sentence, with a rather awkward structure and word order. It also contains a curious construction

in τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα, a passive verb apparently linked with an accusative. A construction such as μεταμορφούμεθα εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα would have made a much more natural reading, and would have made this clause parallel in construction to similar clauses in Philo (for example, μεταμορφούμενος εἰς προφήτην, *De Vita Mosis*, Book I, paragraph 57).

A careful investigation of these and other syntactical difficulties is an important part of the interpretation of the chapter. Some of these problems, though, just cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of everyone.

A third area of linguistic difficulty is semantics. Semantics, the science of sentences, is to be distinguished from semiotics, the science of signs, a distinction noted by Saussure and endorsed by Ricoeur.[17] Even if all of the lexical difficulties noted above could be resolved with certainty, the reader would still not necessarily have perfect understanding of the text. For meaning is conveyed primarily by sentences, not by signs or words. One may know all the definitions of all the words in the dictionary, yet still not grasp the meaning of a text.[18] Even though a sentence is composed of words, its meaning is not simply the sum total of the definitions of the words it contains. The meaning of a sentence cannot be analyzed into the meaning of its constituent parts. Rather, it is a construct or synthesis, in which both the sense and the function of the words are integrated into an irreducible whole. Semiotics, the science of signs, is only partially effective in helping the reader to grasp the meaning of a sentence.[19]

For example, when Paul uses metaphors, the meaning may not be clear initially. 'You are our letter' (v. 2) is one example of metaphor from 2 Corinthians 3. One may know the definitions of all the words in this sentence and still not understand the sentence. The same is true of τὴν

δόξαν τοῦ προσώπου (v. 7) and κάλυμμα ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν αὐτῶν κεῖται (v. 15). Paul is not using language in its ordinary descriptive sense. He has become 'a kind of poet',[20] using language artistically to verbalize reality and convey truth. Such statements cannot be verified empirically, but they may still be true nonetheless. Metaphorical statements are examples of expressive or depth language, as opposed to descriptive language. Metaphors, though different from ordinary or literal language, nevertheless 'really mean something, make a kind of transsubjective reference.'[21] To understand 2 Corinthians 3 one must be able to identify metaphors and other figures of speech. Having recognized Paul's metaphors, it then becomes necessary to investigate what they signify and to what they refer. Is Paul merely ornamenting speech which could otherwise state plainly the nature of religious realities? Or is he conveying truth which can only be expressed metaphorically? These are but some of the questions about semantics which arise in an attempt to explain fully the meaning of 2 Corinthians 3. The work of Ricoeur, along with others, will be utilized to formulate understandings of language which may begin to answer these questions.

The final aspect of linguistic difficulty relates to the contextual problem. The issue here is primarily a literary one. What are the proper limits of the literary unit in which 2 Corinthians 3 appears? The following suggestions have been offered. Héring treats the entire chapter as a literary unit. Barrett marks off 3.4-18 as a section. Bultmann treats 3.7-18 as a unit; Bachmann, 3.4 - 4.6; Furnish, 3.7 - 4.6; and Hughes, 3.12 - 4.6. This diversity is an early indicator of the difficulty of the structure and the sequence of thought in the passage.[22]

Following Stephanus, Héring, and Hickling, the decision has been made to consider 3.1-18 as a unit for consideration in this dissertation. The

other commentators are certainly correct to notice that chapter 3 is related very closely to the end of chapter 2 and the beginning of chapter 4. But to take chapter 3 as a whole does provide an appropriate beginning and ending, as well as furnishing ample material for applying Ricoeur's interpretation theory. Other Pauline writings will be surveyed, though, as needed.

In reading through 2 Corinthians 3, one is struck by the diverse concatenation of images which Paul has assembled.[23] He begins by discussing letters of recommendation, proceeds to distinguish between two covenants, then contrasts two types of ministry, develops a metaphorical and allegorical interpretation of the veil of Moses, and concludes by affirming a glorious transformation for Christians. What is the point of this metaphoric 'montage'?[24] What is the train of thought which leads Paul from the beginning to the end of this block?

Hans Windisch first proposed the midrashic nature of chapter 3 in 1924.[25] He called it a Christian midrash on Exodus 34 and suggested that it could be removed without any damage to the apostle's argument in this section. Schulz and Georgi, among others, have modified and expanded Windisch's initial proposal.[26] They see in the passage a midrash originally composed by Paul's opponents in Corinth. Paul got hold of it, expanded and corrected it and then sent it back. His revised version is approximately what appears in the epistle today. Some contemporary scholars, including Dunn, Hanson, and Fitzmyer, accept the general notion that 2 Corinthians 3 is a Pauline midrash on Exodus 34, though they may disagree on some particular points.

For example, Fitzmyer, calling 3.7-18 '... one of the few passages in the New Testament which is clearly midrashic,' sees the text proceeding on

the basis of a running commentary on Exodus 34 with allusions to other Old Testament passages as well.[27] The key to understanding this text is to recognize the rabbinic mode of argumentation which Paul uses here:

> What is operative here... is the free association of ideas which runs throughout the entire passage. The association is caused by catchword bonding, in which one sense of a term suggests another, and so the argument proceeds.[28]

According to Fitzmyer, there are six key words which form the basis for the flow of thought in this passage: ἐπιστολή, γράμμα, δόξα, διακονία, κάλυμμα, Μωϋσῆς. Each of these terms occurs in the text with a certain meaning which then suggests another possible meaning and finally gives rise to a related theme. So rather than rigourously exegeting a given Old Testament passage, Paul, by means of a play on words, is instead composing a text of his own.[29]

Another variation on the midrash theory is proposed by Young and Ford, who employ rhetorical criticism in order to find a basis for the structure.[30] They defend the integrity of the epistle as a whole. They contend that it is a literary unity and that it is in the genre of an apologetic epistle. They note that the organization of 2 Corinthians corresponds closely to the structure of an apologetic epistle of Demosthenes.

The model apology, as discussed by the ancient rhetoricians, would have consisted of an introduction, narrative, proofs, and peroration. While Young and Ford do not present an outline of the rhetorical structure of 2 Corinthians, it would probably look like this, based on the comments and suggestions they do make:

I. Introduction (1.1-7).

II. Body, consisting of narrative and proofs mingled together (1.8-9.15).
III. Peroration (10.1-13.14).

Next they identify the Paul's purposes in writing the epistle.[31]

> ... Paul's fundamental intention... [is] ... to persuade the Corinthians that their doubts about him are unfounded, that he really is an apostle called by God, and that their reaction to him is of life and death significance.

The whole epistle, then, and each of its parts relates to this apologetic motif. Chapter 3, then, is indeed a midrash but a midrash with a rhetorical purpose. It was not conceived independently of its epistolary context and then conveniently slotted in here later. Rather, Young and Ford maintain that Paul constructed it quite self-consciously in order to vindicate the greater glory of his covenant and ministry.

> The midrash is about Paul's ministry, but it is also about the mutual dependence of the apostle and the community he addresses, and the dangers of not responding to his appeal.[36]

The train of thought, then, in 2 Corinthians 3 is not guided so much by 'linear logic' as by an 'explanatory progression' of points related to his apology.[33] As Paul lays out his case for the defence, he puts forth several ideas in a loosely connected arrangement, which becomes apparent when each part is related to the overall purpose which is guiding the structure of the letter. Chapter 3, then, is Paul's attempt to develop some ideas which form part of the 'proofs' section of the apologetic epistle.

Opposing Windisch's thesis of the midrashic nature of 2 Corinthians 3 is Furnish.[34] He rejects two of Windisch's notions: (1) that 3.7-18 is a

Christian midrash; and (2) that 3.7-18 is a passage that is not connected to its context and can be removed without endangering the force and flow of Paul's argument. Furnish believes that in 2 Corinthians 3 Paul is not interpreting Exodus 34, but rather he is 'appealing'[35] to the OT passage to support his own argument. This explains why Paul is selective in his use of citations from the Old Testament text and why he is rather free in his application of them to his present situation. 'It is not the story in Exodus 34 but his own remarks in 2.16b - 3.6 that are the focus of Paul's attention in vv. 7-11.'[36] Furnish proceeds to demonstrate that the purpose of 2 Corinthians 3.7-11, far from being a Christian midrash on Exodus 34, is rather to illustrate and expound Paul's conviction that '... the ministry of the new covenant is superior to that of the old.'[37] The following verses, developing other motifs found in Exodus 34, further assist Paul to affirm the sincerity and validity of his apostolic ministry. The chapter concludes with 'the grand affirmation of 3.18 in which all the themes of 3.7-17 are impressively integrated.'[38] By following 'the internal development of the argument' and 'without resorting to any of the special hypotheses', Furnish attempts to make sense of the train of thought in 2.14 - 4.6.[39] His conclusion is:

> The passage as it stands, interpreted with reference to its own context - as an exposition of the new covenant (v.6) - and with reference to Paul's thought generally, yields a completely plausible meaning.[40]

Furnish has developed a cogent alternative to the Windisch-Schulz-Georgi hypothesis, and he has shown how Paul could have composed this chapter on his own initiative. But he has failed to account for the midrashic elements in the text and for the remarkable similarity of 2 Corinthians 3

and Exodus 34. Furthermore, it appears that he has collapsed two positions into one, in that he appears to be arguing at the same time against both the midrashic theory and against the pre-Pauline tradition theory. It could be, however, a reasonable and coherent view to accept that *Paul* composed the passage and that he utilized midrashic methods to do so. That he 'appealed' to it in support of his own individual argument does *not* preclude the possibility that, in appealing to it, he employed midrashic procedures to enable him to apply it most effectively to his case.

Another alternative to the midrash theory of 2 Corinthians 3 is offered by Lambrecht.[41] His thesis is that the passage exhibits a cyclic or concentric pattern of argument, rather than a linear train of thought. This section should not be viewed as one tightly knit argument which proceeds from verse to verse by means of strict logical syllogism or the even looser method of rabbinic argumentation. Rather, Paul introduces a theme, then he develops a second, and finally he returns to the first, though restating it in different language. So if one reads 2 Corinthians 3 as a straightline argument, the passage will appear to be incoherent, containing *non sequiturs.*[42] But according to Lambrecht, the key to understanding 2 Corinthians 3 is to be aware of its cyclical structure, which proceeds along the pattern of an A - B - A' style. By doing so, the structure and unity of the section becomes apparent.

According to Lambrecht, Paul's purpose is to defend his apostleship. The cyclical structure of his defence proceeds thus:

A - Christian Ministry 2.14-3.6

B - The Two Ministries 3.7-18

A'- Christian Ministry 4.1-6.

Within these three divisions Lambrecht detects further subdivisions which

also exhibit a cyclical pattern. He then goes into great detail to demonstrate this structure. The weakness in Lambrecht's proposal is that it is unlikely that Paul would have developed such an intricate pattern before writing his letter. But the more important point to note here is that Lambrecht believes this passage (2.14 - 4.6) is a unity, and that this unity is based on a common theme, Paul's defence of his apostolate, which recurs throughout the section. Viewed in this way, the central section, 3.7-18, is an integral component of the passage. Thus the passage exhibits a unity of theme rather than a linear unity based on a series of propositions that follow in logical order. The immediate value of Lambrecht's contribution is the freshness of his approach. It affirms the thematic unity of the passage by means other than a strictly straight line progression of thought.

Three options have now been presented which attempt to explain the sequence of thought in 2 Corinthians 3:

1. It is a Christian midrash on Exodus 34 (Windisch).
2. It is not a midrash, but it is an argument which leads to a conclusion (Furnish).
3. The structure is cyclical or concentric (Lambrecht).

There is indeed a 'conflict of interpretations' at work here.[43] While it may be impossible to decide which one is right or superior, it is possible to note here that it is the text itself which gives rise to these many suggestions. It is true that each scholar brings his own interests to the text and that this in some measure influences what he finds there. Yet it is the *text* which provides the raw material for his analysis and the constraints which limit and guide what he can reasonably conclude. It is also true that as each scholar brings different methods (historical,

literary, rhetorical) to his study of the text he will thereby draw different conclusions.

It is not surprising that there is no widespread agreement about what is going on in 2 Corinthians 3 and that new suggestions are constantly being proposed. This *is* a difficult text. It has been variously described as 'complicated',[44] 'exceedingly complex',[45] and 'unsystematic and spontaneous'.[46] Furthermore, it is not unusual to find an occasional excursus in Paul's epistles.[47] To compound this, the text of 2 Corinthians reveals the presence of 'Wucherungen, Interpretamente, Verdeutlichungen, und Überladungen'.[48] So it is not surprising that this passage yields so many interpretative options. What kind of a text is it that can give rise to such differing theories? One answer is that it is a text full of metaphor and images, a text that is loaded with potential meaning and interpretative possibilities. There is no need at this point to declare that one interpretation is correct and to reject all the rest. Rather, the present writer will draw water from all of these wells in order to spell out a fuller meaning or offer a possibly fuller reading of the text. In this way, the problems of interpretation become opportunities for new insight.

SECTION D. A NEW PROPOSAL.

As noted in the previous section, there are a good many unresolved difficulties relating to the interpretation of 2 Corinthians 3. This in itself is sufficient reason to justify yet another attempt. But there are other reasons also. There are new methods to be applied and new questions to be asked. Since the possibility of new and valid interpretations always exists, it is worthwhile to initiate a new interpretative effort.

Most of the recent work on 2 Corinthians 3 has been dominated by one of these three concerns: general exegesis,[1] as part of a larger commentary on the epistle; the structure or sequence of thought in the chapter;[2] or, the opponents of Paul in Corinth.[3] There has been little work done that takes notice of current developments in literary criticism, hermeneutical theory, and linguistic analysis.[4] These are the primary concerns of this present writing.

First of all, this dissertation is not meant to be a commentary. It does not go into introductory questions of date, integrity, and occasion with which the standard commentaries are engaged. It does not outline the epistle as a whole nor chapter 3 in particular. Nor does it discuss every word and every verse in order. The interest here is rather (1) with the text of 2 Corinthians 3 and the picture it depicts and also (2) with only some of the key words which appear therein.

Secondly, this interpretative attempt is not overly concerned with the psychologizing approach, advocated by Schleiermacher. For him, the aim of hermeneutics is '... the reconstruction of the mental experience of the text's author,'[5] and to achieve this the interpreter tries to re-enact or re-experience the creative processes and peculiar genius of the author.[6]

The strength of Schleiermacher's method is that it regards the text as a work, a human production, and it recognizes the importance of the author's personality and historical situation for the production of meaning. Its weakness is that it overlooks the fact that, if interpretation is to be modelled as dialogue, then it is a dialogue with the *text* and not with the *author* of the text. As noted earlier, when Paul died, his writings became orphans. Dialogue with Paul is no longer possible, and access to the mind of Paul is restricted to a consideration of his epistles. The concern in this present work is not recovering the mind of an author, Paul, but rather with discovering the meaning and significance of a text, 2 Corinthians 3. The concern is less about what went on in the mind of Paul that caused him to write as he did than with what he actually produced, the text which lies before the reader. To investigate the mind of Paul and his train (or 'cycle') of thought is a valid endeavour, but it is not the endeavour contemplated here.

Finally, the problem of historical reconstruction is also a valid endeavour, but it too lies outwith the scope of this work. Scholars who are interested in historical reconstruction view interpretation as a treasure hunt. They search through the text for clues to lead them to the buried riches, that is, 'what really happened'. In this way, the text is less a passageway into the mind of the author than a window through which one can see the past. Scholars using the text in this way reconstruct the chain of events that transpired long ago which caused Paul to write 2 Corinthians. They discover the identity and theology of the opponents against whom Paul was polemicizing.[7] These attempts are, of course, legitimate, but they are of secondary importance in this dissertation.

All of the endeavours mentioned above can be worthwhile and fruitful.

But they are not the primary pursuits of the present writer, whose interest is rather in examining and applying the interpretation theory of P. Ricoeur. Ricoeur has written extensively on the subjects of interpretation and hermeneutical theory.[8] He has also written on the theory of biblical interpretation, implying that his work is as applicable to biblical as it is to other types of literature.[9] The purpose of this dissertation is to expound the theory of interpretation proposed by Ricouer; to examine it by referring to others who have offered critiques; to apply it to a particular text, 2 Corinthians 3; and then to appraise the results.

As the attempt at interpretation begins, two questions emerge which will guide the investigation. The first is: 'What is there about 2 Corinthians 3 which makes it meaningful and significant for the contemporary reader?' Or, 'Why and how is 2 Corinthians 3 a meaningful and significant text for the contemporary reader?' A discussion of this question will form the focal point of Chapter Two. The discussion will be guided by Ricoeur's notion of the 'world of the text.' This aspect of Ricoeur's theory has been chosen because it takes special notice of the hermeneutical problems associated with the writing and reading of texts. 2 Corinthians was written by Paul in the first century to the Christian congregation at Corinth. This letter was specifically addressed to first century Corinthians. But it has been read and used by Christians of other times and places as if it had been addressed to themselves. Why is it valid to read someone else's mail? How can one justify using in one situation a document which was intended for another? By means of his notion of the 'world of the text', Ricoeur has aimed at providing a validation for this process of appropriating a biblical text by an audience other than the original one. To support his theory at this point, he

develops the concepts of the autonomy of the text, distanciation, appropriation, decontextualization, and recontextualization. These concepts will be explored in Chapter Two as the notion of the 'world of the text' is expounded. This is followed by an investigation of the 'world' of 2 Corinthians 3 and the roles and relationships of three of its primary characters: God, Paul, and the Corinthian church.

The second question which will guide the investigation is this: 'What is the meaning of the language that Paul used to describe his relationship with God?' It is immediately apparent that his language is *religious* in that it is concerned with God and his dealings with man. It is also *figurative* in that a literal interpretation is unacceptable. It is also *conditioned* in that it is directly related to the social and cultural conventions of the times. Above all, Paul's language abounds with *metaphor*. Metaphor is an appropriate means of talking about God, and Ricoeur's theory is a valid way of interpreting the cognitive content of metaphor. In Chapter Three, Ricoeur's theory of metaphor will be presented, critically examined, and then applied to the interpretation of three Pauline metaphors in 2 Corinthians 3: letters, glory, and life and death.

CHAPTER TWO. 2 CORINTHIANS 3 AND THE WORLD OF THE TEXT.

SECTION A. PAUL RICOEUR AND THE WORLD OF THE TEXT.

In the writings of Ricoeur, the relationships between the world and the text are expressed in three different phrases: 'the world of the text', 'the world behind the text', and 'the world before the text'. In this section, these relationships will be discussed by comparison and contrast with each other. In the next section, the notion of 'the world of the text' will be applied to the interpretation of 2 Corinthians 3. This application will proceed by examining the roles and the relations of three actors - God, Paul, and the Corinthians - who inhabit the 'world' of that text.

In order to understand the relationship between world and text, it will be helpful to see the different ways in which these words are used. Ricoeur employs the word 'world' in several different senses. In the first case, it means simply the universe or, more particularly, the earth, as an empirical object: 'But the very meaning of this truth-claim is itself measured by the limiting network which rules conventional descriptions of the world.'[1] In this passage, 'world' refers to planet earth in its objectivity, something to be analyzed and quantified. This usage is neither common nor significant in the writings of Ricoeur.

A slightly different sense of the word occurs in these two representative passages from *Fallible Man*. 'My body [is] an originating mediator between myself and the world'; and '... the whole movement of objectification tends to set a world over against me...'.[2] Here 'world' includes both earth and the things upon the earth, with the greater emphasis upon the latter. World here is something like the bundle of

materiality which man encounters in his daily existence.

A third meaning of 'world' contains both senses mentioned above along with the added notion of 'humanity'. This more inclusive usage also occurs in *Fallible Man*. 'The ethical vision of the world [is] our continual effort to understand freedom and evil by each other'.[3] There is a major transition here, though, because world as planet earth and world as a *collage* of physical objects recede in importance and the human factor comes to the fore. World here is not just a physical environment but a distinctly human and personal environment. In speaking of 'freedom and evil', one might think that Ricoeur is using 'world' exclusively as a synonym for 'humanity', but this is not quite the case, because for him the appearance, experience, and description of evil is to some extent mediated by the natural world. This is the most inclusive meaning of 'world' to be found in the writings of Ricoeur, and it occurs more often than the first two.

'World' can also denote 'mankind' or a 'particular part of mankind'. In this respect, Ricoeur refers to the English-speaking people as a subset of humanity: 'This displacement has been completely misunderstood by those so-called existentialist interpretations of Heidegger that have especially flourished in the Anglo-Saxon world.'[4] In this case, 'world' has both an anthropological and a geographical reference, denoting the *men* who have an opinion and the *place* where that opinion is held.

The final and most significant sense of 'world' for Ricoeur is that of 'the arena of human experience'. Such usage also occurs among the ordinary men in the street when, for example, one asks, 'What's new in your little world?', which is roughly equivalent to, 'How are you doing today?' The concept that immediate human experience can constitute and be called a

'world' is a basic presupposition in the interpretation theory of Ricoeur. Consider the following excerpt:

> If language is closed in upon itself, discourse is open and turned toward a world which it wishes to express and to convey in language. If this general hypothesis holds and is significant, the ultimate problem raised by metaphor is to know in what respects the transposition of of meaning which defines it contributes to the articulation of experience, to the forming of the world.[5]

It is clear from this passage that 'world' no longer refers to any objective realities 'out there' in the world but rather to the composite structure of one's encounters with such realities. This can be seen in several phrases. 'To express' a world is a self-conscious attempt to speak about one's experience of reality. This is different from 'describing' an object, which is rather an attempt to talk about that which is 'out there'. To be sure, description is affected by one's perception, which is itself an experience. Still, the distinction can be and must be maintained between an intention to talk about an object and an intention to talk about my experience of that object. In passages like the one quoted above, Ricoeur is aware of such a distinction and is defending it. Also, it is important to notice that the phrase 'a world ... to express' is closely paralleled by the apposite phrases, 'the articulation of experience' and 'the forming of the world'. The world to be expressed, for Ricoeur, is just that continuous stream of immediate experience which calls for an articulation. It is by articulating experience that one forms a world. In this sense, the world is bounded by the horizon of one's experiences of it and by one's ability to speak about these experiences. In the context of the above citation, Ricoeur is eager to prove that metaphor provides a tool with which to formulate language about experience and reality. But, whether the

language is literal, metaphorical, or conceptual, underlying this discussion about metaphor is the presupposition that 'world' is formed linguistically, by the competence to generate an articulate and intelligible discourse about experience.

This use of 'world' as 'arena of human experience' is the most common and characteristic for Ricoeur. Its meaning is further elucidated by another quotation from his writings.

> For me, the world is the ensemble of references opened up by every kind of text, descriptive or poetic, that I have read, understood, and loved. And to understand a text is to interpolate among the predicates of our situation all the significations that make a *Welt* out of our *Umwelt*. It is this enlarging of our horizon of existence that permits us to speak of the references opened up by the text or of the world opened up by the referential claims of most texts.[6]

The world, for Ricoeur, is no longer an *Umwelt*, a milieu composed of things and persons around him. Nor is it simply a *Lebenswelt*, 'the prereflective world of lived experience'.[7] Rather, the world has now become a *Welt*, an 'ensemble of references', surrounding him and integrated into his existence. World, in this sense of 'horizon of existence', is closely related to language and text, because, for Ricoeur, it is through the interpretation of texts that one's horizons are expanded and one's orientation toward life is examined and perhaps altered.

Ricoeur should not be accused of linguistic solipsism though. He is not asserting that language is everything nor that nothing exists outside of language. Examples cited above of his other uses of 'world' are sufficient to discharge that claim. Furthermore, the notion of 'extra-linguistic reality' is explicitly endorsed in the paragraph cited below:

> This origin of the text in discourse must be re-

> called because it is discourse which simultaneously raises the question of the *reference forward* to an extra-linguistic reality, the *reference backward* to a speaker, and the *communication* with an audience. Language or discourse has a speaker, a world, and a vis-à-vis. These three traits together constitute discourse as an 'event' in a threefold sense: the speaker is brought to language; a dimension of the world is brought to language; and a dialogue between human beings is brought to language.[8]

'World', as used here in its most characteristic Ricoeurian sense, makes clear that Ricoeur acknowledges the existence of reality outside of language. World is distinct from and other than language. But Ricoeur's primary concern is with an understanding of experience as it is articulated *inside* the horizon of language. For him language is a mediation between lived experience and reflection on that experience. Thus the understanding of existence '... is always understanding through language'.[9]

Another line of defence against falling into a linguistic solipsism is provided by Ricoeur's appropriation of Frege's distinction between sense and reference.[10] Frege wrote that one is not content to know the sense of discourse, that is, what it says. One is compelled also to know the reference, that about which the discourse is speaking. Language as system, as *langue*, refers only to other entities in the system. But language as discourse, as *parole*, breaks out of the system. It says something about reality, about something in the world. Ricoeur points out some of the consequences of this distinction:

> But the dialectic of sense and reference is so original that it can be taken as an independent guideline. Only this dialectic says something about the relation between language and the ontological condition of being in the world. Language is not a world of its own. It is not even a world. But because we are in the world, because we are affected by situations, and because we orient ourselves comprehensively in those

> situations, we have something to say, we have experience to bring to language.''

By emphasizing and taking seriously the distinction between sense and reference, Ricoeur avoids the position of those structuralists, who find in language 'the absoluteness of a closed system'.[12] As noted earlier, language can label the world and can even lead one to discover new aspects of the world. But language, as Ricoeur states above, is not the world nor does it create the world, though it is the means whereby existence in the world is articulated.

Having seen the range of senses in which Ricoeur uses the word 'world', it is now possible to explore briefly its particular meaning in the phrase, 'the world of the text.' In this metaphorical expression, 'world' does not at all mean the earth, the physical environment, humanity, or even any combination or composite of these. 'It is not therefore the ordinary world of everyday language.'[13] It relates most closely to the fifth meaning mentioned above, 'the arena of human experience,' though in a modified way, for it refers to *possibilities* of human experience proposed by a text based on the actualities of human experience in the past as described in that text. The world, in 'the world of the text', is a potential world, the way in which life could (and, according to the text, *should*) be oriented. This will stand as a provisional meaning, for, before more progress can be made, it is necessary to look at 'text'.

What is a text? This question forms the title of an essay written by Ricoeur in 1971. 'Let us call a text every utterance or set of utterances fixed by writing.'[14] This definition presumes that a text was first a speech, if only potentially. The psychological and sociological priority of speech to writing is not doubted. But, whether or not the text was

actually spoken before it was written, it is a message which under different circumstances would have been spoken but which was written because it could not have been delivered orally. 'One writes precisely because one does not speak.'[15] That is certainly the case with 2 Corinthians. The reader feels the urgency in the text and senses that the author would have preferred to deliver his discourse in person. Since that was not possible, it was written instead. It is this fixation in writing that gives birth to a text.'[16]

It is significant that Ricoeur calls a text 'an utterance fixed by writing' or 'an instance of discourse'.[17] A text is a discourse or message, but 'it is not an instance of dialogue',[18] because '... dialogue is a world consisting of two persons' talking to each other.'[19] Reading a text is not a conversation between two or more parties. Reading is not analogous to speaking. Reading is not an example of asking a question and receiving a reply, because the writtenness of a text introduces a disjunction into the dialogical model. 'The reader is absent from the writing of the book, the writer is absent from its reading.'[20] The reader is unable to question the writer, and the writer is unable to answer. The text, then, is discourse in that it is the record of the message of the author. But it is not dialogue, because it is a not an instance of a two-person communication.

The distinction between discourse and dialogue is basic to Ricoeur's theory of the text. The radicality of the disjunction of text from living speech is basic to all of his subsequent theorems, including autonomy of the text, distanciation, double-reference, and appropriation. This will become clearer as these topics are discussed later. For now, though, it is sufficient to mark the distinction.

Having clarified Ricoeur's use of 'world' and 'text', it is possible to discuss the relationship between the two. The 'world *behind* the text' refers to the situation of the composition of the text. It includes the author, his intention, his biography, and his genius. It also includes the original addressees, their relationship (if any) with the author, and the way that they would have understood the text. The world behind the text is pursued by scholars working with the historical-critical method. They seek to reconstruct this world. One disadvantage of this method is the possibility of falling into 'the trap of circularity: the text is used to reconstruct the situation and then the situation is used to interpret the text.'[21] Though Ricoeur generally has an anti-historicist orientation, he does not dispense with the necessity of doing basic historical-critical work.[22] But he maintains that this is preparatory to interpretation, not interpretation itself. He wants to go on from explanation to appropriation, which occurs in the 'world in front of the text.'

The world in front of, or before, the text is the world of the reader. It is the place in which real people perform real actions. It is whither the text projects its meaning. The world of the text has '... a sort of transcendence within immanence that is precisely what allows for the confrontation with the world of the reader.'[23] It is in the world in front of the text that the reader actualizes the potential meaning of the text by applying it to his situation. This is what Ricoeur means by interpolating the significance of the text into one's own world. If the world behind the text is related to the initial stages of interpretation, then the world before the text is linked to the final stages of interpretation. In between one finds the world of the text, the central category of Ricoeur's hermeneutics.

'The world of the text' is an example of two big words 'coagulating' to form a single phrase.[24] The meaning of the phrase is related to the denotations of the words within it, but it is not simply the sum of these senses. This phrase, or its equivalents, occurs repeatedly in Ricoeur's writing on language, and is rightly called a 'key concept' in his theory of interpretation.[25] It suggests that not only the author and the reader have a world, but that the text has one also. This is a little shocking at first, because the primary sense of world for Ricoeur is 'horizon of experience', something related directly to the concept of living persons, not to inanimate objects such as texts. The shock may be ameliorated by remembering the preliminary proposal that 'the world of the text' relates to a *proposal* for human existence and not to a *description* of human existence.

The task of understanding the meaning of the phrase, 'the world of the text', is the challenge of grasping the meaning of these words when they are used in a metaphorical expression such as this. Because this phrase is an amalgamation, the senses of its components are intertwined and the overall meaning is thick. In order to gain an understanding, the phrase will be examined as it appears in several contexts. In this way, perhaps the sediment will settle to the bottom, and the solution itself will become more lucid.

Hermeneutics, for Ricoeur, is little concerned with discovering the intention of the author or re-experiencing his creative genius. In fact, it is not much concerned with understanding others at all. Rather, following Heidegger, Ricoeur sees the aim of hermeneutics as helping the reader to understand himself: '... *the text is the mediation by which we understand ourselves.*'[26] Ricoeur's programme is designed not to recover

meaning in its original milieu but to provide a '... rational clarification of human existence in the world.'[27] So then what is to be interpreted is not the author, his mind or intention, or his cultural or historical situation. These factors, along with all the other data connected with the writing of the text, constitute the 'world behind the text'. That world is, to a large degree, inaccessible and irretrievable. Even if it were recoverable, it would be mostly irrelevant to the contemporary reader. Ricoeur's method of interpretation is not primarily concerned with such historical and psychological issues. Any such information arising during the course of one's investigation of a text would be regarded only as a contribution toward interpretation and not as the goal of interpretation.

The text, the kind of classic text with which Ricoeur is dealing, is concerned with more than a description of the everyday world of ordinary language. Such texts have more than a literal or first order reference. Their concern is greater than the particular historical situations in which they are written. These classic texts of the past, including the Bible, operate with a second order reference, that is, a 'non-situational reference' which outlives and outdistances its original setting.[28] They present a discourse with a 'non-ostensive reference',[29] a message which is not bound by spatio-temporal limitations. They talk about the world not only as it is but as it could be. When properly understood, these texts show the reader how to organize his own life-world, how to understand his situation in the world, and how to orient himself toward the world.

> Actually, what is to be interpreted in a text is a proposed world, a world that I might inhabit and wherein I might project my ownmost possibilities. This is what I call the world of the text, the world properly belonging to this unique text.[30]

This world is not immediately apparent on a first 'naïve' reading of the text because it is often presented indirectly in symbol, myths, and metaphors.[31] The interpreter is to 'disentangle' the threads of the text, to make explicit the 'implicit project' of the text, and to reveal the 'indirect proposition of new modes of being'.[32] The interpreter has completed his task when he has enabled the reader to see, hear, and understand this new world which the text offers to him. The requirement, then, is '... to unfold the text, no longer backwards towards its author, but forward toward its immanent meaning and toward the sort of world which it discovers and opens up.'[33]

To perceive the world of the text requires understanding. This is not the comprehension of bare facts about objects. Rather, it is the ability to grasp the possibilities which are opened up in the text, to detect our own potentialities as revealed by the text. Understanding a text, then, is not the discovery of an '... inert meaning which is contained therein. Rather it is to unfold the possibility of being which is indicated by the text.'[34] Understanding a text is intimately related to understanding life. At this point, 'the world of the text' may be summarized as something like a possible way of life depicted by the text or the sum of world propositions projected by the text.

The notion of the 'world of the text' in the writings of Ricoeur can be distinguished from that of Palmer.[35] In *Hermeneutics*, he uses the term to refer to the world view prevalent at the time of the author as revealed in the text. He gives two examples. The Bible is a difficult book to translate and interpret because it portrays a '... world distant in time, space, and language, a strange world which we must interrogate....'[36] It assumes a cosmology which is completely unacceptable to modern man, and it

must be demythologized if it is to become a believable book. According to Palmer, then, it is the responsibility of the biblical scholar to mediate between two different worlds, the world of the text and the world of the reader. The second example is the Odyssey, which also presents obstacles to understanding for much the same reason. It is based on assumptions, perceptions, and a world view which are no longer tenable. These produce a 'clash' and a 'tension' for the contemporary reader.[37] Nevertheless, this text can become meaningful if one grasps 'the underlying sense of reality' which it conveys.[38] But, for Palmer, this significance for human existence is not 'the world of the text'. Rather, the world of the text is the world view implicit in the text. When one reads ancient documents, 'there are always two worlds, the world of the text and that of the reader, and consequently there is the need for Hermes to "translate" from one to the other.'[39] Whereas for Palmer, the world of the text is the antiquated world view held by the author and implied in his text, for Ricoeur it is the essential subject matter which can be appropriated by the reader.

Ricoeur's expression, 'the world of the text', can also be distinguished from the literary notion, 'narrative world', used by Petersen in *Rediscovering Paul: Philemon and the Sociology of Paul's Narrative World*. For Petersen, all worlds are artificial worlds, made by humans. A narrative world is the construction of a narrator. It is the world as it is represented in a narrative. The narrator inserts actors into this world, narrates those actions of theirs which are relevant to the story, and informs (either directly or indirectly) the reader of the relationship between the actors. The narrative world is the space in which the narrated events are played out.

> The narrative world is that reality which the narrator

> bestows upon his actors and upon their actions, a reality into which he authoritatively invites his audience, whether he is telling a fairy tale, a spy story, or a great novelistic adventure.[40]

There are at least three points of difference between Petersen's 'narrative world' and Ricoeur's 'world of the text'. First, Petersen starts with an author who fabricates a world and then confers reality upon it. Ricoeur, however, starts with a text, and he already assumes (especially in the case of the Bible) that it depicts a real world, though, perhaps, not the empirical world of scientific description. Second, Petersen views the narrative world as the author's invitation to enter into the text. The reader leaves the 'real' world and engages temporarily with the narrative world. For Ricoeur, however, the text projects itself toward the reader, and proposes, not different ways of looking at a past event, but rather new ways of orienting himself toward the future. Third, Petersen explores the narrative world for the purpose of better understanding the actors who live there and the actions which they perform. Ricoeur, on the other hand, maintains that the purpose of the world of the text is not to understand others but better to understand one's self.

Petersen's 'narrative world' is a useful way of looking into a text. His notion will sometimes be employed in the remainder of this chapter. But 'narrative world' is concerned primarily with explanation. 'The world of the text', however, is a broader notion, for it encompasses, in addition to explanation, the concept of application also, which challenges the reader to incorporate the propositions of the text.

What are the preliminary factors which lead Ricoeur to propose the world of the text as the 'central category for hermeneutics'? They may all be summarized in the one word 'distanciation'. Distanciation disturbs the

relationship between (1) the text and its author; (2) the text and its original situation; and (3) the text and its first or intended readers. The distanciation of the text from its author forms the basis for the semantic autonomy of the text. The distanciation of the text from its original situation opens the way for a second order reference. The distanciation of the text from its first readers permits a decontextualization and a recontextualization of the ideal meaning of the text. The effect of the distance on the text will now be discussed with reference to each of these three factors.

The distanciation of text from author is a phenomenon which has its roots in discourse itself. Discourse is a dialectic of event and meaning, which are the two 'abstract components of a concrete polarity'.[41]

As *event*, discourse brings into actual existence the words in language which have only a virtual existence in a dictionary. Yet as event, it is a fleeting item. Once completed, it passes into the continuum of history and vanishes. The intention of the author in writing a text may be considered an event because it is an action which he performs. When he has finished writing, he has also finished intending. The intention is gone. Only the text remains. What rescues discourse from evanescence is its *meaning* pole.

Meaning refers to the content of the discourse, a content which is preservable because of its ideational character.[42] Meaning itself, for Ricoeur, results from the intertwining of the singularity of an *identification* and the universality of a *predication*. The subject singles out a particular thing or group of things, and the predicate says something about it.

This dialectic of event and meaning is summarized thus by Ricoeur: 'If all discourse is actualized as an event, all discourse is understood as

meaning.'[43] The significance of this dialectic is that it provides a basis for distinguishing the event from the meaning. The event pole requires a speaker, but the meaning itself can have a life of its own. The message, when transmitted orally, no longer needs its originator. The message, when preserved in writing, henceforth needs no author. A text is born. An important change is underway. The event side of the dialectic is suppressed and then surpassed by the meaning side. This supremacy of the meaning pole of discourse tends to liberate it from the time and space factors which bind the event pole. This is fully realized in writing.

The writing of a text separates it from the author in a very physical way. The discourse he would have delivered orally to a listening audience is now inscribed with pen and ink on paper. There is now no dialogue - no speaking and listening, no asking and answering. The only remnant of the act of communication that endures is a piece of paper (or papyrus, in the case of Paul). The voices are silent, and only the text remains.

> With writing, the verbal meaning of the text no longer coincides with the mental meaning or intention of the text. This intention is fulfilled and abolished by the text, which is no longer the voice of someone present. The text is mute.[44]

This disjunction between the original mental meaning of the author and the verbal meaning of the text paves the way for Ricoeur to declare the 'semantic autonomy of the text.' The text means what *it* means, not what the author intended it to mean. If the author wrote well, then that intention is already encoded in the text, and the verbal will correspond to a greater or lesser extent with authorial intention. But authorial intention can no longer be a guide to interpretation.

W. K. Wimsatt and M. C. Beardsley state the case quite clearly in

their essay, 'The Intentional Fallacy'. They hold that '... the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the work of literary art.'[45] A poem, for example, is indeed the result of an author's creative purpose. But the purpose is to be found nowhere but in the poem. An appeal to the author or to his intention is beyond the scope of the literary critic, for whom the task is to study the work and not any factors external to it.

The notion of authorial intention as a guide to interpretation raises other problems. First, many works give no clear evidence as to how they are meant to be interpreted.[46] In the absence of any clear signal, the reader would have to be prepared to assume that he can and does know what that intention was. Since any assumption would have to be acquired from or confirmed by the text, it would really be a *verbal* or *textual* intention and not an *authorial* intention which is governing the interpretation.

Another problem is that '... a knowledge of authorial intention would not necessarily clarify the text. An author may intend one thing and achieve another.'[47] When this happens, how does one arbitrate the dispute between the rights of the author and the rights of the text? Does the interpreter delete the statements which contradict the intention? If he did so, this would be something other than *textual* interpretation. To give priority to authorial intention over verbal intention would be authorial interpretation and would introduce methods which could easily become arbitrary and overly subjective. As Scalise has noted, '... it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to interpret the author's intentions without psychologizing on the one hand or falling prey to historical or cultural determinism on the other.'[48]

When there is a conflict between the intention of the author and an

effect of the text, between what was intended and what was produced, then there is a need for interpretation.[49] Ricoeur would arbitrate in favour of the text every time. The meaning is to be sought in the work and in the work alone. The verbal intention always prevails, because it is the text and not the author which is the object of the enquiry.[50]

One final point may be advanced in favour of autonomy of the text over authorial intention. Many texts, including biblical texts such as Job and Hebrews, are meaningful and significant even though the identity of the author is not known. It would be strange indeed to assert that one knows the intentions but not the identity of these authors, and that these intentions must be the determining principle for interpretation. It would be much more sensible to state that these texts are precious because of what they say rather than because of what their unknown authors intended to say. They were preserved and passed on, not because the author's name, personality, and situation were known and because these added to the meaning of the text. They are treasured, rather, because the text, although the product of an anonymous author, was yet an articulate expression of God's ways of dealing with man and a proposal for a proper response to God.

This priority granted by Ricoeur to autonomy of the text over authorial intention is grounded in his opposition to the Romanticist hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and the historicist hermeneutics of Dilthey.[51] Authorial intention is part of the world behind the text and is therefore of lesser consequence in interpretation. In affirming the autonomy of the text, which is properly a function of the world of the text, Ricoeur is viewing the text as an '... atemporal object, which has, so to speak, cut its ties from all historical development.'[52] As an

atemporal object, the text is not closed in upon the world of the author, but rather it is opened up to the world of the reader. In this way, the text (not the author) can question the reader, challenge his assumptions and behaviour, and offer him a new mode of existence in his situation. For these reasons, Ricoeur can affirm that '... the concept of the world of the text has taken the place of the author's intention.'[53]

The distanciation of text from *situation* is similar to that between author and text described above. But whereas 'meaning' was the key term in that discussion, 'reference' will be the key word in this. At this point, Ricoeur relies upon the essay 'On Sense and Reference' by Frege.[54] The thesis in that work is that the reader is not satisfied to find only the sense of a statement, but that he proceeds to seek the reference also. The sense is what the text says; the reference is that about which it says something. 'The sense correlates the identification function and the predicative function within the sentence, and the reference relates language to the world.'[55]

Reference itself has two directions, as noted earlier (page 39). It points backward to a speaker and forward to a world. Discourse points back to its speaker by means of *pronouns*, which distinguish the speaker from those he is addressing and from those who are outside of the dialogue. It points forward to a world by means of verb *tenses*, which refer to actions or states of being in terms of their linear sequence, and by *adverbs*, such as 'now' and 'then' and 'here' and 'there', which further serve to ground discourse in a particular temporal-spatial matrix. The *demonstrative adjectives* locate the speaker in this matrix with respect to other identifiable features in the context which are common to both speaker and hearer.[56]

But reference is also '... another name for discourse's claim to be true.'[57] It serves not only to situate a speaker in a context and a context in a world. It also relates to the truth of what is said. It is here that Ricoeur makes an original contribution to hermeneutics, with his concept of *second order reference*.

Many written works, including poetry, literature, and the Bible, have an explicit first order reference. They speak of people, times, and places which are for the most part either fictitious or in the distant past or both. They refer to 'familiar objects of ordinary discourse.'[58] The sense of these texts is tied to their reference to distant or imaginary situations and is not necessarily relevant or applicable to the situation of today's reader. Ricoeur proposes to suspend the referential function on the first level, or the level of ordinary discourse, and to take it up again on a second level of personal or existential concerns. This is necessary because the sense calls for a reference, and the first order reference, the original situation, is either non-existent or vanished. The only options available, according to Ricoeur, for these great works of literature are to follow the structuralists and abandon the question of reference altogether, or to posit a *second order reference*, in which '...we may imaginatively actualize the potential non-ostensive references of the text in a new situation, that of the reader.'[59] These non-ostensive references include the 'aporias of existence'[60] and other existential concerns. By opening up an alternative reference for discourse, the sense of the text can become significant for the contemporary reader.

This approach to interpretation locates sense and reference not in the original situation of discourse, nor in that of the author or of the first readers. They are not to be found in the 'world behind the text'. That

original situation has vanished, lost in the dim past of history. If reference is related to that original situation and if the sense is related to *that* reference, then the text is only meaningful for its original addressees, and it has no abiding value or enduring significance. But to affirm that the sense and the reference of a written discourse lie in front of the text and not behind it is to salvage that text for the edification of future generations. It is the distance between a text and its original situation which makes this second order reference possible. This new proposal for the question of reference makes a radical shift in the focus of interpretation:

> What has to be understood is not the initial situation of discourse, but what points towards a possible world, thanks to the non-ostensive reference of the text. Understanding has less than ever to do with the author and his situation. It seeks to grasp the world-propositions opened up by the reference of the text.[61]

By acknowledging the concepts of the semantic autonomy of the text and the second order reference of the text, interpretation turns away from the author, his historical situation, and the world behind the text, and it turns toward the reader, his contemporary situation, and the world in front of the text.

The next item on the agenda is the distance between the text and the reader. This discussion will focus on the twin concepts of decontextualization and recontextualization. Reading is the counterpart of writing. As mentioned above (see page 41), written discourse presents a particular problem because, in most situations, the writer and reader do not interact with each other - the reader is not present at writing, and the writer is not present at reading. They do not share a common situation.

In oral discourse, '... the problem [of reference] is ultimately resolved by the ostensive function of discourse ... [which is] the power of showing a reality common to the interlocutors.'[62] But this is impossible in written discourse. Because author and reader do not share the same situation and because they can not interact, they are no longer able to resolve difficulties. The author is unable to communicate his intended reference, so the reader is guided only by the text. Since the text has been liberated to produce a second order reference, the reader now relates the meaning of the text to the non-ostensive reference set free by the text.

> Without a doubt it is this abolition of the demonstrative or denotative characteristics of reference that makes possible the phenomenon which we call literature where every reference to the given reality may be abolished.[63]

When discourse is inscribed, this original contextualization is effaced. The world of the text escapes from the world of the author and from the world of the intended readers.[64] The text is no longer bound by the intentions of the author nor by the hypothesized feelings and judgments of the original addressees. This atemporal object is free to seek a new home elsewhere. It is like a freighter loaded with cargo, stopping in at various ports so people can inspect her merchandise.

This process of breaking away from the original situation is what Ricoeur calls 'decontextualization'.[65] The text is no longer directed only to its original readers. It is addressed potentially to anyone who knows how to read and to anyone who can gain access to the document.[66] Its significance is not limited psychologically by the mental intention of the author nor sociologically by the circle of the original addressees. It is

a free text, decontextualized now and awaiting a reader.

Those people who find the text and read it are, by implication, free to adopt it and give it a new home. As they seek to grasp its meaning and apply its propositions in their own situation, they are 'recontextualizing' it. The text is agreeable to this process because, according to Ricoeur, its meaning is omnitemporal.[67] It is relevant to anyone grappling with the perplexities of human existence, because '... it is bringing what is essential in the past into our personal present.'[68] Genuine understanding of a text always goes beyond enjoyment and involves application, because the great works of art require participation and not just observation in order to yield up all their meaning. As the reader appropriates the text, he comes to a full understanding of it.[69] The text is agreeable to recontextualization for another reason also. Its reference is non-ostensive. The second epistle to the Corinthians is no longer addressed to them alone. It is also addressed to you and me.[70] Its reference is no longer intertwined with the Christian congregation in first century Corinth - with the intruders, the opponents, and the rebellious factions there. This letter, according to Ricoeur, is for anyone who can read because it projects a world which anyone can embrace for himself. One need not know the original contextualization of the epistle in order to grasp and apply the world-propositions which it utters. It has been decontextualized, and it can be recontextualized by the contemporary reader.

The process of decontextualization and recontextualization is made possible by a consideration of the text as a 'work', as a product of human labour. As a work of art, it belongs to a genre of literature, and it is the genre of a work which contributes to its decontextualization and its recontextualization.[71] Because a discourse is generated according to

certain rules, it can be better understood and remembered by its audience, and it escapes the fate of a vanishing speech-event. Because it conforms to a generic code, it can be written down and thereby protected under the umbrella of its genre. This genre confers both a closing and an opening upon the work. It closes the work to any further distortion of its content, and it opens it to new audiences and thereby to new interpretations.[72]

> The genre establishes the first contextualization, but, being at the same time a virtual decontextualization of discourse, it makes the subsequent recontextualization of the message possible.[73]

Of course, the process of decontextualization and recontextualization, being such an open-ended mechanism, can be applied widely and also irresponsibly. One can make the text say almost anything about anything. The door is open to wholesale eisegesis. An example of careful scholarship in the use of these categories may be found in the work of Schneiders.[74] She has applied them to the foot washing pericope in John 13, showing that humble service is the model of Christian discipleship, and to a group of texts which seem to be oppressive of women, showing how their narrower perspective on the role of women is superseded by the wider perspective of liberation proclaimed in the New Testament. Her results may not be universally accepted, but she has made a reasoned attempt to decontextualize certain biblical texts and recontextualize them in the twentieth century.

The distance between the text and its *original addressees* also makes a contribution to the development of the concept of the 'world of the text'. The distance between the text and its contemporary reader is just an

extension of the distance between the text and its original addressees. This distance was initiated at the time of writing, when the author and the reader did not share a common situation. The distance increased as the text moved out of its original spatio-temporal network. But the distanciation can become productive. Because the written discourse is produced in conformity to a genre, it can be decontextualized and then recontextualized. In this way, distance as a factor between author and reader can become productive and help to establish the world of the text.

Distanciation, as an interpretative category, then, lies at the base of Ricoeur's development of the world of the text. The distance between a text and its author, original situation, and first readers allows the text to be liberated from any purely psychological or historical interpretation. Because its meaning is omnitemporal and its reference is non-ostensive, the text becomes an atemporal object which is then available for decontextualization and recontextualization.

What, then, are the consequences of making the world of the text a category for *biblical* interpretation? Ricoeur himself has discussed this in his essay, 'Philosophical Hermeneutics and Biblical Hermeneutics'.[75]

First, the requirement to unfold the world of the text is a counterbalance to a premature emphasis on existential appropriation of the text. As a necessary stage between the objective analysis of the content of the text and the personal appropriation of its essential message, the laying out of the world of the text mediates between these other two processes. 'The first task of hermeneutics is not to arouse a decision on the part of the reader, but first to allow the unfolding of the world of being which is the "thing" of the biblical text.'[76]

Second, the locus of revelation is transferred from the inspiration of

the author at the time of writing to the presentation of the issue of the text at the time of reading.[77] The Bible is revelation as it reveals its propositions to the reader. 'Revelation, in short, is a feature of the biblical world proposed by the text.'[78]

Third, the world of the text, as a world, involves the whole community of faith and allows no room for a purely individualistic relation between man and God. The believer does not stand alone, but rather he becomes part of the people of God. Their texts become his texts. The 'world' of these texts is not a one-man production, but rather it is the result of the creative and cooperative labour of all the members. Because of the texts (among other things), the believer is linked to the traditions of the past as well as to the interpretations of the present community.[79]

Fourth, the world of the text bursts through ordinary experience to project a mode of being which transcends daily reality.[80] Because it operates on a different level, it breaks down old ways of seeing things and opens up new visions of truth and reality for the Christian. The power of a biblical text is not so much its descriptive content or its didactic function but rather its power to bring into view a new vision of the world. All of the biblical texts point to God as their ultimate referent and as the originator of the new creation which is brought into view by these texts.[81]

Finally, the world of the text challenges the reader to develop his most unique and personal possibilities. When the text announces that the 'Kingdom of God has come', the text implies that this is a kingdom which comes from God and not from the reader. By responding to a summons from outside himself, he can become what he was meant to be.[82]

In summary, the world of the text is a unique hermeneutical category developed by Ricoeur. By 'world', he means the arena of human experience. By 'text', he means a group of utterances fixed by writing. When these two words coagulate into the phrase, 'the world of the text', the result is semantically thick and dense. The world of the text is a mode of being which unfolds itself before the text. It is the sum of the world-propositions opened up by the text. It provides the reader with a new way of seeing things, with a new way of orientating himself in the world, with a challenge to develop his 'ownmost possibilities'.

The text has both a closure and an opening.[83] The closure refers to the configuration of its structure. But the text also

> ... opens onto a world, like a 'window" that cuts out a fleeting perspective of a landscape beyond. This opening consists in the pro-position of a world capable of being inhabited.'[84]

This opening is the 'outside' of the text, in which the text projects itself towards the reader and offers itself to his 'critical appropriation.'[85] The world of the text is a world which the reader may inhabit, in which he may receive the claims of the text, and project his new existence. The world of the text projected by the Bible is called the new creation, the new covenant, the kingdom drawn near. Underlying the phrase, 'the world of the text', is the concept of 'distanciation'. there is a distance between the text and its author, the text and its original situaton, and the text and its origin readers. The Bible is just such a distanciated text. It has escaped the intentional horizon of its authors, their situations, and their original readers. Because of its omnitemporal meaning and its non-ostensive reference, it is an atemporal object which

may be appropriated by the contemporary reader, by decontextualizing and recontextualizing '... the truth which has been incarnated in it by the poetic function.'[86] Thus, for Ricoeur, the notion of the 'world of the text' becomes a key concept of interpretation theory and the central category of biblical hermeneutics.

SECTION B. GOD AND THE WORLD OF 2 CORINTHIANS 3.

'The world of the text', a notion of Ricoeur discussed in the preceding section, will now be applied to a particular text. The world of 2 Corinthians 3 will be investigated by examining the roles, relations, and actions of the characters in this world.[1] A *role* refers to a position within a social structure or institution, such as a father in a family or a chairman of a committee. It describes the place of a person in his organization. A role is characterized by the actions typical of the one who plays that role. A father disciplines his son; a chairman calls for a meeting of his committee members. A *relation*, on the other hand, refers to a comparison of one role to another, and it may be expressed as superior, equal, or inferior. In the family, the father is superior to the son. But all men are equal in the eyes of the law. Relations describe the structure and explain the basis on which persons interact with one another. By examining the roles, relations, and actions of the characters in a text, the world of the text can be brought to light.

The characters of 2 Corinthians 3 to be examined in Chapter 2 are God, Paul, and the Corinthians. Each section of the chapter will be devoted to a study of the roles, relations, and actions of one of these three characters. Investigating the actions and interactions of each of these actors will clarify aspects of the essential meaning of this passage. Since many of the actions of a character are carried out only in relation to another character, some overlap is unavoidable. But the emphasis in each section will be upon the character, the actions he initiates, and the actions of which he is the object.

While our investigation is centred primarily upon 2 Corinthians 3,

reference will be made occasionally to other biblical texts, in order to clarify the roles and relations of the characters, and to gain a more adequate understanding of their actions. If the model of concentric circles were used, 2 Corinthians 3 would be the smallest circle, for it is at the heart of the study. The next circle would be the whole of 2 Corinthians, followed by the Pauline corpus, and then the rest of the Old and New Testaments. For the discussion of the *actions* of the characters, though, the focus will be upon 2 Corinthians 3, since it is what they do in *this* text that is the subject of the present inquiry.

Furthermore, this will not be an exhaustive listing of all the roles of these characters. The roles which are presented in each part are limited to those which are either explicitly indicated in the text or are implied by means of a relation or action which is mentioned in the text. So the discussion will focus only on those roles which are relevant to the text at hand.

In this section, the roles, relations, and actions of God which appear in 2 Corinthians 3 will be examined.

In the Pauline corpus as in the Bible as a whole, God is regarded as the 'ultimate *actant*'.[2] He is the one who begins human history, by creating heaven and earth (Gen 1). He is the one who brings human history to its grand finale (Rev 22). And he is the one who guides all that happens in between. The faith of Israel includes the idea that God is either the direct or indirect agent of all that transpires in the arena of human affairs.

The two most dramatic examples of God's activity are the Exodus and the Resurrection. In the first, it is Yahweh, Israel's covenant name for God, who leads the children of Israel out of bondage in Egypt and into

freedom and prosperity in the Promised Land. Moses and later Joshua were the human leaders of this campaign, but it is Yahweh who is credited with bringing them out 'with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm' and with giving them the 'land flowing with milk and honey' (Dt 26.5-11). The early Israelite confessions understood Yahweh to be the one who intervened on their behalf to make all of these good things possible.

In the second example, the early church believed and confessed that God raised up Jesus from the dead. It was the letter which had put Jesus to death, in that he had broken certain laws and had to be penalized for the breach. But it was the Spirit, the Spirit of God, which had made him alive, for it is the work of the Spirit to bring to life that which was dead (2 Cor 3.6). There is, of course, much debate about exactly what 'resurrection' means. But however one decides on this issue, it is clear that the first believers attributed this mighty event to God. Whatever happened, God had done it. By his mighty power, he had somehow intervened in a situation hopeless and forlorn and had brought victory when defeat had seemed certain (1 Cor 15).

The mention of these two examples is sufficient to suggest how it was that Paul and his Christian contemporaries considered God to be the ultimate *actant*. Now it is time to develop this notion by citing further instances from 2 Corinthians 3 and its neighbourhood which depict the action of God as it appears in the text.

The notion of God as *creator* is dominant in the Old Testament, and Paul alludes to it in 2 Corinthians 4.6:

> For it is the God who said, 'Let light shine out of darkness,' who has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ.

In this verse, Paul draws the conclusion that God brings light where darkness once reigned. In the creation, the light dispelled the darkness of chaos (Gen 1.3). In the salvation of believers, God sheds his light in order to overcome the darkness of sin and unbelief. 'The Creator God of the Old Testament is one and the same with the Re-Creator God of the New Testament.'[3] Belief in God as creator was foundational to the Christian faith, and creation as an activity of God is certainly a background feature of the landscape of the world of this text.

'Creation' here has at least two senses. It refers to the making of the sky and the earth. The Israelites use a fabrication metaphor to express their belief that Yahweh gets the credit for the production and existence of the natural world. 'Creation' also refers to God's making of Christians. By means of Christ, God has performed a new creation (see, e.g., 2 Cor 5.17). With God it is possible for persons to have a new personhood. God creates and re-creates. He sets things right.

Another role of God is that of *governor* of human history. This is a recurring theme in the Old Testament, and it is taken up by Paul in 2 Corinthians 2.14:

> Τῷ δὲ θεῷ χάρις τῷ πάντοτε θριαμβεύοντι ἡμᾶς
> ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ καὶ τὴν ὀσμὴν τῆς γνώσεως αὐτοῦ
> φανεροῦντι δι' ἡμῶν ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ.

The exact translation of θριαμβεύω is uncertain. The RSV preserves rather than resolves the ambiguity, by not specifying the role of 'us' in relation to the triumph: 'But thanks be to God, who in Christ always leads us in triumph.' That θριαμβεύω is a metaphor based on the celebrations accorded to Roman conquerors can hardly be doubted, but its exact significance is not clear. At least six possibilities have been suggested: (1) causes us

to triumph; (2) leads us in triumphal progress, as if we were conquering soldiers following the general in his celebration march; (3) triumphs over us; (4) leads us about as captives in a triumphal march; (5) displays us or makes us known; (6) displays us as captives, with shame and humiliation as attendant circumstances.[4] But, for the purpose at hand, it makes little difference whether the status of 'us' is that of persons conquering, persons conquered, persons on display, or persons continually humiliated. The important point is that God is portrayed as the great general, who has just won a major victory. The metaphor conveys the idea that God is the great strategist who can outsmart and overcome his foes. Whether 'we' are the conquering army, following in his train, or the vanquished opponents, being paraded as a spectacle to the world (cf. 1 Cor 4.9), the focus is upon God who conquers and who leads. He leads *Paul* (taking ὑμᾶς as an apostolic plural) in his triumphal march. It is God, not Paul, who determines the route of the march. It is God who decides the itinerary of the true apostle. The apostle might formulate tentative plans, but the final orders come from headquarters. As a person led around in the train of the great conqueror, Paul does what the general tells him to do, not what he himself decides. He follows where God leads him.

Young and Ford see Paul as a conquered soldier, being paraded around and humiliated by the conqueror.[5] As a defeated soldier he has become a slave, and so he is not responsible for his actions. He goes where he is led and does what he is told. Therefore, he should not be criticized by the Corinthians for not fulfilling his travel plans (2 Cor 1.15-22). His plans are always subject to revision by God, who is the great general and dispatcher of ambassadors (2 Cor 5.20).

So much emphasis has been placed on the role of Paul in the triumph

that the role of God has not been fully appreciated. If θριαμβεύω is a metaphor, referring on the literal level to a Roman triumph and perhaps alluding also to the triumphs of David and the Maccabees, then the role of God in the triumph is without doubt that of conqueror. He is the general who has executed the successful campaign, the tactician who has won the battle. Whether Paul is viewed as a conquering soldier or as a conquered soldier, he is nonetheless a soldier, and God is the general. Thus God's relation to Paul is one of superior to inferior. Though Paul may have counted others better than himself (Phil 2.3), he always counted God best of all. The military metaphor θριαμβεύω is but one way that Paul expresses God's superiority.

Because God always (πάντοτε) triumphs, he will win all of his battles and defeat all of his foes. 'We do not yet see everything in subjection to him' (Heb 2.8; cf. 1 Cor 15.27), but Paul's hope is in God nonetheless (τοιαύτην ἐλπίδα, 2 Cor 3.12), and he is confident (τοιαύτην πεποίθησιν, 2 Cor 3.4) that God will eventually win the day. Because God will someday conquer all of his foes and because Paul himself has already witnessed that conquering power, God may be regarded here as the leader of human history, and Paul, for one, has already acknowledged him as emperor.

In addition to creator of the universe and governor of human affairs, Paul also refers to God as *father*. In the greeting of all seven authentic Pauline epistles (and the other six epistles of the traditional Pauline corpus as well), Paul recognizes God as father. The mention of *father* brings up the notion of family. Father is a relational term, implying the existence of children. It is the birth or adoption of children which makes a man a father. In the writings of Paul, these children are always sons, with the one exception of 2 Corinthians 6.18:

καὶ ἔσομαι ὑμῖν εἰς πατέρα καὶ ὑμεῖς ἔσεσθέ μοι εἰς
υἱοὺς καὶ θυγατέρας, λέγει κύριος παντοκράτωρ.

Both the authenticity and the integrity of 2 Corinthians 6.14-7.1 are controversial issues, with no general agreement on its status. Furnish has summarized the arguments and concluded that it is at best 'only marginally Pauline' in content and an 'enigma' as to its location in the epistle.[6]

2 Corinthians 6.18 appears to be a revision of God's promise to David concerning his descendants:

ἐγὼ ἔσομαι αὐτῷ εἰς πατέρα,
καὶ αὐτὸς ἔσται μοι εἰς υἱόν (2 Samuel 7.14).

But the mention of 'daughters' in addition to 'sons' does not affect the direction of this discussion. The point here is that in a family all of the children, both boys and girls, are subordinate to the father. The father, in first century Judaism, was the accepted authority figure in the family, and he held a position superordinate to the children.

In the epistles of Paul, the concept of kinship is a dominant model for describing the relationship of God and believers.[7] As noted above, all of the Pauline epistles open with an acknowledgement that God is our father. This is underlined in 1 Corinthians 8.5-6 when Paul writes:

> although there may be so-called gods in heaven or on earth - as indeed there are many 'gods' and many 'lords' - yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist.

Paul is using the language of human relationships to talk about divine affairs. For believers, there is only one God. He is known to them as 'father', and they are his children. Unlike ordinary human society, there is but one family and one father in Paul's 'symbolic universe'.[8] A person

is either in or out of this family, and, if he is in, he is subordinate to the father and equal to all other siblings in the family (Gal 3.28). Human fathers, who are subordinators in their earthly families, become *subordinated* to God in the heavenly family and *coordinated* with their own sons in the family of God. Roles are revised and relationships are reconfigured when, by trusting Christ, a person becomes a member of the family of which God is the father. Thus, in addition to creator of the universe and governor of history, Paul also regards God as father of the family of believers.

The other major role which Paul envisions for God is that of κύριος - lord or master (2 Cor 3.16-18). It is true that the early church confessed that 'Jesus is Lord' (Rom 10.9), but that does not conflict with the notion of God as Lord. For God is the 'ultimately authoritative master' of the universe.[9] It is God who, declares Paul with reference to Jesus, has 'highly exalted him and bestowed on him the name which is above every name' (Phil 2.9). It is the prerogative of superiors to confer titles and honours upon inferiors, not vice versa. This clearly implies that if Jesus is a lord, then God is a greater lord.

This may be confirmed in two ways. First, the lordship of Christ is *temporary*, and therefore lower than the eternal authority of God. Paul writes that Christ will reign *until* he has abolished every other authority, and *then* he will hand over the kingdom to God the Father (1 Cor 15.24-5). In considering the political order, there may be a hierarchy of power, but there is always someone at the top. There may be many lords and nobles in the kingdom, but just one king. So it is that in the God-man arena. Paul says that every one will bow his knee to Jesus and confess that Jesus is lord (Phil 2.10-11), but this lordship is not *forever*. It is only *until* he

delivers it to God. God is king, ultimate authority, lord of all.

Second, the role of Jesus as *lord* is paralleled by that of Jesus as *son*. As son, Jesus is subject to the father. Though he is subordinate to the father, he is not portrayed as equal to the other sons. He is the 'first-born among many brethren' (Rom 8.29), and therefore in a position superior to that of the other sons. Jesus is not a son in the way others are, because he was a son before 'being born in the likeness of men' (Phil 2.7). Also, he is a born son, and all of the other children are adopted. But though superior to the rest of the brethren, he is still a son and therefore subject to the father (1 Cor 15.28).

That God is lord or master is a common theme in the Pauline epistles. The role of lord or master implies the role of slave, just as the role of father presupposes that of son. The master is the one who owns the slave and the one (ideally) to whom the slave is obedient and before whom the slave is humble. Paul sings a song about Jesus, a slave who 'humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even death on a cross' (Phil 2.8). Those who believe in Jesus are repeatedly exhorted by Paul to become obedient and humble to God. He urges them to imitate the example of Jesus, 'the ultimate model of humility and obedience'.[10] More implications of the master/slave relationship will be noted as the investigation focuses on 2 Corinthians 3.

The master/slave relationship is implied in 2 Corinthians 3.1:

> Ἀρχόμεθα πάλιν ἑαυτοὺς συνιστάνειν; ἢ μὴ χρήζομεν
> ὥς τινες συστατικῶν ἐπιστολῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἢ ἐξ ὑμῶν;

The question of self-recommendation was a point of controversy between Paul and the Corinthians, as suggested by the πάλιν.[11] The question of

commendation is raised by Paul at least seven times in 2 Corinthians, in 3.1; 4.2; 5.12; 6.4; 10.12; 10.18; 12.11. The issue seems to revolve around the proper source of recommendation. There are some who commend themselves, and Paul regards them as being 'without understanding' (10.12). There are some who are commended by the Corinthians, as suggested by 2 Corinthians 3.2, and Paul is not happy about this either. If the Corinthians are going to commend anyone, then they should be commending Paul, not someone else (12.11).

The potential solution of the conflict can be found in 10.18:

> οὐ γὰρ ὁ ἑαυτὸν συνιστάνων, ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν δόκιμος,
> ἀλλὰ ὃν ὁ κύριος συνίστησιν.

A person is not approved just because he commends himself. In order to be properly commended, he needs the recommendation of a superior. In 10.18, Paul is recognizing the Lord as the one superior who is competent to commend and approve him. If the one who recommends is a lord, then the one who is recommended is a slave.[12] Thus, Paul is implicitly referring to his role as 'slave' and the role of God as 'lord', in order to establish the proper criteria for recommendation. Paul is a slave, and the recommendation which matters is that of God, his heavenly lord. It is the Lord who judges Paul, and therefore he is not concerned about the judgments and opinions of men (1 Cor 4.4). Their opinions matter little, because a slave stands or falls in the judgment of his master (Rom 14.4). It is the condemnation or commendation of the master that determines the status of the slave.

If the questions of 2 Corinthians 3.1 are rhetorical questions, then Paul is saying that he does not recommend himself and that he does not need

letters of recommendation to the Corinthians or from them.'[13] Since Paul denies that he is commended either by himself or by others, the implication is opened up that he is commended by God. Though this is not explicitly stated, it is implied by the elimination of all the possible candidates but one. The text opens up a gap in its texture, and the reader is invited to fill in the blank.'[14] God not only commissions Paul. He also commends Paul. The apostle does not depend upon himself or upon other men for his recommendation. This comes from God alone. Paul is a slave, and God is the lord who commends. God is both commissioner and commender.

God is also an *author*. According to 2 Corinthians 3.3, he writes letters:

> φανερούμενοι ὅτι ἐστὲ ἐπιστολὴ Χριστοῦ διακονηθεῖσα ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἐγγεγραμμένη οὐ μέλανι ἀλλὰ πνεύματι θεοῦ ζῶντος, οὐκ ἐν πλαξὶν λιθίναις ἀλλ' ἐν πλαξὶν καρδίαις σαρκίναις.

These letters are not everyday letters, because they are written not with ink on ordinary surfaces but with the Spirit on hearts. The characters of this letter are not traced by ink but are outlined by the Spirit. The finished product is not a manuscript but living persons. Anyone can chisel letters on stone or write ink documents on papyrus. But to write a living letter is of a completely different order. It is to *create* characters and not merely to write them. God does things which men are unable to do. He is one of a kind. He is not just an author, but the ultimate author. The ultimate actant has acted on the Corinthians. On them he has written a letter like no other.

The realm of letter writing also reveals other aspects of the relationship of superiority/inferiority. The writing of Moses and of Paul

is of one kind. It leaves its mark on inanimate objects. These marks and the documents which they constitute are perishable. But the writing of God is of a superior order. God makes his mark on living persons, by means of the power of the Spirit. There is a stark contrast 'between the abiding illumination of the Spirit and the perishable blackness of inanimate ink.'[15] God, then, rather than Ronald Reagan, should be called the 'great communicator', because his messages are superior to anything that man can generate.

But it is true nevertheless that Paul envisions God's writing on stone also. He alludes in 2 Corinthians 3 to the narrative in Exodus 34 concerning the giving of the ten 'words'. Moses is told to go up on the mountain and to prepare two stone tablets on which God could write the commandments (Ex 34.1). In 2 Corinthians 3.7, Paul writes:

> Εἰ δὲ ἡ διακονία τοῦ θανάτου ἐν γράμμασιν ἐντετυπωμένη λίθοις ἐγενήθη ἐν δόξῃ,....

Because of the Exodus narrative, the passive participle ἐντετυπωμένη may be regarded as a divine passive, in which God is understood to be the one who engraved the letters on the stones. Even though Moses himself actually took up the chisel and hammer, God is still regarded as the 'Engraver', because he is the commissioner of the engraving and Moses is his agent. For Paul, it is God who decides that a certain person will perform a certain task. In Paul's symbolic universe, '... the Lord is over all forms of service and God is behind everyone's actions (1 Cor 12.4-6).'[16] So it is easy to see why Paul implied here that God, whether directly or indirectly, carved out the old covenant on the two stones.

In addition to the divine passive, there is another indicator in 2

Corinthians 3 that Paul believes that the old covenant was of divine origin. He acknowledges that it 'came with splendour'. The glory of God, often associated with a dazzlingly bright light, is tantamount to the presence of God. God was there on the mountain during the writing of the law. He showed his presence and approval by revealing his glory to Moses and the people. Paul agrees with this point, even if only reluctantly.

It is precisely here that a problem arises. For Paul, the old covenant is a temporary phenomenon linked with the administration of death and condemnation (vv. 7, 9, 11). The new covenant, based on Christ and proclaimed by Paul, is an enduring alliance bringing life and justification. How can Paul affirm 'the divine origin of the law'[17] *and* affirm that it brings death and condemnation? And how can Paul state consistently that God devised such a death-dealing arrangement *and* that God later inaugurated another that produces life and righteousness? For Paul, the issue was simply this: God had done something new in Christ which superseded the old thing he had done at Sinai. The question of Paul and the law is beyond the scope of this dissertation.'[18] It is a question which Paul himself never fully and adequately answered, and it is still a controversy on which there is no general agreement. The purpose here is to investigate how Paul handles the issue in 2 Corinthians 3.

It is clear that he fully affirms that the law had divine approval. It was written and glorified by God (vv. 7-10). If it conflicted with the new thing God was doing, then the conflict must be arbitrated in favour of the new thing. Paul does this in two ways. First, he affirms the glory of the old way, but insists on the greater glory of the new way. Three times in 2 Corinthians 3 (vv. 7-11) Paul employs the *a fortiori* argument to demonstrate the superiority of the Christian ministry over the Mosaic

ministry.[19] The scene on Mount Sinai was certainly a glorious affair, but it is not nearly so splendid as the revelation of God in Christ, because the latter, unlike the former, gave men the gifts of justification and of the Spirit.

Second, Paul demonstrates the superiority of the new over the old by pointing to the transience of the old and the permanence of the new. The glory of the old way was like the glory on Moses' face - real enough, to be sure, but not eternal. The fading away of the glow on Moses' face was an indicator of the temporary nature of the old covenant, which is now not so much abolished as superseded (cf. Gal 3.23-26). The new covenant, based on the death of Jesus, is permanent and enduring. The eternal must always take precedence over the temporal. So, then, in 2 Corinthians 3, Paul affirms the superiority of the new covenant over the old by pointing out both the greater splendour of the new and its enduring character. Whether or not this actually resolves the issue is another question. It is sufficient here to note that the apostle attempts to dispose of the problem in this way. Whether this attempt can be reconciled with other statements and solutions of the problem in the Pauline corpus is also another question which will not be pursued here.

To return to the notion of God as author, it is apparent from this text that Paul regards God as a unique writer. God draws up a contract on stone by using hammer and chisel. (Indeed might not one venture to say, though in a different way, that God also wrote using hammer and *nails*, for was it not the belief of the early church that God, in the crucifixion death of Jesus, was writing a new covenant with men (1 Cor 11.23-26)?) God produces epistles by making his mark on the lives of those who believe in him. The world of this text is proposing that the reader recognize the

superiority of the new covenant, commit himself to it, and allow God to make his mark on his life. If every life is a letter, then the challenge is to let *God* write the letter of the life of the believer.[20]

Paul depicts another relationship between himself and God when he writes in 2 Corinthians 3.4:

Πεποίθησιν δὲ τοιαύτην ἔχομεν διὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πρὸς τὸν θεόν.

Πεποίθησις is usually translated 'trust, confidence' and is cognate with πείθειν, which means 'to convince, to persuade'. Πεποίθησις carries the idea, then, of a trust which is the result of being convinced with respect to a person or a thing. It is an assurance based upon persuasive evidence. The suggestion here is that Paul has been persuaded by Christ to be confident toward God. The topic of πεποίθησις in verse 4 may refer back to Paul's conversion and calling, in which it was the revelation of Jesus Christ (Gal 1.12) which led him to re-orient his life toward God by believing in Jesus as the Messiah. It may also refer to the preceding context, in which case it means that Paul is confident in his role as an apostle even though he does not have the external credentials which some people think are so important.[21] In any case, the confidence Paul has in God is mediated through Christ.

What exactly was it about Christ which caused Paul to be confident toward God? This can not be known, and it is not the object of this inquiry, which is to interpret a text rather than to know the mind of its author. What can be known is what Paul wrote, not what he thought, though indeed his writings may be regarded as approximate expressions of his thought. It is possible, though, to examine what he wrote and make suggestions as to what *might* have persuaded Paul.

Paul refers occasionally to the narratives of Abraham (for example, Rom 4 and Gal 3). For him, Abraham is an example and a model of faith. God made promises to Abraham and then fulfilled them. Abraham believed God and it was credited to him as righteousness. Perhaps it was by meditating upon the sagas of Abraham that Paul became confident toward God.

Or it may have been the entire Hexateuch, which is also constructed on the model of promise and fulfilment.[22] The theme of promise is introduced in Genesis through the narratives of the patriarch, and the theme of fulfilment finds its ultimate, or at least a penultimate, realization in Joshua, with the conquest and possession of Canaan. All along the way from Egypt through the wilderness and into the promised land, the biblical record shows God to be faithful to his promises and gracious to his people.

A third possibility, in addition to the narratives of Abraham and Israel, may have been the example of Christ himself. Jesus was convicted as a criminal and executed by crucifixion. He died in weakness. But he 'was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father' (Rom 6.4). Perhaps it was the Christ event which led him not to rely on himself but upon God who raises up the dead (2 Cor 1.9).

These are clues which may point to the cause of Paul's confidence in God. But the experience or experiences through which he came to trust in God are not accessible to the reader.

> The experience as experienced, as lived, remains private, but its sense, its meaning, becomes public. Communication in this way is the overcoming of the radical noncommunicability of the lived experience as lived.[23]

Paul's conversion is a private event. He can try to communicate the *sense* of this experience to others, but the event itself remains private. At

this point it appears that the world of the text is proposing confidence 'through Christ toward God' as a possible way of orienting one's life. The reader can not enter into Paul's experience, but he can read Paul's record of Paul's experience. The reading of this text can challenge the reader to rely upon God as Paul and others have done in the past. This text proposes an alternative to relying upon oneself. It opens up a new vista and a different orientation. The text invites the reader to join the 'we' of this statement. It calls the reader to decide to live with confidence toward God. Since this text is an atemporal object, the first person plural subject of this sentence is not limited to Paul and his contemporaries. Rather, any reader can choose to believe in Christ and to step inside the circle of faith. The 'we' is not a closed community but rather an open invitation to all readers everywhere to experience what Paul has experienced.

The statement, 'Such is the confidence that we have through Christ toward God,' is not a narrative in itself, but rather it is a sequence in the larger narrative of Paul's relationship with God. There is often a reciprocity between the actors in a small sequence of a narrative.[24] For example, if one is a donor, then the other must be a receiver. This concept can be applied to the sequence in 2 Corinthians 3.4. If Paul has confidence toward God, then this implies that God is trustworthy. This is not necessarily an established fact from the narrative, but, in the absence of any information to the contrary, the reader is justified in assuming that it is true.[25] The dependability of God is best demonstrated from the promise-fulfilment schema outlined above. Paul fully accepted this notion, as evidenced by his statement in 2 Corinthians 1.18-20:

> As surely as God is faithful, our word to you has not

> been Yes and No. For the Son of God, Jesus Christ, whom we preached among you, Silvanus and Timothy and I, was not Yes and No; but in him it is always Yes. For all the promises of God find their Yes in him. That is why we utter the Amen through him, to the glory of God.

Paul is without doubt persuaded that God is faithful to his promises. Furthermore, he is convinced that the ultimate fulfilment of the promises is to be found in Christ.[26] So, in addition, to the other actions of God already noted, it may be added that God not only acts but also acts faithfully, responsibly, consistently. He can be relied upon to do what he says he will do. Thus, the challenge offered by the text to 'trust in God' is enhanced by the logical corollary that 'God is trustworthy'.

Closely connected to the notion that 'God is trustworthy' is the statement that 'our competence is from God'.[27] In emphatic fashion, Paul affirms that his competence is not at all from himself. Note that the ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν reinforced by the ἐξ ἑαυτῶν. The God he serves is an all-sufficient God, and his sufficiency comes from such a God as this. The abstract proposition that our sufficiency is from God is restated in concrete terms in verse 6, when Paul writes that God has 'made us competent to be ministers of a new covenant'. The competence supplied by God is not an abstraction about which to theorize. Rather, it is a reality experienced by Paul as he performs the job for which he was commissioned (cf. 2 Cor 1.21-22).

Ἱκανότης is a rare word, appearing only here in all of the Greek Bible.[28] It is variously translated as 'competence, sufficiency, adequacy'. It signifies that there is enough skill to do the job. It may be distinguished from an overwhelming abundance of performative ability on the one hand and from a lack of energy and acumen to face the challenge one

confronts on the other hand. Rather, God grants the apostle just what he needs and what he is capable of receiving and implementing.[29] In this way, Paul is again confident toward God, because God has always made him sufficient for whatever apostolic task arose. Paul can rely upon God because God has made good his promises to Paul. His grace has always been sufficient, and the apostle has repeatedly seen the power of God manifested in the apostle's weakness (2 Cor 12.9).

Another action of God in 2 Corinthians 3 is that of giving life. In verse 6, Paul writes: τὸ γὰρ γράμμα ἀποκτέννει, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζῳοποιεῖ. The contrast of life and death is familiar in the Pauline epistles, and it is especially important in 2 Corinthians. When this epistle is read as a unity, it appears that Paul thinks that the church at Corinth is at a 'T' junction. If they turn with Paul, they will be choosing life. If they turn away from Paul at this crucial point, their salvation is in jeopardy.[30] Much of the epistle is designed to challenge the Corinthians to obey Paul, because 'he is God's agent, from whom comes salvation.'[31] The significance of life and death as religious metaphors will be explored in more detail in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, but at this point it is sufficient to notice the importance of these words in 2 Corinthians 3. They pervade every section of this chapter as well as passages preceding and following it (2.14-17 and 4.7-12).

The emphasis at this point is on God as life-giver. The verb ζῳοποιέω is variously translated as 'make alive, give life to'. It is used 'especially of dead persons who are called to life'.[32] The notion of God as life-giver is related to his work in creation and resurrection. In Genesis 2.7, the reader is told that '... the Lord God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man

became a living being.' The creation narrative suggests that God initiated life in that which was inanimate. Although ζῳοποιέω is not used in the LXX rendering of the creation narrative, the sense of ζῳοποιέω, bringing to life that which was not formerly alive, is clearly present. This notion is evident in 1 Corinthians 15.42-50, where Adam is contrasted with Christ: ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζῳοποιοῦν (v. 45). Whereas the first Adam was breathed upon and became a living soul, the last Adam breathes upon *others* and causes *them* to come alive (cf. 1 Cor 15.22: οὕτως καὶ ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ πάντες ζῳοποιηθήσονται). In this way, Paul develops the motif of the *new* creation (2 Cor 5.17), in which a person becomes a new creation by the agency of Christ, who is himself the life-giving spirit.[33]

In the Pauline corpus, the notion of the life-giving God is also connected to the resurrection:

> εἰ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἐγείραντος τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐκ νεκρῶν οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν, ὁ ἐγείρας Χριστὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν ζῳοποιήσει καὶ τὰ θνητὰ σώματα ὑμῶν διὰ τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντος αὐτοῦ πνεύματος ἐν ὑμῖν (Rom 8.11).

'St. Paul is fond of arguing from the Resurrection of Christ to the resurrection of the Christian.'[34] God raised Jesus from the dead. He will also make alive those who believe in him. He will do this through the power (or on account of the presence) of his spirit.[35] His spirit dwells in (or with) believers.

This passage from Romans will perhaps clarify the meaning of 2 Corinthians 3.6. All men are dead in sins and trespasses before they come to faith in Christ. It is the role of law to define sin and transgression. The law was given for life, but in itself it has no lifegiving power.[36] It can point out the extent of one's sin and sinfulness. This leads to death.

This is the case for every man. But the 'unholy trinity of law, sin, and death'[37] does not have the last word. Through faith in Christ, God reverses the process. Law, having served its purpose, no longer condemns the one who has faith in Christ (Rom 8.1-2). It is neither abolished nor terminated. But once it has performed its function, it is no longer effective in the salvation process. Because of Christ, sins are forgiven and sin's power is broken. The believer is no longer a slave to sin but instead becomes a slave to righteousness. Death, as a metaphor for alienation from God and as the penalty for sin, is done away with. The believer is now alive unto God (Rom 6.11), and he 'walks in newness of life' (Rom 6.4), as one who has 'been brought from death to life' (Rom 6.13). This newness of life is a gift of the spirit, and it is by the power of the spirit that the believer is transferred from death unto life. In this way, the spirit makes alive. He is sent by God to anyone who comes to believe in Christ, and he brings that dead person back to life.[38]

If the concept of reciprocity is applied to the sequence in verse 6, 'the spirit gives life', then the corollary of 'someone receives life' can be deduced. In this sequence, the giver of life is logically regarded as superior to the receiver of life. The receiver, prior to being quickened, has been overpowered by death. The text states only one possibility for being made alive - the spirit of God. The donor need not be superior in *every* narrative sequence. For example, a king may accept a gift from his subject without in any way becoming inferior to the donor. But in *this* case, the donor of life must logically be superordinate to the receiver. The receiver is implicitly acknowledged as inferior by his inability to redress his problem by himself. The necessity to rely upon another more powerful person requires that the receiver be regarded as inferior and the

donor as superior. Once again, Paul depicts himself as subordinate to God.

The issue of the text of 2 Corinthians 3.6, indeed of 2 Corinthians as a whole, is *life* (cf. 1.8; 2.16; 4.12; 5.15; 6.9). This text portrays God as one who is able to bring life into situations where there is death.[39] There are perhaps many ways to explain how τὸ γράμμα ἀποκτέννει. But the crucial factor for Paul is that all men without Christ are already dead. And the spirit of God is the only one who can bring them back to life. This text proposes *life* for everyone who will turn (ἐπιστρέφω, v.16) to God and have confidence (πεποίθησις, v.4) in him. This life is not ordinary biological life (βίος) but life of a different quality, the eternal life which is the gift of God (ζωή, Rom 6.23). This text challenges the reader to open himself toward God and receive the gift of life which God offers to him. The re-orientation, though, implies a willingness to acknowledge one's own helplessness in the present situation. It necessitates a desire to look to someone else and to acknowledge that other person as more powerful than one's self. This text claims that that powerful other is God, and it requires man to accept God as his superior. If man does so, he receives not only life, but also hope, (2 Cor 3.12), peace (Rom 5.1), and a host of other gifts from God.

The final actions of God, the ultimate actant, to be considered are found in 2 Corinthians 3.18:

> ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ τὴν δόξαν κυρίου κατοπτριζόμενοι τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν καθάπερ ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος.

This verse is long and complex, with 'many ideas crowded together here'.[40] Before attempting to interpret the sentence as a whole, it will be useful to examine some of its parts.

The subject is ἡμεῖς πάντες, or possibly just ἡμεῖς, since some manuscripts omit πάντες; but that problem will be discussed later. At this point, however, it is clear that ἡμεῖς at least is the subject, and that two phrases serve to modify this subject. (1) The first is ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ. The perfect participle indicates that the face was covered with a veil at some point in the past, uncovered at some later point, and now remains unveiled at the time of writing. This seems to be a straightforward statement of fact. But who was it that lifted the veil? According to Exodus 34, Moses both veiled and unveiled himself. Perhaps Paul is suggesting that believers, who once veiled themselves through disobedience to God and rejection of his Christ, are those who have now unveiled themselves. That is, they have seen the error of their ways and turned to the Lord, trusting in Christ now for salvation. A different possibility is that the believer's face is uncovered by God. The participle could be taken as a divine passive and would point to God as the initiator of the salvation process. He is the one who enables men to see salvation as coming from outside of themselves, and he is the one who reveals his glory to them. Since this passive participle is anonymous, perhaps the primary emphasis of the text is not upon the one who does the unveiling but rather upon the fact that the veil which once covered the face is no longer there, and it is now possible to behold/reflect the glory of the Lord.

(2) The other phrase modifying the subject is τὴν δόξαν κυρίου κατοπτριζόμενοι. There are two problems with this phrase, textual and lexical. First, there are textual variants for the participle. The majority of manuscripts read the text printed above, which is preferred by Nestle-Aland. However, Minuscule 33 reads κατοπτριζόμεθα, thus putting two

finite verbs in verse 18 and presumably making two sentences instead of one. P 46 also reads κατοπτριζόμεθα, but it has οἱ μεταμορφούμενοι instead of μεταμορφούμεθα. Alexandrinus, Origen, and 614 have both κατοπτριζόμενοι and μεταμορφούμενοι, thus leaving two participles and no finite verb in the verse. What sense can be made of this textual situation? It seems most likely that 33 is the latest stage of textual revision. By emending the text to have two finite verbs (instead of one or perhaps none in the text received by the copyist) and thereby two sentences, the awkwardness of this overloaded sentence is reduced. Because this is the easiest reading, it is probably not the original. P 46, an early and normally very reliable text, apppears also to have made an attempt at smoothing out a difficult predecessor. It is possible that the predecessor contained a verse 18 with two participles. P 46 would then have made one of them dependent on the subject ἡμεῖς and the other one the main verb of the sentence. P 46, which omits πάντες or possibly copies a text which did not include it, can be translated like this:

> We, the ones who are being transformed into the same image from glory to glory as by the Spirit of the Lord, are with unveiled face beholding the glory of the Lord.

The rest of the manuscript tradition made the opposite move, keeping κατοπτριζόμενοι as a participle of attendant circumstance dependent on the subject and changing μεταμορφούμενοι into the finite verb μεταμορφούμεθα. That leaves A, Origen, and 614, which, it is being suggested here, preserved the original text which had the two participles, κατοπτριζόμενοι and μεταμορφούμενοι, and no finite verb. This is the most difficult reading, and it best explains the other variants, which changed either one or both participles into finite verbs in order to create a syntactically

correct sentence(s).[41]

The second problem with κατοπτριζόμενοι is lexical. Collange has summarized the four possibilities:[42] (1) to behold as in a mirror; (2) to reflect as a mirror reflects; (3) to behold, without the idea of a mirror; and (4) both to behold as in a mirror and to reflect as a mirror, because, since Paul has intentionally employed an ambiguous verb, there is no need to choose between the alternatives. Bultmann gives the evidence for options (1) and (2) before deciding in favour of (1).[43] Hughes makes a case for (3),[44] and Carrez for (4).[45]

It is this fourth option which is most interesting and promising. Carrez notes that the evidence for 'behold' is weighty indeed. But he also understands the force of the middle voice in this case to mean that the subject is personally involved in the action. In a rather passive way, the believer is viewing the glory of God on the face of Christ. But in a more active sense, he is also reflecting this glory to others.

> Le sens est alors: *'Nous tous, le visage dévoilé, nous contemplons et nous reflétons la gloire du Seigneur'*. Ce sens paraît conforme à la manière de procéder de Paul: il exprime souvent un double mouvement par un seul mot, toute relation vraie allant de Dieu à l'homme et en retour de l'homme à Dieu ainsi qu'aux autres hommes.[46]

Carrez does not cite any examples of this 'double mouvement', but the middle voice of κατοπτριζόμενοι, along with the other conflicting evidence from external sources and the extremely difficult context in which it appears, should be sufficient to prevent one from hastily eliminating the ambiguity. Because the middle conveys aspects of both the active and passive, Carrez seems justified in making this translation. And because his translation preserves the ambiguity associated with the word itself,

this interpretation seems to be the most acceptable.

There is one other point in favour of Carrez's proposal. It relates to the troublesome phrase, τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα. It is almost always attached in some way to μεταμορφούμεθα, even though a passive verb with an accusative is rare. If εἰκών were the object of a preposition (such as εἰς or κατά), it would attach very smoothly to a passive verb such as μεταμορφούμεθα. Alternatively, εἰκών can be regarded as an accusative of respect. Cerfaux suggested instead that τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα stands in apposition to τὴν δόξαν κυρίου, but this attempt has been criticized on grammatical grounds.[47]

Plummer, however, says that the construction is not rare. Rather, it is the regular construction for μεταμορφοῦσθαι and other compound verbs formed from μετά, such as μεταβάλλειν and μεταλλάσσειν, which need no preposition to convey the sense of 'to' or 'into' because this is implied in the verb itself. He states that μεταμορφοῦσθαι means 'to be transformed *into*'. This would work well here, but it would create a dangling translation in Romans 12.2 and Mark 9.2, where μεταμορφοῦσθαι is again passive and there are no complements with which the 'into' can be connected. He cites parallels from Plato and other classical writers, showing that μετά verbs can appear quite normally with a simple accusative. But all of his illustrations are in the *active* voice, and the accusative *follows* the verb in every case. None of them show an accusative attached to and preceding a passive μετά verb. Philo, on the other hand, uses μετά-verbs regularly in *De vita Mosis*, and every time he uses one in the passive with an accusative there is a preposition to link them together.[48]

It is not impossible that εἰκών is an accusative of respect or an accusative in the manner indicated by Plummer, though these explanations

are not without their difficulties. But it is also possible that another approach could be successful. The suggestion being proposed here is that τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα is the complement not of μεταμορφούμεθα but rather of κατοπτριζόμενοι. This participle has already been shown to be best translated by rendering both of its basic meanings, 'behold' and 'reflect'. It is possible that τὴν δόξαν κυρίου could be the object of 'behold' and τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα could be the object of 'reflect'. Such an interpretation could be translated like this: 'All of us, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord and reflecting that same image,....' This arrangement has several points in its favour: (1) It preserves the ambiguity which is inherent in κατοπτριζόμενοι. (2) It provides a suitable complement for each of the English verbs used to translate the two senses of κατοπτριζόμενοι. (3) It allows the accusative which follows the participle to be the object of that participle, a perfectly natural and easy interpretation of a participle followed by an accusative. (4) It eliminates the awkwardness of trying to force τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα to be construed with μεταμορφούμεθα. (5) It allows μεταμορφούμεθα to be linked directly to the phrase ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν, which is its most natural grammatical connection.

The above proposal interprets verse 18a as a variation of the grammatical construction called *zeugma*. Zeugma is defined as the 'placing of two words in the same relation to another that is suited to one only of them'.[49] An example is: She arrived in a car and a fit of rage. The preposition 'in' is connected grammatically to both phrases which follow it in the sentence. The one sentence may be analyzed into two. 'She arrived in a car' is simple enough, and the preposition, used locatively here, is well suited to its complement. But 'She arrived in a fit of rage' requires

the reader to adjust his understanding of the preposition, because 'in' now signifies an attendant circumstance, not a location. 'In' does not connect with 'fit of rage' in the same way as it connects with 'a car'. This example is rather simple, and it presents no particular problem of understanding. The average Scotsman could make the necessary adaptation of meaning, perhaps without even consciously thinking about it.

In the case of 2 Corinthians 3.18a, the construction is somewhat more complicated. The participle here requires the reader to think of its two different meanings, in a similar way as he recognized the two senses of 'in' in the example above. Just as each complement of 'in' suggested how the preposition was to be understood, so also in verse 18a each direct object indicates which meaning of κατοπτριζόμενοι should correspond with it. In comparing the two dispensations, Paul states that every believer, not just one privileged leader, can behold the glory of God.[50] After having beheld the glory, each believer will naturally reflect the same image of that glory on his face.[51] So it is that each object calls for a different nuance of the same verb.

Two new suggestions have been made thus far with respect to verse 18. First, the original text most likely read two participles instead of one verb and one participle or two finite verbs. Second, κατοπτριζόμενοι should be interpreted as conveying both of its meanings in this context, because the two direct objects call for two different senses of the verb.

Now what significance do these proposals have for the interpretation of this verse? How could it be interpreted with no finite verb? Participles standing alone may occasionally function as imperatives.[52] The entire textual and interpretative tradition has taken this verse as an indicative, as statements about what God through the spirit is doing and

will do for believers. This surely is no mistake, and, if it were, it would involve a mammoth project to point out the errors. However, it is possible that these participles may originally have had some imperatival force, in addition to their indicative function. Since all believers are now with unveiled face, it is important that they view not Moses but the glory of the Lord. Since all believers are now able to behold the divine glory, they should reflect that same image to others, and not hide their light under a bushel basket (cf. Mt 5.15). Since the spirit is the power of God at work within the believer to transform him, he should not hamper or resist this divine process of transformation. These participles were surely meant to be understood as indicatives, but there is also an implicit imperatival force lying nearby.

The actions of God in verse 18 may now be summarized. If believers are able to behold and reflect the divine glory, it is because God has *revealed* his glory to them by means of Christ. Some Old Testament narratives suggest that the glory of God is a brilliant splendour which is revealed only on certain rare occasions (for example, Ex 33; Is 6; Ez 39). But it is the teaching of Paul here that the divine glory is *always* on display. If anyone will gaze intently upon the face of Christ, he will see the glory of God. That which had been concealed is now revealed, so that it can be seen by all who have been unveiled.

Secondly, it is God who *transforms* believers. This transformation is not a magical or mystical process, but rather the power of God at work in the lives of believers.[53] It does not occur 'through some ecstatic experience' but rather through a gradual and continual process which 'transforms all of one's relationships within history'.[54] The goal of the transformation is not that the believer will become deity,[55] but rather

that he will be changed from one degree of glory to another, until he has a glory fit for the kingdom of God.[56] And all of this is accomplished by God through the power of his spirit.

In summary, then, it is being suggested that κατοπτριζόμενοι be translated in such a way as to maintain the double meaning of 'behold' and 'reflect'. This can be done by viewing both δόξα and εἰκών as objects of κατοπτριζόμενοι. Such an interpretation recognizes the surplus of meaning in κατοπτριζόμενοι and allows the translator the freedom to express it. This suggestion may not be entirely acceptable, but it is an attempt to deal with a textual problem whose previously proposed solutions were not entirely satisfactory either.

The roles of God which have been displayed in 2 Corinthians 3 may now be summarized. God has been viewed as creator. As creator, he is superior to the creation and to humanity, to which he has given both physical life and spiritual life. God is also lord or master, and in this role he is superior to slaves. At this time, only those who have believed in Christ are called his slaves, but some day every knee will bow and acknowledge the lordship of Christ. Then Christ will hand over the kingdom to God, who is also the father of Christ and the father of all believers. The role of father is only implied in our text, by means of the mention of Christ. Christ is the son of God, but, for Paul, Christ is also the first born of many brethren, so, by implication, all believers are also sons of God. This is stated explicitly in the greeting of all the Pauline epistles, where God is called 'our father'. As it is in the human family, where all the children are subordinate to the father, so it is also in the family of God, where all believers are subordinate to God. For Paul, Christ is the ideal model of sonship, because he has humbled himself and been obedient

unto death. All the younger children are exhorted to imitate the example of Christ. The God who is creator and father is also revealer and transformer. Through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus and through the preaching of the gospel he has revealed his power and glory. To those who trust Jesus God has promised a transformation, a changing from glory to glory.

SECTION C. PAUL AND THE WORLD OF 2 CORINTHIANS 3.

Paul plays many roles: father, son, overseer, slave, emissary, and the sender of emissaries. In the Corinthian correspondence, he portrays his relation to God and the Corinthians by means of the many different roles he assumes. In this section, the topics of investigation are Paul's roles and the actions which correspond to these roles. The investigation consists of two parts. In the first, the Corinthian correspondence as a whole will be surveyed in order to identify Paul's roles in relation to God and the Corinthians. This rather lengthy overview will identify in turn four different language fields - family, workers, emissaries, and servitude - which Paul uses to spell out his involvement with God and the Corinthians. In this Pauline panorama, it will be seen that Paul depicts himself as *always* subordinate to God, but as *alternating* between superordinate, subordinate, and equal in his standing with the Corinthians. In the second phase of the enquiry, the focus will be upon 2 Corinthians 3 in particular and on Paul's role of διάκονος which is so prominent there. The examination of 2 Corinthians 3 will reveal that Paul uses the διάκονος metaphor in this smaller text to display the same relations which he illustrates with such variety in the larger text of the Corinthian correspondence as a whole; namely, that he is always an underling of God, but that his status with the Corinthians varies. If Paul used words to paint pictures of his relationships with God and the church at Corinth, then the Corinthian epistles are a mural, and 2 Corinthians 3 is a miniature.

Paul uses *family* language to talk about God. As mentioned in the preceding section, God is depicted in the Pauline epistles as the 'father'

of all the believers. By calling God his 'father' (1 Cor 1.3; 2 Cor 1.2), Paul recognizes his own role as that of a child, who is subordinate to the parent. In this family, Paul is an obedient child, and God is the good provider:

> And God is able to provide you with every blessing in abundance, so that you may always have enough of everything and may provide in abundance for every good work (2 Cor 9.8).

To talk of the father of a family is to speak literally. For an American, however, to say that 'George Washington is the father of my country' is to use metaphorical language. 'God is my father' is also metaphorical. It suggests that all believers now relate to one another in a different way. This new relation is as brothers and sisters. God is responsible for this new relationship. He has started a family. In this family, God is the 'father', Jesus is 'older brother', and all believers are 'brothers'. The institution of family is especially significant in the Corinthian correspondence, where he calls that congregation 'brethren' no less than twenty-three times.[1] By naming them as brothers, he is recognizing the equality of roles which they share. Both he and they are children of God, and thus brothers to each other.

In the Corinthian epistles, Paul calls other believers 'brother' also. In the greeting of 1 Corinthians, he identifies Sosthenes as co-author and brother (1.1), and in 2 Corinthians, he names Timothy in the same manner (1.1). In another passage, Paul calls Timothy his 'son' (1 Cor 4.17), but that reference will be discussed below (p. 98). Other mentions of brothers are: Apollos (1 Cor 16.12); Titus (2 Cor 2.13); and the anonymous brothers who are 'messengers of the churches' (2 Cor 8.23).

Paul's use of 'brother' indicates his acceptance of all fellow-believers as equals, at least in respect of their common faith in Christ. Since he and the Corinthians are brothers, they are equals. They are neither subordinate nor superordinate to each other. Thus, they do not have authority over one another. Rather, they are all subject to the authority of the father. As brothers, and therefore equals, Paul has no inherent authority over the Corinthians. The only authority Paul or any other brother might expect to have is a moral authority earned from the others on the basis of a superior wisdom, character, and conduct. As brothers in *this* family, though, no one can *demand* hegemony over the other brothers, since all are equally subordinate to the father.

Even though Paul often uses egalitarian terminology to refer to the Corinthian believers, it is clear from the Corinthian correspondence that Paul consistently acts like one who has authority over *this* congregation. This is stated explicitly in 2 Corinthians 10.8 and 13.10:

> For even if I boast a little too much of our authority, which the Lord gave for building you up and not for destroying you, I shall not be put to shame.
>
> I write this while I am away from you, in order that when I come I may not have to be severe in my use of the authority which the Lord has given me for building up and not for tearing down.

These texts indicate that from the Lord Paul has received authority over the Corinthians. Paul qualifies the purpose of the authority. It is neither arbitrary nor totalitarian. Rather, it is for the edification of the church. It is clear that Paul writes as one who is convinced that he has authority and as one who is attempting to exert it.

Authority, though, as a social phenomenon, is a reciprocal

relationship. One has authority only to the extent that it is recognized by the intended subjects.[2] It can be delegated, as in this case from the Lord to Paul, but, in order for it to be effective, it must be accepted by the underlings. Paul is one who, according to himself anyway, has been given authority by the Lord over the Corinthians. The real issue now is whether the Corinthians will acknowledge it by becoming submissive to Paul.

Paul expects the Corinthians to be obedient to him.

> For this is why I wrote, that I might test you and know whether you are obedient in everything (2 Cor 2.9).

It is not clear which role Paul is playing as he writes these words. Surely he writes as one who thinks he has authority, but it is not apparent whether this is the authority of a father, a master, or some other figure. However this passage does indicate that Paul thinks that he has jurisdiction in this matter and that therefore he has the authority to intervene. It further shows that he expects the Corinthians to recognize his authority by their obedience to his exhortation.[3] The test (δοκιμή) of *their* obedience is also the confirmation of *his* authority.

The example of 2 Corinthians 2.9, cited above, is just an explicit case of Paul's seeking to get the Corinthians to ratify his authority. This occurs implicitly in his repeated exhortations, suggestions, and warnings to them. All through 1 Corinthians Paul issues instructions and orders about community life in the congregation at Corinth. This implies that he has the right to direct their affairs, to some extent. It also implies that he expects them to abide by his rulings on these points of controversy. The fact that they had previously written to him, inquiring about certain matters, implies on their part that they thought that he had

some degree of jurisdiction in their affairs (e.g., 1 Cor 7.1).

Even though Paul calls the Corinthians 'brothers', it is clear that he does not always *act* like brother. The examples cited above show that Paul exerts (or tries to exert) authority over the church. This is not properly a fraternal relationship. How does Paul justify this?

One answer may be found in another of Paul's uses of family language. In several passages, he refers to himself as 'father' of the Corinthians. That Paul can conceive of himself as both brother and father to the Corinthians may help to explain the fact of Paul's occasional intervention in the church at Corinth.

Paul's role as father of the Corinthians is most explicit in 1 Corinthians 4.14-17a:

> I do not write this to you to make you ashamed, but to admonish you as my beloved children. For though you have countless guides in Christ, you do not have many fathers. For I became your father in Christ Jesus through the gospel. I urge you, then, be imitators of me. Therefore I sent to you Timothy, my beloved and faithful child in the Lord....

Paul has indeed already shamed his readers in 1 Corinthians 4.7-13, but he now says that he wrote that out of his fatherly love for them. He implies that no one could love them more than he does, because he is their father.[4] He became their father by preaching the gospel of Jesus Christ to them. They became his children (τέκνα) by believing the gospel.[5] As their father he is superior, and this superiority is demonstrated: (1) by his appeal for them to imitate him (v.16); (2) by his ability to shame them, though he prefers rather to appeal and to admonish (vv.14,16); and, most of all, (3) by the power of the rod of discipline which he wields over them (v.21).[6] Rather than come in person at this time and use the rod, though, he shows

his fatherly affection by both writing them a letter and sending them Timothy to give them guidance and encouragement (1 Cor 4.17).

The mention of Timothy in 1 Corinthians 4. as 'my beloved and faithful child in the Lord' is no accident. Timothy would already have been known to the Corinthians as a fellow-preacher of Paul (2 Cor 1.19). One might assume that, as a co-worker and 'brother' (2 Cor 1.1), Timothy was on equal terms with Paul. Yet here Paul refers to him as his son. As a *beloved* son, he is being identified with the Corinthians, as one among those whom Paul had led to faith in Christ. But as a *faithful* son, he is being held up to the Corinthians as an example of how to be an imitator of Paul. Timothy knows the teachings of Paul and adheres to them faithfully. Paul rather subtly admonishes the Corinthians to do likewise. The faithful son is sent to encourage the other sons to become faithful also.

Because Paul is father to the Corinthians, he has affection for them and authority over them.[7] He has the right to instruct them and to expect them to obey him. If they do not obey, he threatens to punish them with the rod of discipline, though he prefers to come to them 'with love in a spirit of gentleness' (1 Cor 4.21). So it may be concluded that it is at least partially on the basis of his role as father that Paul can exert authority over the Corinthians.[8]

Three times in 2 Corinthians Paul implies that he is father to the believers in Corinth.[9] The first instance is in an appeal for them to reciprocate a candour which he uses with them:

> Our mouth is open to you, Corinthians; our heart is wide. You are not restricted by us, but you are restricted in your own affections. In return - I speak as to children - widen your hearts also (6.11-13).

Using a pastoral tone, Paul pleads for warmer personal relations with the Corinthians. 'This appeal is marked by a warmth and tenderness',[10] which indicates that Paul as parent is not scolding them as he does in 1 Corinthians 3. In calling them 'children', Paul assumes the role of father. As a superior, he appeals to them to diminish the distance between them and himself and enter into an intimate relationship more characteristic of children with their parents.

The language of parent and child is also implied in 2 Corinthians 11.2:

> I feel a divine jealousy for you, for I betrothed you to Christ to present you as a pure bride to her one husband.

Although the imagery here is a little confused,[11] there can still be little doubt that Paul is taking the role of a father presenting his daughter as a virgin bride to her husband. According to Jewish marriage customs, it is the father who presents his daughter to the groom, and it is the father who is 'responsible for safeguarding his daughter's virginity between the time of her betrothal and the time when he actually leads her into the bridegroom's house'.[12] It is on the basis of his role as parent that Paul chides the Corinthians for their willingness to be led astray by the teaching of other apostles. As a father, he expresses his concern for the well-being of their faith.

The third and final occurrence of parent-child language in 2 Corinthians is in 12.14-15:

> Here for the third time I am ready to come to you. And I will not be a burden, for I seek not what is yours but you; for children ought not to lay up for their parents, but parents for their children. I will most gladly spend and be spent for your souls.

Paul is not scolding or disciplining his converts here. Rather, he is conveying his love for them and contrasting his methods with those of his opponents. 'Through the Gospel, Paul had begotten them as Christians, and was therefore responsible for, and for maintaining, their Christian existence; they were in no sense responsible for him.'[13] Since Paul is the parent of the Corinthians, he has the responsibility not only to nourish them but also the right to exercise authority over them. 'Paul has a superordinate role in relation to all those whom he converts.'[14]

The Corinthian epistles, then, portray Paul in two completely different family roles in relation to the Corinthians. Since both he and they are children of God, he is, on the one hand, a *brother*, and therefore, equal to them. But, with reference to their entrance into the Christian faith, Paul considers himself a *father* and the Corinthians his children. As father, Paul can apply stern discipline, but he prefers, in loving authority, to appeal and admonish. In this family relationship, Paul is superior. As parent to the Corinthians, Paul has both rights and responsibilities which he does not have as their brother.[15]

In addition to family terminology, Paul also uses 'working' language to define his roles and his relationships *vis-à-vis* God and with the Corinthians. This is one of his favourite metaphors for describing his missionary activity.[16] '"Work" is for him primarily a metaphor for the noneconomic productivity of believers among believers (1 Cor 15.58; 1 Thess 1.3) and particularly for the productivity of those believers like himself who have a special role to play in relation to the gospel.'[17]

Paul is not alone in the work of the Lord. He has co-workers. First and foremost among these is God. 'For we are God's fellow workers' (1 Cor 3.9).[18] This statement occurs in the midst of a passage which deals with

the relationship of Paul and Apollos as they work for God among the Corinthians (1 Cor 3.5-17). The Corinthians are the field and the building which are the workplace for Paul and Apollos. God owns the field and the building, and he works there too. He is a working manager, a working owner. He is not simply a gentleman farmer, who lives in town and sends others to do all of the work. He is involved in the work, too. And the text portrays Paul as one of those who labours alongside of God on the farm and the construction site.

Another of Paul's co-workers is Apollos (1 Cor 3.5-9). Apollos appears to be an equal of Paul. His name, like Paul's, is attached to one of the four parties in the church at Corinth (1 Cor 1.12; 3.4). Paul identifies both Apollos and himself as διάκονοι (3.5). Paul had one job (planting), and Apollos had another (watering), but both are insignificant in comparison to God, who causes the growth (3.6-7). Their equality would seem to be indisputable, according to 1 Corinthians 3.8-9:

> He who plants and he who waters are equal, and each shall receive his wages according to his labour. For we are God's fellow workers; you are God's field, God's building.

Paul asserts here that he and Apollos are equal. Both are hired workers under the employ of God. Both will receive wages according to their effort. Lietzmann notes that συνεργοί can mean both '... Leute "die mit Gott arbeiten" und "die miteinander im Dienste Gottes arbeiten"'.[19] So both as workers together with God and as workers with each other in the service of God, Paul seems to be stating his equality with Apollos. This is confirmed by the conjunction of Paul, Apollos, and Cephas in 1 Corinthians 3.22 and by Apollos' refusal to heed the suggestion of Paul (1

Cor 16.12), which indicates his independence of Paul and the non-necessity of his submitting to the authority of Paul.

But Paul does not always view Apollos as his equal, for there are subtle suggestions in the text which indicate the contrary. 'In both agricultural and building construction metaphors, Paul depicts his job as temporally prior to and as of more fundamental significance than Apollos's.'[20] This becomes clearer in verses 10-15, where Paul depicts himself as the one who lays the foundation and warns those who build upon it to be careful in their construction. Whatever is built upon the foundation which Paul lays must be congruent with the gospel of Jesus Christ which Paul preaches. This implicit warning to Apollos and the parties in Corinth is a clear attempt by Paul to assert his superiority. It shows that he thinks of himself as still responsible for the quality of the building, even though he only laid the foundation and then moved on. He writes as one who has the power of veto over all of the construction plans and work of the church. 'As the foundation layer Paul has the ultimate superordinate authority' in the local community.[21] Thus Paul represents himself as superior to his co-worker Apollos, despite all of his explicit statements to the contrary.

Another co-worker mentioned in the Corinthian correspondence is Titus: 'As for Titus, he is my partner and fellow worker in your service' (2 Cor 8.23a). As a partner and co-worker, one would assume again that Paul is regarding Titus as an equal. Support for this is seen in Paul's reference to him as 'my brother' (2 Cor 2.13), and in Paul's appeal (not command) for Titus to go back to Corinth in order to complete the good work he had begun there. Titus agrees to this appeal and goes there 'of his own accord'.

But again, as in the case of Apollos, these explicit signs of equality

and independence conceal Paul's authority.[22] 'The subordinacy of the fellow workers to Paul is principally reflected in the fact that Paul usually initiates their actions.'[23] In this case, Paul strongly implies that *he* is sending Titus, in that he says that he is sending other men along with (συμπέμπω) Titus (2 Cor 8.18-22). Similarly, Paul appeals (παραχαλέω) to Titus to return to Corinth, and he states he is sending with him (συναποστέλλω) 'the brother' (2 Cor 12.18). On another occasion, Paul writes that 'I went up again to Jerusalem with Barnabas, taking Titus along me' (Gal 2.1). The reference to 'taking' (συμπαραλαμβάνω) is a clear sign that Paul perceives Titus as a subordinate. If Titus is indeed a partner and co-worker with Paul, then Paul is clearly the senior partner. Thus, the explicit language of equality with Titus is undermined by implicit suggestions of a hierarchical pattern in their relationship. 'The fact is that Paul sends all of his emissaries because they are *his* emissaries. They go from him, work for him where they are sent, and return to him (cf. 1 Cor 16.10-11; 2 Cor 2.12-13 and 7.5-16; 1 Thess 3.1-8).'[24]

The last of the co-worker passages to be considered is 2 Corinthians 1.24:

> Not that we lord it over your faith; we work with you for your joy, for you stand firm in your faith.

In this verse, Paul declares himself a co-worker with the *Corinthians*.[25] As such, he is not lord (κύριος) over them.[26] He is renouncing a role superior to them, and instead adopting a role of equality. In most other 'work' passages, Paul portrays the Corinthians as the product of his work. But, in this verse, Paul portrays them as *workers* and co-workers with himself, in order to generate a rapport with the Corinthians and to reduce

the tensions which had arisen since his last visit.

Although Paul depicts himself as a co-worker with the Corinthians, he still sees himself in some sense superordinate to them. For after the egalitarian language of 2 Corinthians 1.24, he is soon giving them instructions and suggestions again, indicating his role of primary care-giver for them and authority over them (2.5-9). So it seems that at times Paul's egalitarian language is only a thin veil for his superordinate position in all of the churches he has founded.

In addition to the language of the family and the workplace, Paul also uses terms from the 'emissary' word field to depict his roles. He often refers to himself as an ἀπόστολος (e.g., 1 Cor 1.1; 2 Cor 1.1), and once he uses the verb πρεσβεύω (2 Cor 5.20) to describe his activity. In addition to being one who is sent, he also sends *other* men on missions (e.g., 1 Cor 4.17; 2 Cor 8.18).

Ἀπόστολος, from ἀποστέλλω, means, of course, one who is sent out or sent away on a mission. In the New Testament, ἀπόστολος has four related but distinguishable meanings:[27] '(1) one who is sent, and sent with full authority; (2) one who is lawfully charged to represent the person and cause of another; (3) the commissioned representative of a congregation (2 Cor 8.23; Phil 2.25); and (4) a bearer of the New Testament message.' The first three of these meanings are usually translated by either 'delegate, envoy, or messenger', but the fourth is translated by 'apostle', because it has the more restricted sense of one serving a special function in a Christian community.[28] It is this final sense which is most relevant to an understanding of Paul's role as an apostle, though one must acknowledge that Paul never '... quotes a generally held definition of the apostle.'[29]

The term 'apostle', as it applies to Paul, has '... often been

investigated, but with varying results'.[30] It does seem to be fairly clear, though, that he views his apostleship as a commission given him by God and not by man. 'It did not come to him in the ordinary course of events, but by a definite Divine decree.'[31] Accordingly, Paul, 'a divinely appointed emissary',[32] felt compelled to follow this calling of preaching the gospel of Jesus Christ (1 Cor 9.16-17).

As one sent by God, he goes with the full authority of God. In Galatians 1.1, Paul calls himself an apostle and then stresses the sender: Jesus Christ and God the father who raised him from the dead. As an ἀπόστολος, Paul puts the emphasis upon the sender, who has initiated both the mission and the message which is entrusted to Paul. Paul has something like a 'power of attorney' from God, a permission to act for him and to speak for him (2 Cor 2.17). He has been commissioned to preach a message of reconciliation (2 Cor 5.19). So in this sense, 'apostle' means much the same as 'professional missionary',[33] for he is one who is commissioned to go and tell. But Paul is adamant that he was not sent by any man or human institution. For him, the apostolate is not an office in an organization nor a position to which one is elected.[34] Rather, it is '... a product of God's decision that a certain function be performed by certain individuals'.[35] Furthermore, the apostolate is not a local function like some others mentioned in 1 Corinthians 12 and Romans 12. Rather, it is an itinerant function, with a 'translocal authority',[36] which supersedes the authority of any local office or function.

In this role, Paul is unquestionably subordinate to God, since the sender is always greater than the one who is sent (Jn 13.16).[37] For this same reason, Paul is superordinate to all those in his missionary entourage, since he sends them on missions for him. Furthermore, Paul, as

an apostle, must be regarded as superordinate to the churches which he has founded, since he comes to them with the full authority of God. He is acting on the initiative of God. He is proclaiming a story not about himself but about Jesus Christ (2 Cor 4.5). He does not send himself, but he is sent by one who is greater than himself and the Corinthians. When Paul speaks, people listen, or at least he thinks they should, since he speaks for God. As one who has encountered the Risen Christ and been commissioned by him, he has been smitten by the mighty power of God. And once smitten, he is forever driven - driven to fulfil the mission which has been assigned to him.

Somewhat parallel to Paul's self-characterization as *apostle* is that of *ambassador*:

> Ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ οὖν πρεσβεύομεν ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ παρακαλοῦντος δι' ἡμῶν. δεόμεθα ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ, καταλλάγητε τῷ θεῷ (2 Cor 5.20).

Now πρεσβεύω, unlike ἀπόστολος, does betray in secular Greek writings a history of diplomatic usage. It can mean simply 'to be one who is sent', but it can also signify 'to bring a message' and 'to negotiate'.[38] Philo uses the word in a religious sense, to indicate the mediatorial ministry of Moses and of others who represent men to God and God to men.[39] Thus, πρεσβεύτης comes to signify not a title or an office but a function.

So in this passage, Paul is saying that he is doing the work of an ambassador. He is doing it on the orders of Christ, since ὑπέρ often indicates the one who commissions and authorizes the ambassador.[40] Thus, his preaching is official and authoritative. He is representing Christ when he speaks. And when he pleads with the Corinthians, it is as though God himself were appealing to them. Once again, Paul casts himself as one

who is subordinate to God and superior to the Corinthians.

Paul, then, is one who is sent by God on a special mission. He can express this either by the noun ἀπόστολος or by the verb πρεσβεύω. But Paul is also one who sends. He sends Titus and Timothy as his emissaries to Corinth. But they are not called apostles. Paul calls them 'brother', 'co-worker', and 'partner', but not 'apostle'.[41] But since they are his emissaries, they share in *his* authority. So when he sends them to Corinth, they are (theoretically) superordinate to the church there. Apparently these men did a good job. Whether their success is due to Paul's authority or to their own ability may never be known. But what can be known is that Paul had the authority to send men on missions, and these men recognized that authority by going and doing as they were instructed.

The final category of roles with which Paul characterizes himself in the Corinthian correspondence is drawn from the language of *servitude*. Paul is a δοῦλος. There is a κύριος who owns him body and soul. He works for the master, doing whatever he is told. As a δοῦλος, he is not a free man. He is under obligation to serve his master. In using δοῦλος as a self-referential term, Paul may occasionally intend to portray himself as a courtier of the king of heaven, as an official working for the God of his fathers. Such a possibility is Romans 1.1-6, where Paul appears as a slave entrusted by God with a major project, 'to bring about the obedience of faith for the sake of his name among all the nations' (Rom 1.5b). As δοῦλος, Paul is always to be regarded as subordinate to the κύριος. But as δοῦλος he may serve in any number of positions of various rank and honour.

One of these offices is οἰκονομία, the management or administration of a household. Paul writes: οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι (1 Cor 9.17). He has been entrusted with a responsibility to oversee the estate of his master.

As overseer, his title is οἰκονόμος (1 Cor 4.1). The prime requirement of an οἰκονόμος is that he be trustworthy, because the possessions of his master are under his care (1 Cor 4.2). As an οἰκονόμος, he is subordinate to his master. But, because the οἰκονόμος was often the overseer of all the slaves of the household, he is superordinate to the rest of the domestic staff.[42] This accords well with Paul's use of relationship language elsewhere. He uses egalitarian language to indicate that all believers are on the same level (all are sons, all are slaves). But he also uses hierarchical language to talk about church order. Yes, he is a slave, but he is also an οἰκονόμος, with authority over the Corinthians. There is a continuing tension in the epistles between the egalitarian and the hierarchical. Paul's use of δοῦλος and οἰκονόμος is just one example.

Another term which shows Paul to be a servant is ὑπηρέτης, which he uses in 1 Corinthians 4.1:

> Οὕτως ἡμᾶς λογιζέσθω ἄνθρωπος ὡς ὑπηρέτας Χριστοῦ καὶ οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων θεοῦ.

In classical Greek, an ὑπηρέτης denotes someone who works under the supervision and instruction of a superior. He may be, among other things, a soldier's helper, a physician's assistant, or a builder's apprentice. The ὑπηρέτης, in contrast to a δοῦλος, is a free man and willingly accepts subordination to his master. He is still bound to obey, but he does so as a free man and not as a slave. These connotations are carried over almost intact into Hellenistic Judaism, where the emphasis continues to be on the service rendered freely to a superior, who gives the instructions and sets the goals. Philo characterizes Joseph as a ὑπηρέτης, and Josephus likewise Moses, since both are God's assistants in the accomplishing of his will.[43]

Paul uses ὑπηρέτης only once (1 Cor 4.1) and applies it to himself and Apollos, as men who are committed to obey God. God tells them what to do, and they do it. Since Paul and Apollos are taking orders from God, they are not subject to the judgment of the Corinthians.

This context establishes clearly that Paul subordinates himself to God. He should not be condemned by others, because he is following instructions issued by God. But, in using ὑπηρέτης, Paul is also subtly implying his superiority over the Corinthians. As an assistant to and a 'co-agent'[44] of God, he is related hierarchically to his congregation. Paul is no ordinary believer, but rather one who is intimately related to Christ, as an apprentice who works daily with a master craftsman. He receives instructions directly from his supervisor, so he knows how things are supposed to be done. There is, then, an implication here that the Corinthians should subordinate themselves to Paul, as he has subordinated himself to Christ.

The final self-characterization which Paul uses from the semantic field of servitude is διάκονος. In the New Testament, διάκονος is used in several different senses. (1) It carries its original concrete sense of one who is 'a waiter at a meal', as in John 2.5. (2) It has the slightly developed meaning of 'a servant of a master', as in Matthew 22.13. (3) It also signifies in a figurative sense 'a servant' or 'a helper' who is attached to a spiritual entity, such as δικαιοσύνη (2 Cor 11.15), εὐαγγέλιον (Col 1.23), and Χριστός (2 Cor 11.23). (4) It denotes an official position in the church (Rom 16.1).[45]

The distinguishing sense of διάκονος (and its cognates) as contrasted with other Greek words in this semantic field is that it points to the *act* of the service performed and the *benefit* of that service for its

recipients.[46] This is clearly exemplified in 1 Corinthians 3.5, where Paul indicates that he and Apollos are nothing but ... διάκονοι δι' ὧν ἐπιστεύσατε. The emphasis of this statement is not upon the servant himself but upon the *result* of the service performed. Because Paul and Apollos fulfilled their assignments, the Corinthians came to believe in Christ. Paul is playing down the significance of his and Apollos' work, noting that they are only instruments used by God to bring the Corinthians to faith.[47] As a διάκονος, Paul is God's helper or errand boy.

In this role, Paul is clearly subordinate to God, who has commissioned and sent him. The role of διάκονος implies the existence of at least three persons: the sender or master; the διάκονος himself; and the persons who benefit from the service. Normally, one might assume that the διάκονος is inferior not only to his master but also to the recipients of his service. The persons seated at the table are greater than the persons serving the meal. The dinner guests of the king are of higher rank than the waiters and waitresses.

Elsewhere, Paul calls himself a servant of the new alliance (2 Cor 3.6); a servant of God (2 Cor 6.4); and a servant of Christ (2 Cor 11.23). Thus it appears that, for Paul, the role of διάκονος was virtually identical to that of ἀπόστολος, and it may be translated by 'envoy',[48] since it involves the work of missionary preaching rather than acts of charity. When διάκονος is thought of as a functional equivalent of ἀπόστολος, the notions of leadership and authority surface again. Though Paul is in one sense a *servant* for the Corinthians, he is in another sense their *authority figure* also.

Having examined the Corinthian correspondence to determine the roles of Paul, the results of this first part will be summarized. It is clear

that Paul always characterizes himself as subordinate to God. Even in passages in which Paul seems to indicate an equality of roles (συνεργοί, 1 Cor 3.9; συνεργοῦντες, 2 Cor 6.1), the context indicates that God is a worker of a superior order, and that his work is qualitatively superior to that of Paul, of Apollos, and, by implication, of all men. Similarly, Paul always depicts himself as superior to his missionary companions. Even though he uses egalitarian language to depict their roles (partner, co-worker, brother), he also uses hierarchical language in order to make clear that his relationship is superordinate to theirs. Because Paul is superordinate, he can call them 'son' (of Timothy, for example, in 1 Cor 4.17), and he can send them as his emissaries (2 Cor 8). In relation to the Corinthians, the situation is similar. Paul seems to regard them as equals. Both he and they are slaves, brothers, co-workers, sons of God. But Paul also uses hierarchical language in regard to the Corinthians. He calls them his children. He portrays himself as one in authority over them, by using language of family, workers, emissaries, and servitude. Thus there is a tension in his depiction of his relationship with the Corinthians, as he uses both egalitarian and hierarchical language for his roles. He looks like a brother, but he acts like a father.

In the second part of the investigation, the focus will be on 2 Corinthians 3 and especially on Paul's use of διάκονος as a self-designation. As a διάκονος in this passage, Paul will continue to appear as always subordinate to God, but he will appear to have three different relations to the Corinthians.

In verse 3, Paul refers to the Corinthians as an ἐπιστολὴ Χριστοῦ διακονηθεῖσα ὑφ' ἡμῶν. In this verse, Paul is seen to be subordinate to the Corinthians. They are portrayed as a letter of Christ, while he plays the

lowly role of servant. This may mean that he is an amanuensis, taking dictation from Christ and actually writing the document. Or it may signify the duty of errand boy, delivering the letter to its destination. Possibly it involved the activity of proper care and attention for those who constitute the letter. In any case, Paul is designating a lowly role for himself, and showing himself to be a helper for the benefit of the Corinthians. This characterization is similar to that of 4.5, in which Paul says he is a δοῦλος ὑμῶν διὰ Χριστὸν. This does not mean that Paul is a slave owned by the Corinthians. Rather, he belongs to Christ, who has assigned him to labour for the benefit of the Corinthians.

The lowly rank of Paul is reinforced by 3.5, in which Paul declares that he is not sufficient for the job to which he has been assigned. Ἱκανός is variously understood as sufficient, adequate, qualified, fit, or competent. It suggests that one has the necessary resources to cope with the demands that arise. This Paul says he is quite unable to do. But he does his work anyway, because he is made competent for his work by God.

God's faithful and powerful dealing with Paul gives him confidence (πεποίθησις, v.4) in his relationship toward God. Though only a servant, Paul knows that God always treats him fairly and sometimes even better than he deserves. Paul's πεποίθησις comes about through Christ, who was mistreated by men but in the end was vindicated by God through resurrection.

The project in which Paul is involved is full of glory, even more glory than accompanied Moses during the inauguration of the old covenant (vv.7-11). As a minister of the new covenant, Paul participates in its greater glory. The humble servant (διάκονος) is also a glorious minister (διάκονος)! It is quite probable that, as a minister of the new covenant,

Paul is contemplating also the divine commission he was given and the divine authorization which would have accompanied it. As a preacher of the good news and as an organizer of Jesus communities, Paul has the power to instruct, discipline, and guide the new congregations. Such a διάκονος is superordinate, since he has been specially chosen by God for the task. In Paul's view, the welfare of his churches depended on their obeying his authority.

In his work as a διάκονος θεοῦ, Paul uses great boldness (παρρησία, v. 12). He is not at all ashamed of the gospel of Christ, but instead he is eager to preach (Rom 1.16). Great boldness would indeed be needed to continue proclaiming when such activity frequently resulted in persecution (2 Cor 4.7-12).[49] But παρρησία also suggests the idea of freedom of speech, as practiced in the Greek cities. Paul is permitted (or acts like one who is permitted) to speak openly and state his case before others. Παρρησία designates 'the right to speak openly and publicly'[50] in the assembly as well as the privilege of speaking frankly to a friend. It is the latter connotation that may be most applicable in the context of 2 Corinthians 3. Paul is bold toward the Corinthian converts. Initially, he preached them the gospel freely and boldly. As they came together and formed a congregation, he admonished and even disciplined them. He opens up to them and speaks his mind. He wishes they would do the same with him (2 Cor 6.11-13).

Paul the διάκονος has hope (ἐλπις, v.12). The hope is based on his understanding of the new covenant, which gives men the Spirit and justification. It is grounded in God, for Paul knows that God will ultimately bring victory to the cause of the gospel. In fact, the celebration has already begun (2 Cor 2.14). Just as a little boy believes his father can always make everything come out right in the end, so also

Paul is even more confident that his heavenly father will eventually produce a successful conclusion to all things (Rom 8.37; 1 Cor 15.57).

For Paul and all believers, this hope leads toward a transformation from glory to glory (v.18). The Spirit is at work now and will be in the future to produce changes in believers. The result is glory (δόξα). At this point, one might say that considerations of subordinacy and superordinacy have fallen aside, for Paul's διακονία aims at leading all men into this intimate relationship with God. The transformation pertains equally to all men, and it eliminates notions of hierarchy. This glorious work of God is not meant only for a privileged few, but is intended for all who believe. This is the ἐλπις which leads Paul onward, even in the face of tribulation.

In summary, then, Paul's epistles show that he always views himself as God's underling. Whether he calls himself a son, slave, or a servant, he always recognizes the superiority of God in every way. But Paul's relations with the Corinthians are more complicated. He sometimes uses egalitarian language, calling the believers his brothers or co-workers. However he reveals his superordinacy toward them by referring to himself as their father. At the other extreme, he calls himself their slave. Paul seems to be using a sliding scale to depict his relationship with the church, for he shows himself alternately as equal to, greater than, and less than the Corinthians. This is also the case in 2 Corinthians 3. Paul's use of διακονέω and ἱκανός suggest that he is rating himself rather low in comparison to the Corinthians. But his talk of the splendour and grandeur of his διακονία produces an image of respect and eminence. But in 3.18, the talk of transformation seems to erase all distinctions of rank, since it is an event that affects all equally.

SECTION D. THE CORINTHIANS AND THE WORLD OF 2 CORINTHIANS 3.

In this section, some of the major roles of the Corinthians, as they appear in Paul's letters to them, will be enumerated. Some of these roles have already been suggested in Sections B and C. More attention will be paid to those roles which have not been treated extensively thus far. Then the roles of the Corinthians in 2 Corinthians 3 will be investigated, in order to determine how they relate to the other characters in that text.

First, the Corinthians are *sons* of God. They, like Paul, can address God as 'ἀββα ὁ πατήρ' ((Rom 8.15; Gal 4.6). Paul teaches that those who believe in Jesus Christ may call God their father (1 Cor 1.3; 2 Cor 1.2). As noted earlier, Paul thinks of the church as a 'family', with God as father and all the believers as sons. Christ is pre-eminent among the children, because he is 'the first-born among many brethren' (Rom 8.29). The remainder of the brothers are often portrayed as equals. But Paul sometimes exerts authority over the Corinthians, assuming either the explicitly stated role of father or the implied role of big brother. So, even though all believers are sons of God and brothers to each other, and therefore presumably equal, there is a 'pecking' order among them, and the Corinthians are portrayed as subordinate to Christ always and to Paul sometimes.

It is possible that being younger brothers to Paul chafed them somewhat. There are signs of tension between them and Paul throughout the Corinthian correspondence. These letters can be read as Paul's attempt to assert his authority over a group that is trying to assert its independence of him.' Since all believers have freedom (2 Cor 3.17), the Corinthians appear to be exercising their freedom by choosing to affiliate with other

apostles (2 Cor 11). Much of 2 Corinthians can be viewed as Paul's persuading the Corinthians that this is not a wise choice. As an older brother, he exhorts them (2 Cor 13.11) to accept *him* as their apostle and to acknowledge *his* authority over the church. But younger brothers can be 'feisty' sometimes.

The process of becoming metaphorical brothers to those who are not literal brothers can be called 'resocialization', because it involves becoming oriented differently to society and to other people.[2] Resocialization is not always a smooth process, and, in the case of the Corinthian Christians, there was some difficulty. The difficulty was that the believers were not fully integrated into a cohesive group. There was division among them. This may have had theological origins. The splintering has been attributed to the emergence of 'parties' or 'cliques' in the church, each loyal to a different figure.[3] Or it may have been the result of a spiritual elitism, arising out of a Philonic interpretation of Christianity introduced perhaps by Apollos or other Hellenistic Jews.[4]

Alternatively, the failure to coalesce may have had sociological causes. The Corinthians had come from different social groupings - slave and free, rich and poor, men and women. It would have been difficult for everyone to drop on the porch of the house church every aspect of his sociological self-image before entering for fellowship and worship. But, because they believed in Jesus Christ, each of them had become a member of equal standing in the same social group, the family of God. Paul regarded all of them as brothers, and he taught that they too should consider one another as brothers and, accordingly, as equals. But problems arose in this branch of the family, and there were questions about how to treat a literal non-brother as a metaphorical brother. Much of 1 Corinthians is

concerned with Paul's trying to resolve this fraternal conflict. At least twenty times in 1 Corinthians, Paul addresses his readers as 'brethren', and then he goes on to give them advice, suggestions, or commands on practical issues of Christian living.[5]

In 2 Corinthians, though, the situation is somewhat different. Only three times are the believers called 'brethren', and the emphasis is less upon intra-church affairs, as in 1 Corinthians, and more upon the relation of Paul to the church. In this epistle, Paul defends his ministry and apostolate from attacks originating both among some Corinthians and some unnamed intruders.[6] Because of the changed situation, the Corinthians, though still sons of God and brothers of Paul, are not so often portrayed as brothers. When they are so addressed, it is in connection with an instruction or an appeal, as in 1 Corinthians.[7]

In addition to being sons of God and brothers of Paul, the Corinthians are also slaves of Christ. When they call Christ 'κύριος', they imply that they are his 'δοῦλοι'. Because they are δοῦλοι, they are bound to obey and honour their κύριος. They are not free to do as they please. Rather, they must do the bidding of another. Yet Paul writes: οὗ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα κυρίου, ἐλευθερία (2 Cor 3.17). A believer is both a δοῦλος and an ἐλεύθερος, even though these terms are antonyms and appear to be mutually exclusive. To be a free slave is 'ein paradoxes δουλεύειν'.[8] The paradox arises in part from Paul's use of language from the same word field (master/slave relations) in two different ways to talk about the life of the Christian. In relation to the power of sin, the believer is free (Rom 8.2; Gal 5.1, 13). In relation to Christ, he is a slave.

In Romans 6, Paul seems to teach that all men are slaves. They are either the slaves of sin and law, resulting in death, or slaves of God and

righteousness, resulting in sanctification and eternal life. In this life, then, no person is absolutely free. All are slaves. The believer is one who is no longer a slave of sin, but rather has been 'bought with a price' (1 Cor 6.20) and has become a slave of Christ. The freedom of the Christian is not an absolute freedom, but rather a freedom from bondage to sin. He has been transferred from one master to another. He is now free from the compelling power of sin and is free to obey and serve God. He is still a slave, but is now a 'freed slave' - a slave who has been released from the binding power of sin.[9]

The Corinthians, then, are freedmen in relation to their former master, sin, but they are slaves in relation to their new master, Jesus Christ. The concept of the bondage of a slave, though, still seems to conflict with the idea of the freedom that a son would have. Though still subordinate to his father, the son is not in servitude as is the slave. Since the Corinthians are both slaves of Christ and sons of God, and therefore both bound and free, their relationships are discordant. Petersen suggests that these conflicting roles are mediated through the image of *adoption*.[10] In this life, the Christian is *actually* a slave of Christ and only *potentially* a son of God. He has received the spirit as a downpayment, and the adoption process is *underway* though not yet *completed*. Until it is, he is still a slave, though sonship is a reality which is already partially realized. The completion of the adoption will only occur after the death and resurrection of the believer. Then he will become a full-fledged son, and no longer will he be a slave. This adoption process is a transformation. It changes an enslaved non-son into a free son.

Along with this change in one's status occurs a change in one's honour-rating, for the glory of a son is greater than that of a slave.

This change in the degree of one's glory is one possible explanation of the enigmatic phrase in 2 Corinthians 3.18b: μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν. The Corinthians have now the lesser glory of a slave, but they are being transformed by the spirit through the adoption process, and they will someday have the greater glory of a son. Through the image of adoption, then, the master/slave system is related to the family system as one stage in the process of believers becoming the sons of God.

In addition to being sons of God and slaves of Christ, the Corinthians are the addressees of an epistle (2 Cor 1.1). As addressees, they are meant to receive and read the letter. The writing of a letter either initiates or maintains a relationship between the two parties. In the case of 2 Corinthians 3, Paul is attempting to maintain (or regain) his relationship with the Corinthians as their apostle. In order for them to receive the letter, it had to be delivered. Paul did not use the imperial postal service. This letter, probably written in Macedonia, was delivered to Corinth by Titus, Paul's personal courier.[11] If carried overland, the journey of about two hundred miles would have taken approximately two weeks.[12]

With the letter written and received, it remains now for the letter to be read. The writing of a letter implies that it will be read. A letter is a 'surrogate'[13] or 'substitute'[14] for the personal presence of the author. But the reading of a letter is not an example of dialogue. The reading of a letter results in '... the reduction of the reciprocal subjectivity of the face-to-face encounter to the one-sided objectivity of the letter.'[15] Letters are written because the two parties can not or will not meet in person with each other. In this case, Paul may have been wiser to write than to visit, since he had a reputation for producing epistles

'weighty and strong', and since his personal presence was regarded as weak and ineffectual by some in Corinth (2 Cor 10.10). Because the situation in Corinth was tense and fragile, Paul probably put his best foot forward by keeping both his feet in Macedonia and sending a letter via Titus.

The Corinthians, then, are the addressees, recipients, and readers of a letter. Every letter tells a story.[16] This letter, 2 Corinthians, not only tells a story, but is also a part of the larger story of Paul's dealings with the church at Corinth. As principals in the larger story, the Corinthians, more so than the modern scholar, would have understood the letter and its various referents. They knew the situation. The letter refers to prior events in their relationship.[17] Also, the letter itself becomes a part of the continuing drama. It is 'a functional link in a specific chain of communications between Paul and the Corinthians.'[18] The Corinthians would have well understood this link because they held the chain to which it belonged. The modern reader holds only the link.

As mentioned earlier, Young and Ford have identified 2 Corinthians as an apologetic epistle, modelled on the example of other such documents.[19] They point particularly to this passage in 2 Corinthians 12.19 as evidence for their claim:

> Have you been thinking all along that we have been defending ourselves before you? It is in the sight of God that we have been speaking in Christ, and all for your upbuilding, beloved.

They could also have cited 2 Corinthians 13.11, where Paul gives several commands, including παρακαλεῖσθε, which the RSV translates as 'heed my appeal'. If the epistle is indeed an apology, then Paul would have been exhorting his readers to take notice of the appeal it contained, and to

respond positively to its content.

If the epistle is a unity and if it is apologetic, as Ford and Young at least maintain, then what effect would *2 Corinthians 3* have had on the church as it was read and re-read? How does this passage fit into the overall scheme of the defence? The discussion of these questions could lead on to tangential issues of authorial intention and psychological interpretation, and away from the main purpose of this dissertation, which is to analyze the roles, relations, and actions of the characters in 2 Corinthians 3 and to explore the language used to portray these roles, relations, and actions. Yet the question of genre is a valid one, and it is a significant hermeneutical issue.[20] It is possible, and perhaps necessary, to propose a possible genre and to posit an intention which gave rise to that genre, even though no one knows or can know what Paul's actual intention was.[21] Once an intention is proposed, then a genre can be suggested, one which corresponds to the proposed intention. This too can never be conclusively verified, but it can be tested, and it can be judged more or less probable than other possibilities. The approach here will be to examine the proposal of Young and Ford, and then, after surveying the chapter, determine how useful it is in interpreting 2 Corinthians 3.

If 2 Corinthians is an apologetic epistle for Paul's apostolate, then chapter 3 is part of the 'proofs' section of the epistle, which comprises 2.14-9.15.[22] 2 Corinthians 3 is that part of the defence where Paul reveals his concept of the true διάκονος. He portrays his διακονία and defends his role of διάκονος by making four points.

First, he has good credentials for the job (vv. 1-3). The existence of the Corinthian church validates his ability to do the work, even though that existence is certainly fragmented and subject to strain. While in

Corinth, Paul preached the gospel, some believed it, and they were gathered into a congregation. This fact verifies that Paul has done (and can do) the work of an apostle.

Second, Paul claims that he is both commissioned and qualified by God (vv. 4-6). Paul did not choose this career for himself. Nor did any men select him to do this work. Rather, God himself picked Paul for the preaching of the gospel. Furthermore, Paul does not think himself competent for the work of a διάκονος. But God has made him sufficient to perform the work to which he was called.

Third, Paul maintains that his διακονία is attended by a greater splendour than that of Moses (vv. 7-11). In a series of *qal wa-homer* arguments, Paul specifies the superiority of his service. The new service, that of the Spirit, is even more certainly attended with glory than that of Moses, which was a service of death (vv. 7-8). Furthermore, Paul's service, a service of justification, much more abounds in glory than that of Moses, which is a service of condemnation. Finally, Paul's work, part of an enduring enterprise, has a far more excellent splendour than that of Moses, which was only for a while and is now passing away (vv. 10-11).

The fourth and final point in Paul's portrayal of his ministry is that he has performed his work differently from Moses (vv. 12-18). Paul acts with great boldness, but Moses was somewhat diffident (vv. 12-13). Under Moses, the people's minds were hardened, but, under Paul, people are being converted (vv. 14-16). Whereas Moses' ministry was accompanied with a veiling (which still is present today), Paul's ministry is characterized by an unveiling, which results in a glorious transformation (vv. 14-18).

Each of these four points is intended to delineate Paul's conception of his apostolate and to persuade the Corinthians to accept its validity.

Included in the proofs are appeals to external authority (namely, the Hebrew Bible), rabbinic argumentation, and comparison and contrast. It is difficult to determine how convincing these proofs would have been, since the nature of the opponents and their charges are not known for certain.

If 2 Corinthians is an apology, then a courtroom setting may by way of illustration be imagined for its reading. The opponents (and whatever Corinthian believers they may have persuaded) are the plaintiffs. The exact nature of their charges can not be ascertained, but it seems to have related to Paul and his particular style of διαχονία. Paul is the defendant. Rather than hire an attorney, he chooses to represent himself. He does not appear in person to answer the charges pressed against him. Instead, he sends a written deposition which constitutes his defence. The Corinthians themselves are the jury which will render a verdict in the case. They have heard the case presented by the plaintiffs, and some of them have been persuaded of the legitimacy of their position. Now it is time for Paul to tell his side of the story and to put forward evidence which will exonerate him of all charges. Paul's case, according to Young and Ford, is contained in 2 Corinthians.

As mentioned earlier, the Corinthians must be thought of as *readers*. As they read the epistle known as 2 Corinthians, they are doing more than ingesting information. They are being called upon to judge the validity of its contents. They are being required to evaluate the evidence that is being presented. Every time Paul makes a 'we' statement, such as 'we use great boldness' (2 Cor 3.12), the Corinthians must contemplate the truth of the claim. They cannot be neutral observers, because they are in the midst of a conflict. They must decide for one or the other. They can be impartial, but they cannot be noncommittal. They must take a decision.

And Paul's opinion is that ruling for him is choosing for life, while ruling against him will have serious consequences.[23]

The claim of Young and Ford that 2 Corinthians is an apologetic epistle can neither be verified nor disproved. It is a reasonable suggestion, though it needs more evidence to make the case a probable hypothesis. The attractiveness of their suggestion is that it helps to explain the presence of different genres of material within a single document. For, according to the handbooks of rhetoric, an apology could consist of several types of discourse, including narrative, proofs, and exhortation.[24] So the occurrence of these and other types of material in 2 Corinthians need not be considered unusual.

The weakness of the argument of Young and Ford is their reluctance to specify exactly who and what Paul is defending himself against. An apology is not mere exposition, but rather it is a treatise addressed to someone in which the author is arguing against the charges of someone else. Young and Ford are disinclined to discuss the identity, doctrines, and charges of Paul's opponents. Yet they claim that 2 Corinthians is a defence against specific persons and charges. It would not be easy for a reader of this epistle to understand the apology, if he does not even know the complaint. So the hypothesis is limited in its interpretative value, as it applies to the epistle as a whole and to 2 Corinthians 3 in particular.

The strength of the position of Young and Ford is that it does underscore the importance of the *reader* in interpretation. By suggesting the judicial nature of the epistle, it projects the original reader into the role of judge or jury.[25] This active orientation of the original reader is paralleled by the active role required of the modern reader as well. The text is *not* self-explanatory. It requires the reader to make explicit some

logical connections that are only implicit in the text. It requires him to construe the meaning and reference of sentences, some of which give no more than clues as to their real import. Finally, the text requires the reader to use his imagination synthetically to link together the sentences into a cohesive discourse.[26] This emphasis upon the role of the reader and his reception of the epistle as a text to be read is the primary value of the twin hypothesis of Young and Ford that 2 Corinthians is a unity and that it belongs to the genre of apologetic epistle.

The facts of the Corinthians being sons of God, slaves of Christ, and brothers of Paul are garnered from the epistolary salutation of the epistles (1 Cor 1.1-3 and 2 Cor 1.1-2). These data may be regarded as constitutive elements in Paul's symbolic universe.[27] That the Corinthians are the addressees of this letter is made explicit in the salutation (2 Cor 1.1). That they are recipients and readers of this epistolary text is implied also by the salutation. These, then, are some of the roles of the Corinthians as portrayed by Paul in the Corinthian correspondence at large.

To be examined at this point are the roles of the Corinthians which are mentioned specifically in 2 Corinthians 3. The focus of the investigation will be on verses 1-3, in which the roles of the Corinthians are most prominent.

Verses 1-3 reveal the roles of the Corinthians from Paul's point of view, not their own, as no writings of the Corinthians are extant. So this examination of the roles of the Corinthians is guided by what Paul writes about them. This may differ from what the Corinthians themselves would have thought, but the only information available for inspection is that which comes from the hand of Paul.

Paul's mention of the roles of the Corinthians in 2 Corinthians 3 is introduced in verse 1:

> Ἀρχόμεθα πάλιν ἑαυτοὺς συνιστάνειν; ἢ μὴ χρήζομεν
> ὡς τινες συστατικῶν ἐπιστολῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἢ ἐξ ὑμῶν;

These two questions imply that Paul and the Corinthians are not on the best of terms. The whole issue of commendation is a sensitive one for Paul, as evidenced by his continual usage of συνίστημι and its cognates in 2 Corinthians. One common line of comment on this verse is that the Corinthians perceive self-commendation as a distasteful practice, and that in 2.14-17 Paul appears to be beginning to commend himself.[28] The πάλιν suggests that Paul has practised self-commendation in Corinth previously, or at least that the Corinthians regard some of his previous statements as self-commendation. Paul is aware that this charge might possibly be raised against him again at this juncture, so he meets the challenge head-on. The first question, then, is viewed as a rhetorical means for Paul's denying in advance a possible accusation of self-commendation. The question would also give the impression that Paul is not prepared to engage in this practice.

According to this common explanation, the second question is an explicit reference to the opponents,[29] who must have arrived bearing letters of recommendation and used them to gain access to and authority over the church at Corinth. Since Paul did not have any letters of recommendation when he arrived in Corinth, his legitimacy is being questioned, and his standing is being made to look inferior to that of the intruders. In order to meet this challenge, Paul brings up the topic of letters of recommendation, and, by means of another question which expects

a negative answer, asserts that he does not have and does not need such letters. This line of explanation is based upon the assumption that the intruders had letters of recommendation, and that their use of them resulted in Paul's being drawn into an unfavourable comparison with the intruders.

Instead of an unfavourable comparison of Paul's credentials with those of his opponents, P. Marshall has suggested a different scenario to account for the appearance of the issue of letters of recommendation in this chapter.[30] His reconstruction, based on the social convention of friendship in the ancient world, runs like this. Paul first arrived in Corinth with no letters of recommendation. Instead, he initiated his relationship with the Corinthians by means of self-commendation, which, within certain limits, was an acceptable procedure. The Corinthians accepted his self-commendation as valid and were converted by Paul's preaching of the gospel. A relationship of friendship was established. Since the giving and receiving of gifts was an important aspect of friendship, and since some of Paul's converts in other cities had also given him financial support, the Corinthians offered monetary gifts to Paul. Paul refused to accept these gifts. The refusal of a gift offered by a friend is a serious incident, though in certain circumstances it is excusable. Unknown is the reason why Paul refused, but refuse he did. The Corinthians were offended, apparently not agreeing with Paul about the validity of his grounds for refusal. From the Corinthian point of view, the relationship of friendship was terminated. Since Paul is now writing them a letter (2 Corinthians), the Corinthians view this as Paul's attempt to re-establish a friendship. It is likely that they would expect him to be commended again, since it was customary for the person initiating a

friendship to present a recommendation to the prospective friend. Paul had initiated the first relationship with self-commendation, so perhaps the Corinthians suspected that he would commend himself again. Thus the question in 2 Corinthians 3.1 arises: 'Are we beginning to commend ourselves again?' The preceding paragraph (2.14-17) may have appeared to the Corinthians to be the commencement of a letter of recommendation, and Paul anticipates their response. The effect of his question is to assert that he is *not* going to commend himself again. They already know him. For his part, the relationship of friendship still exists, though it is somewhat bruised. Paul is writing, then, to heal a relationship, not to initiate one.

Concerning the second question in verse 1, Marshall suggests that Paul is saying that he does not need commendatory letters *to* the Corinthians because they already know him. They know him on the basis of his self-commendation and his sojourn with them. Such letters would be superfluous in this situation. Furthermore, he does not need letters of recommendation *from* them, because he uses self-commendation instead. The use of letters of recommendation might suggest that he is an agent of *men*, and Paul is concerned that he be known rather as one sent by *God*.

The hypothesis of Marshall is attractive because it does not take τινες (v. 1) as an explicit reference to the opponents. Thus he does not have to struggle with the speculative questions of who they were and where their letters of recommendation came from. Rather, he seeks to explain the text on the basis of the history of the relationship between Paul and the Corinthians. His explanation is guided by explicit information in the text, especially as it is enlightened by the social custom of friendship in the Greco-Roman world. The weakness of his position is that he too must

rely upon speculation in order to complete his reconstruction. He is forced to posit Paul's self-commendation as the first step in his relationship with the Corinthians. Then he must assume that this self-commendation was properly performed by Paul and approvingly accepted by the Corinthians. Finally, the conventions of friendship and enmity seem to be too narrow to account for all of the aspects of and developments in the relationship between Paul and the Corinthians.

It is impossible to establish exactly what the circumstances were which led to the writing of 2 Corinthians and to the mention of letters of recommendation in 2 Corinthians 3. The evidence is too meagre to afford a complete reconstruction. All the attempts, attractive as they are, rely upon conjecture to fill out their sketch of the Corinthian landscape.[31] To attempt such a programme is to investigate the world *behind* the text and to avoid coming to terms with the world *of* the text.

What can be known with assurance, however, is that Paul, for some unknown reason, was concerned about letters of recommendation as they affected his relationship with the Corinthians, and that he made this concern explicit in 2 Corinthians 3.1-3.

By means of rhetorical questions, Paul insists that he is not beginning to recommend himself again. Furthermore, he does not need to bring letters of recommendation to them or take such from them. The fact is that Paul has already established his credibility in Corinth, and his credentials are located there. The surprising twist of language which Paul creates is that the Corinthians themselves are his commendatory letters. The imagery is not fully consistent in these three verses,[32] but Paul nevertheless declares, 'You are our letter' (2 Cor 3.2).

The primary role of the Corinthians in 2 Corinthians 3 is that of a

letter. This is not a personal role, in the sense of a son, slave, or ambassador. Nor does it fit neatly into a social institution, such as family or government. Yet it is the role assigned by Paul to the Corinthians at this stage of the epistle. The metaphor of letters of recommendation will be explored further in Chapter 3, but some initial comments will be offered here, in order to explain the grounding of the word 'letter' as a relational term.

First, Paul writes, 'You yourselves are our letter' (v. 2). Then he adds later, 'You are a letter of Christ' (v. 3). The juxtaposition of these two letters generates an interesting interpretative problem. In what way may the Corinthians be called a letter at all? Then, what is the relationship between Paul's letter and Christ's letter?

It is commonly assumed that verse 2 means that the Corinthians are not just any letter, but rather specifically a letter of recommendation for Paul. This is indicated by the translation of the RSV and by the comments of many scholars.[33] This line of comment reasons that Paul first arrived in Corinth with no letters of recommendation, but now, at a later time, he is being asked to present letters of recommendation. Such documents would function as credentials and validate his apostolic status. This had become necessary because, in the meantime, some intruders had presented impressive letters of recommendation to the Corinthian church and thereby gained their confidence.

There is a problem with this explanation. To whom would Paul's letter of recommendation be presented? Would it be presented to the Corinthians? If so, then Paul is saying that the Corinthians are recommending Paul to themselves by means of themselves. This is a rather odd formulation, for it implies that the Corinthians do not know who they are. The idea is that

they are a validation for Paul, and they do not even know it. Also, it calls for a most peculiar practice, that of equating the recommendation with the *recipient* of the recommendation. If that is the case, then one must conclude that this is an ill-conceived metaphor. But this approach seems contrived, and it is unlikely that it is the Corinthians to whom the letter would be addressed.

Would it have been addressed to the intruders instead? This makes better sense of the metaphor, for it separates the role of the recommender (the Corinthians) from that of the recipient of the recommendation. But this suggestion does not fulfil the reader's logical expectations, for Paul would certainly not have wanted to commend himself to his opponents, whom he later labels as 'false apostles' (2 Cor 11.13). Since that would have served no useful purpose, it seems unlikely that the letter would have been bound for these intruders.

A final possibility for the addressee of this letter of recommendation could be the general public, especially since Paul states that it is 'known and read by all men' (v. 2). In this way, the letter would function as an introductory letter, helping to acquaint strangers with the apostle Paul. But this also seems unlikely, for this would make sense only in an evangelistic context, and that is not the situation here. Also, it appears that the problem with which Paul is dealing in this epistle is not a problem with outsiders, but with insiders. It is not at all obvious how a letter of recommendation to unevangelized outsiders would assist Paul in his present crisis.

Failing to find a suitable addressee for these letters, one must conclude either that they were not meant to have an addressee or that they are not letters of recommendation at all. The latter option is simpler, and

it makes better sense of the text. Instead of a letter of recommendation, the Corinthians are rather a letter in the sense that they are the tangible results of Paul's work. Paul metaphorically refers to these results as a 'letter', something which has been written. His efforts in Corinth were not fruitless. The effect of his labours was the production of a document, which is nothing other than the Corinthians themselves. The formation of a Christian community was the result of Paul's visit to and work in Corinth.

Furthermore, the point of verse 2 is that this letter is *Paul's* letter. The founding of the church in Corinth must be attributed to Paul and not to anyone else. Thus Paul believes that there is and should continue to be an indissoluble link between him and the churches which he has initiated. The statement, 'You are *our* letter', is a reminder to the Corinthians of their origin. They came together as a worshipping community as a result of the missionary endeavour of *Paul*. He alone, then, is their founding apostle, and he believes that he alone is the apostle with legitimate authority there. Others may come along later and contribute to the edification of the Corinthians, but this does not displace Paul from his position of authority over the church. As a pointer back toward origins, this statement also serves to remind the Corinthians of the happy times which they and Paul both experienced in the early days. This nostalgic appeal is part of the rhetorical force of the letter, and it may be identified as *pathos*, that kind of proof which is '... the emotional reaction which the hearers undergo as the orator "plays upon their feelings"'.[34]

In calling the Corinthians '*our* letter', Paul is reminding them of his claim on the church. He founded the church, and he thinks that he still has a right to exert authority over it. He will not allow poachers to

sneak in and claim the church for themselves. Thus, implied in the statement, 'You are our letter', may also be a warning to the intruders not to try to take away that which rightfully belongs to another, that is, to Paul. In this way, Paul is reasserting his claim that the church in Corinth is his charge, his parish, and he will not allow others to muscle in on his territory.

The statement, 'You are our letter', then, conveys several notions. The letter may be thought of as a letter of recommendation, though this is not the only or perhaps the most important connotation. For the writing of a letter is a metaphor, conveying the substance of Paul's apostolic activity while in Corinth. The Corinthian church is a letter, in that it is living, visible evidence that someone has done something constructive there. Paul 'wrote a letter' in Corinth. He did not burn a letter, as some burn old love letters or as some burn copies of *The Satanic Verses*. Rather than burning a letter, Paul *wrote* a letter. He produced a document; he wrote an epistle which the Corinthians themselves constitute. The letter needs to be edited now, so Paul is writing a literal dead letter to the metaphorical living letter. He wants to correct some errors in the metaphorical letter.

The metaphorical letter which was written is Paul's, not somebody else's. No person, in Paul's opinion, can legitimately move in after Paul leaves and claim this territory for himself. The Corinthians are still Paul's letter, and he continues to care for them. As a letter of recommendation, the Corinthians must be commendatory for *Paul*. But the commendatory effect of the letter should not be construed as the sole purpose of the letter. For as a letter, the Corinthians are proof that Paul has laboured among them for God.

The statement in 2a, 'You are our letter', is paralleled by that in 3a, 'You are Christ's letter'. How is ἐπιστολὴ Χριστοῦ to be construed? It could be: (1) an *authorial* genitive, 'a letter written *by* Christ';[35] or (2) an *objective* genitive, 'a letter written *about* Christ'.[36]

Rissi argues for the objective genitive, because he understands 'letter' again to refer to letters of recommendation. He thinks Paul's point is that the Corinthians are letters of recommendation *about* Christ. They are those who introduce people to Christ and speak a good word on Christ's behalf. Rissi sees **the** subject of letters of recommendation beginning in verse 1 and continuing right through verses 2-3.[37]

Furnish prefers the authorial genitive and rejects the objective genitive, because '... there is less thought of what is "in" the *letter* represented by the Corinthian congregation than of the existence of the *letter* as an attestation of Paul's apostleship.'[38] This view is probably correct, though there is no reason to eliminate entirely the possibility that Paul intended the genitive to be ambiguous or polysemous. The authorial genitive, though, seems to fit the context better, and it is to be preferred as the primary meaning here.

When ἐπιστολὴ Χριστοῦ is taken as an authorial genitive, there is a parallel between Paul's letter and Christ's letter. Paul's letter is written by means of his proclamation, and the result is visible as believers are gathered into a congregation. In this sense, it may be seen and read by all men. Christ's letter, on the other hand, is produced in an extraordinary manner - by the Spirit of the living God.

The relation between these two 'letters' is not competitive but complementary. Paul worked according to the principle of 'Not I, but Christ'.[39] Having stated that the Corinthians are *his* letter, Paul hastens

to correct himself by declaring that this letter is actually *Christ's* letter. The Corinthians are a letter ultimately written by Christ, not Paul. Paul has only a subordinate role in the composition of this letter. Or, stated differently, 'Christ is the author, and Paul is the instrument'.[40] Or, Christ is the dictator, and Paul is the amanuensis. This view is supported by Bultmann,[41] who explains the participial phrase, διακονηθεῖσα ὑφ' ἡμῶν (v.3), in the following way:

> ... das Werk des Paulus ist also im Grunde nicht sein Werk, sondern das Werk Christi (dessen δοῦλος er nach 4.5 ist), für das er nur die Rolle des διάκονος spielt.

Thus Paul has moved in three verses from a relatively trivial starting point about credentials to a significant theological discussion of the relationship of Christ, the Corinthians, and himself.[42]

This 'communications' model, which depicts the activity and relationship of these parties in 2 Corinthians 3.1-3, is similar in structure to the models of 'agriculture' (1 Cor 3.5-9) and 'construction' (1 Cor 3.9-15) which Paul also employs. In these latter two models, Paul depicts himself as a workman and the Corinthians as the product of his labour, though God is regarded as the effective force behind the work that is done (1 Cor 3.6, 10). God gives the growth by giving Paul the muscle to build! All three of these models are summarized in 1 Corinthians 9.1, where Paul asserts by means of a rhetorical question that the Corinthians are his workmanship (ἔργον) in the Lord. Paul worked in Corinth as an apostle sent by the Lord. The result of his labour is the Corinthian church, his workmanship. And all of this occurred 'in the Lord', that is, by means of his power.

Concerning the topic of letters, then, the main points may now be

summarized. The Corinthians are called a 'letter' by Paul, but this does not denote primarily Paul's letter of recommendation, though commendation is in the context and though the letter may have nonetheless served to commend Paul to the 'readers'. They are Paul's letter and at the same time Christ's letter also. As Paul's letter, they are evidence of his apostolic activity. As Christ's letter, they are actually the work of Christ, with Paul serving as a helper. Again, the Corinthians are not meant to be letters of recommendation for Christ. Rather than introducing or commending him, they are created by him. Christ is the author of that letter which the Corinthians themselves constitute. It is not clear whether the participle διακονηθεῖσα indicates for Paul the function of scribe or courier. Both senses can be supported with lexical evidence. But another possibility is that Paul is here breaking out of the semantic field of letter-writing altogether and moving into the (relatively independent) field of community development. The sense would then be that Christ has started communities of faith, and he has commissioned Paul to help them grow stronger and more cohesive. In any case, it becomes increasingly clear in verses 1-3 that Christ is the ultimate letter writer, that Paul is his subordinate helper, and that the Corinthians are the result of the synergistic efforts of that dynamic duo, Christ and Paul.

In order to summarize this section on the Corinthians, it may be noted that, in relation to the symbolic universe of the Corinthian correspondence, the Corinthians are regarded as sons of God and slaves of Jesus Christ. In this respect, they are subordinate to God. As sons of God, though, they are brothers to Paul and therefore equal to him. Because of the special relationship resulting from Paul's founding of the church in Corinth, however, the Corinthians are sometimes regarded explicitly as

children of Paul and elsewhere implicitly as younger brothers. If Paul is indeed a brother to the Corinthians, he often acts like an elder brother who has authority over them. Thus, the Corinthians are theoretically in egalitarian relationship to Paul, but in practice they are often implicitly portrayed as subordinates in a hierarchical relationship. This fact becomes increasingly obvious in 2 Corinthians, in which Paul rarely addresses the believers as 'brethren'. In this epistle, 'authority' not 'fraternity' is the significant issue.

In 2 Corinthians 3, in particular, the role of the Corinthians is that of a letter. They are not only the addressees, recipients, and readers of a letter, but they are also a letter themselves. As a letter of Paul, they are evidence of his apostolic activity. They are the tangible result of his labour in Corinth. As a letter of Christ, they are the product of a divine author. They bear on their hearts the writing of Christ. In this scenario, Christ is the superordinate letter-writer, and Paul, the subordinate, is his helper. Whether seen as Paul's letter or as Christ's letter, the Corinthians are in any case subordinate to both. The letter-writer is worthy of more honour than the letter, just as the builder is worthy of more honour than the building (Heb 3.3). Thus, in the text of 2 Corinthians 3, the Corinthians are identified not as isolated entities but in relationship to Christ and Paul. They find their place and significance in a 'dyadic relationship'[43] with their founding apostle Paul and his sender, the Lord Jesus Christ.

CHAPTER THREE. 2 CORINTHIANS 3 AND THE THEORY OF METAPHOR.

SECTION A. PAUL RICOEUR AND THE THEORY OF METAPHOR.

This chapter is concerned with Paul Ricoeur's theory of metaphor and Paul of Tarsus' use of metaphor. The approach is first to define and to criticize the theory of metaphor expounded by Paul Ricoeur. Then this theory will be applied in a practical manner to the metaphors used by the apostle Paul in 2 Corinthians 3. The purpose of this exposition and application of Ricoeur's theory is to shed light on Paul's use of metaphor and to suggest possible directions for explicating the metaphors which appear in a particular biblical text.

Section A of this chapter will be devoted to a description and critique of Ricoeur's theory of metaphor. The method to be followed will be to summarize the contents of Ricoeur's major work on this subject, *The Rule of Metaphor.*[1] This summary will be supplemented as needed by references to other treatises in which Ricoeur deals with this subject. Throughout this section, critiques of Ricoeur's theory will be offered, in which the strengths and weaknesses, possibilities and limitations, and abridgements and expansions of this theory are set out.

Each of the succeeding sections will be devoted to an examination of one Pauline metaphor from 2 Corinthians 3. Relevant aspects of Ricoeur's theory will guide the explication and interpretation of each metaphor. These attempts at interpretation are designed to enrich the study of this text by the contemporary reader, whether he be a scholar or not. Where possible and practical, new metaphors will be proposed as a means of teasing out more of the meaning of the dense and thick language which occurs in the text of 2 Corinthians 3.

The Rule of Metaphor is composed of eight studies, each of which takes up one or more aspect of a contemporary study of the linguistic phenomenon known as metaphor. Throughout the book, the guiding thesis is that only a contemporary, semantically-based theory of metaphor can fully and adequately do justice to the dynamics of metaphor. Such a theory emphasizes the priority of the metaphorical statement over the metaphorical word, and it stresses metaphor's ability to convey a new vision of reality. Thus, '... metaphor is the rhetorical process by which discourse unleashes the power that certain fictions have to redescribe reality' (7).

This statement is significant for understanding the unfolding of Ricoeur's theory. It is perhaps as close as he comes to offering a formal definition of metaphor, but, at the same time, it indicates that he is less concerned with defining metaphor than with describing how it operates. Metaphor is a process that generates new meaning, not merely a static word with a stable meaning. The 'event' character of metaphor is attested by its attachment to discourse, which also is an event as opposed to the synchronic nature of language as *langue*. Metaphor, for Ricoeur, is neither ornamental nor effete, but rather it is powerful enough to say something significant. Though the truth of a metaphorical statement, considered solely on the literal level, can not be sustained, it is nevertheless by means of this fiction that reality is described on a higher level. In the end, then, Ricoeur wishes to demonstrate that metaphor is not merely a word game that exists for its own sake inside a linguistic ghetto. Rather, it is an instrument for talking about reality, for referring language to a real world. In order to flesh out this skeleton outline of the theory, a summary of *The Rule of Metaphor* will now begin.

Study 1 is entitled, 'Between rhetoric and poetics: Aristotle.' The

writings of Aristotle have been influential on the entire subsequent course of the theory of metaphor. Aristotle's analysis led to the study of metaphor being limited eventually to a mere classification of types of word metaphors. Metaphor came to be regarded as a dispensable ornament of language. Ricoeur admits that Aristotle can be read in this way, as providing the basis for a 'taxonomic' (68) treatment of metaphor. But he insists that another interpretation is also possible. Within the writings of Aristotle himself are the seeds of a dynamic, semantic approach to metaphor which Ricoeur and others are eager to exploit.[2]

Ricoeur emphasizes that metaphor is discussed both in the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*. As a component of the field of rhetoric, it is quite legitimately reckoned as one of the tropes, that is, figures of speech that focus on the word. This orientation, coupled with Aristotle's emphasis on the word as the basis of language and discourse, gave rise to the generally held notion of metaphor as a word used figuratively, or other than in its proper manner. But, because metaphor is also an integral part of poetics, it participates in the power and the effects of discourse which can not be reduced to an analysis of individual words. It is the soil of the *Poetics* which proves to be the most fertile for Ricoeur's contemporary theory of metaphor. It is the tension between metaphor's rightful place in two different arenas that keeps it alive and prevents it from becoming simply a pleasing decoration. It is this lively tension which allows Ricoeur to do a *biopsy* instead of an *autopsy*, like so many before him have done.

Ricoeur begins (13) by citing Aristotle's definition of metaphor: 'Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy.'[3] Ricoeur

discusses four major features of this definition. First, '... *metaphor is something that happens to the noun*' (16). It is this orientation toward metaphor as naming that leads to the later emphasis upon classification.

Second, '... *metaphor is defined in terms of movement*' (17). 'Transference' (ἐπιφόρα) indicates the motion of a meaning from one word to another. Thus there is already something dynamic about metaphor, though later rhetoricians tended to overlook this. The use of movement to talk about meaning is itself inevitably metaphorical, since 'there is no non-metaphorical standpoint from which one could look upon metaphor...' (18).

Third, Aristotle's definition suggests that'... *metaphor is the transposition of a name*...' (18). According to Aristotle, everything has a common or ordinary name. When called by a new name, the noun so used is metaphorical. It is an alien name for the thing to which it refers. This contrast between the current name and the foreign name is what gives metaphor its unique character. This distinction also led to later developments in the theory of metaphor which stressed the notions of deviation, borrowing, and substitution as the essential mechanisms of metaphor.

The final feature of Aristotle's definition is that '... *a typology of metaphor is outlined in the continuation of the definition*' (20). In listing these four types of metaphors, Aristotle gave impetus to the later tendency to sort out and classify all metaphors accordingly. In the end, 'metaphor becomes nothing more than a figure related to the fourth type in Aristotle's list' (21). The work of Jennings, *Metaphor in Poetry*, is an example of this reductionist approach.[4]

Ricoeur is certain that there is more to the life and power of metaphor than is allowed by this interpretation of Aristotle. In response,

he offers a three point theory which squeezes more juice out of this fruit than the old rhetorical tradition allows. First, metaphor can not be something which happens to only one word, since it requires at least a pair of words to accomplish the transference described by Aristotle. So the result of metaphor is more than the 'displacement' of the meaning of one word. Rather, it is the disruption of '... a whole network by means of an aberrant attribution' (21).

Another possibility is opened up by regarding the transference of names as a *dis-ordering* instead of a *deviation* (22). Aristotle insists that metaphor conveys new knowledge through the transference of names. This increase may be accounted for if metaphor is seen to destroy an old order of naming and to create a new one.[5] 'Thus, the category-mistake is the de-constructive intermediary phase between description and redescription' (22).

The final factor in Ricoeur's tentative hypothesis is that metaphor is '... the process that disturbs and displaces a certain logical order, a certain conceptual hierarchy, a certain classification scheme' (22). The use of metaphor allows one to re-organize his view of reality to re-describe his vision of the world.

Ricoeur resurrects an Aristotelian notion of the relation between metaphor and simile, one which had been neglected (and even opposed) from Quintilian onwards. The latter suggested that metaphor is an abbreviated simile. But Aristotle, in proposing that simile is a developed metaphor, made simile subordinate to metaphor, both logically and linguistically. The result is that all metaphor calls for a spelling out of the simile which is contained within. This point will be utilized extensively in the present work, when the metaphors of Paul are interpreted.

The remainder of the first chapter is concerned with other comments of Aristotle about metaphor which help Ricoeur to install a semantic, interactive theory of metaphor in place of an ornamental, substitution theory. He notes that the purpose of metaphor is '... to instruct by suddenly combining elements that have not been put together before' (33).[6] This can be accomplished, in part, by '... setting the scene before our eyes.'[7] In this way, a good writer uses concrete terminology to describe abstract realities (34). This notion will also be important in the sections which follow. Finally, Ricoeur argues that, for Aristotle, '*mimêsis* is *poiêsis*, and *poiêsis* is *mimêsis*' (39). *Mimêsis* is not simply an imitation or reduplication of what one sees in the world about him. Rather, it is also a creative interpretation which intensifies that which is best and worst in humanity. Thus, *mimêsis* is involved in a double tension: '... submission to reality *and* fabulous invention, unaltering representation *and* ennobling elevation' (40). The intertwining of the themes of imitation and construction will be a dominant theme for Ricoeur throughout the remainder of his book.

Study 2 is entitled, 'The decline of rhetoric: tropology.' Ricoeur's thesis in this chapter is that the fate of metaphor is linked to the study of rhetoric. As rhetoric deteriorated, the theory of metaphor was gradually reduced to a study of types and categories of metaphor. 'A purely rhetorical treatment of metaphor is the result of the excessive and damaging emphasis put initially on the word, or more specifically, on the noun or name, and on naming, in the theory of meaning' (44).

The field of rhetoric, concerned with the art of persuasion, originally consisted of argumentation, style, and composition. Through the centuries, this field was gradually reduced by the rhetoricians. The

result was a 'restricted rhetoric, restricted first to a theory of style and then to a theory of tropes' (9). This restricted rhetoric rated metaphor as simply a decoration for discourse (45).

The postulates of rhetoric which led to this shrinkage of the role and function of metaphor are summarized by Ricoeur (45-46):

1. Words have a proper meaning, because they name things which properly belong together. Metaphor uses these words improperly, by referring these names to other things.

2. Lexical or semantic gaps occur sometimes, when there is no proper word to name an entity.

3. 'The lexical lacuna is filled by borrowing an alien term' (46).

4. The price of borrowing is 'deviation' (46), that is, the difference between the proper meaning of the word and its newly acquired meaning when used to fill a gap.

5. A word can also be used figuratively when there exists a name for a thing, but another word is used instead. This is called 'substitution' (46).

6. The reason for such a substitution, in the case of metaphor, is resemblance, which thus becomes the paradigmatic structure for metaphor.

7. The reason for the use of a trope guides the process of recovering the proper absent word, which can then be restored in place of the present figurative word. This restitution results in an 'exhaustive paraphrase' (46).

8. 'The figurative use of words does not provide any new information' (46). Since the substituted word is fully translated by the restored word, the metaphor does not say anything new. Or, 'substitution plus restitution equals zero' (46).

9. The purpose of the trope is ornamental: to please, not to teach.

The work of Pierre Fontanier, *Les Figures du discours*, one of the last of the old rhetorical treatises, well exemplifies the model of metaphor which is outlined by these nine postulates.[8] As Ricoeur reviews this work, he identifies the major presupposition of this rhetorical treatment of metaphor as its continued emphasis upon the 'hegemony of the *word*' (51) and the subordination of the *statement* to the word in the constitution of meaning. The result for metaphor is that it continues to be regarded as a one-word trope, and its effect is attributed to the figurative use of a *word* (54). Yet even within the work of Fontanier, Ricoeur finds traces of a 'properly predicative theory of metaphor' (57), which necessarily involves more than substitution and ornamentation. When Fontanier cites examples such as 'consuming remorse' and 'his seething spirit',[9] he is referring to metaphors which do not name in a figurative way, but which rather characterize and qualify something which has already been named. Thus, even in attempting to account for metaphor as a word-based phenomenon, he nevertheless implies that it is 'a sort of attribution, which requires the whole sentence'.[10]

A basis for each of the nine postulates listed above can be found in the writings of Aristotle, though he himself did not develop them in this way. He should not be held responsible for the faulty theory of metaphor which resulted, though it can be fairly stated that he contributed to the eventual decline of the status of metaphor by 'the central position accorded the noun in the enumeration of the parts of *lexis* and the reference to noun in the definition of metaphor' (47). But, as noted by Ricoeur in Study 1, Aristotle himself provides many hints for correcting the misguided substitution theory of metaphor with which his name is often

associated.

Another defence of Aristotle may be found in *Metaphor and Religious Language*, by J. M. Soskice.[11] She, like Ricoeur, denies that Aristotle formulated a substitution theory of metaphor, though she admits that he placed an undue emphasis on the word as the primary bearer of meaning. But, in his defence, she keenly observes that Aristotle was not as concerned with the philosophy of language as with assisting the public speaker with his techniques of persuasion and the poet with his style. Aristotle dealt with metaphor in order to help one recognize it when he saw it and to become able to create it when needed.[12]

The distinction between a *nominal* definition, such as the one given by Aristotle, and a *real* definition, which shows how metaphor is brought about, is the starting point for Study 3, 'Metaphor and the semantics of discourse.' As long as one talks of a nominal definition of metaphor, one can be concerned only with a word and its meanings. But when one seeks a real definition, which is concerned with 'generative causes' (65), then the subject must shift from the individual word to the complex of discourse.[13] Even though it is proper to speak of the word as 'the locus of the effect of metaphorical meaning' (66), it must be recognized that it is the sentence which produces this meaning effect.

This distinction between word and sentence as carriers of meaning corresponds to the distinction between the two branches of linguistics, semiotics and semantics. Semiotics, the science of signs, focusses on the word and on language as system, while semantics, the science of sentences, studies discourse and language as event (69).

The nature of discourse can be described by listing and discussing some of its traits. Since discourse is dialectical, these traits come in

pairs and may be summarized as follows. The first pair is that 'discourse always occurs as an event, but is to be understood as meaning' (70). Language as system has only a virtual existence. But, when a speaker makes a statement, that is, puts language to use, this is an event, 'an instance of discourse' (70). The event itself, as a combination of speaker, listener, and situation, is not repeatable, but the meaning pole of discourse can be preserved and restated in new situations.

The second pair concerns the functions of identification and predication (70). The function of nouns is singularizing, that is, to specify, out of all the possible entities in the universe, a single entity (or group of entities) as the subject of a sentence. The verb, on the other hand, on the basis of its universalizable characteristic, attributes something - such as qualities, classes, relations, or actions - to this identified subject. It is only as noun and verb are intertwined that a sentence is formed, that a speaker says something about something. This combination of a singularized subject and a universalizable predicate '... produces the fundamental polarity of language' (71).

The third pair of traits of discourse is that of locution and illocution (72).[14] The first has to do with the act of saying something, when a speaker intertwines the identifying and predicating functions of discourse. But what he achieves in speaking is termed illocution. Making a statement of fact, expressing a wish, swearing an oath - all of these are illocutionary acts, in that they *do* something in addition to *saying* something.

The fourth pair concerns sense and reference (73). This distinction, introduced into philosophy by G. Frege, has already been discussed in Chapter 2, Section A. It may be further stated here that 'this distinction

is a necessary and pervasive characteristic of discourse' (73). The *sense* of words may be defined by referring to other words in the dictionary. The system is immanent. But with the sentence, language as system is transcended. The *reference* of a sentence, of discourse, points beyond itself to a world.

The final pair of traits is the paradigmatic and syntagmatic spheres of language (75). The paradigmatic, in the sphere of semiotics, concerns the signs in the system and their inflections. The syntagmatic, which is related to semantics, concerns the coming together of words to form a sentence. The significance of this distinction is that '... if the paradigm is semiotic and the syntagma semantic, then substitution, a paradigmatic law, belongs on the side of semiology. Consequently, it will be necessary to say that metaphor as treated in discourse - the metaphorical statement - is a sort of syntagma' (76).

The result of these five distinctions is to establish metaphor as an effect created by a sentence. The effect itself may sometimes be centred upon a particular word, but it is always the result of several words acting together. Metaphor, then, is a process which results from words (more than one) coming together in an integrative relation to generate a new meaning, which the word in isolation is incapable of producing.

The undoing of the classical theory of metaphor was pioneered by I. A. Richards in *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*.[15] Ricoeur is heavily dependent upon this work as he enunciates his own doctrine of this linguistic enigma.

Ricoeur opposes the substitution theory of metaphor elaborated by the old rhetoric and renounces all nine of the postulates which undergird it. Instead, he puts forward a tension theory and six tenets which counter those of the classical theory. First, metaphor is a phenomenon of

predication, not of naming, because it only has meaning in a statement. 'Metaphor depends on a semantics of the sentence before it concerns a semantics of the word.'[16] For example, consider the metaphor of Psalm 23:1a, 'The Lord is my shepherd.' None of the words in this sentence taken alone by itself can be regarded as metaphorical. Rather, the metaphor occurs when all the words are put together in one sentence, and the words are then understood literally. 'The Lord is my shepherd' is metaphorical, therefore, because the author is not a sheep, and the Lord is not a man standing over him with a rod and staff. So 'we must not speak of words used metaphorically, but of metaphorical statements. Metaphor proceeds from the tension between all the terms in a metaphorical statement.'[17]

Second, the primary phenomenon of metaphor occurs not so much at the level of words deviating from their literal meaning as at the level of the sentence interpreted literally. Metaphor occurs because a literal interpretation produces an absurdity or contradictory, which can only be resolved by another interpretation, a metaphorical interpretation.[18] 'Semantic incompatibility is more than a signal for interpretation, and is in fact a component of the production itself... Semantic incompatibility is an essential moment of the metaphor's production.'[19] This metaphorical interpretation makes sense for it 'twists' the meaning of the words in the metaphorical statement.[20] The tension observed in metaphor is a result not only of the two terms in the statement (subject and predicate) but also of the two interpretations (literal and metaphorical) of the statement.

Ricoeur also objects to the proposition which tends to reduce metaphor to a device which simply illustrates an idea. Metaphor does indeed embrace the concept of resemblance, but it is a resemblance in which ordinary vision sees no kinship.

> Metaphor is close to what Gilbert Ryle has called a "category mistake." It is a calculated error, which brings together things that do not go together and by means of this apparent misunderstanding it causes a new, hitherto unnoticed relation of meaning to spring up between the terms that previous systems of classification had ignored or not allowed.[21]

For example, Paul writes, 'You are our letter,' (2 Cor 3:2). Ordinary vision does not see enough similarity between the categories of 'person' and 'letter' to make such a bold ontological claim. But Paul, while writing about letters of recommendation, commits a calculated error. He links together the categories of persons and documents and produces a new meaning. These categories do not normally go together but Paul detects a kinship between them. In an instance of discourse, this new metaphor is born, because Paul allows a 'hitherto unnoticed relation of meaning to spring up' between two different terms, persons and letters.

In his fourth proposition, Ricoeur rejects the idea that *substitution* is the process which solves the riddle of metaphor. Classical rhetoric stated that the metaphor could be explicated simply by substituting the word whose literal meaning corresponded to the figurative meaning of the word used. 'But substitution is a sterile operation, whereas in a live metaphor the tension ... elicits a veritable creation of meaning.'[22] The metaphor exists in the tension of the statement - that is, the tension between the literal and the metaphorical interpretations of the statement. Since the metaphor is not the one word which seems out of place in the sentence, the process of substitution is inadequate to explain the metaphor. The metaphor is grounded in the sentence, not in the word. This again illustrates why Ricoeur prefers to speak of 'metaphorical statement' instead of 'metaphorical word'.

The metaphor, then, is created in a moment, by an author with an acute sense for resemblance. His semantic innovation has no existence in language before he forms it. And it only continues to exist because two incompatible terms are linked together as subject and predicate in a metaphorical statement. In this way, metaphors thrive on a certain discordance. Because metaphor is created through unusual attribution, it is a semantic process.[23] Once again, it is clear that the process involved is not *naming* but *predication* because metaphors do not name but rather characterize what has already been named.[24] In the example of Psalm 23:1, 'the Lord' is the subject and 'is my shepherd' is the predicate. The tension created between these two conflicting fields of reference immediately provokes one to ask: 'What is there about "shepherd" that reminds the psalmist of the Lord? What characteristics of "shepherd" are applicable to the Lord?' Likewise in 2 Corinthians 3.2, the reader is startled by the collision of foreign categories. He is challenged to detect the attributions of 'letters' which might pertain to 'persons'. Ricoeur explains how this interpretation proceeds:

> Metaphor is analyzed in accordance with two modalities of semantic relationship. In effect, the expression first functions literally...Subsequently, it functions iconically, by indirectly designating another, similar situation...Thus, the iconic representation harbours the power to elaborate, to extend the parallel structure...One must therefore 'work out' the parallelism between situations that will guide the iconic transposition of one to the other.[25]

The fifth proposition of Ricoeur opposes the claim of classical rhetoric which states that a metaphor does not create any new meaning and can be translated by substitution. The collective force of Ricoeur's first four postulates is now sufficient to demonstrate the fallacy of this

claim. It is clear that in a tension-metaphor new meaning is created, because 'the metaphorical meaning is non-lexical: it is a value created by the context ... It is the clash on the literal level that leads one to seek out a meaning beyond the lexical meaning.'[26] Because metaphor involves a tension in the entire statement, it is not possible to single out one 'metaphorical' word and replace it with another word whose literal meaning fits the context and produces the same meaning. Therefore, 'real metaphors are not translatable.'[27] They are not translatable simply because they create their own meaning. They may be paraphrased, though, but this does not ensure that all of the metaphor's innovative meaning will be explicated. However, 'good explication will maximize all of the possible legitimate meaning of a metaphor.'[28]

Concerning the ninth postulate of the old rhetorical model, which states that metaphor is an ornament of discourse used for its emotive value, Ricoeur holds a contrary point of view. A metaphor is far from being an ornament, which adds beauty, decoration, or pleasing variety. Rather, metaphor causes a clash, a tension, a contradiction. It creates a new way of looking at things. It can have a disturbing effect initially because it brings together two entities whose resemblance has not yet been registered. Because metaphor elicits a tension which the reader must resolve, it is safe to say that metaphor is not an ornament of discourse. Although metaphor may have emotive impact, its main value is in the cognitive realm. 'It offers new information. A metaphor tells us something new about reality.'[29] How does this happen? How does metaphor accomplish this? As mentioned earlier, true metaphor brings together two fields or categories not generally associated with each other. In this new relationship, the one item begins to reveal similarities to the other. M.

Black has explained it well:

> A memorable metaphor has the power to bring two separate domains into cognitive and emotional relation by using language directly appropriate to the one as a lens for seeing the other; the implications, suggestions, and supporting values entwined with the literal use of the metaphorical expression enable us to see a new subject matter in a new way. The extended meanings that result, the relations between initially disparate realms created, can neither be antecedently predicted nor subsequently paraphrased in prose.[30]

Thus, metaphor sheds its reputation as an 'ornament' and fulfils a lively and creative role in discourse.

It is now possible to state Ricoeur's six points of a semantic theory of metaphor. These propositions, influenced by Richards' revived philosophy of rhetoric, are opposed to the old substitution theory developed by classical rhetoric.

> 1. Metaphor is a phenomenon of predication, not naming.
> 2. The phenomenon of metaphor occurs at the level of the sentence, not at the level of the word. Thus, there are metaphorical statements but no metaphorical words.
> 3. Metaphor reveals a hitherto unnoticed kinship between seemingly alien categories.
> 4. True metaphors exist because of a tension between the literal and the metaphorical interpretation of a sentence.
> 5. Real metaphors are not translatable. They may be paraphrased, but their innovative meaning can never be fully verbalized.
> 6. Metaphors generate new information about reality. The unusual predication stimulates the reader to perceive new relationships and new insights.

Another approach to a new theory of metaphor, in addition to that advanced by Richards in his *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, is that of logical grammar, suggested by M. Black, in *Models and Metaphor*. Ricoeur sees three significant contributions to the theory of metaphor made by Black. First, Black recognizes that the entire statement constitutes the metaphor, though

the emphasis falls upon one word, whose presence in the sentence causes it to be metaphorical (84). The distinction is made between the *focus* and the *frame* of the metaphor, the frame being the metaphorical sentence and the focus being the word which is used metaphorically. This terminology clarifies the relationship between the 'undivided meaning of the statement and the focused meaning of the word' (85).

Black's second contribution is his demonstration that a substitution theory is inadequate to account for the functioning of metaphor. Since all of the words of the sentence are required to constitute a metaphor, it is impossible to think that one can translate or even paraphrase a metaphor by substituting a word used literally for the word used metaphorically. Such a substitution would result in a 'loss of cognitive content'.[31] Since a metaphor is untranslatable, '... it carries new information; briefly, it tells us something' (87).

Finally, Black's theory begins to explain how a metaphor works. The metaphorical statement contains a principal subject and a subsidiary subject. The subsidiary subject connotes a system of associated commonplaces, which are then attributed to the primary subject. Some of these implied characteristics are congruent with the primary subject and are, therefore, applicable. Others are irrelevant or inappropriate and are, therefore, eliminated from consideration. In this way, the features of the primary subject are organized by reference to the subsidiary subject.

The 'system of associated commonplaces' is both a strength and a weakness in this theory. Its strength is that it accounts for the 'transposition' of meaning that Aristotle identified as being at the very heart of the metaphorical operation. Its weakness is that, since these

commonplaces are already widely known, the result is often likely to be nothing more than 'trivial metaphors' (88). Furthermore, this theory does not explain *how* one knows which features of the subsidiary subject are to be transferred to the principal subject and which are to be rejected (89).

A more frontal attack on Black's theory comes from Soskice.[32] She notes that its greatest weakness is its insistence on two distinct subjects, one subordinate to the other. This results in its application only to metaphors of the 'A is a B' type, and is unable to cope with those which consist of only a noun coupled with an adjective or a participle. More serious still, '... the "two subjects" position invariably lapses into a comparison theory and ceases to merit the title "interactive"'.[33]

The third and final approach to a semantics of metaphor which Ricoeur reviews is the literary critical view advanced by M. Beardsley.[34] His theory states that the basis for metaphor is 'logical absurdity', in which a given subject is paired with a modifier that initially seems incompatible or contradictory. But living language is powerful enough continually to extend the boundaries of meaningfulness, especially since words have 'inexhaustible connotative possibilities' (95). The abundance of connotations assures that, with help from clues in the context, even the most troublesome of metaphors can be 'explicated' (94). This principle of 'plenitude' (96) maximizes the meaning of a metaphorical statement, and it implies that original metaphors create an 'emergent meaning' (96). Though Beardsley's theory is attractive, it suffers the same fate as Black's, for 'potential range of connotations' is really little more than a 'system of associated commonplaces' (98). Thus, Beardsley's theory is not fully semantic, because it goes beyond the words of the sentence to a comparison of *things*, in order to account for the production of metaphorical meaning.

Though Ricoeur finds the theories of all three of these thinkers (Richards, Black, and Beardsley) beneficial, he also finds all of them deficient at certain places. At the close of Study 3, he offers a succinct explanation of metaphor, which is perhaps his best short statement on the subject:

> I would rather say that metaphorical attribution is essentially the construction of the network of interactions that causes a certain context to be one that is real and unique. Accordingly, metaphor is a semantic event that takes place at the point where several semantic fields intersect. It is because of this construction that all the words, taken together, make sense. Then, and only then, the metaphorical *twist* is at once an event *and* a meaning, an event that means or signifies, an emergent meaning created by language (98-99).

This statement, either explicitly or implicitly, correlates metaphor with discourse and the five pairs of traits of discourse with which Study 3 began. The dialectic of *event and meaning* is made explicit here. The intertwining of the functions of *identification and predication* are implied in the phrase 'metaphorical attribution', which requires that, in a metaphor, a subject is identified and a predicate is attributed to it. The creation of a metaphor, furthermore, has both a *locutionary aspect*, as an act of discourse, and an *illocutionary force*, since it involves the 'self-engagement' (73) of the author in the truth of the statement he is making about reality. The fourth pair, *sense and reference*, is implied here, in that the semantic fields are constructed on the basis of both a comparison and contrast *within* language and a pointing to a reality *outside* of language. Finally, the distinction between *paradigm and syntagm* is alluded to in the phrase, '... all the words, taken together, make sense.' Ricoeur, therefore, has built up a strong case for anchoring metaphor

firmly within the realm of discourse. Metaphor is truly an '"instance of discourse" *par excellence*' (97).

Study 4, 'Metaphor and the semantics of the word', does, in Ricoeur's own words, '... appear to move backwards' (4), for its purpose is to demonstrate the importance of the *word* in the formation of metaphor. Following the sustained emphasis in Study 3 on the *statement* as the real locus of metaphor, based on the work of English language theorists, it is surprising to see Ricoeur review, somewhat approvingly, the work of French linguists who stress the role of the word and its place in the system as essential to the structure of metaphor.

Ricoeur does agree in part with their position.

> [Aristotle's] definition of metaphor as transposition of the name is actually not wrong. It allows metaphor to be identified and to be classed among the tropes. Above all, the traditional rhetorical definition cannot be eliminated because the word remains the carrier of the effect of metaphorical meaning. It should be remembered in this connection that, in discourse, it is the word that assumes the function of semantic identity: and it is this identity that metaphor modifies (4-5).

The general position of most contemporary French linguists is to continue to view metaphor as a one-word trope, which is produced by substitution and characterized by a deviation in meaning (101-2). This tendency is a result of two major emphases - 'the monism of the sign and the primacy of the word' (103) - which guide their discussions of language.

Ricoeur demonstrates this by referring to the work of H. Konrad and S. Ullmann, who are heavily dependent upon and influenced by F. de Saussure.[35] All three of these writers define metaphor as a process of denomination, and they try to account for the emergence of metaphor as an event within the linguistic system, without reference to discourse.

Konrad sees two aspects in the metaphorical process, generalization and concretization. A metaphor generalizes, by identifying a characteristic. It concretizes by attributing this characteristic to a particular subject for the first time. The metaphorical term is so appropriate that it can designate the new object with a minimum of shock. Thus, 'metaphor names an object with the help of the most typical representative of one of its attributes.'[36] Konrad fails to see the implicit predicative operation which is at work alongside of the explicit denominative function which she addresses.

The work of Ullmann proceeds upon similar lines. The word is chosen as the carrier of meaning, and the meaning of a word is the combination of its name and its sense (111-2). The word has an openness which allows it to bear several meanings and to acquire even more. The result is polysemy, and polysemy itelf is resolved by reference to context, which 'sifts' (115) the possible meanings until the one most appropriate is found. Metaphor contributes to polysemy by naming things in a striking and surprising manner. For Ullmann, then, metaphor never escapes the prison of the word, for it is a naming game. He '... never confronts the truly predicative operation' (119) which produces the lively metaphor.

Ricoeur points out the weaknesses of these approaches. Metaphor, as change of meaning, can not be accounted for inside of a semiotic system, for it is in the act of speech that these changes occur. '... Each individual change is a leap that attests to the dependence of innovation on speech' (121). What makes the attempts of Konrad and Ullmann plausible is that metaphor does have some structural aspects. But it also has some historical aspects, that can not be explained within the system. Thus, 'the word seems truly to stand at the crossroads of two orders of

consideration, thanks to its capacity for acquiring new meanings without losing the old meanings' (122). The flexibility of the word allows this 'cumulative process' (122) to occur. Thus the word has a role to play in the formation of metaphor, but the word alone, as a member of the semiotic system, cannot completely account for the production of new metaphorical meanings.

Since metaphor owes something to both the word and the statement, Ricoeur suggests that '... the real location of metaphor in the theory of discourse would begin to define itself *between* the sentence and the word, *between* predication and naming' (125). There are several reasons for this. First, the plurivocity of the word renders it 'an unstable structure' (127) in a system where order is the rule. Its polysemy requires not a system but a sentence to sort it out. Second, it is only in a context that the meaning of a word can be specified. Words do have a degree of autonomy, but they are always subject to the rule of the context in which they occur (128). Finally, it is discourse itself which allows words to function effectively. For words in isolation have only '... a potential meaning, made up of the sum of its partial meanings... They have actual meaning only in a given sentence, that is to say, in an instance of discourse' (129).

At the end of Study 4, Ricoeur describes how the relationship between the word and the statement affects the functioning of metaphor.

> For a sentence to make sense it is necessary that all the acceptations of the semantic potential of the word under consideration be eliminated except one, that which is compatible with the meaning, itself appropriately reduced, of the other words of the sentence. In the case of metaphor, none of the already codified acceptations is unsuitable; it is necessary, therefore, to retain all the acceptations allowed *plus one*, that which will rescue the meaning of the entire statement (131).

Ricoeur concludes that the integrative power of the metaphorical sentence is focalized in a single metaphorical word. In return, the word itself depends upon the sentence for its contextualization. Thus, the place of metaphor is between words and sentences (133).

Study 5, 'Metaphor and the new rhetoric', continues the detour through the semantics of the word. This route now runs through the neighbourhood of the New Rhetoric, especially as it appears among French writers. At first the new rhetoric seems to be nothing more than a reformulation of the old classical rhetoric, but it actually makes a new contribution. It discusses metaphor in relation to *figure* and *deviation*, both of which serve to advance the theory of metaphor beyond that conceived by Aristotle. But the centrality of the word remains the primary theorem for these scholars, just as it did for those reviewed and criticized in Study 4.

This study progresses on a format of question and answer. The first question is: If metaphor is defined in terms of *deviation*, then from what is it a deviation? 'Where is the "rhetoric degree zero" from which the distance could be felt, appreciated, even measured' (137)? The new rhetoric can offer three different answers. G. Genette suggests that the deviation is the difference between what the author of the metaphor thought and what he wrote.[37] According to this approach, every metaphor is translatable. The reader simply substitutes the absent word for the one the author wrote, and the riddle is solved. But the task of interpretation is to make sense out of the words that are *present*, and it is no help in explicating a sentence to replace the troublesome words, especially since the reader has no certain knowledge of what the author thought.

A second answer is proposed by J. Cohen, who works from the basis of a relative, not absolute, degree zero.[38] The language of science is the

least figurative of all, and it offers a firm foundation from which the figurative language in other disciplines can be plotted. If one translates the figurative statement into the straightforward language of science, then this 'identity of information' (141) corresponds to the zero degree, from which the deviation of the figurative statement can be assessed. This answer is not totally acceptable because it relies on an external factor (the language of science) to clarify the figure (141).

A third answer is that a figure consists of a base which has not been modified and another part which has undergone rhetorical deviation.[39] The invariant aspects of the base provide the starting point from which the deviation in the remainder of the figure can be identified (142).

A second question in this chapter is: What does it mean to call a metaphor a *figure*? As noted earlier, everyone uses metaphors to talk about metaphor, because there is no non-metaphorical point at which to stand and from which to view metaphor. The metaphor of *figure* is no exception, being drawn from the semantic field of *space* (or shaped space). This suggests that, as a figure, metaphor has both an exterior and a form, and that this external form presents '... something like a milieu of spatiality overlaid by a design' (144). To exteriorize thought is to express it in discourse, and this is often done in figures of speech, which bring to light the invisible features of thought (145). Metaphor, as the most powerful of the figures, opens up a meaningful space for itself by means of the many connotations which it is able to generate (147). But because, for the new rhetoricians, metaphor depends upon its connotative ability and because connotation is so closely related to substitution, this account of metaphor as a figure of speech is unacceptable to Ricoeur (148).

The third question of Study 5 is this: How can one make sense of

metaphor, if it is considered to be both deviation (a spatial metaphor) and a figure (a metaphor of exterior form)? Ricoeur cites with approval (149) the contribution of J. Cohen on this issue.[40] The principle of pertinence requires that, for a sentence to make sense, the predicate must say something that is pertinent to the subject. To say that 'the sky is dead' is impertinent because the attribution of life to such an entity is not appropriate (152). Metaphor is guilty of 'semantic impertinence', because it makes just this kind of predication. But metaphor carries with it the ability to reduce this deviation - to create a pertinence - because it finds its justification in the drawing together of two or more semantic fields, which then allows the label to pertain to its subject (153). Thus, the concepts of semantic impertinence and of the violation of a code go a long way toward justifying the description of metaphor as a 'deviation' and a 'figure'. The result is that, even though Cohen remains committed ultimately to a word-based theory of metaphor, he recognizes that the functioning of metaphor is properly a predicative process (156). And he offers '... a semiotic equivalent of the semantic process' (157) of metaphor which Ricoeur espouses.

Though recognizing some helpful features in the new rhetoric, Ricoeur still prefers the tension theory of metaphor, which he proposed in Study 3, because

> ... it alone gives an account, through the interaction of all the terms present at the same time in the same statement, of the *production* of the intersection that the theory of the word-metaphor postulates. The crucial phenomenon is the *augmentation* of the initial polysemy of words by means of an instance of discourse. What compels the addition of a semantic variant that did not exist before is the recoil shock where the predicative structure and the semantic field meet.[41]

Ricoeur, then, notes the change of meaning and increase of meaning which is focalized on the metaphorical term in the sentence, but he holds tenaciously to the position that this effect is the result of the interaction of all of the words in the sentence upon this metaphorical term. Theories of word metaphor can observe this effect, but they cannot give a logical account of it. Only a theory of metaphor as *statement*, a truly semantic theory, can account for the production of metaphorical meaning.

Study 6, entitled 'The work of resemblance', is concerned with the relationship of metaphor and resemblance. Ricoeur's thesis is clearly stated at the beginning of the chapter:

> I propose to dissociate the fate of resemblance from that of the substitution theory and to reinterpret the role of resemblance within the guidelines of the theory of interaction set out in the third Study (173).

Resemblance is often associated with the theory of substitution, as is seen in the sixth postulate of the old rhetorical theory of metaphor. All figures have a 'reason' for the transposition of meaning which they effect, and the paradigmatic structure of metaphor is that of resemblance (46). This pact between resemblance, substitution, and metaphor is strengthened by the work of R. Jakobson.[42] He proposes that sentences, viewed as a large sign, are the result of combination and selection. Syntax operates with the combination factor, semantics with that of selection. 'In the constitution of a message, one word is chosen among other similar words within a group that constitutes a paradigm based on similarity' (176). Thus, metaphor viewed as a semantic phenomenon, is cut off from any predicative operation and is reduced to the role of a mere word, which may be substituted for any other word in the group from which it is selected

(179). In the words of Jakobson himself: 'Similarity connects a metaphorical term with the term for which it is substituted.'[43]

There is certainly an essential relationship between resemblance and metaphor.[44] This was recognized even by Aristotle, who noted that '... a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars.'[45] But the characteristic of similarity in metaphor can not be fully accounted for by the theory of substitution.

Instead, Ricoeur attempts to incorporate the notion of resemblance into his interaction theory. His first point is that resemblance is better explained as a process of predication than of denomination (194). The fact of resemblance allows something new to be said by the metaphorical term about the subject of the metaphor. Similarity begins the operation, but metaphor is not exhausted by similarity alone. Secondly, it is metaphor which enables one to perceive the similarity amidst the dissimilarity. In fact, the '... resemblance is more constructed than seen' (195). Furthermore, metaphor allows one to see the similarity 'despite difference, in spite of contradiction' (196). By recognizing resemblance among disparity, metaphor breaks down old boundaries and initiates new categories of classification. Finally, metaphor makes visible new patterns of relatedness 'in the interplay of identity and difference' (199). Thus, Ricoeur succeeds in wrenching resemblance from the grasp of substitution and connecting it with his own interaction theory of metaphor.

Study 7, 'Metaphor and reference,' crosses the boundary from semantics to hermeneutics, from the study of the meaning of a sentence to the study of the meaning of texts. The issue here is: 'What does the metaphorical statement say about reality' (216)? The question of reference is not addressed by semiotics, the science of signs, because signs, caught up in

the 'interplay of differences and oppositions' (216), only refer to other signs in the system. 'Sign differs from sign, discourse refers to the world' (216). Or, semiotics is immanent; semantics is transcendent.

G. Frege, in his essay 'On Sense and Reference',[46] clarified the meaning of these terms. At the level of the word, there is a 'regular connexion' (217) between a sign, its sense, and its reference. To a sign corresponds a sense, and every sense presupposes a reference. In this way, speakers can use words to identify objects. This distinction also works at the level of sentences, which identify not objects but states of affairs. The statement has a sense, what it says, and a reference, that about which the something is said. 'Our intention in speaking or thinking... is the striving for truth,... [which] drives us always to advance from the sense to the reference.'[47] Thus, both word and sentence, each in their own way, express a sense and designate a reference.

The question of reference posed by a text is more complex. In regard to literature, sense is attainable, but reference is suspended. The poem or novel does not designate a real state of affairs. The relationship of literature to reference is not descriptive. Nevertheless, it does refer, but it does so by means of its structure - its arrangement, genre, and style (219). 'To interpret a work is to display the world to which it refers...' (220). Ricoeur formulates his postulate of reference this way:

> The literary work through the structure proper to it displays a world only under the condition that the reference of descriptive discourse is suspended. Or to put it another way, discourse in the literary work sets out its denotation as a second-level denotation, by means of the suspension of the first-level denotation of discourse (221).

The implication for metaphor is similar. The literal interpretation of a metaphor fails, and sense is made only by means of a metaphorical interpretation. These two levels of sense correspond to two levels of reference. The first-level reference is abandoned, along with the first-level sense. The real meaning of the metaphor is found in its second-level sense and reference. 'A second-level reference, which is properly the metaphorical reference, is set free by means of the suspension of the first-level reference' (221).

There are objections, though, which can be raised against the possibility of metaphor having a referential function. Following the schema of Jakobson, one might argue that metaphor does not refer to the real world. Rather, it refers, by means of substitution, only to other words in the same field for which it can be replaced (223). A similar claim is that metaphor is just another means by which the poet can play with language for language's sake (224). It has no external reference or cognitive value. Another line of objection comes from that type of literary criticism which would hold that metaphor, like poetry and literature in general, has emotive value, that is, the ability to project a mood, and nothing more (226). But this is an effect of metaphor, and it does not explain the creation of meaning achieved by metaphor. And the previous objections overlook the fact that, though reference is suspended or abolished at the literal first-level, this does not mean that there is no reference at all.

This leads to the heart of Ricoeur's thesis on the relation of metaphor and reference. The first-level reference is abolished because it is linked to the first-level sense, or literal interpretation, of the metaphorical statement. Because of a 'category mistake'[48] or a 'semantic

impertinence'[49], the literal interpretation breaks down. But the destruction of a literal sense does not necessarily lead to nonsense. The metaphorical interpretation is employed in order to generate meaning on the rubble of the old literal interpretation (230). The split sense - a divergence between the literal and the metaphorical meaning - carries with it a split reference. The literal reference is abandoned along with its sense. But in its place arises a second order reference to complement the metaphorical sense. 'Such is the schema of split reference. Essentially, it sets up a parallel between metaphorization of reference and metaphorization of meaning' (231).

The question of metaphorical reference is taken up quite differently by M. Black and M. Hesse,[50] whose works Ricoeur cites with approval. Black identifies three kinds of models (scale, analogue, and theoretical), but it is the third type which is most applicable to metaphor (240). The theoretical models are not constructions or diagrams but rather a *language* which is introduced to provide a new means of identifying entities and discussing relations (241). They work with a logic of discovery instead of a logic of deduction or investigation (242).

The working of a theoretical model is seen in the current research on particle physics.[51] A new £1 billion machine, a particle accelerator called LEP, has recently begun operation near Geneva. It is designed to investigate the existence and relationship of subatomic particles, by generating high-speed collision between electrons and positrons. The scientists involved hope to learn more about the recently discovered Z particles, which '... will decay into quarks, the elusive fundamental building blocks of matter....' Professor Kalmus, one of the British scientists working on the project, said: 'We hope not only for the

particles we know but to see new phenomena.... We're looking for something that gives mass to the universe and so for the source of gravitation.'

Behind all of this experimentation are theories which set out the structure and behaviour of the atom. Previous atomic theories have been only partially correct, so new theories have been adopted and then revised in accordance with later research. These new theories have predictive potential, and they have led the scientists to 'look' (they will see, perhaps, the effect of the particle but not the particle itself) for certain particles in particular. Thus, these theoretical models have both explanatory and predictive significance. They account for the activity of particles already known, and they propose the existence of new particles whose identity is suspected but not yet identified.

Theoretical models also organize and redescribe what is known about a subject. In this way, they closely resemble metaphors. Some metaphors, known as 'root metaphors' (244), are so radical that they organize related metaphors into a network. For example, 'God is king', calls up not only the power and majesty of God, but also other descriptions of God, such as 'Lord', 'Father', and 'Fortress'.[52]

The conclusion of the chapter on 'Metaphor and reference' turns to the issue of metaphorical truth. For Ricoeur, metaphorical truth has a tensive and dialectical character, which finds its focus in the copula 'is' (247). The metaphorical 'is' simultaneously means 'is', 'is not', and 'is like'. The first option, 'is' means 'is', suggests an 'ontological *vehemence*' (249), in which the author of the metaphor affirms that there is a resemblance between the subject and the predicate of the metaphor. He perceives an identity in the midst of difference and proclaims this with an 'A *is* a B' type of metaphorical statement. This very assertion leads to

the second possibility, that 'is' means 'is not'. For in laying aside 'ontological *naïveté*' (251), the truth comes out that A is not B after all. This is the unmasking of metaphor for which interpretation calls (252). The 'is' and the 'is not' are resolved in an 'is like', for a simile is a metaphor which has begun to be explicated. This inclusion of 'is like' at this point can only occur after the notion of 'resemblance' has been reclaimed from a substitution theory and restored to its proper place in the interaction theory. This move was justified in Study 6 and paves the way for the conclusion of Study 7. The truth of metaphor is paradoxical. 'The paradox consists in the fact that there is no other way to do justice to the notion of metaphorical truth than to include the critical incision of the (literal) "is not" within the ontological vehemence of the (metaphorical) "is"' (255). This paradox is resolved in the 'is like', which preserves the truth of both the identity and the difference expressed by the metaphor.

The eighth and final study is 'Metaphor and philosophical discourse.' This unit contributes less than the preceding ones toward a theory for interpreting Pauline metaphors, yet a brief summary of its principle points will round out this overview of metaphor.

The first topic is that of the relation between analogy and metaphor. With regard to the relation of metaphor and the analogy of being in the writings of Aristotle, Ricoeur concludes that there is little similarity in their operations. 'The ordered equivocalness of being and poetic equivocalness move on radically different levels' (261). Philosophical discourse carefully controls and organizes the polysemy of its language, while the work of metaphor in poetry seems to proceed with a reckless abandon. Furthermore, analogy has a conceptual structure which differs

from that of metaphor. It always implies 'an equality of relations among four terms' (271), something which is not necessarily true of metaphor. In addition to retaining its own conceptual structure, analogy also 'receives a transcendental aspect from the field to which it is applied' (270). The sophisticated structure and transcendental character of analogy reveals that, in terms of form and function, it is already 'a step beyond metaphor' (272).

Next, the application of analogy to theology in the writings of Thomas Aquinas is reviewed. Aquinas' problem was to describe a theological discourse which could, at the same time, both preserve the concept of divine transcendence *and* allow the possibility of communication between God and man (273). 'Analogous attribution' was his proposal, because 'analogy functions at the level of names and predicates, and it belongs to the conceptual order' (274). Through the use of proportionality, the *distance* between God and man could be maintained, without the *difference* becoming radically exclusive. It is at the point of proportionality that analogy comes closest to metaphor (278). But it is at the point of predication that their separation is most distinct, for analogy 'rests on the predication of transcendental terms', while metaphor requires 'the predication of meanings that carry their material content with them' (280).

The third enquiry is into the relationship between metaphor and metaphysics. The point of departure is Heidegger's famous maxim: 'The metaphorical exists only within the metaphysical.'[53] This statement suggests (at least) two propositions: 'the metaphysical transfer of the sensible to the non-sensible, the metaphorical transfer of the literal to the figurative' (281). The implication is that the reader should take seriously the use of metaphor in philosophical discourse (283).

A serious challenge to the efficacy of metaphor in philosophical discourse is raised by J. Derrida,[54] who aims at '... demonstrating the limitless metaphoricity of metaphor' (285). Both the language and the method of Derrida are obscure, but he seems to be saying that *all* language was originally metaphorical. But, as metaphor was used so often, it died, and now dead metaphor conveys only a literal sense, which conceals its true conceptual power. One result is that '... discourse on metaphor is itself infected by the universal metaphoricity of philosophical discourse' (286). According to Ricoeur, the critique of Derrida attempts to '... unmask the *unthought* conjunction of *hidden* metaphysics and *worn-out* metaphor' (285).

Ricoeur offers clarification to the theory of Heidegger and Derrida at several points, as well as using their work to expound further his view on the subject. Dead metaphor does indeed seem sometimes to result in the simple process of denomination. But that is because the oft-used metaphor has lost its tensive character and, along with it, its predicative operation (290). The literal meaning of a word can be contrasted with its metaphorical use, for that is one way of identifying metaphor. But the *literal* sense should not necessarily be equated with the *original* sense. It is a well known fact that words change their meaning with time. Thus, the literal sense should be construed as its ordinary use in current speech (291). Finally, as a corrective to both Heidegger and Derrida, Ricoeur reminds the reader that '... it is not metaphor that carries the structure of Platonic metaphysics; metaphysics instead seizes the metaphorical process in order to make it work to the benefit of metaphysics' (294-5).

Ricoeur next considers the relation between poetic discourse and speculative discourse. He suggests that the conceptual articulation of speculative discourse becomes possible because of the metaphorical dynamism

of poetic discourse (296). The 'semantic shock' (296) engendered by metaphor calls for explication so as to produce conceptual knowledge. This increase in knowledge is accompanied by a gain in reference (297). There is a dual relation between reference and predication. First, strange predicates can be applied to familiar referents in order to highlight some new aspect. Likewise, familiar predicates can be applied to alien referents '... in order to explore a referential field that is not directly accessible' (298). In this way, the metaphorical statement operates in two different semantic and referential fields simultaneously. This suggests that meaning, exerting centripetal force on one field while submitting to the gravitational tug of another, is not a stable entity, but, rather, that it has a 'dynamic, directional, vectoral character' (299). This interplay of forces provides a 'semantic sketch' which calls for a 'conceptual determination' (299). Thus metaphorical statements, by means of a sort of 'ontological vehemence' (300), offer clues which require further elaboration.

This elaboration is the activity of speculative discourse, which in no way is to be linked with or identified with poetic discourse. They are related, as stages on the way to a destination, but they must not be blurred together, as Heidegger does (309). They are different levels of discourse, which cooperate with one another but must always remain distinct. Speculative discourse distinguishes itself in one particular fashion, in that it is able to state its case unequivocally (or almost, anyway), while metaphor is mired willingly and even gleefully in the 'duplicity of language.'[55]

Metaphor is drawn out of its lair by interpretation, which is related to speculative discourse and works with concepts. 'Interpretation is then

a mode of discourse that functions at the intersection of two domains, metaphorical and speculative' (303). It is influenced by two competing forces - 'the clarity of the concept' and the 'dynamism of metaphor' (303). Both are needed for the articulation of reality, but it is metaphor, *la métaphore vive*, which enlivens discourse and calls for a work of interpretation. Interpretation, in its attempt to explicate, would destroy the metaphorical by means of the conceptual, but '... metaphor itself has an immediacy and a vitality that mocks at all such reductive explanations of the process.'[56]

The final relation to be explored in Study 8 is that of metaphor and reference. This pair was indeed the central topic of Study 7, but, at this point, Ricoeur approaches it again from a more philosophical angle. The notion of sense drives inexorably toward reference. 'Something must be for something to be said' (304). But it is not necessary for the thing to be demonstrated '... on the field of a verificationalist concept of truth, itself bound up with a positivist concept of reality' (306). Rather, reality can be 'set before the eyes'[57] by means of metaphor. Metaphor, which ultimately resides in the copula 'to be', means 'is, is not, and is like' all at the same time. The 'is like' of imaginative resemblance mediates the naïve realism of the 'is' and the reductionist tendency of the 'is not'. Thus metaphor can affirm the existence of entities which are beyond the reach of empirical observation and can propose the possibility of states of affairs which are not accessible to ordinary vision. This metaphorical seeing of truth resides in the imaginative power opened up by metaphor, operating under the theory of split reference. The truth of metaphor, then, is similar to the 'tensional' truth of poetry (313).

In summary, then, the theory of metaphor advocated by Ricoeur is truly

a tension theory. According to Ricoeur, there is a tension between the words of the metaphorical statement itself. They come from different semantic fields and create a clash when they are brought together. Also, there is a tension between the literal and the metaphorical interpretations of the sentence. The literal is absurd or contradictory and must be discarded. In its stead, a metaphorical interpretation is established which is able to make sense of the verbal conflict. It does so on the basis of resemblance, which is also tensional, because it sees identity in the midst of and in spite of difference. The literal reference is dissipated along with the literal sense. The result is not no reference at all, but rather a second level reference, a metaphorical reference to correspond with the metaphorical sense. In this way, metaphor redescribes reality. It has a cognitive function and is not merely ornamental or illustrative. Metaphor says something about reality.

SECTION B. LETTERS.

The tension theory of metaphor, proposed by P. Ricoeur and summarized in the preceding section, can be applied to the explanation, understanding, and interpretation of metaphors in 2 Corinthians 3. Such a theory will allow one to identify metaphors when they occur in this text. Sometimes, the reader of a passage fails to notice a figure of speech because he is already familiar with the passage and because he already has in mind an interpretation of the passage and its imagery.' In such a case, the metaphor is not reckoned as such because its force is already dissipated. The absurdity it originally produced has already been explained away. The metaphor has become a mere relic of the familiar interpretation which explicates it.

The employment of the tension theory forces the reader to take a new look at the text. It invites him to lay aside traditional interpretations and to experience once again the original absurdity of the metaphor, the clash of incompatible categories, the awkwardness of unusual attribution. Then the reader is compelled to analyze his experience and the semantic event which generated it. The tension theory also leads the student beyond *word* studies toward an examination of the sentences in which these words appear, for it is in the *sentence* that the tension of the metaphor occurs. After having been confronted once again with the strangeness of the literal interpretation ('Our God is a rock,' for example, provokes an astonishing literal interpretation for a worshipper in the Judeo-Christian tradition), the reader is challenged to develop a metaphorical interpretation of the statement in question. While experiencing the tension between the literal and the metaphorical interpretations, he might realize that this metaphor

is very difficult to translate. His paraphrase may seem inadequate. Having given a diligent and prolonged effort, the reader comes to the realization that the metaphor says more than he can say. It communicates more than he can verbalize. In this way, he will perceive that the biblical writers have used metaphors (some metaphors, at least) as '... an instrument for the redescription of lived experience that permits us to see new connections in things, or to decode the traces of God's presence in history.'[2]

The text of 2 Corinthians 3 contains three metaphors to which Ricoeur's theory will be applied. The first of these is 'letter', which Paul develops in the paragraph comprising verses 1-3. Verse 1 opens with a question: "Are we beginning again to commend ourselves?" This question arises from the preceding paragraph (2.14-17), in which Paul might appear to some to be boasting about his relationship with God. God causes Paul to participate in a triumphal march by means of Christ (v.14). God, through the agency of Paul and his company, makes himself known everywhere (v.14b). 'Everywhere' (ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ) is either hyperbole, meaning 'everywhere I have travelled' or even (though perhaps still somewhat hyperbolical) 'everywhere I have travelled - and from those places to everywhere else!'. Paul's efforts result in salvation and life for some and in destruction and death for others (vv.15-16). Then Paul avers that he is sincere, not a 'hawker' or a 'huckster' of the word of God (v.17).

One possible interpretation would state that Paul supposes that some of his Corinthian comrades might accuse him of boasting or bragging. That someone might entertain such a thought is an indicator that there are those in Corinth who are opposed to Paul, or at least suspicious of him. Paul appears to be a bit sensitive to the charge of self-commendation, since it

arises here and again in 2 Corinthians 5.12 ('We are not commending ourselves to you again but giving you cause to be proud of us, ...'). So he poses the question that others will perhaps be asking. Paul would not want to commend himself, nor appear to others to be commending himself, because he prefers ultimately to be commended by the Lord (2 Cor 10.18). So, by asking this question, he hopes to disarm or neutralize his detractors in Corinth. According to this explanation, the occurrence of συστατικὴ ἐπιστολή in 3.1-3 arises in the mind of Paul as he reflects on what he has just written and on the Jewish scriptures, which provide the motifs for this section (2.14-3.6).[3]

Another explanation for the mention of συστατικὴ ἐπιστολή is historically, rather than literarily, oriented. In verse 1, it seems that there are opponents of Paul at work among the Corinthian Christians, and that they would like to discredit Paul. Verse 1 implies that the opponents have brought letters of recommendation to Corinth and that, upon their departure, they requested (or will request) letters of recommendation from Corinth. If the use of letters of recommendation was a common custom among the early Christians,[4] then it is not surprising that the opposition would ask the Corinthians if Paul had such documents. Because the response would have been negative, they would have had an opening to attack the credibility of Paul. The apostle naturally would have been concerned when word of this verbal assault reached him. This may well have been the chain of events which led up to the mention of letters of recommendation in 3.1. Paul takes up the challenge but deals with it in his usual elliptical fashion.

Whether the mention of συστατικὴ ἐπιστολή originated in a literary context with Paul himself or in a historical context among the Corinthians,

the topic nevertheless appears in the text of 2 Corinthians 3. The chapter begins with a question: 'Are we beginning to commend ourselves again?' The question is not answered. Then he asks another question, which furthers the concept of commendation by introducing the notion of letters of recommendation: 'Or do we need as some do letters of recommendation to you or from you?' Because the question is introduced by μή, there is the suggestion that a negative answer is almost certainly expected from the reader. It might be translated, 'We do not need, as some do, letters of recommendation to you or from you, do we?' Here is revealed the main point of 3.1-3, the central concept which gives rise to the metaphorical exposition which follows: Paul does not need letters of recommendation.

It would have helped if Paul had given at least one reason why he did not need letters of recommendation. He could have stated that God is the only recommendation he needs, in much the same way as he later declares that God is the one who qualifies him for ministry (v. 5), though the appeal to God would not necessarily have been a strong argument in this case. He could have recounted his call experience (Gal 1.1, 15-16, for example). Or he could have written that his recommendation comes from the power and the wisdom of God, not the weakness and foolishness of men (1 Cor 1.25). But Paul does none of this.

Paul is not predisposed against letters of recommendation in general. He demonstrates his acknowledgement of their validity by writing a short one on behalf of Phoebe (Rm 16.1-2) and another one for the delegates carrying the collection to Jerusalem (2 Cor 8.16-22).[5] Nor does Paul say that he wishes he had a written recommendation but that he could not acquire one. Paul does none of this. He states his thesis: I do not need letters of recommendation. But he does not follow it up with any reasons.

Instead of explanations, Paul makes a rather curious statement: 'You yourselves are our letter.' It might seem a little strange for the man who says that he does not need a letter of recommendation to produce one anyway. The course of this argument is rather unexpected. After tacitly telling them that he is not going to commend himself and that he does not need letters for his commendation, he immediately starts writing about having a letter. He then continues by describing the letter.

One might suggest that Paul is a sly old fox, or that he is confused or inconsistent. A possible alternative is that Paul has switched points of view. *He* does not have any letters of recommendation, and he does not need any (v. 1). His case is closed. But in verse 2, Paul takes up the Corinthian agenda. It appears that there is a crisis in the congregation about these letters. Somehow or other letters of recommendation had become a significant issue for these people. Perhaps some other Jewish or Christian missionaries had arrived in Corinth, hoping to gain influence with the church there by presenting letters of recommendation. Upon learning that Paul still exercised some authority there, they sought to undermine it by castigating him for having no proper credentials. When Paul got wind of this, he casually inserted a little paragraph in his next epistle to Corinth, stating that he did not need such letters, as some folks apparently did. These 'some' (τινες, v. 1) might be the same as the 'many' (οἱ πολλοί, 2. 17),[6] but they need not be.[7] But they do seem to be persons who made much of their letters of recommendation, and they tried to convince the Corinthians to expect such from Paul and all other missionaries who came to town.

This whole issue of letters of recommendation raises another question. Why are Paul and the Corinthians concerned about these letters at this

point in their relationship? The church there should have known Paul quite well by now, for he had spent a considerable amount of time there (a year and a half, according to Acts 18.11), had visited them a second time, and had been in correspondence with them already not once, but three times.. Why would they now expect to see Paul's letter of recommendation? What could it add to their knowledge of Paul which had already been acquired through their own reading and observation? It all seems a bit puzzling. Even if outsiders had contested the legitimacy of Paul's authority, still the Corinthians who had witnessed Paul's ministry should have been able to vouch for his integrity and effectiveness as an apostle. They should have been able to lay that issue to rest. But for some reason, probably the criticisms of an accredited opposition, the problem of recommendation arose and became known to Paul, and he addressed it in an epistle.

As noted above, the main point in 3.1-3 is that Paul does not need letters of recommendation. He gives no reasons. He simply declares that he does not need them, and he contrasts himself with those who do need them or use them.

It seems inconsistent that Paul proceeds to state that he has a letter: 'You yourselves are our letter' (v. 2). The contradiction is superficial, though, if understood in light of the provisional explanation given above (p. 179). The apparent contradiction is a result of Paul's attention to two different agendas. Paul for his part does not need them. But if the Corinthians need them, then that is another matter. Paul seems to be willing to discuss the matter for the benefit of the Corinthians, even though it is of little consequence to himself.

The seeming inconsistency is also less troublesome when one realizes that Paul is discussing two different kinds of letters. He does not need

literal letters of recommendation. He is consistent in his unwillingness to present letters of recommendation that are written with pen and ink on papyrus. The letter he does present, the Corinthian church, is quite a different kind of recommendation. Paul is more eager to discuss the metaphorical letter of recommendation. In fact, it seems in verses 2-3 that Paul the apologist/polemicist has laid down his quill and that Paul the poet has picked it up. The controversy about literal letters of recommendation has led to the idea of metaphorical letters.[8] The question of credentials gradually fades into the background as Paul's imagination brings 'people-letters' into the foreground.

'You are our letter.' This is a metaphorical statement. Paul has mixed terms from two different categories, persons and documents. Obviously, the persons in question, the Corinthians, are not literally letters, ink and papyrus documents. There is a 'category mistake' here, to use the words of G. Ryle.[9] Paul has linked together these two categories in a way in which they do not ordinarily overlap in normal conversation. Persons are not usually likened to documents, and vice versa. Yet Paul has caused these two categories to overlap throughout verses 2 and 3. This juxtaposition of two different fields of language creates a tension, and it calls for a work of interpretation.

Paul is not the first writer to pull together these two fields in this way. The prophet Jeremiah speaks of a day when the Lord will do a new thing for his people Israel:

> But this is the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel after those days, says the Lord: I will put my law within them, and I will write it upon their hearts; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people (Jer 31.33).

Judging from the context, the Lord is unhappy with his people because they have broken the covenant, by disobeying the commandments. The covenant refers to the agreement God made with Israel through the mediation of Moses after God had brought Israel up out of the land of Egypt (Jer 31.32; Ex 34). The old covenant was written by Moses upon tablets of stone (Ex 34.1) and consisted of the ten commandments (Ex 34.28). But the new covenant would be written upon the hearts of the Israelites. The prophet uses the contrasts of old/new, tablets/hearts, and external/internal to talk about God's ways of dealing with men. God had made an agreement with the Jews. They broke their side of the bargain. God will cut a new covenant.

The idea of internalization is found again in Deuteronomy 6.6: 'And these words which I command you this day shall be upon your heart.' The author does not say 'shall be written' upon your heart, but the idea is not far away. Moses does command the Israelites to write the commands on the doorposts and gates (6.9). Perhaps they would become present upon the heart and mind by means of talking about them (v. 7) and by seeing them regularly (v.8). The point is that words from the physical world should somehow be impressed upon the mind. Again there is a category mistake, and one's imagination is required to comprehend the full meaning of this Old Testament passage.

That which was implicit in Deuteronomy becomes explicit in Proverbs:

> My son, keep my words
> and treasure up my commandments with you;
> keep my commandments and live,
> keep my teachings as the apple of your eye;
> bind them on your fingers,
> write them on the tablet of your heart. (7.1-3).

The exhortation to obey the commandments is to be effected, in part, by writing them on the heart. The primary exhortation ('keep my words') is supported by suggestions for its implementation. Figurative language pervades the passage. The phrase 'write them on the tablet of your hearts' is suggestive of the modern expression, 'to take something to heart.'

The theme of writing on the heart, then, occurs in the Old Testament. There is a difference, though, between the passages. In Deuteronomy, the writing is implied but not clearly stated. The author of Proverbs explicitly exhorts the reader to write on his heart, and the content of that writing is the commandments, presumably the same commandments given by God to Moses on Mt. Sinai. In Jeremiah, however, exhortation is replaced by promise. The prophet describes something that God promises to do for man, rather than something which man must do for himself. So it is God and not man who does the writing. The message that is written is not the same covenant as before but rather a new covenant (Jer 31.31). The content of this new covenant remains undefined, in contrast with the explicit enumeration of injunctions contained in the old covenant. The emphasis of the Jeremiah passage is that the writing will be performed by God, not man, and on hearts, not stone tablets.

There are also interesting parallels in classical literature. Bultmann notes several,[10] the one most pertinent to our study being found in an excerpt from *The Phaedrus* (276a-277a):[11]

> *Soc.* I mean an intelligent word graven in the soul of the learner...
> *Phae.* You mean the living word of knowledge which has a soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than an image?
> *Soc.* Yes, of course that is what I mean ... Then he [the wise man] will not seriously incline to 'write' his thoughts 'in water' with pen and ink...But nobler far is the serious pursuit of the dialectician, who,

> finding a congenial soul, by the help of science sows and plants therein words which are able to defend themselves and him who planted them, and are not un-unfruitful, but have in them a seed which others brought up in different soils render immortal, making the possessors of it happy to the utmost extent of human happiness.

Socrates, as portrayed here, affirms that speaking is superior to writing, though writing itself is not completely devoid of value.[12] It is apparent, though, that oral discourse is the preferred form of communication and instruction. Yet there is a kind of writing which is approved - metaphorical writing. This is accomplished by engraving words on the soul of a person who has begun to learn (μανθάνοντος), a soul which is deemed fitting or congenial (προσήκουσαν) for further instruction. Such knowledge may be regarded as a word which is alive and embedded in a soul (ἔμψυχον). In contrast stands the written word which is characterized as nothing more than a lifeless image (εἴδωλον). The metaphor changes in this section from documents to agriculture. Beginning with knowledge *written* on the soul, the author soon mentions words *sown* in the soul. Socrates (like Paul) picks up an image, develops it as far as he wants, and then discards it in favour of another.

This excerpt from *The Phaedrus*, though similar to 2 Corinthians 3, is not a direct parallel. Socrates is primarily contrasting written words and spoken words, and he argues for the superiority of the spoken. While he does once mention writing on the soul and this in a favourable manner, the main imagery employed is the personification of the spoken word and the metaphor of the seed.

There is a contrast between the weakness of the written word and the efficacy of the spoken word, especially when the spoken word becomes

inscribed on a congenial soul. Paul, on the other hand, in 2 Corinthians 3, makes no such disjunction between the written and the spoken. Rather, his oral word is linked to his written word. His preaching produced a church. The resulting equation is: I founded a church - I write a letter. The church is now called a letter. Thus his oral word becomes his written word; his preaching wrote a letter. Paul accepts the validity of both the spoken and the written. His concern is with the proper means of writing. Paul allows for the propriety of the written word and employs it often to serve his purposes. But he argues for the superiority of things written by the Spirit over things written by the hand of man.

Other writers, then, have drawn together these two semantic fields of persons and documents. But Paul is the first to link them so imaginatively with the verb 'to be'. He does it twice in 2 Corinthians: 'you are our letter' (v. 2) and 'you are a letter of Christ' (v. 3). These metaphorical statements are neat, terse, and concise unions of two realms of language, using the 'A is a B' style of metaphorical utterance. The texts cited above may have influenced Paul to consider this intersection of fields. But these particular metaphors are the result of Paul's creativity, having been '... cast in the furnace of the perceptive and prophetic imagination.'[13] While writing a letter to the Corinthians about a crisis pertaining to letters, he twists the meaning of 'letter' by using it in a metaphorical statement.

A semantic analysis of the metaphor, 'You are our letter,' reveals the following points. Paul takes the Corinthians ('you') and attributes to them an unusual predicate ('are our letter'). This sentence does not make sense at the literal level. People are not epistles. These categories do not relate in the way Paul has structured them. People may write epistles,

read, mail, or even 'eat' them (cf. Ez 3.1-3; Rev 10.1-11), but it is not true (literally) that people *are* epistles. Considered in another sense, people may be referred to as friends, enemies, relatives, neighbours, and other such relational terms, but they may *not* be called epistles. Paul has committed a calculated error. He has intentionally linked the semantic fields of 'persons' and 'documents' in an unallowable manner. Therefore, one can safely conclude that a literal interpretation is untenable.

But this discord at the literal level pushes one to seek a metaphorical interpretation which might explain this transgression. One must look for the 'hitherto unnoticed resemblance' between persons and epistles.'[4] What characteristics of letters may also be properly attributed to people? At this point, the common line of commentators will be followed, which states that 'letter' in verse 2 is short for 'letter of recommendation', and that 'letter of recommendation' itself is a technical term. Later, though, it will be suggested that this approach does not exhaust the interpretative possibilities of this metaphor.

Letters in general have a sender, a recipient, a situation, and a content. This is the essential structure of an epistle which is to be transferred to that letter which is constituted by the Corinthians.

The sender of this letter of recommendation is Paul himself, the one who is being commended. Self-commendation can be awkward or even abrasive, as in the case of Muhammad Ali, the heavyweight boxing champion of the world in the 1960's and early 1970's. He announced, 'I am the greatest.' The statement was true at the time, for he knocked out everyone who challenged him, but it was not well-received by the general public. Ali commended himself vociferously but did not make many friends in the

process. Others, like Paul, prefer a more subtle approach.

Paul, who wrote several letters of the ink and papyrus type, also wrote another kind of letter, 'a living letter.'[15] As a result of his preaching in Corinth, some had believed in Christ and a church had been formed. It is this group of saints which he now calls his letter of recommendation. So, in some way, Paul equates his preaching and organizing activity with that of letter-writing. Paul the preacher is also Paul the author *incognito*.

The explanation above is based on taking ἡμῶν as a subjective genitive. Paul is the *author* and *sender* of the letter. An alternate possibility is that ἡμῶν is an *objective* genitive, a letter *about* Paul written by the Corinthians. Understood this way, the letter is a letter of recommendation, one which they wrote on their own heart. It would be this heart-written letter which is in Corinth, commending Paul to 'all men'. If the letter in verse 2 is indeed 'commendatory', then it is certainly about Paul. But such an interpretation does not require that such a letter be written by the Corinthians. If the letter is commendatory, though, it is more likely to be one written by Paul, for the issue apparently was not whether the Corinthians would or would not recommend Paul. Rather, the issue seems to be the proper means of *self*-commendation. Paul's point on commendatory letters is that he does not need paper-letters since he has people-letters.

The identity of the receiver of this metaphorical letter of recommendation is a mystery.[16] It was probably not the Corinthians, for that would require them to be a letter to themselves. It was probably not the opponents, because, in 2 Corinthians, Paul is not otherwise attempting to commend himself to them. Rather, he is defending himself against their

attacks and forging a polemic of his own against them. In such a belligerent situation, an item like a letter of recommendation, which is associated with friendship and not enmity, would have been totally out of place. There is a possibility that the letter of recommendation, which the Corinthians are, could have been intended for no one in particular, but rather for the general public. In this case, it would have been like a 'wanted' poster, which is addressed to anyone in the locality who knows how to read. If this were the case, the letter may have served either an apologetic function or an evangelistic function. As an apology, it would have presented a defence for Christianity, by portraying examples of what faith in Christ can do. As an evangelistic tool, it would have invited its 'readers' to believe in Christ also. None of these three suggestions is particularly persuasive, though, and perhaps this question must remain asked but not yet answered.

The question of the content of the letter of recommendation is perhaps not so difficult to deal with. In short, the character of the Corinthians themselves is the content of the letter of recommendation which they constitute. They have received what Paul has 'served' them: life instead of death (3.6-7), a verdict of acquittal instead of guilt (3.8), the gifts of glory, freedom, and the Spirit (3.17-18). Thus, the Corinthian believers are now different from what they were before. As a result of their faith in Christ, it is becoming apparent that Jesus Christ produces humane people, not stony-hearted people (3.3). His people are motivated more by the indwelling Spirit and his promptings than by written laws and their requirements (3.6).

Now, as for the fourth and final feature of a letter, its situation, it may be said that this too is an enigma, which raises more questions than

answers. This metaphorical letter was written when Paul was in Corinth, a year or two before the writing of the literal letter in which the metaphorical letter is mentioned. The letter was written in the past, and it still exists. It is the existence of the metaphorical letter which calls for the writing of the literal letter. It seems that some poachers are trying to seduce the Corinthian congregation, and Paul wants to prevent this. Part of his strategy is to point to the church there as his letter of recommendation. But it is difficult to see how this is advantageous to him. Both the Corinthians and the intruders already know that Paul pioneered this church. There could have been no dispute over an issue like that. Rather, the issue is whether or not he still should have a voice (the loudest voice) in their affairs. Is he still the big brother who gives advice and settles squabbles? The opponents (and probably some of the locals also) answer in the negative. Paul's rejoinder that the Corinthians are his letter of recommendation seems somewhat out of place. Furthermore, it is debatable what kind of recommendation was constituted by this church for Paul. It had divisions, a grievous moral offender, insensitive and uncompassionate members, and a faction whose loyalty to Paul was certainly wavering. One is mystified as to why Paul would want to call this church his letter of recommendation, especially at this time, when his relationship with them was less than rock solid. Thus, the situation surrounding this metaphorical letter of recommendation is not at all clear. Further elucidation is required, but not now available.

The foregoing similarities between literal letters and figurative letters are sufficient to justify an analogical explication of Paul's metaphor, 'You are our letter.' An analogy of proportion, Aristotle's fourth class of metaphor, is (like a simile) an expanded metaphor. It is a

metaphor which has been reflected upon in an attempt to spell out the logical force of the metaphor. Metaphor generates meaning in figurative terms. Analogy expresses meaning in conceptual terms.

The metaphor currently under consideration, 'You are our letter,' can be paraphrased in the form of a four part analogy (as a is to b, so c is to d). As a letter of recommendation validates the credentials of other ministers, so the Corinthians validate the credentials of Paul. Or, what a literal letter of recommendation does for the credibility of the opponents, the Corinthians (a metaphorical letter) do for the credibility of Paul. Paul seems to indicate that, though he calls himself the least of the apostles, he still feels that he is equal to any of them in terms of apostolic documentation. He can produce credentials as good as (or better than, since God prepares Paul's documents) the rest of them. Paul's credentials may be of a different order, but they are equally impressive.

The statement, 'You are our letter,' completely breaks down under the weight of a literal interpretation, as noted earlier. The Corinthians are not a papyrus document with Greek characters inscribed on them. The letter which the Corinthians are is written not διὰ μέλανος καὶ καλάμου (3 Jn 13). The statement can only be rescued by a metaphorical interpretation, which acknowledges that the Corinthians are not a letter. Rather, they are, in some ways, like a letter. The metaphor, 'You are our letter,' occurs, therefore, in the tension between its literal interpretation, 'You Corinthians are a written document,' and its metaphorical interpretation, 'You Corinthians are not a letter, but you are like a letter.' The literal meaning is absurd and calls forth another interpretation which can salvage the statement. The literal meaning self-destructs in a significant contradiction. But the metaphorical interpretation transforms this

nonsense into a meaningful utterance.

The emphasis so far has been on the noun and the pronoun, 'our letter' and 'you'. It might be helpful here to take note also of the copula 'are'. When 'are', along with the other words in the metaphor, is given its lexical value in the sentence, the result is nonsense. Thus, the literal interpretation proves itself inadequate. The metaphorical interpretation of the statement, however, proceeds by twisting the literal meaning of 'are' into the figurative meaning of 'are not', and 'are like'.'[17] The literal meaning, 'You *are* our letter,' immediately provokes a negative reaction, 'You people *are not* documents.' But the salvaging process goes on to suggest, 'Though persons are not epistles, perhaps they *are like* epistles.' So this opening statement of the extended metaphor goes through three interpretive stages:

1. You *are* our letter.
2. You *are not* a letter.
3. You *are like* a letter for us.'[18]

What does it mean to say that the Corinthians are like a letter of recommendation for Paul? First, it suggests the presence of both readers and documents. Documents written with ink can be read and understood and can thus serve as means of conveying information. A letter of recommendation, more specifically, serves to commend a person known by the author but unknown to the recipient. Our text does not tell us who the third party is in this case, but it does imply that the saints at Corinth can commend him to them. Whereas documents can only communicate by means of the written word, persons can communicate by the spoken word. Second, this metaphor suggests that the Corinthians possess the proper kind and amount of information to transmit a legitimate recommendation. In order to

produce such a letter, the writer must know something about the person's past accomplishments, his abilities, his character, and his potential for further effectiveness. The Corinthians were capable of doing all of this for Paul. After two personal visits to Corinth and at least two letters to them, they were well acquainted with this apostle and were indeed able to vouch for him to all questioners. Perhaps Paul has a subtle purpose underlying this metaphor: 'You are our letter. Go ahead and commend me to the "some". Why have you not already done so? It is only proper and fitting that you speak up for me.'

'You are our letter, written on our heart.' Paul further affirms that this letter has been written on a specific writing surface. It is inscribed on the heart. Again the tension arises. Either 'written on paper' or (something like) 'love' in the heart would have been acceptable. But writing on the heart is a mistake. There are no letters written on the heart. Writing on the heart is a fiction. But it is a fiction which allows Paul to redescribe reality. To the ordinary eye of a disinterested onlooker, the Corinthian church is just a religious group, which meets periodically to worship God. But for Paul they are that and so much more. They are his work, his seal of authenticity, his letter of recommendation. Their existence as a body of believers announces to the world not only the Christian faith but also Paul's place within the new order which God has begun. He is an apostle, *their* apostle, and their church witnesses to that fact. This attestation is such an intimate reality that it is just like a letter written on his heart. Certainly Paul is not thinking here of the internal organ which pumps blood, but rather of the inner man, the innermost core of one's being, the centre of one's thoughts and emotions.'[9] It is there that the letter is inscribed.

On whose heart is the letter written? There is a troublesome textual variant here. The weight of manuscript evidence favours ἡμῶν, which is also the harder reading.[20] A few manuscripts (א 33 88 436 1881 eth^{ro}) read ὑμῶν which seems to make more sense in this context.[21] Because ὑμῶν has some good, though limited, manuscript support and since it appears to fit the sequence of thought better, it may well have been in the original text. How then did ἡμῶν enter into the textual tradition? It might have occurred as a result of the public reading of the epistle. When it was read aloud to the church in Corinth, the reader might have changed the ὑμῶν to ἡμῶν in order to make clear that the reference was indeed to the Corinthian listeners. The Corinthians were 'you' when being addressed by Paul, but they were 'us' when being addressed by one of their own number. The ἡμῶν which originated in the public readings might then have been carried into the written text, when additional copies of the epistle were produced for the Corinthians. So then the autograph may well have read ὑμῶν, which a few manuscripts maintained. But most manuscripts would have followed the wording of the first copies, since they did not have access to the autograph. These first copies were those which had been altered to give the right sense when read aloud in liturgical situations. If this indeed was what actually happened, then it reveals a rather innocent editing of the autograph, an emendation performed in an attempt fully to elucidate and appropriate the meaning of the text. It shows an early interpretation of the text by those to whom it was addressed. This willingness to interpret means that the Corinthians, and perhaps others in early Christianity, did not feel themselves slavishly bound to an exact preservation of each word of their religious documents. They adapted the text to make it meaningful for their own situation.

J. Weiss suggests that the whole phrase under discussion, ἐγγεγραμμένη ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν (ἡμῶν), is a gloss. He believes that the phrase completely defaces the verse in which it stands. It is, he claims, simply a case of a later scribe adding words in order to fill out the sense of the passage as he understood it. Weiss states that such expansions (Wucherungen) and clarifications (Verdeutlichungen) occur repeatedly in the Pauline corpus, especially in Second Corinthians. Such glosses are unfortunate, and sometimes even unbearable. Other examples he cites are: τῷ θεῷ (2 Cor 2.15) and καρδίαις (2 Cor 3.3).[22]

Bultmann thinks Weiss might be correct, though he hesitates to give him his full support.[23] Bultmann recognizes that it is 'absurd' to think of the Corinthians, who are the letter, being written on their own heart. In order to save the phrase and make some sense of it, he gives it the meaning that God has written something on their hearts, meaning simply that the Corinthians are Christians.

Omitting the ἐγγεγραμμένη phrase does make verse 2 read more smoothly: 'You are our letter, known and read by all men.' It does reduce the overloading of imagery, making the language more manageable. It also eliminates the problem of understanding how the Corinthians are written on the Corinthians' hearts. It also eliminates, if drastically, the necessity of choosing between ὑμῶν and ἡμῶν. Still it is possible to keep the phrase and make sense of it. Now the need for 'making sense' of a potentially absurd phrase may appear to be an additional reason for omitting it, on the basis of a belief that the text should be self-explanatory: that is, it should make sense without the reader having to struggle with it. But that is exactly the problem one faces when dealing with ancient texts. Sometimes they just do not make sense on a cursory or superficial reading.

Sometimes they still do not make sense after one has studied them, because, among other reasons, the reader may not have, nor be able to acquire, the necessary historical or lexical information which he needs for a full understanding of the text. More importantly, though, is that the meaning of a sentence is a 'resultant', something which issues forth from the 'interinanimation' of all the words in the sentence.[24] The reader is challenged to understand how all of the parts of a sentence function together dynamically to achieve their unified and integrative effect. That metaphor calls for a work of interpretation has already been stated. Thus, some effort is required to understand it. One is justified in keeping the phrase and struggling to grasp its meaning.

There has been so much discussion about which pronoun ('our' or 'your') is the correct reading that many commentators have completely overlooked the metaphorical character of the expression as a whole. An epistle written on the heart (ours, yours, or anyone else's) is a startling concept. The heart is neither the proper location nor the proper surface for letter-writing, though one could chisel a splendid letter on a stone or a stony heart! 'Written on the heart' is a statement that self-destructs in contradiction, because Paul brings together seemingly unrelated categories (hearts/letters). The absurdity of the literal interpretation calls for a metaphorical interpretation which can rescue the sense of the sentence.

A saying of Jesus, as recorded in the Synoptics, can be mentioned here as a helpful parallel:

> You brood of vipers, how can you who are evil say anything good? For out of the overflow of the heart the mouth speaks. The good man brings things out of the good stored up in him, and the evil man brings

> evil things out of the evil stored up in him (Matt 12.34-35, NIV).

Writing on the heart for Paul is comparable to the fullness of the heart in the teaching of Jesus. For Paul, what is written on the heart, though it can not be seen, can be known and read by all men. Similarly, Jesus teaches that the heart is known by the words and deeds that it brings forth out of its fullness. In both cases, the heart, though unseen, can be known by others.

Finally, 'written on the heart' excludes such meanings as 'stamped on the forehead' and 'tattooed on the arm.' The message is not to be seen in the outer man. It would not be noticed by a casual observer. It was engraved on the heart and would only be apparent to those who were acquainted with the Corinthians. 'Written on the heart' is therefore a phrase used by Paul to limit and define his meaning.[25] Paul is saying that the hearts of the Corinthians, having been worked on by the Spirit, are the letter which has been written.

'Known and read by all men' continues the mixing of semantic fields. Letters can be known and read. People can be known. But 'people can be read' is a category mistake. It calls for the verb 'read' to be used in an other than normal fashion. It is a metaphor. Paul is stating that the Corinthians, as letters, are known and read by all. The 'all' is hyperbole, an exaggeration used to emphasize the public nature of Paul's credentials: the Corinthian church is open for inspection and available for all to read, in contrast to a letter which comes rolled or in an envelope and is addressed to and read by only a few.

The language here is reminiscent of the saying attributed to Jesus in Matthew 16.3: 'You know how to interpret the appearance of the sky, but

you cannot interpret the signs of the times.' Some people can 'read' the weather, even though the sky is not written in a human language. Likewise, people can 'read' other people by interpreting their attitudes and actions. For example, in *Ivanhoe* the Black Knight announces to Locksley, 'I have been accustomed to study men's countenances, and I can read in thine honesty and resolution.'[26] Perhaps Paul is giving another implicit exhortation: Live the right life so people will read the right message.

Verse 2 is full of figurative language - perhaps too full. It must be remembered, though, that Paul is not writing polished poetry. He is not aiming to be the poet laureate of ancient Corinth. He is writing a *letter*, and the letter is not meant to entertain but to persuade. Paul is trying to persuade the Corinthians to warm up to him again and to acknowledge him as their apostle. The language he uses to do this is thought-provoking, even if less than elegant.

The main issue in verse 3 is the little phrase ἐπιστολὴ Χριστοῦ. The letter of Christ which the Corinthian Christians are - is it a *Himmelsbrief* or a letter of recommendation? Is it written *by* Christ (authorial genitive) or *about* Christ (objective genitive)? If it is a letter of recommendation, does it recommend Paul or Christ?

Bultmann characterizes the epistle as a *Himmelsbrief*, a letter written by God to men.[27] He compares it to the scroll handed down from heaven to Ezekiel (Ez 2.8-3.3), which had writing on both sides of it. The heavenly voice commanded Ezekiel to eat it and then to go and speak to the house of Israel. A similar idea occurs in Rev 1.17-20, when the Lord God Almighty commands John to write a letter to each of the seven churches of Asia. God was the author, and John was the amanuensis. Bultmann concludes that Paul here is using the mythological image of the *Himmelsbrief*, but that it is

not very effective because it was probably conceived in a blink of the eyes and was not made to coordinate with the context.[28] J. Weiss, though, is not convinced that Paul wrote his letters unreflectively on the spur of the moment:

> Die gewöhnliche Vorstellung, daß Paulus seine Briefe so in einem Zuge, ohne Pause und ohne Meditation improvisiert hätte, ist eine literarische und psychologische Unüberlegtheit, fast möchte ich sagen eine Respektlosigkeit gegen den Verfasser. Man unterschätzt die geistige Leistung, die in diesen unglaublich gehaltvollen Werken steckt.[29]

Rissi contends that verse 3 refers to a letter of recommendation, not a *Himmelsbrief*. Paul is continuing to use 'epistle' as he has in the previous two verses. This epistle can only be a recommendation for Christ, since the Corinthians proclaim Christ, not Paul or anyone else. Paul is commended only by the fact that he founded the church there. The church proclaims and commends Christ, not Paul. Thus Rissi takes Χριστός as an objective genitive.[30]

Furnish, on the other hand, reads the genitive as authorial.[31] He notes that the emphasis is on the origin and existence of the letter, not on its content. The remainder of verse 3 confirms this opinion. Paul continues the metaphor by describing how the letter was written (by the Spirit) and where it was written (hearts). Since he does not mention the contents, one must conclude that this aspect of the letter was less important than its origin and existence. It does seem, then, that Furnish is correct in understanding ἐπιστολὴ Χριστοῦ to refer to an epistle authored by Christ. As such, it serves to recommend both Christ, the sender, and Paul, his servant.

The phrase, διακονηθεῖσα ὑφ' ἡμῶν, has also attracted several different

interpretations from the commentators. Hughes and Kümmel think it refers to the scribal function.[32] Bultmann says it means 'cared for by us' or 'attended to by us,'[33] though he goes no further in specifying its sense. Furnish suggests that it could indicate the role of courier, but then concludes that it is not very important exactly what function Paul meant by the term. The really significant point is that Paul's role in founding the Corinthian church, that of διάκονος, is subordinate to the role of Christ, who is the Lord.[34] Both here and in 1 Corinthians 3, Paul characterizes his work with the Corinthians as a necessary but insignificant task when compared with the mighty work of God.

The next phrase in verse 3, ἐγγεγραμμένη οὐ μέλανι ἀλλὰ πνεύματι θεοῦ ζῶντος, sets out quite a sharp contrast between a letter written by men with inert materials and one written by the Spirit, which is living and powerful and far superior to anything of human authorship. Paul is subtly informing his readers that, while the 'some' may rely on man-made letters of recommendation, he depends totally on the sufficiency which comes from God (v. 5) and on the recommendation which really matters - the one from the Lord (2 Cor 10.18).

The final phrase of verse 3, οὐκ ἐν πλαξὶν λιθίναις ἀλλ' ἐν πλαξὶν καρδίαις σαρκίναις, has also caused some difficulty. It is almost certain that the wording arises from allusions to Old Testament passages (Ex 31.18; Prov 3.3; Ez 36.26). The problem is with the three consecutive words in the dative case, πλαξὶν καρδίαις σαρκίναις. Schmiedel, Bachmann, and Weiss[35] want to smooth out the reading by eliminating καρδία as a gloss, while Windisch, Bultmann, and Rissi[36] strike out πλάξ, in order to create a neat antithetical parallelism.

But Furnish rightly notes that there is no textual warrant for

striking out either πλάξ or καρδία.[37] All three datives must be retained in the text. The antithesis must remain unevenly worded: πλαξὶν λιθίναις/ πλαξὶν καρδίαις σαρκίναις. This parallelism may not be neat, but it is Pauline. Paul has constructed other antithetical parallelisms which are not neatly and evenly balanced. For example, in 2 Corinthians 3.3, there is: μέλανι / πνεύματι θεοῦ ζῶντος; and in 1 Corinthians 2.13, Paul contrasts διδακτοῖς ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας λόγοις/διδακτοῖς πνεύματος (λόγοις). 2 Corinthians 3.1-3 may not exhibit stylistic perfection, but it is evidence of a Christian writer exploring and employing language at several levels in order to describe that which he had experienced in his relationships with God and his fellow believers.

As stated earlier, it is possible that ἐπιστολή (vv. 2-3) refers to a letter of recommendation. The context both suggests and allows this interpretation. Whether the ἡμῶν is objective or subjective, the letter of recommendation would still have been about Paul, either written by him or by the Corinthians.

It is possible that, in addition to this, ἐπιστολή just means 'letter' in general and does not refer to a letter of recommendation or any other specific kind of letter. As a letter, it is something written by hand and therefore a result of human labour. The metaphor, 'you are our letter', could be then be explicated by an analogy different from the one proposed above. As a man writes a letter, so Paul has worked for Christ. As the letter is evidence that the man wrote, so the Corinthian church is evidence that Paul laboured there. The very existence of the Corinthian church is proof that Paul has done the work of an apostle.

In interpreting the metaphor in this way, the concept of work intrudes into the discussion. 'Work' (ἔργον) itself is used metaphorically by Paul

to describe his activity as an apostle of Jesus Christ. If 'letter' is to be explained in terms of 'work', it is because 'work' is an organizing metaphor in Paul's religious vocabulary, and 'letter' is one of those metaphors it organizes. As Ricoeur says, 'organizing metaphors gather subordinate metaphors from a lower level and diffuse concepts at a higher level.'[38] 'Work' is a paradigm of Paul's productive activity for Christ. It gives him language to verbalize what he is doing. It affords a concrete expression for activity that sometimes yields only intangible results.

The most exemplary occurrence of 'work' as a paradigmatic expression of Paul's activity is in 1 Corinthians 9.1: οὐ τὸ ἔργον μου ὑμεῖς ἐστε ἐν κυρίῳ; This is a rhetorical question, and the presence of the negative requires that the question be answered affirmatively.[39] Thus the question may be reworded as a statement: 'You [Corinthians] are my workmanship in the Lord.' Though ἔργον often means 'work, action', it can also, as here in 1 Corinthians 9.1, have a more passive sense and be translated 'workmanship, achievement.'[40] Paul, then is establishing the fact that the Corinthians, as a Christian church, are the result of his labour. The pronoun μου identifies Paul, in contrast to any of the other apostles, as the one who started the Corinthian congregation. This church exhibits the craftsmanship of *Paul*. The Corinthians should not doubt the authenticity of Paul's apostolate, since he had done the work of an apostle *among them*! 'In presence of the finished structure that draws the world to gaze, it is too late to ask if he who built it is an architect.'[41]

But the text also includes a prepositional phrase (ἐν κυρίῳ) which acknowledges the divine activity. Though the RSV translates '*in* the Lord', an instrumental dative ('by means of the Lord') would be more accurate than the locative. Paul is not emphasizing that whatever he does takes place in

the sphere of the Lord, but rather that the founding of a church is always the work of God.[42] So, in a way, Paul is stating that the Corinthians are his workmanship, but not really his - they are the work of God, with whom he is a συνεργός (1 Cor 3.9). The Corinthians, then, are Paul's workmanship, in that they were converted under *his* preaching, and not that of someone else. But they are ultimately the result of *God's* creative activity, in which Paul only played the role of helper or assistant (διάκονος). 1 Corinthians 9.1, on this reading, specifies *in nuce* the relationships of God, Paul, and the Corinthians. It is God who creates churches. Paul is his co-worker, but in a subordinate role. And the Corinthians are the ἔργον, the result of God and Paul working together.

As examples of the types of work Paul has done, he can say elsewhere, 'You are God's house for which I laid the foundation', and 'You are the farm in which I plant the seeds' (1 Cor 3). In all of these examples, Paul identifies himself as God's co-worker. Paul and God labour together, and the Corinthians are the result. This is also the case in 2 Corinthians 3, where Paul first says 'you are *my* letter' (v. 2) and then adds, 'you are *Christ's* letter' (v. 3). The Corinthians are a letter. The fact that there is a letter is a sign that the author has been working. This letter has a joint author. Both Paul and God had a hand in its writing, though the hand of the latter is bigger and stronger!

This is perhaps an example, also, of Paul correcting his own theology. He makes a statement, which is true, but it is not 'the whole truth'. In order to prevent a misunderstanding or overemphasis on one aspect of the truth, he adds a complement or a corrective.

For example, the text of 2 Corinthians 3 suggests this kind of clarification. 'You are my letter. Well, you are Christ's letter, really,

but I assisted in the writing.' The passage in 1 Corinthians 3 implies a similar expansion. 'You are my building. Well, you are really God's building, but I laid the foundation for him, like a wise master builder. You are my farm. Well, you are really God's farm, but I planted the seeds for him, and he made them grow.' This kind of writing suggests that Paul reflected on what he had written, modifying and amplifying as he was guided by the Holy Spirit.

It is possible, then, to understand ἐπιστολή in 2 Corinthians 3.2 to refer both to letters of recommendation and to letters generally as a product of human work. 'Work' is an organizing metaphor referring to Paul's apostolic activity, and 'letter' is a subordinate metaphor which relates to it. 'You are my workmanship' is the paradigm, and 'You are my letter' is a specific example of this paradigm. It is no coincidence that, in both 1 and 2 Corinthians, when Paul the *apostle* is under attack, Paul the *workman* is summoned to provide evidence of the work he has done.

A fair question to ask at this point is: Could Paul or did Paul intend both of these meanings of 'letter'? Is it not more reasonable to think that he only meant one sense of the word? Or, stated differently, to what extent was Paul aware of the two possible interpretations which have been advanced? Was the ambiguity intended, or was it even recognized?

The difficulty in answering these question is obvious. What Paul thought or intended is not accessible to the reader. The author is not present to comment on his text. But the question can be pursued anyway, because, even though the writer is not available, his text is extant, and his other writings are extant also. And, while certainty is not possible, it is a reasonable approach to guess and to criticize the guesses. The interpreter might get it wrong, but, then, there is always a risk in

interpretation.

The question of authorial intention can not be summarily dismissed, for several reasons. First, what is in the text is in some way a reflection of what Paul thought, though there is always the problem of possible glossation. He intended something, and he expressed it more or less well in his text. Second, the text is a *work*, a *human* work, the accomplishment of a person, and it is unfair to regard it as an anonymous object in which its author has no rights at all.

Nevertheless, the factor of authorial intention in interpretation must be subordinated, since Paul is not present, and his intention is accessible only through the text, with, of course, some help from Acts and other New Testament writings. Therefore, the question must be settled primarily on the basis of what the text allows, not on what the author intended. What Paul intended was an event, and it vanished with the act of the writing of his epistle. What is inscribed in the text is not the author's intention, but rather the sentences he formed to express that intention. Thus an intention of the author is directly dependent on the text, and is the construct of a reader interacting with the text.

The guide, then, is what the text allows. And this allowance is broader now than it was for the original audience of 2 Corinthians, because written copies of several different Pauline epistles are available for examination. An interpretative possibility, *perhaps* unintended by Paul and unnoticed by the Corinthians, may be opened up by a clue from another passage or another epistle. This meaning need not be rejected, for it is entirely feasible that Paul may have meant more than one thing as he wrote. And, if such a meaning arising from a text is true, then it may have to be accepted, as there is no access to what the author intended other than the

author's text and that is what is in dispute.

The existence of the letter argues for the activity of the writer. As such, the letter does not commend Paul so much as it proves that he has been writing. The *content* of the letter is less important than the *existence* of the letter. There is visible evidence of his apostolic activity in Corinth. Whatever may have been the controversy about the proper criteria for being an apostle, Paul repeatedly argues, by means of his 'work' metaphors, that he *is* an apostle because he has done the *work* of an apostle.

In 2 Corinthians 3, then, Paul is speaking metaphorically about the church in Corinth and its relation to himself. He is pointing to the congregation as evidence of his work as an apostle. 'Letter' may properly be understood as a generic letter, the existence of which authenticates his apostolicity. The notion of 'letter' is invoked by Paul to attest to his role as apostle, and as apostle of the church in Corinth.

Therefore, it may be concluded that 'You are our letter' may be legitimately interpreted in more than one way. This metaphor exhibits a surplus of meaning. This multivalent expression should not be termed 'ambiguous', though, because with ambiguity the context demands that one reading be accepted and the other rejected.[43] No such demand is evident here. The immediate context, 2 Corinthians 2.14-4.6, certainly allows that 'letter' (v. 2) may be explained as a letter of recommendation. The larger context, the Pauline corpus and its 'work' metaphors in particular, substantiates the validity of taking 'letter' as a generic letter. Both of these possibilities are allowable, and both are the result of a reader confronting the text and asking it questions. The rights of the text have been respected, and the role of the reader has been recognized. But one

can not say that the metaphors of 2 Corinthians 3.1-3 have now been fully translated. They will continue to diffuse concepts, images, connotations, and suggestions, and readers will continue to discover and articulate them.

SECTION C. GLORY.

In 2 Corinthians 3, Paul uses the term δόξα frequently. It is a key word in the chapter, but its meaning is not clear. It is translated in the RSV in 2 Corinthians 3 by three different terms: brightness (v. 7), splendour (vv. 8-11), and glory (v. 18). This attempt by the RSV to translate δόξα is more a statement of the problem than a resolution of it. For δόξα is a multi-faceted word. Like much religious language, it is polysemous, having many significations. It is a sign pointing in differing directions. The interpreter's task is to identify which way or ways it points for Paul in 2 Corinthians 3.

The commentators are occasionally helpful in defining δόξα, though some of them, like Paul himself, use the word freely, as if the reader already had a thorough understanding of its meaning.[1] The purpose of this section is to contribute to an enlightenment of this opaque term and to investigate its use in metaphorical statements. In Part I, a history of the usage of δόξα is explained. In Part II, the particularly Pauline use of the term is investigated by referring to several passages where its meaning is more or less clearly indicated. Part III is an attempt to discern the overall significance of δόξα in 2 Corinthians 3. Part IV is an exploration of two Pauline δόξα metaphors.

I. HISTORY OF THE USAGE OF δόξα.[2]

In non-biblical Greek, δόξα generally means 'opinion,' either an opinion held by the subject or an opinion about the subject held by others. It gradually developed toward signifying a favourable opinion. In this sense, it can be translated 'reputation' or 'renown.' It was later used to

sum up in a word 'the concept of supreme and ideal worth'.[3]

In the Septuagint, δόξα is often the translation for כָּבוֹד. When used of physical things, this Hebrew word sometimes means 'weight, heaviness'. It was used literally of things, but came to be used figuratively of persons, meaning 'honour, respect.' A heavy man would be respected for his physical strength and prowess. A wealthy man would be honoured for the weight of his riches. Because a strong or wealthy man could often acquire important positions in society, כָּבוֹד came to be applied also to leaders and to men in high position. Perhaps as a result of its application to prominent figures in Hebrew society it was considered suitable to be applied to God also. The כְּבוֹד יְהוָה may then be thought of as that which makes God impressive to man, the powerful force of his self-manifestation. These manifestations were often associated with clouds (Ex 24.5), thunderstorms (Ez 1.1-28), and fires (Ex 3.1-6). Thus, the nature of the כְּבוֹד יְהוָה itself is to be conceived of as a fiery radiance, often shrouded in a cloud. The story of Moses' awesome encounter with the glory of the Lord (Ex 33-34), however oblique it may have been, was the story of a private experience. Such an experience was not intended for the whole nation. These 'rare visionary moments'[4] were not considered suitable for the people at large. כָּבוֹד is often translated by δόξα in the Septuagint.

In the LXX, δόξα has a 'peculiarly biblical meaning.' It is never used in its classical Greek meaning of 'opinion', and only rarely does it mean 'reputation' or 'honour'. Occasionally it signifies 'splendour' or 'power', but its predominant meaning occurs in relationship to God. In this sense, it may indicate the honour attributed to God by reverent men. It may also depict the power of God as it is displayed in the creation (Ps

18.2, LXX).

> The δόξα θεοῦ is the 'divine glory' which reveals the nature of God in creation and in His acts, which fill both heaven and earth.... Thus the 'divine radiance' at the giving of the Law, or in the tabernacle or the temple, is very properly to be rendered δόξα.'[5]

In passages like these, δόξα θεοῦ comes very near to signifying the presence in a physical form of the essence of God himself.

The New Testament writers' use of δόξα resembles the Septuagint use, not that of the classical writers. In the New Testament, as in the Septuagint, it no longer means 'opinion.' It does mean 'honour, respect' and can also signify 'power' and 'radiance.' In the New Testament, however, the word is used for the most part in a sense for which there is little Greek analogy but for which there is some attestation in Hellenistic Judaism. That is to say, it denotes 'divine and heavenly radiance, the loftiness and majesty of God, and even the being of God.'[6]

The foregoing review of the history of δόξα reveals some insights about the senses of a word. (1) Words have an openness which allow them to acquire additional meanings.[7] (2) Some meanings of a word may become obsolete and die out. (3) New meanings need not be related to or derivative from previous meanings. (4) The context in which a word appears contributes more to one's understanding of the meaning of that word than does a knowledge of that word's history. That is, context is more important than etymology in determining the meaning of a word.[8] The meaning of a word is not necessarily stable as it passes through time. It is subject to changes in meaning. Though etymology may perhaps be helpful, it is contextual markers which ultimately decide the sense of a word when it is used in discourse.

II. PAUL'S USE OF δόξα.

In the Pauline epistles, δόξα is strewn about regularly and is used with a variety of meanings, running the gamut demonstrated in the LXX and the rest of the New Testament. The different meanings, along with examples, are listed below.

A. 'Honour, respect, good reputation.'

In 2 Corinthians 6.4-10, Paul is commending himself as a minister of God. He mentions hardships he has endured (vv. 4-5). In verses 6-7, he lists virtues he has exhibited. Then he summarizes in a series of antitheses what he has experienced. Two of these antitheses are:

> διὰ δόξης καὶ ἀτιμίας,
> διὰ δυσφημίας καὶ εὐφημίας (v.8).

The RSV clearly points out the opposition contained in these pairs:

> in honour and dishonour,
> in ill repute and good repute.

There can be little question here that δόξα should be translated honour.[9] It is clearly contrasted with the antonym of the more common Greek word for honour, τιμή. The suggestion of the text is that when Paul is preaching the gospel, he is sometimes treated with respect by some people and with disrespect by others. Though Paul is treated dishonourably by some people, he is always honoured by God. When the apostle is not present, he is also held by some to be of good reputation (εὐφημία) and by others to be of bad reputation (δυσφημία). Or, speaking vernacularly, 'Paul is all right,' and 'Paul is a pain in the neck.' The terms are certainly opposite in meaning, and they strongly influence one to take the other pair (δόξα/τιμή) as

opposites also. But Plummer objects to translating δόξα as 'honour' here.[10] He prefers to use the more common translation 'glory' and interprets the antithesis as simply a good/ bad pair. Plummer maintains that, if Paul had intended a true opposition, he would have written 'τιμῆς καὶ ἀτιμίας', a pair which appears in Romans 9.21 and 2 Timothy 2.20. It is true that there are certain standard linguistic conventions which writers often employ to convey clearly their meaning. But it is equally true that they sometimes mould language for a specific purpose and use words creatively. Paul was a free man (2 Cor 3.17), and this time he chose to do it differently than others might have done it.

Furnish[11] notes a Pauline passage where ἀτιμία stands in obvious contrast with δόξα: σπείρεται ἐν ατιμίᾳ, ἐγείρεται ἐν δόξῃ (1 Cor 15.43). Another text that clearly contrasts δόξα and ἀτιμία is Psalm of Solomon 2.31: ὁ ἀνιστῶν ἐμὲ εἰς δόξαν καὶ κοιμίζων ὑπερηφάνους εἰς ἀπώλειαν αἰῶνος ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔγνωσαν αὐτόν. These texts, along with 2 Corinthians 6.8, show that Paul is well able to vary his style and to create new word pictures when he desires. Therefore, both the surrounding context and the clear opposition to ἀτιμία combine to define δόξα in 2 Corinthians 6.8 as 'honour.'

Δόξα carries a similar meaning in Romans 8.17-18, where Paul contrasts 'the sufferings of the present time' (v. 17) with the δόξα which will be revealed in the future (v. 18). Most of Paul's sufferings were inflicted upon him by men who did not honour him or the gospel he preached. Yet he is convinced that this disrespect he received from men will more than be offset by the honour which God will bestow on him in the coming age. In the phrase, 'τῆς δουλείας τῆς φθορᾶς', the apostle contrasts an ignominious situation with a noble and honourable estate (τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῆς

δόξης Rom 8.21). The tension between φθορά / δόξα is somewhat similar to that of ἀπώλεια / δόξα in Romans 9.22-23. In fact, both φθορά and ἀπώλεια can be translated in the same way: ruin or destruction.[12] The sense of δόξα as honour is further seen in Philippians 3.19, where it is opposed to αἰσχύνη - shame, disgrace, ignominy.[13] The reference is to the many men '... who find their honour in that which redounds to their shame.'[14]

Another clear example of δόξα meaning 'honour, respect' is Philippians 3.21, where 'our lowly body' is contrasted with 'his glorious body.' Ταπείνωσις should be understood as 'the privations, persecutions, and afflictions' which Paul has suffered as a minister of the gospel, resulting in his 'present oppressed and lowly position.'[15] The body which has been yielded to God as a living sacrifice (Rom 12.1) '... is exposed to all the passions, sufferings, and indignities of this life.'[16] However, the body of his δόξα is quite unlike this. It has the honour accorded it through the resurrection power of God, the dignity attending one who is seated at the right hand of the throne of God, as a result of the exaltation conferred by God (Phil 2.9). The contrast laid out in Philippians 3.21 between ταπείνωσις and δόξα is thus to be understood as one of lowliness / exaltation or indignity / dignity or dishonour / honour.

These examples show that Paul uses δόξα in its Hellenistic sense of honour, respect, good reputation. This meaning is best displayed in the various antitheses constructed by Paul.

B. 'Radiance, brilliance.'

Paul seems to be equally familiar with the lexical value of 'radiance' for δόξα, which would have come to him through the LXX. This meaning is best observed in 1 Corinthians 15.40-41, where Paul is referring to the brightness exhibited by the heavenly bodies. Each appears with a

different δόξα, a different degree of radiance. The sun, the moon, and the stars have their own individual brilliance, each different from the other. This brilliance is called δόξα, and it is a somewhat different sense from that of honour described above. In this passage, δόξα has to do with the visible manifestation of light, of the gradation of the illumination of the celestial bodies.

This meaning is seen elsewhere in the New Testament. For example, in Luke 9.31-32, δόξα refers to the bright illumination of the appearance of Jesus, Moses, and Elijah on the mountain during the transfiguration. Acts 22.11 reports that Paul was not able to see 'because of the brightness (δόξα) of that light.'

Δόξα, as brilliance or illumination, does not automatically exclude the sense of honour or respect. Gold, a radiant metal, is an honoured substance. Brilliant scientists are honoured with the Nobel prize. Sir Walter Scott plays on both of these meanings in a passage from *Ivanhoe*, in which Rebecca asks Ivanhoe why he continues in jousting and chivalry:

> 'What remains to you as the prize?'
> 'What remains?' cried Ivanhoe, 'Glory, maiden, glory!
> which gilds our sepulchre and embalms our name.'[17]

C. 'Glory, majesty' as an attribute of God.

The use of δόξα as a term to signify the honour and brilliance of God originated in the Septuagint, where it was chosen to translate כָּבוֹד. Because Paul was familiar with the Septuagint, he sometimes uses the term in this same sense also.

Romans 3.23. 'Since all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, ...' From Adam onward, men have disobeyed the command of God, and, as a result, they 'feel themselves far from the bright effulgence of God's

presence.'[18] Glory here signifies the presence of God and suggests also, in keeping with the Old Testament concept, that this presence has a brilliant lustre. The emphasis, though, of δόξα here is on the presence of God himself. In his commentary on this verse, C. H. Dodd has written:

> 'Man was created to bear the likeness of God; ideally he is "the image and glory of God" (1 Cor xi. 7). This gives us the clue to the meaning of the present passage. **The glory of God** is the divine likeness which man is intended to bear. In so far as man departs from the likeness of God he is sinful.'[19]

Thus Dodd takes δόξα in Romans 3.23 to signify the divine likeness which man is meant to imitate through obedience to the divine will. It makes little difference here whether one thinks δόξα points more to the fact of God's presence or to the brilliance of that presence. Both are closely intertwined, and the reference is certainly to the majesty of God.

Galatians 1.5. ᾧ ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων, ἀμήν. 'To whom be the glory for ever and ever. Amen.' This is typical of the doxologies found in the Pauline corpus. Similar examples occur in Romans 11.36 and 16.27. In these doxological formulae, Luther asserts that men are being exhorted to give glory to God by approaching him reverently. Thus glory, for Luther, denotes reverence.[20] Equally important is the point put forward by Lightfoot. Rather than a wish or a command, the doxology is an affirmation that the glory is a characteristic of God. It is pre-eminently his. 'Glory is the essential attribute of God.'[21] Lightfoot is not specific as to the nature of the divine glory, but is certainly correct in viewing δόξα as descriptive of the nature of God. In doing so, he is recognizing the close link between כָּבוֹד and δόξα which was forged by the translators of the Septuagint. Both of these terms point to the

presence of God.

Philippians 1.11. '... filled with the fruits of righteousness which come through Jesus Christ, to the glory and praise of God.' 'God's δόξα is his majesty in itself; ἔπαινος is the praise of that majesty....The whole work of redemption is the manifestation of the divine δόξα.'[22] Again glory signifies what God is in himself, yet that 'what he is' is not made specific in this or in any other Pauline passage. There are clues, however, which can guide our understanding of δόξα θεοῦ. Here Paul affirms that it is revealed in the saints through the righteousness which fills them. Men are partakers of the divine glory. When believers receive by faith righteousness and glory, they are led to give praise to God. The glory of God given to men results in the praise of men given to God. This Pauline theme is more fully developed by the author of Ephesians, who makes the linking of δόξα and ἔπαινος one of the themes of the epistle (cf. Eph 1.6, 1.12, 1.14).

This δόξα which denotes the majesty of God is also revealed as power, for it is the glorious power of God which raised Christ from the dead: 'We were buried therefore with him by baptism into death, so that as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory (δόξα) of the Father, we too might walk in newness of life (Rom 6.4).' This passage emphasises the glory of God as it is externally manifested in the resurrection. Thus δόξα here is the divine energy intervening in human affairs and in some way making manifest thereby the character of God. Paul here suggests that glory has an external as well as an internal significance.[23]

Paul further depicts δόξα θεοῦ as 'the riches of his glory' (Rom 9.23, Phil 4.19; cf. also Eph 1.18, 3.16). Perhaps it was in thinking of God as a king that Paul was led to write of wealth in connection with the glory of

God. But the point here at least is that there is a rich abundance of the glory of God. It is not limited to a manifestation in Israel alone or among the Jews only. 'The riches of his glory' in this passage helps to support Paul's position that God's mercy extends to all people, both Jews and Gentiles. One may agree with Barclay that the analogy Paul constructs in Romans 9.19-24 is not especially fortuitous.[24] Yet the passage does illuminate the concept of glory. There is an extravagance about glory, and it has been made known unto men. The 'superabundant bounty' coming from God supplies both earthly needs and heavenly benefits. This thought is the immediate cause for Paul's thanksgiving in Philippians 4.20.[25]

The meaning of δόξα as an attribute of God may be summarised as follows. It can be translated as glory or majesty, and it refers to God's essential character. It points to God without describing him in detail. Δόξα signifies the presence of God, especially as it is manifested to the world through the life of believers. It has a close connection with praise, power, and riches. Yet δόξα θεοῦ remains a difficult term to understand. It is a thick word, not easily seen through. Paul uses it often but does not define it. He supposes that his readers already have a good understanding of δόξα and its many meanings. Part of the difficulty in understanding Paul today is that, although we stand inside a common tradition, we do not share a common situation with the early Christian community. Their language, theology, and metaphors are sometimes foreign to us, but there is common ground which allows interpretation to begin.

III. THE MEANING OF δόξα IN 2 CORINTHIANS 3.

The significance of δόξα in this passage is not easy to establish. This text is closely related to the narrative in Exodus 34.27-35, in which

Moses goes up on Mount Sinai, remains there with the Lord for forty days and nights, receives the ten commandments, and then descends to proclaim them to the people of Israel. This narrative is obscure, the actions of Moses are not easily comprehended, and this is the only instance in the OT where a man's face is reported to have glowed after a divine encounter. Another reason for the difficulty is ascertaining the train of thought in 2 Corinthians 3 and its connection with its wider epistolary context. The implications for meaning arising from the relationship between word and context have been discussed elsewhere, yet it is necessary to point out here that this is a dynamic, rather than a static, relationship. That is, the meaning of individual words can affect the sense of a text, and the overall meaning of a text can shape the meaning of individual words. Furthermore, authors sometimes 'bend' language in order to fit their thoughts, thereby giving words a somewhat different meaning.[26]

The meaning of δόξα will be affected by one's decision as to the nature of the passage at hand. Is it polemic, apologetic, expository, or even hortatory? There is also the difficulty resulting from the plurivocity of the word. Δόξα has several distinct, though not altogether unrelated, meanings from which the interpreter may choose. Nevertheless, in spite of these difficulties, an attempt will be made to set out some of the meaning of δόξα in 2 Corinthians, where the apostle uses the word nineteen times. Eleven of these are in chapter 3 and will be dealt with later, but first a brief survey of the other eight occurrences will be presented.

1.20. 'For all the promises of God find their Yes in him. That is why we utter the Amen through him, to the glory of God.' It is to God and for his glory that the early church uttered amen.[27] By this affirmation,

man recognises 'his own abject resourcelessness and magnifies the sovereign grace of his Creator and Redeemer.'[28] By both word and deed, God is glorified by the obedience of his people.[29] In this verse, δόξα points both to the majesty of God and the honour which Christians show him.

4.4. 'In their case the god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers, to keep them from seeing the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the likeness of God.' Plummer interprets δόξα as 'honour.'[30] Others understand it to mean radiance, because of the number of terms referring to light and vision in the passage (τυφλόω, αὐγάζω, φωτισμός, εἰκών).[31] Schmiedel affirms the meaning of 'light' for δόξα here by pointing to the bright light of the Resurrected One which Paul encountered during his conversion experience as reported in Acts 9, 22, and 26.[32] The glory of Christ is certainly meant to be distinguished from the glory of Moses expounded in chapter 3.

4.6. 'For it is the God who said, "Let light shine out of darkness," who has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ.' Δόξα, as in 4.4, probably means radiance.[33] It also suggests the majesty of God. But the emphasis is primarily upon the power of God as evidenced through his saving acts.[34] God manifested his glory in Christ by raising him from the dead. This glory is now to be seen in the face of Christ. The permanence of the glory of God on the face of Christ is a strong contrast to the fading glory on the face of Moses.

4.15. 'For it is all for your sake, so that as grace extends to more and more people it may increase thanksgiving, to the glory of God.' The glory of God means the honour of God, θεοῦ here being an objective genitive (the honour which men give to God) rather than a subjective genitive (the honour which God possesses, which he has within himself). As the gospel is

proclaimed (v. 4) and men come to believe in Christ (v. 13) and give thanks to God (v. 15), so God is honoured. So here δόξα θεοῦ is the honour and praise and thanksgiving offered to God by men.

4.17. 'For this slight momentary affliction is preparing for us an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison.' Again δόξα means honour. Paul and his missionary band suffer many bodily afflictions which cause their outer man to be 'wasting away'. These afflictions, mentioned in verses 7-12, are temporary, lasting only for the moment. They are *light* compared to the eternal *weight* of glory of heavenly treasure they are producing in Paul and his company. Glory must mean 'honour' here in order to contrast with affliction. The apostle was dishonoured by the afflictions laid on him by men. But someday he will receive honour conferred on him by God, because he focuses on the unseen realities of eternity, not on the visible things which are only temporary (v. 18).

6.8. 'In honour and dishonour, in ill repute and good repute.' Δόξα here certainly means honour, as demonstrated earlier in this section (pp. 210-211). The contrast with ἀτιμία coupled with the antithesis δυσφημία / εὐφημία which follows places δόξα in the realm of personal relations. The words in this semantic field point more to one's reputation than to one's character, more to what others think of him than to what he is in himself. So the word signifies the positive regard and high appraisal conferred by men, and perhaps God. It may be translated honour, respect, or dignity.

8.19. 'And not only that, but he has been appointed by the churches to travel with us in this gracious work which we are carrying on, for the glory of the Lord and to show our good will.' As in the preceding passage, δόξα again means honour. Though at first glance the phrase δόξα κυρίου may bring to mind the OT concept of כְּבוֹד יְהוָה and the signification

of the majestic and mysterious presence of the Lord, yet the context again filters out this meaning and permits the notion of 'honour' to come through. In this passage, the administrative section of the epistle, Paul is eager for all of his plans concerning the offering for the Jerusalem church to be carried out smoothly. This ministry of distant converts sending funds to needy brethren at headquarters is being carried out ultimately for the purpose of (πρός) bringing greater honour to God.[35] For whenever Christians supply the needs of each other, it results in honour being attributed to the Lord (Mt 5.16; cf. Mt 25.31-46).

8.23. 'As for Titus, he is my partner and fellow worker in your service; and as for our brethren, they are messengers of the churches, the glory of Christ.' H. D. Betz has cited several ancient epistles in support of his claim that 'glory (δόξα) was firmly connected with the practice of sending and receiving envoys. The authors were vague about what is meant in specific, but no doubt reference is made to certain privileges.'[36] Since 2 Corinthians 8.16-24 functions as a letter of recommendation for the sending of Titus as Paul's envoy to the Corinthians, it is not unusual then that δόξα appears here also. But its function is not easily discernible. Betz suggests that it serves two purposes. (1) Though it is given as a compliment to the brothers, it is actually an exhortation to the brothers '... to be representatives of a kind of glory (δόξα) consistent with that of Christ.'[37] Their appearance, conduct, and speech ought not to bring reproach to the name of Christ. (2) It also urges their hosts to accord the brothers the same privileges as they would Christ himself.[38] In so doing, they would be effectively glorifying Christ as well as fulfilling the hospitality code of the early church. If Betz is correct in his suggestion about the place and purpose of δόξα in a letter of recommendation,

then one can again conclude that δόξα in 8.23 means 'honour.' The unnamed brothers, envoys of the churches, are being diplomatically urged to conduct themselves in an honourable manner. If they are indeed the δόξα Χριστοῦ, then they must act as if they are. Their deeds ought to bring honour and not shame to Christ. Furthermore, their hosts should honour and respect each envoy as if he were Christ himself. Though the hosts were not previously acquainted with their guests, they should still grant them privileges that are appropriate to bearers of this 'honorific title' conferred upon them by Paul.[39] Although Betz proposes these possibilities, he is reluctant to make great claims of certainty for them, noting that the meaning of δόξα Χριστοῦ in this context is somewhat fuzzy. 'The very vagueness of the expression may reflect the language of diplomacy, where vagueness is a virtue.'[40]

2 Corinthians 3. The meaning of δόξα in this chapter varies, shifting from one emphasis to another. All of the various meanings appear in the chapter, but in each instance one meaning emerges as dominant while the others recede without disappearing. Paul exploits to the full this plurivocity of the word, emphasizing first one meaning of δόξα and then another.

In verses 7-18, Paul considers Exodus 34.27-35. Windisch has identified this passage as a Christian midrash.[41] Georgi has gone a step further by analysing it as a midrash which Paul has re-worked by making certain changes and glossing it freely. Georgi thinks that the original midrash had been composed by Paul's opponents in Corinth, a group of Hellenistic Jewish Christian missionaries. Paul got hold of it, thoroughly revised it, and sent it back to Corinth in order to refute his opponents.[42] Klauck regards Georgi's thesis as highly improbable, since it depends to a large extent on conjecture and hypothesis and there is no manuscript

evidence to support it.[43] Furnish says the midrash theory is unnecessary to understand and explain the text as it stands today. Regardless of one's view of the history and literary integrity of the text, one must still construct an interpretation of δόξα in 2 Corinthians 3.

In 2 Corinthians 3.7a, ἐν δόξῃ seems to be best understood as the radiant and mysterious presence of God with Moses. In Exodus 24.15-18, the writer describes the appearing of the glory of the Lord to Moses while he was on the mountain for forty days and nights receiving the tables of stone. 'Now the appearance of the glory of the Lord [כְּבוֹד יְהוָה, τῆς δόξης κυρίου] was like a devouring fire on the top of the mountain in the sight of the people of Israel' (v. 17). God's glory as revealed on Sinai was like a raging fire, producing both a bright light and a great heat. The narrative in Exodus 34, apparently drawing on Exodus 24 (most OT commentators think that both are 'P' material), presupposes that the bright light of God's presence appeared to Moses, thereby illuminating his face. So in 2 Corinthians 3.7, ἐγενήθη ἐν δόξῃ must refer primarily to the presence of God on Sinai, and secondarily to the brilliant illumination accompanying that presence. In 7b, the priority of these two connotations is reversed. The main emphasis of τὴν δόξαν τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ is the brilliant illumination of Moses' countenance, and the 'presence of God' is a secondary meaning.

In this way we see one sense of a word suggesting another sense.[44] Δόξα as the majestic presence of God (7a) gives rise to δόξα as brilliance (7b), just as the כְּבוֹד יְהוָה as devouring fire (Ex 24.17) suggested the idea of light, introduced in Exodus 34.29,35. This is an interesting and perhaps ironic development, because a key word for Paul throughout 2 Corinthians 3 is δόξα, and ἡ δόξα κυρίου does not appear in the LXX of

Exodus 34.27-35. The verb form δοξάζω is found in Exodus 34, but in each of its three occurrences it refers to the illumination of Moses' face and not to the splendour of God. The glory of God is certainly implied, though, since, if Moses was glorified, then it was God who glorified him. Both Exodus 24 and Exodus 33 give out clues that indicate that Moses viewed the glory of the Lord and that his face later reflected this glory as he descended the mountain. Even though δόξα does not occur in Exodus 34, it does appear in 2 Corinthians 3. And its meaning in 3.7 shifts subtly from presence of God in 7a to illumination in 7b.

At least two questions arise in verse 8. What is the sense of ἡ διακονία τοῦ πνεύματος? And in what way is it ἐν δόξῃ? If ἡ διακονία τοῦ πνεύματος is taken as a subjective genitive, then it points to the ministry which the Spirit performs. Paul might be suggesting that the Spirit of God was at work in the life of Jesus, extending even to his death and resurrection (Rom 1.4). Since Paul also attributes the resurrection to the glory of God (Rom 6.4), one might conclude that both Spirit and glory accompanied Jesus both during this life and beyond. If this is the sense of the subjective genitive, then one would not have been surprised if Paul had written, 'Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is *glory*.'

The ministry which the Spirit performs is also directed toward the believers, whom Paul urges to walk by the Spirit (πνεύματι περιπατεῖτε, Gal 5.16). As they do so, the Spirit transforms them ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν (2 Cor 3.18). Thus, the work of the Spirit in the believer is also a glorious affair. So, with reference both to Christ and to Christians, ἡ διακονία τοῦ πνεύματος ἔσται ἐν δόξῃ.

If ἡ διακονία τοῦ πνεύματος is, however, a qualitative genitive, as Furnish suggests, then it would refer to the ministry which 'deals in the

Spirit'.[45] Such a ministry is one in which the Spirit, instead of death and the letter, is the predominant feature. It is characterized by believers' receiving of the Spirit and by the Spirit's powerful operation in their lives.

It is not necessary to choose between the two alternatives. It is possible to take 'the ministry of the Spirit' as both a subjective and a qualitative genitive. That it is possible to interpret another of Paul's genitive phrases in two different senses has been demonstrated by M. Hooker, with reference to πίστις Χριστοῦ.[46] She points out the necessity of allowing this phrase to refer to both the actual faith of Christ himself and the faith of men who believe in Christ. In the case of ἡ διακονία τοῦ πνεύματος, it is also desirable to understand it as both subjective and qualitative genitive. Such a choice is compatible with Paul's theology, and it reveals the richness of his use of religious language. In cases like this, it is more advantageous, and perhaps more accurate also, to proceed onward from debates about 'either/or' to an embracing of 'both / and'. One should not be offended or surprised that Paul can say one thing and mean two. This kind of plurivocity can lead the reader to discover new horizons of meaning in religious texts. While the interpreter should perhaps be sensitive to the author's original intention, he should not be restricted by this intention. Rather, he should explore the text and open it up in such a way that it comes to mean all that it can mean in his own situation. For it is quite possible for a text to contain truth that only a later audience can recognise.[47]

In verse 9, Paul compares two glories. There was glory in the ministry of Moses, even though this ministry resulted in condemnation for many. Here δόξα again points to the presence of God on Sinai and to the

light accompanying his presence. But there is a more abundant glory in the ministry of righteousness. Through faith in Christ men receive δικαιοσύνη. Since the resurrection glory of Christ was more brilliant and abiding than the fading glory on Moses' face, Paul concludes that the ministry which leads men to righteousness is likewise more glorious than the one which leads men to condemnation.

In fact, the new ministry is so brilliant that it causes the brilliance of Moses and the old ministry to appear as if it were not even illuminated (v. 10). But someone may object that the ministry of Jesus would not outwardly appear to have been very glorious, since he suffered the accursed crucifixion death of a criminal. But the New Testament constantly refers to the glory of his resurrection as a sign of the true glory of his ministry and as a vindication by God of that ministry.

But an even weightier objection is that the ministry of Paul did not appear to be glorious. He had difficulties with Peter and the Jerusalem church. He was hounded by Jews and Romans. He encountered many hardships (2 Cor 4.8-9, 6.4-10, 11.16-33) and even had a prison record. There are no reports of Paul's face glowing, let alone glowing brighter than Moses'.

It becomes apparent, then, that δόξα here in verse 10 can no longer mean light, at least in any literal sense. It must refer again to the glory of the presence of God. For it was through suffering that God manifested his glory in Paul, and this happens inwardly in the heart, not outwardly on the face.[48] Paul had a greater glory than Moses in that he had a greater experience of the presence of God. The theophanies were few, and their light left but a fading glow on the face of Moses. But Paul knew the eternally abiding presence of God. God comforted him in all his afflictions (2 Cor 1.4), supplied all his needs (Phil 4.19), and provided

him with every blessing in abundance, so that he always had enough of everything and abounded in every good work (2 Cor 9.8). Because of the revelation of God in Christ, Paul knew God more personally and intimately than Moses did, and, as a result, Paul's ministry was more glorious than Moses'.

Paul's use of δόξα in verse 11 is much the same as in verse 9. The temporary thing (the whole complex of theophany, covenant, ministry) was blessed with glory, that is, with the presence of God. The permanent thing (the whole complex of Christ and the new covenant), however, is also blessed with the presence of God. Paul affirms that the old covenant is in no way superior to the new and claims rather that the new is much more superior and glorious than the old.

There is no mention of δόξα again until verse 18, where it appears three times. In summing up his comments on Moses, Paul affirms that all of us believers have unveiled faces and are beholding the glory of the Lord. It is impossible to overlook the contrast between one man with a veiled face (Moses) and the many with unveiled face. But how is it that Christians behold the glory of the Lord? Except for a few resurrection appearances, the Lord had not been manifest to believers as he was to Moses. And certainly their faces were not illuminated as Moses had been. How then can Paul say so boldly that all of us see the glory? He is speaking metaphorically. We see the glory of the Lord when we see Christ imaginatively pictured (προγράφω, Gal 3.1) before us in the preaching of the gospel. We see the glory of the Lord when we hear in faith of Christ's life, death, and resurrection.

The transformation from glory to glory means to be transferred from the lesser glory of the old covenant to the greater glory of the new

covenant, and from one stage of the greater glory to yet further stages. Or stated differently, one is transformed as one moves from the less personal knowledge of God available through the law to the more intimate realization of the presence of God within us through faith in the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ.

IV. TWO δόξα METAPHORS IN 2 CORINTHIANS 3.

After the preceding overview of δόξα in the Old Testament and in the Pauline corpus, it will be useful now to select two δόξα metaphors from 2 Corinthians 3 and give them a thorough semantic treatment. These two metaphors are: ἡ δόξα τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ (v. 7) and ἡ δόξα κυρίου (v. 18). The starting point will be a discussion of the relationship between polysemy and metaphor, of which δόξα provides a good illustration.

Δόξα is a word that exhibits polysemy *par excellence*: it has several different senses and is able to acquire even more. Because δόξα and all other words in ordinary language are capable of polysemy, there is a basis for symbolic discourse and metaphorical predication.[49] Δόξα, like any other word in the system though, has only virtual sense until it is used in discourse, when one or more of its meanings are actualized, or when a new meaning is created for it through its use in a metaphorical statement.

In discourse, when δόξα is put to work, its meanings are both actualized and restricted by context. As an integral part of a sentence, it contributes to the overall sense and reference of the statement. Δόξα will not mean everything it can mean in a dictionary, but only what is *suggested* and *allowed* by the sentence in which it is used and by the context of which it is a part.[50] The context is not limited, though, to its 'linguistic environment' but includes also the 'horizon of reality' surrounding the

text.[51] For the purposes of this discussion, the 'linguistic environment' of δόξα is the Pauline corpus and 2 Corinthians 3 in particular. The 'horizon of reality' is that situation common to both writer and reader, the Judeo-Christian tradition as transmitted by the church through the Scriptures.

The objection might be raised that all of this emphasis on the polysemous character of words will lead to ambiguous and equivocal meanings of the text. This is always a potential problem in the use of religious language, but it is the task of interpretation, in its broadest sense, to 'use all the available contextual determinants to grasp the actual meaning of a given message in a given situation.'[52] Thus a fundamental trait of polysemy is its dependence on a context for both the selection and activation of its meanings.

The relationship between polysemy and metaphor is reciprocal. Metaphor contributes to polysemy by adding to the reservoir of potential meaning of a word, and it is polysemy which contributes in part to the possibility of metaphor itself. The lexical value of a word is augmented by the accretion of meanings resulting from dead metaphor. A dead metaphor is a live metaphor (tensive, creative, startling) which has been worked to death. It has been repeated so often that its users have forgotten its metaphorical origin and use it only in its now generally accepted sense. This standardized usage is added to the lexical value of the word, and the polysemy of the word is thereby supplemented.

Polysemy contributes to the possibility of metaphor by means of its accumulation of already accepted connotations. When a word is used metaphorically, it brings with it a set of characteristics which help to generate the clash or tension in the metaphorical statement. But a lively

metaphor 'does not merely actualize a potential connotation, it creates it. It is a semantic innovation, an emergent meaning.'[53] Or, stated differently, metaphor requires all of its accepted meanings plus *one*, the one which will rescue the sentence by making sense of the semantic impertinence. Δόξα is an example of this interplay between polysemy and metaphor. It is polysemous, as any lexicon will indicate and as the preceding word study has illustrated. Δόξα is also used metaphorically, though it is not properly called a metaphor until it is used in a metaphorical statement. But when δόξα is the focus of a 'semantic discrepancy'[54] in a sentence, then it takes on a new meaning. Thus the sentence is the catalyst for new meaning, but the word itself 'is the depository of the creativity of language.'[55]

The development of the plurivocity of δόξα has already been investigated, so a discussion of δόξα as metaphor is now in order. The metaphoricity is sometimes overlooked by New Testament scholars. This occurs because of several reasons. First, the text is often so familiar that the shock of an aberrant attribution is greatly reduced, or even eliminated altogether.[56] The reader is thus anaesthetized by means of critical study, and is not aware of some of the semantic subtleties of his text. Second, the student of the New Testament fully expects to confront figurative language in his text. Since religious documents are so interspersed with figures of speech, and all religious language must be, the presence of a metaphor may be neither surprising or disturbing. Finally, the language of the New Testament has been thoroughly lexicalized. Because it is a closed text and relatively small, the task of defining all the different meanings of δόξα as it appears in the New Testament can be more easily attempted. Thus, the chance of discovering and experiencing a metaphorical twist of

meaning is rather remote. The wide range of meanings for δόξα in the New Testament has already been identified and catalogued.

The present task, then, is to re-sensitize the reader to the oddness of the use of δόξα in 2 Corinthians 3, to inject an antidote to counteract the numbness and loss of sensitivity resulting from critical study, to present some of the nuances of meaning suggested by the metaphorical usage of δόξα in the text.

The first usage to be considered is: ἡ δόξα τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ ('the glory of his face', 2 Cor 3.7). The reference is to the face of Moses and his mountain top encounter with Yahweh (Ex 34.29-35). While Paul uses the noun δόξα in conjunction with the face of Moses, the LXX uses the verb δοξάζω. Both are expressing the notion of 'brilliance' or 'radiance' (קָרַן) which came over the face of Moses as a result of his speaking with the Lord.

The 'glory of his face' is metaphorical, but it is not a metaphor originated by Paul. Rather, it is a metaphor from the Jewish scriptures and tradition which is taken over by Paul and used for his own purpose.[57] To say that there is light radiating from one's face is not literally true, though this is asserted both by Paul and his Old Testament source. Faces are illuminated by light. They are burned by too much light (sunburn). But they do not emit light. Paul even intensifies the ontological vehemence of this metaphor by stating that the light was so bright that the sons of Israel were not able to gaze steadfastly upon Moses' face (2 Cor 3.7). In writing this, Paul goes beyond that which is written in the Pentateuch, though it may be said that Exodus 34.30 approaches what Paul says.

The figurative meaning of 'light', used by the biblical writers, is still current today. 'The bride is simply radiant.' 'His face glowed with

excitement.' 'Her eyes sparkled.' All these statements are attempts to convey the emotion one sees expressed on the face of another. 'Light on the face' or 'his face lit up' are attempts to describe positive emotions. One can also say, 'What a glorious day!', meaning that the sun is shining brightly today. So, even in current idiom, 'glory' can mean brilliance, and 'light' on the face can suggest excitement or enthusiasm. These usages are pointers toward the significance of 'glory on the face.'

Two examples from modern literature may illuminate this sense. Charlotte Brontë, in *Villette*, writes of M. Paul: 'A great softness passed upon his countenance; his violet eyes grew suffused and glistening under their deep Spanish lashes.'[58] Brontë, in writing of M. Paul's expression of the experience of the powerful emotion of love, expressed it as a sparkling of the eyes. Eyes do not literally light up when one is in love, but *something* happens to one's countenance, and a 'radiant face' is perhaps as apt a description as is possible. Brontë, like others before her, used the motif of 'light on the face' to attempt to translate into language the effect of being in love. As the popular song of the 1960's said, 'the look of love' is real, but not easily described. The look can be more easily recognized than talked about.

Dale Carnegie uses similar language to describe the enigmatic Charles De Gaulle: '... although De Gaulle was dignified and cold in appearance, yet inside him there was a flame that could burst out into a brilliant light.'[59] It is obvious that 'flame' and 'light' are being used figuratively of De Gaulle. He was not a fire-breathing man with a pilot light inside who could ignite when the gas was turned on. Rather, the writer was using the metaphor of light to contrast De Gaulle's occasional warmth of personality with the often austere appearance of his face. This

attribute was described in terms of something like a 'light' which came forth from De Gaulle. It was not a literal light, but there was some kind of change which became apparent to onlookers.

This is perhaps the sense of the pericope in Exodus 34. The narrator reports that Moses, after having remained 40 days and nights on the mountain, finally descended again to the camp. When the Israelites saw him, they noticed that there was something different about his appearance, 'and they were afraid to come near him' (v. 30). The story teller/writer attempts to describe this change of countenance by saying that Moses' face was radiant. He explains the reason for this new development: Moses had been speaking with the Lord (v. 29). The Hebrew text three times states Moses' face was radiant (קָרַן, vv. 29, 30, 35). This is translated as δοξάζω in the Septuagint. Paul revises this somewhat when he writes, ἡ δόξα τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ.

'The glory of Moses' face' is a metaphor, though maybe not as odd or startling as, 'You are our letter'. It is an old metaphor, originating in the Old Testament and 're-cycled' by Paul. Max Black, using the metaphor of 'volcano' to talk about metaphor itself, identifies three kinds of metaphor: active, dormant, extinct.[60] 'The glory of Moses' face' is perhaps a dormant metaphor, because it erupted first in the Old Testament and Paul is now trying to awaken it again.

Δόξα (2 Cor 3.7b) probably denotes 'brilliance' or 'radiance'. Paul affirms that there is glory on the face of Moses. But it was not literal light radiating from his countenance. Several reputable Old Testament commentators, acknowledge the ontological vehemence of this language by simply referring to the 'shining of his face'[61] and 'the reflexion of the Divine glory upon his face.'[62] They never mention 'metaphor', and they

seem quite comfortable to take these statements as literally true, or, if they do not mean them literally, they give the reader no clue that both the Old Testament text and their comments on it are to be understood in any sense other than literal.

1 Corinthians 15.40-41, as mentioned earlier,[63] is probably a literal usage of δόξα in the sense of 'brilliance'.

> There are celestial bodies and there are terrestrial bodies; but the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial is another. There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for star differs from star in glory.

Each of the heavenly bodies has its own degree of relative luminosity, as it appears to the earthbound viewer of the sky. But the glory of the face of Moses was not radiance in this sense. To understand it this way, or to think that the ancient Israelites understood it this way, is to misinterpret the language.[64]

This metaphor needs to be 'unmasked'. Beyond the *naïvete* of the literal interpretation lies the contradiction which leads to the breakdown of the literal interpretation. In dealing with metaphor, Ricoeur notes three stages of interpretation: 'it is', 'it is not', and 'it is like'. The 'it is not' is the unmasking, the recognition that these terms do not fit together in their ordinary senses. Faces do not radiate light, let alone a light so bright that it scares away one's friends, and that it must be covered with a veil. Lamps and torches emit light. Faces do not. Something has gone wrong.

מַסְוֶה appears only in Exodus 34.29-35 in all of the Hebrew Bible. It is usually translated 'veil', though it may have been a face mask worn by a priest during his religious duties.[65] 'When the priest put on the

mask he assumed the "face" of the deity and this identified himself with that deity.'[66] When he took off the mask, he removed the pretence and was identified with himself again.

Unmasking a priest is not totally unlike unmasking a metaphor. Unmasking a metaphor is lifting the façade, looking beyond the superficial fascination of the words at play. It is resisting the ontological vehemence of the metaphor. It reveals the words by viewing them in their ordinary meanings, apart from the clever cloaking of the poet.

The 'is' and 'is not' place a tension on the metaphorical utterance which is ultimately resolved by an 'is like' or an 'as if'. Metaphor 'cleverly bypasses given categories in order to reveal similarities in the field of our experience.'[67] The 'is like' of 'the glory on Moses' face' is that Moses' face was so expressive of emotion after his encounter with Yahweh that it was *as if* his face was shining. The writer is attempting to convey the magnificence of Moses' appearance as he descended the mountain. To do so, he uses the language of 'a shining face'. As for Moses, he did not know what his face looked like. But for the Israelite onlookers, it seemed as if his face was glowing with excitement after his mountaintop experience.

The overemphasis on the literal interpretation has led some commentators in a different direction. By not recognizing the metaphorical nature of the language employed, they search for a source for the (physical) light on Moses' face. Thus Driver states that Moses' face was radiant because it reflected the divine glory, of which Moses had only seen the afterglow while he stood in the cleft of the rock and looked on the back of God (Ex 33.21-23).[68] The Hebrew text and the Septuagint do not state explicitly (though they strongly imply) that there is a cause-effect

relationship between the report of Moses beholding the 'back' of the Lord and the narrative of his face becoming radiant. Nor is it certain, in following a more literal interpretation, that Moses, in the Exodus narratives, even beheld the glory of the Lord. The *glory* of the Lord is linked consistently to the *face* of the Lord, and the Exodus text explicitly states that Moses was not permitted to see the face of the Lord, although he was permitted an oblique glance at the back of the Lord (Ex 33.21-23). On this reading, it is unlikely that Moses saw the glory on the face of the Lord, and thus it is also unlikely that the glory of the Lord was the agent which illuminated the face of Moses. Nor does the story state that Moses' radiant face was a 'reflexion' of the glory of the Lord.

Although there is a shortage of explicit statements surrounding the connection between the glory of the Lord and the glory of Moses' face, there is a plethora of suggestiveness. A brief survey of three pericopes in Exodus 33 will help to clarify the mysterious language of Exodus 34.[69]

The first is verses 7-11, in which Moses would enter the tent of meeting. When he did so, 'the pillar of cloud would descend and stand at the door of the tent' (v. 9), thus signifying to the onlookers that the Lord was speaking with Moses. For them, it was a visual event. For Moses, the emphasis is upon the audible, though this talking was enacted 'face to face' (v. 11). This pericope speaks freely of oral contact with God, but it betrays a reluctance to make explicit any visual perception of God. The Israelites were permitted to see the cloud, but they seem to have had no immediate encounter with the Lord, as Moses had.

The second pericope (vv. 12-16) continues the emphasis on the oral communication between Moses and God. They are depicted as conversing freely with one another, and any visual element in their relationship is

again suppressed. This suggests that the proper approach to God is audial, not visual.

The third story (vv. 17-23) seems to be a reversal of the previous two, since it depicts a visual event. Moses is not permitted to see the full radiance of the divine countenance. But he is granted a guarded and restricted vision of the glory of the back of the Lord.

The three narratives, taken together, present a paradoxical account of Moses' interaction with God. It is portrayed as an immediate experience of the divine presence. On the one hand, Moses spoke with the Lord face to face, but, on the other hand, he was not permitted to see the face of the Lord. A face to face conversation without seeing the face is a paradox! The writer is describing Moses' encounter with Yahweh as an immediate experience of the divine but at the same time as an almost unspeakable occurrence.

When reading Exodus 34 in the light of this understanding of Exodus 33, the gaps of the former may be filled in by the suggestions of the latter. Moses descended with a radiant face. Had he seen the Lord or not? The text tends to indicate that he did, without saying so explicitly. 'Man shall not see me and live' (Ex 33.20), but how else can one describe an intimate, personalized experience of the divine? The writer hesitates to use the language of direct vision to denote that Moses had been in close contact with God. So he conveys it indirectly by saying that Moses' face glowed, suggesting (without stating) that Moses *had* seen the face of the Lord, and that this vision is what had thereby illuminated his own face.

The 'descent' narrative goes on to state that Moses was radiant 'because he had been talking with God' (Ex 34.29). The explicit reason given for the illumination is Moses' *speaking* with God, not his seeing him,

though the seeing is not totally excluded. This is similar to the statement in Exodus 33.11: 'Thus the Lord used to speak to Moses face to face, as a man speaks to his friend.' The audial is highlighted, and the visual is suppressed, though not eliminated. The relationship of God and Moses was less one of immediate vision than one of direct communication. In the book of Exodus, Moses is a man who has been honoured by God. Moses is portrayed as a man with a hot line to heaven. He had a reputation (δόξα) for being able to communicate directly with God. He was also honoured by the people for the just and wise laws he gave them.

An overemphasis on the literal illumination of Moses' face is also apparent among New Testament scholars who comment on 2 Corinthians 3.7-18. The view of Bruce is typical: 'As Moses reflected the divine glory to which he was exposed, so Christians, beholding the surpassing glory which shines in the gospel, which is nothing less than the glory of the Lord himself, reflect that glory....'[70] He recognizes the unspoken connotations of the passage, but fails to see the metaphorical nature of the language employed. When the texts state that Moses face shone, this is metaphorical, and it means something like the assertion that Moses had a fantastic religious experience on the mountain and the excitement was expressed on his face. In a more contemporary metaphor, one might say that Moses was so full of his religious experience that awe and wonder were oozing out of his pores. But no dermatologist could have taken samples and proved or disproved this claim, just as no photographer could have recorded any higher than normal light level on the face of Moses. Rather these are metaphors which are making true statements about religious affairs.

When Paul speaks of 'the glory of Moses face', he is speaking metaphorically. He knew (or is this too confident a claim?), as did the

Israelites of Moses' day, that Moses did not diffuse light beams from his face. The 'glory of his face' does not mean that Moses was a walking torch. Rather, as δόξα was a term fit for the presence of God, so δόξα was a fit term for the appearance of Moses who had just come from the presence of God. As God honoured Moses by speaking with him so the tradition honoured Moses by speaking of the δόξα on his face, as a way of stating that Moses stood in a special relationship with God. As 'special relationship' summarises the friendship between the United Kingdom and the United States, so δόξα summarises the honour and esteem and brilliance of both God and Moses and the quality of the friendship between them.

Moses, because he was close (spatial metaphor) to God, wrote right regulations. He was a brilliant lawgiver. He was honoured by his fellow countrymen, who said he had δόξα on his face. This is the exact opposite of the contemporary negative metaphor - 'egg on the face' - for one who has shamed himself by speaking an unwise word.

The relationship between the veil and the glory is difficult to establish. Propp states that Moses' face was burned and disfigured by the fiery heat of the divine δόξα (Ex 24.17), and that the veil was 'to spare the people the gruesome sight.'[71] Furnish suggests that Moses was 'sparing his people the agony of seeing the last of the splendour.'[72] Quite a different reason is proffered by Windisch, who says that Moses veiled his face so that the divine δόξα would not be profaned by commoners' viewing it.[73] C. Hickling would agree, citing Moses' 'reverential motives' for veiling the δόξα.[74] All three proposals are plausible, though none is convincing. The reason for the veiling, unstated by the Exodus narrative and left undefined by Paul, remains a mystery, though one final comment may be offered. The veiling of Moses' face corresponds roughly to Moses' being

hid in the cleft of the rock. If Moses was thus able to see only the afterglow of the divine glory, as the Lord passed by, then Israel was able to see perhaps only the overflow of the divine glory on Moses' face. Thus Israel could only bear some of the radiance, of which Moses got more.

If 'glory on the face of Moses' (v. 7) is metaphorical, then 'the glory of the Lord' (v. 18) is certainly metaphorical also. Some might object that glory is the essential attribute of God and therefore proper to him. If glory is the ineffable presence of God,[75] then perhaps this is so. But the book of Exodus and 2 Corinthians 3 speak of it not abstractly but rather in concrete terms - light, fire, radiance. It is just this concrete sense which creates the tension which is characteristic of its usage in metaphorical statements.

Others might object that 'the glory of the Lord' is not a metaphor but rather a technical theological term within the Jewish literature.[76] This is true. But all the while it is a 'dormant' metaphor, which can occasionally set aside, though perhaps not too far away, its technical character and once more act like the volcanic expression it once was.

2 Corinthians 3.18 is just such an occasion.

> ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ τὴν δόξαν κυρίου κατοπτριζόμενοι τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν καθάπερ ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος.

As noted earlier,[77] this verse is enigmatic. The ambiguity of the present middle participle, κατοπτριζόμενοι, cannot be resolved convincingly, and so will be translated, in this discussion, as 'behold/reflect'.[78] The syntactical function of τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα is in question and will be omitted from this discussion. The first half of the verse is the primary focus: 'All of us with unveiled face behold/reflect the glory of the Lord.' The

phrase, ἡ δόξα κυρίου, appears in the Pauline corpus only here and in 2 Corinthians 8.19.[79] The focus statement alludes to several Old Testament passages. The 'unveiled face' is a motif suggested by the narrative of Moses and his veil (Ex 34.29-35). 'Beholding the glory of the Lord' is perhaps an allusion to Moses: τὴν δόξαν κυρίου εἶδεν (Num 12.8). 'Reflecting the glory' is possibly (though not surely) an allusion to Exodus 34.29.

'Volcano' can be the source of a metaphor for 'metaphor' and also the source of a metaphor for God.[80] With reference to Exodus 13.21, in which the Lord is reported as journeying with the Israelites in a pillar of cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night, M. Noth says that '... the phenomenon of the pillars of cloud and fire presumably goes back to observation of an active volcano.'[81] It is possible, alternatively, that fire became for Israel a symbol of God because of the large flaming torch carried at the head of the Israelite procession through the wilderness. Whatever its origin may have been, כְּבוֹד יְהוָה came to denote 'the appearance of the divine majesty' or 'the visible manifestation of the Deity.'[82] The fire is often recorded as shrouded in a cloud, since it was thought that no human could bear to view the full radiance of the divine glory. 'The fiery cloud thus formed an imposing visible symbol of the spiritual presence of God.'[83]

When 'glory' is attributed to God, it is a metaphorical predicate.[84] To say that God has weight (כָּבוֹד = δόξα) is a misnomer. It is a semantic incompatibility. But to rescue the statement by saying 'God has a weighty reputation' is acceptable. He has a heavy reputation with the Israelites because they believe that he makes good things happen for them. Yahweh was thought to be influential in human history. Israel believed the Exodus and the Conquest were a result of his intervention on their behalf. This was seen, not only in the fiery clouds, but also in his mighty acts.

Because Yahweh had reputation and influence, he was one to be honoured. Just as men tend to respect their fellow men who have a good reputation, so the Israelites honoured their god. They did so by having feasts in his honour, and by offering him gifts and sacrifices, just as famous men today are fêted and lavished with gifts. They said many words of praise to him and about him. They made him famous in all the land. They also wrote and sang songs in his honour, to show their appreciation and acknowledgement of his weighty reputation. Eventually, the word of God to Israel would be that he would be more pleased by obedience to his commandments than by words of praise and sacrifices offered to him.

Because Yahweh had weight, he was one to be listened to and obeyed. He spoke only to certain chosen ones. Moses was one of the special few with whom it is reported that God spoke: 'The Lord used to speak to Moses face to face, as a man speaks to his friend' (Ex 33.11; Nu 12.8). Thus Moses became a spokesman for God to the people, who listened to the words of God transmitted to them through their intermediary. Because Yahweh was heavy, his words were treasured. They were written down on stone tablets, and preserved in the ark of the covenant.

Δόξα θεοῦ (the LXX translation for כְּבוֹד יְהוָה) can be both a subjective and an objective genitive. As a subjective, it refers to the bright light and fiery cloud which accompany the presence of God. It also connotes the weight of his reputation and the importance of his influence in human affairs. As an objective genitive, it refers to the high regard in which he is held and the praise which is given him. Δόξα is thus metaphorical when attributed to God, for it does not apply literally.

As pointed out above, there are enough similarities between 2 Corinthians 3.7-18 and Exodus 34.29-35, to lead some scholars to identify

the former passage as a midrash, or rabbinic style interpretation, of the latter.[85] But the Corinthian passage has several elements which cannot be accounted for on the basis of Exodus 34.[86] It is perhaps more accurate, then, to say that Paul's writing is not properly a midrash, because it does not serve to elucidate the text by means of a running commentary. But it does have some midrashic features, which arise from Paul's adaptation of the material.[87]

Another possibility is that Exodus 34.29-35 may be thought of not as a full and complete narrative but rather as a 'reported story'.[88] The concept of reported story, as a possible genre of Old Testament literature, is proposed and explained by Antony Campbell:

> ... some of the Old Testament narrative texts contain neither the record of the oral telling of a story nor the skilled fashioning of a story as a work of literary art but, instead, provide the report of a story. Such a reported story would contain the basic elements of character and plot as well as key details but would pass over much that could be easily supplied from the story-teller's imagination. ... the reported story would be ... a condensation or an ... aide-mémoire for other storytellers. The intention of the reported story, as literary genre, would be to communicate the gist of a story so that it might be recalled or retold.'[89]

It is conceivable that Exodus 34.29-35 is just such a reported story, and that the Corinthians are already familiar with it. What Paul is doing, then, in 2 Corinthians 3 is not re-telling the story or commenting on it but rather using 'the storyteller's imagination' to fill in some of the details of a cause and effect sequence and to apply the narrative to his own situation.

According to Exodus 34.30, the Israelites were *afraid* to approach Moses because his face was shining. Paul expands this by saying they were

unable to gaze on Moses face because it was so brilliant (v. 7). Exodus 34 gives no reason for Moses donning the veil. Paul supplies one: 'so that the Israelites might not see the end of the fading splendour.' (v. 13) Paul then makes the Exodus narrative of contemporary interest to his readers by applying it to the unbelief of the Jews in contrast with the experience of the Christian ministers.

The possibility of Exodus 34.29-35 being a reported story and 2 Corinthians 3.7-18 an expansion (though a brief one) of it might explain both the brevity of the former and the unique augmentation of the latter.

When Paul writes ἡ δόξα κυρίου in 2 Corinthians 3.18, κύριος refers to God, and δόξα connotes bright light. This phrase seems to emphasize the bright light which is the Lord, which shines forth from the Lord, which is associated with the Lord. It is similar to אוֹר יְהוָה (Ps 27.1), and it is not an unusual Old Testament notion. When Paul uses it here, he is referring to something (presumably visible) which the Christian can behold/reflect. This is parallel to the glory of Moses' face, which Paul interprets as a bright light upon which the Israelites could not gaze intently because of its brilliance. Because of κατοπτρίζω, δόζα κυρίου refers more to God's radiant appearance than to his famous reputation.

God is a light, a very bright light. He is not really a light. He is like a light (Ricoeur's triad again). Light is a word which gives one the ability to start talking about God. Light is necessary for life. It allows people to see where they are going. God is necessary for life. He makes things happen. He helps people 'see' where they are going. His words are a lamp for the feet and a light for the path (Ps 119.105).

2 Corinthians 4.6 informs the reader that God is shining a light into the hearts of believers:

> For it is the God who said, 'Let light shine out of darkness,' who has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ.

But how can this be? Is there a heavenly flash light directed toward every Christian? This is probably not what is intended here. Rather, it should be pointed out that this light is not a visible phenomenon, and that these illuminated hearts are no more literal than Moses' shining face. This is metaphorical language.

A reading of the above verse poses at least two issues which bear on the explanation of ἡ δόξα κυρίου in 3.18. First is the relationship between the glory of God and the face of Jesus Christ. The glory of God is the glory not of a hidden God but of a revealed God, who has made himself known in Jesus Christ. 'Thus the glory of God is none other than the glory in the face of Christ.'[90] It is 'set before the eyes' in the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus. The glory and power of God are revealed in the weakness and shame of the cross and in the triumphant event of resurrection.[91] The 'face' (πρόσωπον) of Jesus Christ might be better translated as the 'person' of Jesus Christ, in the same way that פָּנִים can be translated 'face' or 'person'. For the face of Jesus Christ is no longer visible, but one's mind can gain knowledge about him as a person.

The second issue is the relationship between the glory of God and the hearts of the believers. Glory in the face of Jesus may suggest but does not mean light on the face which the Christian can behold/reflect in any kind of literal sense. Rather, it is the wondrous majesty of God which is known when one becomes acquainted with Jesus through the preaching of the gospel. The enlightening of the heart (2 Cor 4.6) is reminiscent of the writing on the heart (3.3), and it reverses the results of the hardening of

the thoughts (2 Cor 3.14a), the veiling of the old covenant (v. 14b), the veiling of the hearts (v. 15) and the blinding of the minds (4.4).[92] The enlightening may also be a fulfilment of Isaiah 35.2: 'They shall see the glory of the Lord.' The connection between seeing and knowing has long been recognized.[93] Thus, seeing the glory of God in the face of Christ (2 Cor 4.6) is somewhat similar to having Jesus portrayed before one's eyes (κατ' ὀφθαλμοὺς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς προεγράφη, Gal 3.1) by the preaching of the gospel (2 Cor 4.4). Furthermore, a parallel for seeing the glory as roughly equivalent to hearing the gospel is cited by Furnish: μεγαλεῖον δόξης εἶδον οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ αὐτῶν καὶ δόξαν φωνῆς αὐτοῦ ἤκουσεν τὸ οὖς αὐτῶν (Sirach 17.13).[94]

In summary, then, δόξα is seen to be polysemous. Its journey through Greek literature is characterized by a development of meaning from 'opinion' to 'reputation', 'honour', 'dignity', and even 'wealth', 'power', and 'praise'. From its use in the Septuagint it acquired meanings such as 'radiance' and 'brilliance', and especially its peculiar connection with the presence and majesty of God.

Δόξα is also metaphorical. When it is used with reference to Moses' face, it is being used metaphorically. It does not mean that his face was visibly lit up like a light bulb. Rather, it is a writer's way of saying that Moses' face looked very different as a result of his speaking with the Lord. There is no reason to assume that Moses was literally reflecting a visible light, nor to conjecture that such a reflected light issued forth from the radiant majesty of God. Rather, δόξα, as 'brilliance', is seen to be a good word for talking about both the awe and wonder on Moses' face and about the presence of God.

When used metaphorically of ὁ κύριος in the Septuagint, it came to be associated with the presence of God, especially as it was experienced through theophany. The sense of δόξα as a dazzlingly bright light seemed well suited to references to the magnificence of God. When ἡ δόξα κυρίου is mentioned in 2 Corinthians 3.18, it conjures up all of the associations of light, brilliance, honour, and majesty. But 'beholding the glory of the Lord' is not the same as viewing the brightness of the sun. It is a vision of a different order. The glory of God is 'seen' on the face of Christ. The face of Christ is made 'visible' when the gospel of Christ is proclaimed. Preaching is picturing. And, from the listeners' point of view, hearing is seeing. One sees the glory of God on the face of Christ when one hears the good news of justification by faith in Christ. Thus the glory of God in the New Testament is connected more to the message of Christ than to an emanation of light.[95]

There is, though, an oddity in talking about the glory of God in conjunction with the story of Christ, for his life ended in a cruel crucifixion. The glory of God and the cross of Jesus do not correspond well. But crucifixion was not the end. It was followed by resurrection and exaltation. Thus the glory of God is 'the glory which shines through suffering.'[96] The glory of God, which accompanies the ministry of the new covenant and which is beheld/reflected by those who believe in Jesus, is both a present and a future reality.

The believer already knows that God is present with him, even in the midst of suffering and tribulation (2 Cor 4.7-11). The glory of God is the power of God which strengthens the Christian in such times. One sees the glory when one realizes that God is at work in the believer's own life and in the lives of others.

SECTION D. LIFE AND DEATH.

To speak of God is to speak metaphorically.[1] The anthropomorphic language of the Bible is not to be taken literally, as if he were really, after all, just a super man. This language is not, we may suppose, literally correct nor empirically verifiable. Yahweh is not really a man who tends sheep, nor can the size of his 'hand' be measured. Nevertheless to speak metaphorically of God is to *speak* of him. Man need not remain silent about the Divine. If one could not speak metaphorically, one would in most (if not all) cases be forced to remain silent.[2] But metaphors enable writers to become articulate when they would otherwise be tongue-tied.[3]

In the Christian tradition, it is believed that what the Bible says about God, though it be metaphorical, is still *true*. That which is *true* corresponds to that which in reality *is*. What the Bible says about God is true because it is an expression of what God has revealed to man about himself. Man is not silent about God, because God has not been silent toward man.[4] God has made himself known through the prophets and apostles, and ultimately, through Jesus Christ. The Bible, interpreted Christologically, is the written record of the testimony of these men about Jesus Christ, the Old Testament prophets as they looked forward to him, the New Testament apostles as they looked backward to him.

They wrote in order to talk about God, the God who had made himself known to them.

> In his operation God is revealed to us. All we can know of God according to Scripture testimony is his acts. All we can assert of God, all attributes we can assign to God relate to these acts of His. And so not to his essence as such.[5]

Because there is a distance and difference between man and God, there is also a corresponding 'inadequacy of all knowledge of the revealed God.'[6] Yet the biblical writers wrote, in spite of their less than perfect and complete knowledge of God. They used the language of earth to talk about the things of heaven.

Paul is one person who wrote about God. In 2 Corinthians 3 he names 'the living God'. This is a metaphor. It expresses metaphorical truth. It is not a metaphor coined by Paul, but rather one originating in the Old Testament. Paul uses this phrase, but he does not necessarily use it uncritically. 'The living God' appears only three times in his epistles, but on each occasion it serves a particular function.

When Paul utters the phrase 'living God', he is saying something about God. It means first of all that there is a God. Something must be for something to be said. Paul, in his epistles, never questioned nor proved the existence of God. That God exists is a reality for him which required no discussion. Paul is more concerned with speaking about God's activity than about God's existence.

Paul attributed the predicate ζῶν to the subject θεός. This characteristic should be considered metaphorical, because God is not living in the same sense that a plant or animal or human is living. God may have breath (πνεῦμα), but it is not oxygen or carbon dioxide. Paul borrows a word that is properly predicated of earthly organisms and applies it to the heavenly being. This *transporting* of non-theological terms into a theological context gives Paul a way of saying something about God.

To say 'God is alive' is the same kind of statement as 'the sky is dead'.[7] The sky is not an object of which life or death can properly be predicated. Neither is God an entity which can appropriately receive the

literal designation of 'dead' or 'alive'. To say that someone (something) is alive presupposes that it will also die. The biblical writers and the Christian tradition following them have never understood God to be one who has such a tenuous existence.

Humans have life 'signs' which can be monitored. They have life 'support' machines which can enable the body to perform the necessary functions to sustain life. Humans also die. The heart fails, the lungs stop, the brain ceases to operate. Life is gone, and death now reigns, to use a Pauline personification and regnal metaphor. But God is not alive in this sense. This is not to say that God is dead. He is neither dead nor alive, in physical terms. He just *is*, and He keeps on going. The predicates of life and death are not suitable for his description.

But life is attributed to him, nonetheless. Paul had to say something. So he spoke about God as 'the living God'. Paul stands in a religious tradition, and this tradition uses metaphors as one means of speaking about God. One of their metaphors is 'the living God'. Paul borrows this metaphor from the Hebrew scriptures, where it appears thirteen times. An investigation of Old Testament passages where 'the living God' occurs will provide a background for understanding Paul's use of this term.

The living God is the God who gives life to those who trust him. This is seen clearly in the cycle of narratives about the prophet Elijah. An examination of the material in 1 Kings 17-19 will reveal an antithesis of life and death in Elijah's career and will provide a helpful introduction to these themes as they appear in the other Old Testament passages. Though the title, 'living God', does not appear in the Elijah story, its usage in this context would have been completely appropriate.

In 1 Kings 17.1, the prophet Elijah predicts that there will be no

rain in the land for a while and instead there will be a drought, a symbol of death, as a divine judgment on the disobedience and idolatry of his people. But God preserves the life of his faithful servant, first at the brook Cherith (vv. 2-7) and later at the home of the widow of Zarephath (vv. 8-16). Then the widow's son becomes ill and dies, but his life is restored by the prayer of Elijah and the power of God (vv. 17-24).

Chapter 18 begins with Elijah's announcement that he is going to see King Ahab, a move which will endanger the lives of both Elijah and Obadiah. But the lives of these godly men are spared (vv. 1-16). This is the Obadiah who had saved the lives of one hundred of God's prophets by hiding them in caves and secretly sending them supplies (vv. 3-4). At the contest on Mount Carmel, the prophets of Baal are unable to get a response from their deity, so they are put to death. But Yahweh answers by fire, one of the symbols of the living God (Dt 5.26; cf. Ex 34). Following the contest, it is Yahweh who sends the rains, symbolic of life and the renewed favour of God upon his people.

At this point Jezebel threatens Elijah, and he has to flee for his life (19.1-3). But again God spares the life of his faithful prophet and reminds him that there are also seven thousand other Israelites who have been true to Yahweh (vv. 4-18). This narrative concludes with Elisha being called into the prophetic service of God, to replace Elijah (vv. 19-21).

The narrator has skilfully woven the threads of life and death into the fabric of his narrative. It is the false prophets who are put to death. Yahweh, though, preserves the lives of Elijah, Obadiah, the one hundred prophets hidden in the cave, and the seven thousand loyal worshippers. The death and renewal of the widow's son is a small scale replica of the drought and rain which occur in the land. Throughout the

narrative, Yahweh is depicted as the giver of life and the rescuer of the righteous, while death is the due penalty for idolatry. It is perhaps significant that this account does not report the eventual death of Elijah, but it ends with him still alive, passing his mantle on to a younger man. In the individual narratives and in the cycle as a whole, life in all of its symbolism is reported to be the work of Yahweh. Though not called the 'living God', the judgement that he is such may fairly be drawn from the material presented in this biblical passage.

Where *expressis verbis* God *is* called 'the Living God', it will be noted that there are three different Hebrew constructions which are rendered by this one English phrase.

The following five references are a translation of אֱלֹהִים חַיִּים

> For who is there of all flesh, that has heard the voice of the living God speaking out of the midst of fire, as we have, and has still lived (Deut 5.26)?

This question, addressed to Moses by the children of Israel, concerns the the theophany during the giving of the covenant.[8] 'The Lord spoke ... at the mountain out of the midst of the fire, the cloud, and the thick darkness' (v. 22). God spoke to the people with a loud voice, and then he gave the two tablets of stone to Moses.[9] God is a speaker, and God is an author. The combination of both oral and written presentation emphasizes both the divine origin and the divine authority of the covenant.[10] But the Israelites were so afraid at hearing his voice that they asked Moses to listen to the divine voice and then report it to them, so they would not have to hear it any more. Evidently it was a terrifying and dreadful experience for men to hear the voice of the living God.[11] In this passage,

'living God' stands in opposition to 'all flesh', which ' ... characterizes living creatures, in tacit contrast to God, as frail, unsubstantial, and dependent.'[12] The living God, the God of Israel, is the one who appears in the desert in the midst of fire, cloud, and darkness, and speaks to his people. Other passages emphasize that no one can *see* God and live, but here the danger is *hearing* the voice of God.[13] Nevertheless, this narrative reports that Israel not only saw the glory of God (v. 24) and lived but also heard God and survived. This passage, in presenting Yahweh as one who reveals himself to his people and who speaks to them, underscores personhood and communication as characteristics of the 'living' God.

In 1 Samuel 17.26, the shepherd boy David asks the men of Israel about Goliath:

> 'For who is this uncircumcised Philistine, that he should defy the armies of the living God?'

Then again in verse 36 David, upon whom 'the Spirit of the Lord came mightily' (16.13), promises King Saul that he will kill Goliath,

> '... seeing he has defied the armies of the living God.'

Later David arrives at the battle lines and is amazed that the Israelites are being intimidated by Goliath. David, in reminding the Israelite soldiers that they are the armies of the living God, implies that they should be bold and not fear the Philistines. Then as David approaches Goliath to do battle with him, he again predicts victory, (16.13):

> 'This day the Lord will deliver you into my hand,...that all the earth may know that there is a God in Israel,... for the battle is the Lord's and he will give you into our hand' (1 Samuel 17.46-7).

For Israel, the living God is Yahweh, and he is distinct from the deities of the surrounding nations, whose idols '... have no breath in their mouth.'[14] But to say that Yahweh is the living God does not merely mean that he is alive and breathing. Rather, it points to his 'reality and power'.[15] The living God shows his power by enabling David and his armies to defeat the Philistines.[16] The result is deliverance for Israel and censure for those who mock Yahweh.[17] Thus, in this passage, the living God refers to the God who is present with his people and powerful to deliver them. He is a God of action.

The next occurrence of 'the living God', is in Jeremiah 10.10:

> But the LORD is the true God;
> he is the living God and the everlasting King.
> At his wrath the earth quakes,
> and the nations cannot endure his indignation.

Because this passage (10.1-16) looks like a collection of 'piecemeal contributions',[18] questions have been raised about its authenticity and integrity. But, in its present form, it does bear marks of a thematic unity. The passage concerns the contrast between Yahweh, the true and living God of Israel, and the mere idols made by the hands of a craftsman.[19] The contrast is thorough and searching. The idols are but pieces of wood, cut from a tree in the forest, carved by a craftsman, covered with gold and silver, and clothed with violet and purple garments (vv. 4-9). Because they are but the work of men, they cannot speak and move about (v. 5). They are stupid and foolish (v. 8). They are not creators, but are themselves fabrications. They will perish, along with those who made them (v. 11). These images are false, and there is no breath in them (v. 14). Therefore the prophet Jeremiah concludes that they

are worthless and illusory. Their punishment can only be destruction (v. 16).

But Yahweh, the living God, is 'not like these' (v. 16). He is different in every way. The living God is ever active in the affairs of men and ever living, unlike the gods of some ancient Near East religions, who '... were thought to suffer death during the course of the annual cycle of nature and subsequently to be revived.'[20] The prophets of Israel, rejecting all such notions of a dying and rising God, heaped scorn on such man-made idols. Instead, they acknowledged Yahweh as the living God, the one who created the universe (vv. 11-12). It is he who speaks to his people (v. 1). And it is the living God who will bring judgment upon all nations (vv. 10, 15; cf. 9.23-26). Furthermore, when the prophet proclaims that Israel is the tribe of Yahweh's inheritance (v. 16), he implies that God initiates and maintains a personal relationship with his people.

There are problems, though, associated with interpreting this reference to 'the living God' as a statement that Yahweh is powerful, for there is a less than obvious irony generated here.[21] It is possible that this passage is the result of the prophet's meditating on the powerful intervention of God on behalf of Hezekiah when he was under siege by Rabshakeh, the officer of the Assyrian king Sennacherib.[22] But during Jeremiah's time, 'the gods of the other nations had regularly conquered Israel and demonstrated the powerlessness of Yahweh. The whole Jeremiah tradition is a desperate attempt to explain that powerlessness.'[23] One of the prophet's proposals is that the destruction of Israel is a result of the wrath of God, inflicted on account of disobedience, rebellion, and idolatry (chapters 23, 24, 30). If indeed '... 10.1-16 represents the expression of a small cult huddled together to preserve its ideological

distinction',[24] then it is also true that there were still some (if not this group, then others) who believed that the living God was able to bring about the return of his people to their land (c. 31). That would be a time of renewal, and God would make a new covenant with his people, putting it in their minds and writing it on their hearts. Paul mentions the new covenant and the writing of God on the heart.

The author(s) of Jeremiah 10.10, then, were able to contrast the living God with dead idols, even though as they wrote he appeared to be powerless. They looked back to his mighty deliverance of Hezekiah, and they anticipated another such event for Israel in the future. Even in the midst of tragedy, they were able to portray the living God as the god who creates, speaks, and acts in the affairs of men. For the Hebrew prophet, the life of God is seen in the power and the voice of God.

אלהים חיים.

> But 'the burden of the LORD' you shall mention no more, for the burden is every man's own word, and you pervert the word of the living God, the LORD of hosts, our God (Jeremiah 23.36).

The entire twenty-third chapter is an indictment of Israel's priests and prophets, who have failed in their task of shepherding God's people (vv. 1-4). They have perverted the word of the Lord (vv. 16-21). But Jeremiah reminds the prophets that God is near and not afar off and that, if they had really wanted, they could have heard the word of the Lord and then proclaimed the truth (vv. 22-3). Because they abused their speaking privileges and brought the prophetic office into disrepute, Jeremiah now forbids them to use the formula, 'the burden of the Lord', which , in this context means 'the word of the Lord'.[25] The 'burden' is a word of God

which is given only to a true prophet, but it '... was being confused with the private opinions of individual men which they gave out as if they were a "word of Yahweh".'[26] In this passage, the living God is set forth as the God near at hand who communicates with his people. Once again, the 'living God' refers to the 'near God', the 'present God', and the 'God who speaks'.

The second Hebrew form of 'living God' to be considered is אֱלֹהִים חַי. It occurs four times: 2 Kings 19.4 and 19.16 and Isaiah 37.4 and 37.17. The account in 2 Kings 19 is virtually identical with that of Isaiah 37, so it will be used as the basis for the discussion.[27] In the biblical account of the encroaching Assyrian army, their king, Sennacherib, dispatches Rabshakeh to taunt Hezekiah so that he will surrender Jerusalem without a fight. Part of his tactic is to mock the local deity. He implies that Yahweh is just as impotent as the deities of other nations, whom Assyria has already conquered.[28] Rabshakeh delivered his message orally and in writing.[29] After Hezekiah, king of Judah, received the message, he sent off a communiqué to the prophet Isaiah. The end of Hezekiah's message is found in 2 Kings 19.4:

> 'It may be that the LORD your God heard all the words of the Rabshakeh, whom his master the king of Assyria has sent to mock the living God, and will rebuke the words which the LORD your God has heard; therefore lift up your prayer for the remnant that is left.'

After receiving the message from the king, Isaiah sends Hezekiah a word of the Lord which exhorts him not to fear Sennacherib, for he will soon be destroyed (vv. 5-7). Then Sennacherib sends a second message to Hezekiah, warning him not to trust in his God for deliverance, because the gods of the kings of the lands which he has already defeated had not delivered them (vv. 8-13). 'Assyria herself by the destruction of the hand-made idols of

the people has proved the emptiness of heathenism.'[30] At this point, Hezekiah himself goes up to the temple to pray:

> (15) O LORD the God of Israel, who art enthroned above the cherubim, thou art the God, thou alone, of all the kingdoms of the earth; thou hast made heaven and earth. (16) Incline thy ear, O LORD, and hear; open thy eyes, O LORD, and see; and hear the words of Sennacherib, which he has sent to mock the living God. (17) Of a truth, O LORD, the kings of Assyria have laid waste the nations and their lands, (18) and have cast their gods into the fire; for they were no gods, but the work of men's hands, wood and stone; therefore they were destroyed. (19) So now, O LORD our God, save us, I beseech thee, from his hand, that all the kingdoms of the earth may know that thou, O LORD, art God alone.'

As in Jeremiah 10.10, so in this passage 'there is a forceful contrast between the living God and the "no gods" of the nations'.[31] The idols, 'lifeless and helpless', have eyes but cannot see and ears but cannot hear.[32] If Hezekiah's god is but another monument of wood and stone, then he might well be dubious of any divine deliverance.[33] But the king recognizes a qualitative difference in Yahweh, the God of Israel. 'His prayer expresses his faith that Yahweh is no idol.'[34] Yahweh has created the universe, and he now rules over it (v. 15). For this reason, Hezekiah was confident to call upon Yahweh and to acknowledge him as the living God. He had a hope of heavenly help, not from foreign gods, whose man-made images had been destroyed, but from Yahweh, whose credibility was still intact. Yahweh was ever 'living' and everlasting and ever able to rescue his people. Isaiah predicted deliverance for Hezekiah, because the God who had revealed himself in the mighty acts of creation was surely strong enough to overcome the Assyrian army. The prayers of Isaiah and Hezekiah were not a last resort in the face of utter hopelessness and desperation. Rather, they are authentic appeals to the God who sees, hears, and acts.

In this excerpt from 2 Kings 19, Sennacherib 'blasphemes' Yahweh,[35] but Hezekiah and Isaiah trust him, because he is known to Israel as the god who is accessible to sincere seekers like Hezekiah and as the god who communicates to true prophets like Isaiah. In this narrative, the metaphor 'the living God' suggests 'the God who is accessible' and 'the God who communicates'.

The third and final Hebrew form of 'living God' is אֵל חַי. It occurs four times in the Masoretic text, firstly in Joshua 3.10:

> And Joshua said, 'Hereby you shall know that the living God is among you, and that he will without fail drive out from before you the Canaanites, the Hittites, the Hivites, the Perizzites, the Girgashites, the Amorites, and the Jebusites.'

The living God has already made himself known to Joshua. Yahweh has spoken to Joshua and made him his 'authorized spokesman' (3.7).[36] So in Joshua's first speech, he informs the people of Israel that the living God is present with them, and that he will confirm his presence to them by giving them military victory over all the inhabitants of the promised land.

> 'Theologisch ist ihr Anfang das wichtigste Stück der Erzählung. Es geht um den Nachweis, daß ein "lebendiger Gott" inmitten Israels ist, d. h. ein gott, der handeln und sein Ziel erreichen kann.'[37]

The gods of the other peoples were but idols, incapable of intervening in the course of history. But Yahweh, the living god, designs and directs human affairs.[38] By constructing the narrative in this way, the Israelite narrator emphasizes that his god, the living God, dwells with his people, that he speaks to his people (even if only through a mediator), and that he acts decisively on behalf of his people.[39] This text underscores the

presence, power, and tele-communications of the living God.

> Yet the number of the people of Israel shall be like the sand of the sea, which can be neither measured nor numbered; and in the place where it was said to them, 'You are not my people', it shall be said to them, 'Sons of the living God' (Hosea 1.10).

The essential theology of Hosea is that 'Yahweh's sovereign power can overcome anything.'[40] He can change despair into hope. He can cause the few to become the many. He can change 'my people' into 'not my people' and then back again. 'Sons of the living God' refers back to the Exodus tradition of Deuteronomy 14.1, where Moses declares to Israel, 'You are the sons of the LORD your God.' In the Exodus event, God had established a special relationship with Israel. The prophet reminds his readers of this in Hosea 11.1, where God says, 'When Israel was a youth I loved him. And out of Egypt I called my son.' But Israel, through their rebellion and disobedience, had damaged that relationship to such an extent that in Hosea 1.9, the Lord declares: 'You are not my people and I am not your God.' The promise of Hosea 1.10 is that some-day Israel will again enjoy that special father/son relationship with God. 'You are not my people' shall become 'sons of the living God.' 'Sons of the living God' (1.10) is a contrasting metaphor to 'children of harlotry' (2.7).[41] Instead of allegiance to Yahweh, Israel had made alliances with false gods. 'Living God' is an ancient Hebrew name for the divine one, and it evokes the traditional doctrine that God is both creator and life-giver.[42] For Hosea in particular, the living God is, according to 6.2 and 13.14, the one who gives life, the one who possesses might over the powers of destruction, and the one who thereby distinguishes himself from the Baals.[43] For Hosea to speak of the 'living' God suggests that God's final word to Israel is an

offer of life.[44] In this prophecy, then, the term 'living God' signifies the 'God of power' and 'the God who gives life'. His power is manifested in the creation, in the calling of Israel, and in the reversal of human circumstances and relationships.

Psalm 42.2. The first three verses of this psalm provide the immediate context for this occurrence of 'living God':[45]

> (1) As a hart longs for flowing streams,
> so longs my soul for thee, O God.
> (2) My soul thirsts for God, for the living God.
> When shall I come and behold the face of God?
> (3) My tears have been my food day and night
> while men say to me continually, 'Where is your God?'

Delitzsch suggests that this is a lament, in which the psalmist is far from Jerusalem and unable to return.[46] He is surrounded by people who mock him.[47] His longing for the living God is parallel to a thirsty deer desiring a drink from the running water of a cool brook.[48] The flowing stream is a full, running water-course in contrast to one that is stagnant or empty.[49] As only the running water will quench the thirst of the deer, so only will the living God satisfy the psalmist. The living God is thus distinguished from other deities who, for the worshipper of Yahweh, are nothing more than a dry creek bed. The comparison of living God and running water is found again in Jeremiah 17.13:

> O LORD, the hope of Israel,
> all who forsake thee shall be put to shame;
> those who turn away from thee shall be written in the earth,
> for they have forsaken the LORD, the fountain of living water.

Those who ignore Yahweh will be embarrassed (יֵבֹשׁוּ ; literally, 'dried up'). They are like thirsty men trying to drink from a dry burn during a drought. But to turn to Yahweh is like a drink from a refreshing spring,

whose waters flow cool and clear. The psalmist, then, longs for God because he knows in God he will find genuine satisfaction. His thirst will be quenched when once again he beholds the face of God.[50] Thus it is the living God who is accessible to his people and who is able to satisfy them.

The final occurrence of the title, 'the living God', is in Psalm 84.2:

> (1) How lovely is thy dwelling place,
> O LORD of hosts!
> (2) My soul longs, yea, faints
> for the courts of the LORD;
> my heart and flesh sing for joy
> to the living God.

This psalm is a pilgrim song, and it was probably composed just before the exile, or it at least contains some material from a pre-exilic tradition.[51] It may have been written by the author of Psalm 42. The psalmist expresses his awe and joy at worshipping in the house of the Lord. When he says that even the sparrow can find a home at the altars of the Lord (v. 3), he implies that everyone, even the most humble and insignificant of men, is welcome to come and worship. This psalm continues by describing the benefits which accrue to the worshippers of Yahweh: blessing, strength, favour, and honour (vv. 5-12). Yahweh, the living God,[52] is portrayed in this psalm as the all-sufficient God, who satisfies man's deepest needs. He is both the source and the giver of life. Just the thought of going to worship Yahweh in his temple is enough to make the psalmist break out in a 'resounding testimony' of joy and exultation.[53] As in Psalm 42, the living God in Psalm 84 is portrayed as a personal God and the God who satisfies.

This survey of the Old Testament use of the title, 'the living God', reveals an array of significations, which can now be summarized. The living God stands in sharp contrast to dead idols, made and adorned by the

hands of men. These will perish, but the living God is an enduring reality. In the polytheistic world of the ancient Near East, Yahweh is designated by Israel as the living God because he is the one who is aware of the distresses of his people, is attentive to their cries, and is powerful to deliver them from their foes. The living God is Yahweh, the God of Israel, and is thus distinguished from all the surrounding pseudo-deities. In relation to Israel, the living God is known to be present with his people, near and not far away. The encounter of some of Israel's great men with the living God was so intense and profound as to be narrated in terms of personal dialogue: the living God had heard their prayers and praises, and they in return had heard his voice. The living God is also a God of power, as revealed in the creation, the conquest of Canaan, and in David's victory over Goliath. Finally, the living God is described in the Psalms as the God who satisfies man's inner longings. The powerful God had become the personal God. In summary, then, the metaphorical language of 'the living God' suggests that God is near and accessible, that he acts and speaks, and that he has the power to deliver and to satisfy. All of this, and perhaps much more, would have come to mind for both Paul and at least his Jewish-Christian readers when he wrote and spoke of the living God.

When Paul attributes life to God, this is an aberrant attribution. It is metaphorical. It is metaphorically true. It is not an exhaustive description of God, but it is true as far as it goes. It is the task of the biblical interpreter to expound the possibilities of articulation which this metaphor proposes. To say 'God is alive' is not to say everything that can be said about God, but it is an attempt to say something, and a pointer to much more that can be said.

One way to spell out the meaning of metaphors is to examine how they are used in contemporary circumstances. Templeton has noted the metaphorical use of death in the following situation. A man who is intensely concentrating on a book may be described as 'dead to the world.'[54] He is so involved in reading that he is unaware of the world around him and unconcerned about its affairs. Thus 'death' may be translated as 'unawareness' or 'indifference',[55] and its antithesis, 'life', may be rendered 'awareness' or 'concern'. In thinking metaphorically about life, then, the living God may be thought of as 'the one who is aware and concerned', or 'the caring God.' God is *not* dead to the world. He loves humanity and is concerned about their welfare. God also cares about people's sinful condition and their broken relationship with himself. Because he cared, he acted to make things better.

> But when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law, to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons (Gal 4.4-5).

God was aware of man's situation and concerned about it. He did not sit idly by on heaven's throne. Rather he sent his son to put things right. This son is Jesus, the man from Nazareth. Jesus did his job well. 'Therefore God has highly exalted him' (Phil 2.9). In considering the mission of Jesus, Paul learned about God. He discovered that God loves men and cares about their well-being. In this way, it can be said that the living God is the caring God.

Another contemporary metaphor is 'This party is alive!'. A lively party is one in which there are people present, talking and celebrating. A lively party has action, in contrast to a dead party in which people remain

isolated and do not interact freely with another. God is 'alive' when he is seen to be talking with his people and interacting with them. In addition, the living God celebrates. In fact, he leads the way in the triumphal march (2 Cor 2.14).

It is possible at this point, to subject the phrase 'the living God' to a metaphorical analysis, as proposed by Ricoeur. To say 'the living God' is roughly equivalent to saying 'God is alive'. Following Ricoeur's paradigm of metaphorical analysis, one might say:

1. God is alive.
2. God is not alive.
3. God is known by men as if he were alive.

The living God - God is alive. This is a clear and consistent theme in the writings of the Old Testament. He is not like idols of other nations. He is not an inanimate object, whose only power is its evocative value. The Israelites viewed Yahweh as the 'living' God, one who was not only alive, but also active. They detected his actions in the course of history. There is truly an 'ontological vehemence' in their writings about God. They do not merely assert that God *exists*. Rather, they talk about what God *does* - his actions in history, his revelation to Israel, his speaking with Moses.

It is certainly true that Israel included many manufactured items in its worship and cultic ritual - the Temple itself, and *inter alia* the Ark, the altars, the candlesticks. Yet Israel's God - in contrast to those of surrounding nations - was not an idol made by men. Nor was it represented by such idols, a practice forbidden by the ten commandments and condemned by the prophets. Their God was a living God and could not be reduced to physical materials. In fact, rather than an artifact created by man,

Israel regarded Yahweh as the artificer who had fashioned *them*. The living God, for Israel, did not depend on man for his existence. Rather, they depended on God for their very origin and well-being.

The assertion that 'God is alive' may at first glance seem 'naïve and uncritical'[56] to modern man. The 'God is dead' theology has raised questions about the relevance of God in contemporary culture. Yet to use the biblical phrase 'the living God', implying both 'God exists' and 'God is alive', is the beginning of belief. Both the Old Testament writers and Paul used it to affirm their commitment to a Divine Being. They had observed the activity of God in history, and their writings bore witness to it. In their texts, they used figurative language to express their experience and knowledge of God. Such language has a 'semantic plus-value', which gives it 'its capacity to be open towards new aspects, new dimensions, new horizons of meaning.'[57] But all of the latent potential of meaning pent up in the phrase 'the living God' is a result of the phrase's 'ontological vehemence' which is grounded in the commitment of the biblical writers to God, or his commitment (in their view) to them. This faith may have been 'naïve and uncritical', but it was rooted in conviction.

The language of the biblical writers, including the phrase 'the living God', may be investigated critically by modern readers. It need not be accepted 'as is' without being subjected to a work of interpretation. This critical process leads to a movement from the 'it is' to the 'it is not'.

'There is no grammatical feature that distinguishes metaphorical attribution from literal attribution.'[58] So sometimes metaphor is mistaken, taken literally and becomes 'believed poetry'.[59] It is this process which 'inclines it [metaphor] towards abuse, and so towards myth.'[60] It is possible to mistake 'the living God' thus: to interpret it

literally, to think of God as one who is like us. It is the inadequacy of such a literal interpretation which leads one to reject it and to assert 'it is not'. To attempt a literal interpretation and to find it wanting requires that one either reject the statement as nonsense or produce a metaphorical interpretation which will rescue the sense of the sentence. Since there is no grammatical marker that directs one to either a literal or a metaphorical interpretation, it is appropriate to try both until one makes sense of the text.

As one moves from the literal to the metaphorical, the ontological vehemence is replaced by a critical suspicion. With respect to 'the living God', one is inclined to say that God is *not* alive, as plants, animals and humans are alive. 'The living God' is not an idol - a man-made product. God is not to be created in the image of man.

Nor is God just a bigger and stronger (but somehow invisible) man who goes about his business either in heaven or on earth. He is radically different. He is above and beyond the reach and imagination of man. The Hebrew prophets were aware of this, as hinted in the following passage:

> For my thoughts are not your thoughts,
> neither are your ways my ways, says the Lord.
> For as the heavens are higher than the earth,
> so are my ways higher than your ways
> and my thoughts than your thoughts. (Is. 55.8-9)

God is not alive, if life is characterised by the various functions of the human body which are necessary for human life - circulation, respiration, digestion, etc. Unmasking the metaphor of 'the living God' is rejecting this notion of God. The critical rejoinder is that God is in no way to be conceived of in terms of a man-like form or image. God is not 'alive', if that means that the Divine is born, exists for a while and then

dies.

Again it should be emphasized that this linguistic analysis of 'the living God' in terms of 'God is alive' and 'God is not alive' does not coincide with the concerns of a 'God is dead' theology. That movement assumed that the concept of 'God' was no longer relevant to a modern, post-critical man, who had outgrown his need for a divine being.

The present work is distinguished from this in that it is a semantic analysis rather than a developed theology, though it may contain the seeds of such a theology. Such an analysis respects the ontological vehemence of the predication, 'the living God', while it reflects critically on the meaning of such language. On the one hand, one tends to believe in the metaphors which one creates. One implies that 'it is so' when one continues to use them. On the other hand, a labour of interpretation is sometimes (if not always) required in order for the metaphor to become meaningful to others. In accord with Ricoeur's philosophical wager,[61] the present writer is committed to the position that an analysis of language about God will provide a better understanding of God and a firmer base for belief in God. The task is ... 'to arbitrate between ontological *naïveté* and the critique of mythified metaphor.'[62]

This is accomplished by the move from the 'it is' of an uncritical belief and the 'it is not' of critical reflection to the 'as if' or 'it is like' of metaphorical interpretation.

To speak of God 'as if' he were alive opens up many possibilities of articulation. The survey of the Old Testament use of the phrase 'the living God' clarifies the picture of God as one who speaks and one who acts. It continually emphasizes the 'personal' character of God. It shows that he is to be known and understood as one who relates personally to man.

In his brief discussion of the *living* God, Barth spells out some of the implications:

> Who God is and what He is in His deity, He proves and reveals not in a vacuum as a divine being-for-himself, but precisely and authentically in the fact that He exists, speaks, and acts as the *partner* of man, though of course as the absolutely superior partner. He who does *that* is the living God. And the freedom in which He does *that* is His deity. It is the deity which as such also has the character of humanity.[63]

Significant for the present purpose is Barth's statement that it is as a living person that God '... exists, speaks, and acts as the partner of man'. That the living God 'exists' is, of course, assumed by all the writers of the Old Testament. That he exists as the partner of man is especially implied by the two references to 'the living God' in the Psalms (42.2; 84.2), in which the psalmist yearns to have fellowship with the living God. The speaking of the living God to man comes through most clearly in Deuteronomy 5.26 and Jeremiah 23.36, and in Hosea 1.10 in which the people of Israel are called 'sons of the living God'. The action of 'the living God' is characterized in 1 Samuel 17.26, 36 and 2 Kings 19.4, 16 (cf. Is 37.4, 17). All of these Old Testament passages depict a god who exists, speaks and acts in relation to man. These betray a '... belief in an active Providence, to which the Hebrews gave a more significant and moving name, 'the living God'.[64]

Now this name, 'the living God' is more personal and more biblical than those of modern theology, such as 'the Absolute, the Infinite, the Unconditional, or the First Cause'.[65] These names denote a view of God as something completely static and unchangeable, which '... is in conflict with the biblical insistence on the living God.'[66] The scriptures portray

God less as an object with identifiable properties, than as a person who is an 'active revealer ... who has spoken to us, and does not cease to speak to us.'[67] Thus God is 'living' when he is seen to be involved with human relationships.[68] The divine one may be viewed as a 'living' God because, in certain ways, he is like a person, in that he speaks to humanity, he acts graciously on their behalf, and he is available for fellowship with them. This helps to explain why 'life' is such an apt predicate to attribute to God.

At this point, the Pauline usage of the phrase 'the living God' will be explored. Other than 2 Corinthians 3.3, Paul only uses the phrase three times:

> 'And in the very place where it was said to them, "You are not my people," they will be called "sons of the living God"' (Rom 9.26).
>
> For they themselves report concerning us what a welcome we had among you, and how you turned to God from idols, to serve a living and true God (1 Thes 1.9).
>
> What agreement has the temple of God with idols? For we are the temple of the living God (2 Cor 6.16a).

The Romans passage is meant to be a citation of Hosea 1.10, and, since that passage has already been discussed, the Thessalonian text will now be considered. Here the standard Old Testament contrast between idols and the living God is apparent. Faith in the God of Israel (v. 8) and receiving the gospel of Christ (vv. 5-6) are the steps to ἐπιστρέφειν (a technical term for conversion). The turning toward the *living* God necessarily requires a turning away from idols.[69]

The authenticity and integrity of 2 Corinthians 6.14 - 7.1 are of course disputed matters.[70] Though there are problems with this passage, it

is not unreasonable to think that Paul may indeed have written it. However that may be, the opposition between 'idols' and 'the living God', so familiar in the Old Testament, must be noticed. 'And it is impossible to mistake Paul's horror of idolatry; see 1 Cor v. 10, 11; vi. 9; viii passim; x. 7, 14, 19; xii. 2; Gal v. 20; Col iii. 5; 1 Thess i. 9. Fornication and idolatry are both impossible for a Christian because of his exclusive relationship with Christ.'[7]

The text of 2 Corinthians 6. 14 - 7. 1 goes on to show that the living God is a god who dwells with and walks with his people in such an intimate fashion as may be described in family language (father/children, v. 18) as well as cultic language (ναός, v. 16). Thus, both the passages in 1 Thessalonians 1 and in 2 Corinthians 6 emphasize the living God in *contrast* to idols and in relationship with his people. The notion of implied existence and personal relationship, so common in the Old Testament, surface again in Paul's use of this phrase. Noticeably absent though, is any long tirade against idols to prove their futility, or elaboration on the works of God as proof of his reality. One might assume that the new converts were familiar with such arguments and only a mention was needed to remind them.

For the notions of the speaking and acting of the living God, though, one must turn to 2 Corinthians 3. 1-3. 'The living God' for Paul is an acting God. Part of God's labour may be seen in the establishing of the Corinthian church. Through the proclamation of the gospel, (1 Cor 2. 4) they had turned to the Lord (ἐπιστρέφειν, 2 Cor 3. 16). These believers were gathered together into a church, and the existence of the congregation was visible proof of the work both of Paul (v. 2) and of God (v. 3).

'The living God' is also a writing God. His communications are

carried out, in this instance, by the Spirit, who writes upon tablets which are fleshy hearts. Just as the living God had communicated both orally and in writing to Moses (Dt 5.26), so also the living God communicates to the Corinthians orally by the preaching of Paul and in writing by the Spirit. For Paul, whenever believers gather, the living God is writing a letter, communicating by means of his people with 'all men'.

In contrast to the author of Deuteronomy, Paul speaks of the communication of the living God without reference to 'the fire, the cloud, and the thick darkness' (Dt 5.22), just as his mention of the living God in opposition to idols requires no such polemic, as was delivered by the Hebrew prophets. This is true of his epistles at least. There is the possibility, though, that this further elaboration of 'the living God' may have been a part of Paul's oral instructions to the churches.

With reference to the use of the phrase 'the living God', it is clear that Paul continues to use it as the Old Testament writers had done, to refer to a real God whose existence is assumed, though unproved. The living God is a revealing God, making himself known to his people through actions and discourse (both oral and written). In addition, the living God is a personal God with whom believers may by faith enter into a personal relationship, with father/child language being the predominant or at least *a* predominant means to describe it.

The phrase, 'the living God', is a metaphor. It was used by, though it did not originate, with Paul, who stood in a religious tradition that used metaphors to communicate its experience and knowledge of God. The *sense* of this metaphor is determined by the various contexts in which it is used. It does not mean a God who is a living organism, like those found on planet earth. These connotations never arise in the contexts. Rather, the

sense of the phrase, 'the living God', is that God has revealed himself to man in terms that he can know and understand. God's self-revelation occurs in *personal* terms - a person who exists, speaks and acts. What God is in his essence is perhaps unknowable, but the record of the self-revelation of God, in Jesus of Nazareth and in history, as written in Scripture, uses the metaphor of 'living persons' to talk about the reality and activity of God.

The question of reference, or of metaphorical truth, is certainly appropriately raised at this point. Ricoeur opens the question of reference by means of the issue of sense.[72] He states that the sense of the literal interpretation of metaphors is absurd, and thereby the literal referent is abolished. But because the statement (or phrase) opens itself toward a metaphorical sense, this interpretation proposes a correlative metaphorical reference also. J. M. Soskice criticizes this proposal of a dual reference.[73] She insists that metaphor has only *one* sense. The alternative is nonsense. Likewise, there is only one *referent*, that one thing which the speaker is talking about, for it is speakers, not words or expressions, which refer.[74] Speakers refer in a given context, she claims, and the reference, even of a metaphorical expression, becomes clear when the complete context of the utterance is considered. Furthermore, 'a reference can be successful even if the description in the referring expression does not actually fit the referent; for example, in context, the utterance "The man drinking the gin and tonic" can successfully refer even though the man referred to may in fact be drinking soda water.'[75]

There is some truth on both sides of this discussion. Soskice is correct to argue that, in a given situation of discourse, it is the speaker who refers, and that, on most occasions, the speaker has only one referent in mind. She also rightly maintains that an inaccurate description can

still refer successfully. But all of the above propositions are valid only in a situation of *oral* discourse. For it is only in oral discourse that there is a personal speaker who refers. In written discourse there is no speaker - only a text. Also the one referent intended by the speaker becomes known to the hearer not only by the words employed but also by the context, including the location where the conversation occurs. The request, 'Hand me that roll', will both mean and refer differently, depending on whether the speaker is in a bakery, a bathroom, a photographer's studio, or a paper factory. In an oral discourse, the very location may determine the intent, but in written discourse the referent will remain ambiguous unless the text contains sufficient information about the physical and other surroundings of the dialogue. Furthermore, in a live encounter of discourse, an inaccurate description may refer successfully for a number of reasons: a gesture, a demonstrative or personal pronoun, or tone of voice may combine with the speaker's *words* to establish the referent. But in a text, there are only the words. So the proposal of Soskice *is* valid, though it is more applicable in oral than in written discourse.

The theory of split sense and split reference advanced by Ricoeur is better suited to dealing with written texts. Surely it is speakers who refer in oral discourse, but Ricoeur rightly notes that the speaker/writer is (often - and in Paul's case, always) absent from the reading of his text. There is no longer a speaker to refer. There is only the inscribed remnant of his discourse. And how well it refers depends on how well it was written, how well it is interpreted and on whether the interpreter was the original interpreter to whom the writer meant to write (e.g. one of Paul's Corinthians) or some other. In this situation, either the words and

expressions refer, or there is no reference at all. The problem of reference becomes greater when (1) there is inaccurate description (which may have been successful orally but can hardly be so in writing), (2) there is an ill-described environment in the text (when that environment is crucial to understanding), and (3) when the *sense* of the text is subject to various interpretations. All of these factors may de-stabilize the reader's assurance of identifying the intended referent. In such a situation, the reader is justified in considering the literal sense of an utterance and what its reference might be. If that fails, he goes on to see if a metaphorical sense and reference of the statement will accord with the flow of the text. This process of allowing for a dual sense and reference of metaphorical expressions is appropriate, because when the speaker/writer is no longer available (as is the case with biblical texts), then the reader must answer these questions on his own. And sometimes the answers are not self-evident. This is when interpretation is necessary.

Underlying Soskice's critique of Ricoeur is her awareness that the process of double sense and double reference can be and has been abused. She points to S. McFague as an example.[76] But the possibility of its misuse is not sufficient grounds for the abandoning of a theory. Instead, it is a call for its conscientious application.

The category of reference pertains to Paul's use of the phrase 'the living God' in at least two ways. First, there is the question of identifying the referent. Second, there is the question of determining the ontological status of the referent.

With respect to the first issue, there is no question that 'the living God' refers to the god who is the father of Jesus. In the New Testament, it is safe to assume that this is always the referent of ὁ θεός, unless

there is a clear indication to the contrary (e.g. Ac 19.37; 1 Cor 8.5; 2 Cor 4.4). When Paul says, 'the living God', there is no need to seek a split reference, rejecting the literal and retaining the metaphorical. There is only one true God for Paul (1 Thess 1.9), and this is 'the living God'. Furthermore, in the passages in which Paul mentions 'the living God', he is not trying to *identify* a god, though he may be distinguishing this God from idols or other 'gods'. Rather, he is saying something *about* this God. He is affirming, along with the Old Testament writers, that Yahweh, the God of Israel, is the living God. He is re-stating his faith that this God is always accessible to those who call on him and that this God can be known and encountered in terms of a personal relationship. In the case of 'the living God', the referent is easily identifiable. It is the sense which requires explanation.

The second issue concerns the ontological status of the one whom Paul calls 'the living God'. There is little question that, for Paul and the early church, 'the living God' referred to an extra-textual, extra-linguistic, extra-terrestrial deity. In modern times, some seek to deny this position and re-define God. One such attempt is that of Cupitt, in *The Long-legged Fly: A Theology of Language and Desire*. He employs a thorough-going reductionism, and he bases his approach on a radical linguistic structuralism. He states early in his book that '... our language is indeed our world...',[77] which means that he acknowledges no reality beyond that which an individual has experienced and expressed linguistically. Indeed, what is brought to language is not reality but only one's experience of reality. He wishes to hamper the centrifugal force of language. This tendency is confirmed later when he writes:

' ... the meaning of signs is always 'sideways' and

> differential, not referential. Every sentence in one way and another takes up, comments on, and counters or develops a previous sentence. All thought is transacted in signs and is hermeneutical or interpretative. The movement is not from one level to another, from sign to an independent signified, but always horizontally from sign to sign.'[78]

When such a radical structuralism is applied to theology, it eliminates the possibility of any reference to an extra-linguistic reality. 'The living God' no longer refers to a divine being apart from the world and humanity. 'The living God' thus has no existence apart from the words which one utters about such an entity. Such an enterprise is man 'creating' god, thus reversing the whole tradition of Christian theology, which acknowledges a Creator God, distinct from and superior to humanity and his creation. The present writer strenuously rejects all such attempts to reduce 'the living God' to a man-made sign, whose only value is to distinguish itself from other signs such as Peter, Paul, and Mary. It would be very difficult (if not impossible) to accept as 'Christian' any theology which denies the existence of, or the possibility of man's knowledge of, a God who exists as an extra-linguistic reality.

Though certain of Ricoeur's tenets may be construed so as to link him with such a structuralist view of language,[79] he would nevertheless reject such a conclusion.[80] His insistence on a tripartite system of signification, (sign, signifier, signified), should safeguard his theory from being pressed into the service of such linguistic approaches.[81] Furthermore, he mentions 'extra-linguistic reality' as the whole basis for language.[82] 'We presuppose that something must be in order that something may be identified.'[83] His view is that because there is a world, there is language to talk about that world.[84] Thus language, for Ricoeur, is funda-

mentally referential. He would not accept the view of Cupitt that language creates the world in which we live.

So, with reference to the truth of the metaphor, 'the living God', it is justifiable to affirm with the biblical writers that there is a God, that God is other than and superior to humankind, and that the true God is the living God. There is a 'living God', and it is the God of Israel, the father of our Lord Jesus Christ. The Christian interpreter of Scripture can identify the referent of 'the living God' as Yahweh, though the meaning of 'living' when predicated of God requires some clarification.

'Life' is a metaphorical attribute of God. Paul also uses 'life' and 'death' metaphorically to speak of *man* and to describe man's relationships to sin, to law and to God. A thorough discussion of life and death in the whole corpus of Paul's writings would be a major undertaking,[85] and would detract from the present purpose, which is to examine this antithetical pair as it occurs in 2 Corinthians 3 and to spell out their metaphoricity. Occasional reference will be made to other Pauline and New Testament passages, but the primary focus is on 2 Corinthians 3, especially verse 6, in which Paul writes: τὸ γὰρ γράμμα ἀποκτέννει, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζῳοποιεῖ. This is surely a metaphorical statement. But Paul can also use life and death in a more literal sense.

> For we do not want you to be ignorant, brethren, of the affliction we experienced in Asia; for we were so utterly, unbearably crushed that we despaired of life itself. Why, we felt that we had received the sentence of death; but that was to make us rely not on ourselves but on God who raises the dead; he delivered us from so deadly a peril, and he will deliver us; on him we have set our hope that he will deliver us again (2 Cor 1.8-10).

This probably refers to a persecution in Ephesus, and it seems that Paul was imprisoned there and sentenced to death (ἀπόκριμα).[86] He was certain that his hour of physical death had come, and he despaired even of life itself.[87] But somehow he escaped the death sentence and was set free to continue living.[88] He was rescued 'by God', the God who raises the dead. Though Paul is perhaps also alluding to the death of Jesus as a redemptive event, the primary sense of death here is that Paul was condemned to die a criminal's death. But somehow (by God) he survived instead. His physical life (thumping heart, pumping lungs) continued. This natural life, for Paul, is always seen by Paul as given by God and ending in death,[89] except, of course, for the case of those who are still alive, when Jesus returns.

To live (ζῆν), in the Pauline epistles, is more than simply to be alive. It is intentional and directional - one leads life in a certain way or in a specific sphere or by a certain power. Thus, one can live 'in sin' (Rom 6.2) or 'in faith' (Gal 2.20), for self or for God.[90] Likewise, 'death' as a natural phenomenon is the cessation of life's bodily functions. It is viewed as punishment for sin. Since all have sinned, all must die this physical death (Rom 6.23).[91]

These rather literal senses of life and death are more or less clearly understood. They serve as a starting point for a consideration of their metaphorical usage. Such a metaphorical event occurs in Galatians 2.19-20.

> ἐγὼ γὰρ διὰ νόμου νόμῳ ἀπέθανον, ἵνα θεῷ ζήσω. Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι· ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός· ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκί, ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός με καὶ παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ.

When Paul says that he has been crucified with Christ, this is not historical fact.[92] If it were factual he would not have been able to write the epistle to the Galatians in which this statement appears, for one

cannot write when one's hands are nailed to a cross. Rather, it is a fiction, a fiction which he uses to 'redescribe reality'. Metaphors redescribe reality, sometimes by means of fiction. 'I have been crucified with Christ' is a metaphor.[93] Fiction is neither necessarily true nor false. Fiction is that which does not correspond to an actual, empirical state of affairs. It may be true if it describes or re-describes reality on another level.[94] That is exactly what this metaphor does. It is a statement which is literally false, but metaphorically true.

Paul had not literally died nor had he literally been crucified as of the time of the writing of the epistle to the Galatians. Yet it was 'true' that Paul had died by means of crucifixion, as he asserts 'with great zeal and vehemence of spirit.'[95] The ontological vehemence of this metaphor requires that it be taken seriously, though not literally. In what way could Paul have said that he died? He is speaking metaphorically, of course.[96] 'In the usage of Paul, "to die to" a thing is to cease to have any relation to it, so that it has no further claim upon or control over one.'[97] A dead man need not obey the law. A dead man need not do *anything*. Paul is a dead man. He no longer eats and breathes for the law. He is no longer compelled to obey the Old Testament injunctions, nor does he feel compelled to compel others to observe the Mosaic regulations, including those concerning circumcision, diet, and table fellowship.[98]

How did Paul die to the law? There are several interpretations of διὰ νόμου. Burton suggests that 'dying through the law' means that the law ' ... taught him his own inability to meet its spiritual requirements and its own inability to make him righteous, and thus led him finally to abandon it and to seek salvation in Christ.'[99] Thus dying to the law is 'abandoning the law'.[100] Others interpret διὰ νόμου in terms of διὰ τοῦ

σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ (Rom 7.4).[101] The believer dies by means of an 'identification' with Christ'[102] or 'faith union'[103] with Christ, who bore the sin of his people and endured the penalty for it.

The comment of Luther is enlightening:

> '... I am dead to the law; that is to say, I have nothing to do with the law. Paul could have uttered nothing more effectual against the righteousness of the law, than to say: I am dead to the law, that is, I care nothing at all for the law: therefore I am not justified by it.'[104]

Luther avoids any mystical interpretation, and, instead, emphasizes the ignoring of the law and apathy toward it. Both Lightfoot and Burton come very close to this with their talk of 'abandonment'. All of these notions are implied in the modern metaphor, 'dead to the world'. As stated earlier, this phrase suggests inattentiveness or indifference. The reader 'dies to the world' by choosing to ignore it and to concentrate on something else. This is near the meaning of Paul's dying to the law. He chose to ignore it as a means of salvation and to commit himself by faith to Christ instead.[105] He abandoned the law and became apathetic in his observance of it. Paul died to the law by consciously choosing to abandon, ignore and disregard it. Instead he transferred his loyalty to Christ. He became attached to and attentive to Christ, whom he had previously ignored and even persecuted (1 Cor 15.9).

He died to the law, so that he might live to God.[106] Paul says that he was dead. Now he says that he lives. The dead man is alive again. There is life after death. But Paul was alive all along the way. The death was a 'fiction', which allowed him to re-describe life on a metaphorical level. Life is now no longer a biological event, but rather a religious phenomenon. 'Religious' refers to one's relationship to or

interaction with God. If Paul is now dead to law and alive to God, then previously he had been alive to law and dead to God. To be dead to one's god is the worst of all possible religious situations. It is difficult to understand how diligence in observing a law of divine origin can become fatal. The common explanation is that conscientious law observance often (if not always) is a 'vice' which separates one from God.[107] It is plausible to conclude from such an explanation that striving for obedience is actually worse than disobedience itself. But the problem of the law in the Pauline epistles is too large to be discussed here,[108] and, if pursued, would distract from the present purpose, which is to explore Paul's use of life and death as metaphors.

Paul became aware that he was dead to God through the revelation of Jesus Christ (Gal 1.12,16). The solution, for Paul anyway, was to die to the law. The result was that he began to live with reference to God. To be 'alive toward God' means to be aware of God, to pay attention to him. At some point, Paul realized that he had been hostile toward God because he had been rejecting Christ and persecuting the church (1 Cor 15.9). So, instead, he joined the church, accepted Jesus as the Christ and became friends with God. This is another way of saying he became alive to God by entering a personal relationship with God on the basis of trust.

If 'death' is an abandoning, then 'life' is an embracing. θεῷ ζήσω means God received Paul with open arms, or they hugged each other. At least Paul says that he shook hands with God's *people* (Gal 2.9) and kissed *them* (2 Cor 13.12).

Life and death are good words for Paul's theology, because they are grounded in human existence. Men live. Men die. Death is final - it is the end of life. But not in Paul's narrative world where, life and death

take on metaphorical value. Paul died to the law and then began to live toward God. His life took on a new direction. He changed loyalties from law to God. 'Death' is a fiction for re-describing Paul's new decision to abandon the law, just as 'life' is a fiction for re-describing his new, intimate relationship with and commitment to God.

It is possible to say more about the use of life and death in religious language. Jesus is reported to have told a story (Lk 15.11-32) about a wealthy father who had two sons.[109] One day the younger son asked for his share of the inheritance. When he received it, he left home and spent it all. Finding himself impoverished, he returned to his father, who welcomed him back and said:

> 'This my son was dead, and is alive again;
> he was lost, and is found' (Lk 15.24).

Even without any knowledge of Jewish manners and customs in first century Palestine, most readers can understand the plot reasonably well.[110] But this declaration by the father about his dead and alive son, while not necessarily dumbfounding, is still somewhat odd. Taken on the literal level, it is patently false. The boy was never dead - he had pulse and breath throughout the story. And he was never lost - he always knew where he was (geographically anyway, though he may have been separated from himself psychologically and/or disoriented morally). He also knew how to get back home.

But that which is false on the literal level invites a consideration of its truth value on the metaphorical level. The son *was* dead metaphorically.[111] From the father's point of view, the son was dead in that he ran away from home. He had abandoned his family. The son was inaccessible

for relationship and unavailable for communication. Just as a deceased person is departed from his friends and family and is no longer available for fellowship and conversation, so also was this son to his father. The father's comment is a statement about the condition of the son, but it is also a description of the state of affairs involving the father and his son. The word 'death', with its many significations, sums up in a word this relationship, or rather the purported non-existence of this relationship. Though metaphors are never fully translatable,[112] the dead son, in this parable, means something like the son who is alienated, absent, silent. The dead son is the son who abandoned his place in the family and then for a while became indifferent to that family. Death may be partially translated as alienation, absence, silence, abandonment, indifference.

When the father says the lad is alive *again*, he is not being entirely truthful, for on the literal level the son had always been alive. A more accurate statement about the condition of the son would have been, 'My son is still alive.' Yet in the narrative world of the parable, where language often has metaphorical value, the story teller can suspend the ordinary sense of language and lead the listener to believe the unbelievable. Having declared the *departed* son 'dead', the father can now refer to the *returning* son as 'alive again'. In the narrative world of parables, 'death' is not always terminal. Live persons can be called 'dead', and the dead can come to life again. The metaphors of life and death redescribe human relationships by denying the ordinary vision of the world and then redefining it.[113]

'Life' describes the condition of the son, but it also denotes the existence of new possibilities for the relationship between father and

son.'[114] The returning son is no longer unavailable for interaction, and he gets hugged and kissed by his father. 'Life' involves embracing. Instead of absent and silent, the son is now home and making merry with his friends (v. 24). In place of alienation there is now reconciliation. Communication between living persons can now take place. Life, then, in a religious context, refers to situations in which people are accessible to one another for personal relationships. Life suggests presence, fellowship, and communication.

'The parables present their own autonomous world.'[115] To the listener who has been drawn into the world of this parable, the special use of 'life' and 'death' has theological implications. The parable destabilizes the common notions of 'death' and 'life', and then it redefines them in terms of one's orientation to God. In a parable, this misuse of language is permissible, proper, even preferred. Metaphor is efficacious. It communicates. It says something significant in a powerful way. It unleashes a wealth of significations at the mention of a single word. Terms like life and death illustrate that metaphor is often a parable *in nuce*. This is, perhaps, one reason why metaphorical language is so effective in a religious context. It enables the speaker to articulate his experience by providing him with a vocabulary for the depth and the power of his convictions.

The use of life and death in both Galatians 2 and Luke 15 provide a background for viewing these terms in 2 Corinthians 3. The antithesis of life and death is a recurring emphasis in the epistle,[116] and it is especially prominent in 2.14-3.11.[117] Paul, in 2.15-16a, combines an 'olfactory metaphor'[118] with life and death to talk about his proclamation and its results:

> For we are the aroma of Christ to God among those who are being saved and among those who are perishing, to one a fragrance from death to death, to the other a fragrance from life to life.

The notions of aroma (εὐωδία) and fragrance (ὀσμή) may have arisen in connection with the incense and other spices carried along during the triumph of a Roman general, the smell of which meant joy and celebration for the victors and death for the vanquished.[119] The odour may allude to cultic practice or to passages in the Old Testament wisdom literature.[120] Whatever the context(s) Paul may have had in mind, he insists that his preaching, like the aromas, has radical effects. At this point, his preaching is like that of some Old Testament men:

> 'See, I have set before you this day life and good, death and evil' (Dt 30.15).
>
> 'Behold, I set before you the way of life and the way of death' (Jer 21.8).

Thus preaching brings life to some and death to others.[121] Those who accept Jesus as the Christ and trust in him for salvation receive life from God. To those who oppose and reject, death is the result. 'In Christ' is the remedy for sin; if it is taken, it is a life-giving medicine; if it is refused, the apostle's ministry acts like deadly poison.[122]

In 3.1-3, letters of recommendation are discussed, and Paul climaxes this discussion with a clear contrast between the powerful and energizing writing of the Spirit of the living God and the rather lifeless and inert record left by humans writing with ink. A secondary contrast points up the distinction between living human hearts as an appropriate place for the Spirit to write and the deadness of the physical materials upon which men write. Thus this paragraph continues the contrast of life and death begun

in the previous unit.

The antithesis of life and death reaches its climax in 3.6: τὸ γὰρ γράμμα ἀποκτέννει, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζῳοποιεῖ. Γράμμα does not stand for a 'literal' interpretation of Scripture as over against πνεῦμα, which would represent a 'spiritual' interpretation.[123] Nor is it 'a technical term for the "Law" (γραφή, Scripture),' as Bernard suggests.[124] Neither is γράμμα to be reckoned 'das innere Prinzip des alten Bundes.'[125] Γράμμα for Paul is, however, related to, though not identical with, νόμος and διαθήκη. The letter which was carved in stone (vv. 6-7) is 'a clear reference to the Decalogue,'[126] which formed the basis for the covenant law.[127] It is the letter, then, as part of '... the old dispensation, which threatens death.'[128]

The letter, though, '... is not fully synonymous with the law.'[129] There are certain distinctions. Paul can state ὁ μὲν νόμος ἅγιος (Rom 7.12), but he never says (or even implies) this of γράμμα. In fact, Käsemann says, in his discussion of Romans 2.27, 29, that Paul '... always uses "letter" in this depreciatory, negative way, and always as something which is obsolete for the Christian because it belongs to the old aeon.'[130]

Γράμμα should be understood not as identical with the law but rather as an aspect and use of the law. As an aspect of the law, it refers to '... the Mosaic Torah in its written documentation and is identical with scripture as a whole.'[131] It sets down in writing the oracles of God, and it codifies all of the theocratic legislation. Γράμμα is a written code with a divine pedigree.

Γράμμα is also a particular use of the law. The law, being inert, is a document which is subject to a variety of uses. It can reveal '... the sacred will of God, which calls men to obedience and to that degree is,

according to Romans 3.21, a witness to the gospel of God's righteousness....'[132] It also exposes the utter sinfulness of sin, and thus functions as a warning to humanity not to dabble in it. Finally, the law points forward to the coming of Christ and of the new covenant. For Paul, the possibility of this Christological orientation '... consistently determined his interpretation of Scripture.'[133] This is how Paul actually *uses* the law. But sometimes how he *uses* the law does not harmonize with what he *says about* the law.

It is in the negative uses of the law, however, that the significance of γράμμα is to be found. It too often leads one to attempt to achieve a righteousness of one's own and to justify one's self by works of the law. Even worse, *sin* can seize the law and through it deceive and put to death those who know the law (Rom 7.11). The law which was meant for life resulted in death instead (Rom 7.10), because it was powerless to give life (Gal 3.21). The law is 'letter' when it is misused in this way, '... by driving men into transgression and hybris, by causing sin and death.'[134] The law is 'letter' when it is abused by becoming an end in itself and thus failing to achieve its goal, that of pointing humanity to salvation in Christ.[135] When Paul uses γράμμα he is viewing the law as a system of works righteousness, as a perversion of the divine purpose, and as an inert object which is taken over by sin and energized for evil intentions.[136]

It should be noted that the view of γράμμα and νόμος which Paul is attacking is not necessarily the view held by all or even some of his Jewish contemporaries. It is either Paul's understanding of *their* view or his own view of the law situation. In any case, a written law (the Jews' or anyone else's) need not necessarily lead to legalism and a perversion of that law, as some writers might lead one to believe. The New Testament

records portray many godly men and women who show no trace of this infectious legalism (e.g., John the baptizer, Mary and Joseph, Elizabeth and Zechariah, Anna and Simeon).

Paul's special use of γράμμα is not itself metaphor, but is more properly called metonymy, the figure where a part names a whole, as in 'all hands on deck'. But when Paul writes, τὸ γὰρ γράμμα ἀποκτέννει, he is speaking metaphorically. The letter, as a mark engraved on a stone tablet, is not capable of inflicting death, though a good blow to the head with the tablet itself might come very near it.

'The written code kills' does not give the same sense as 'I died to the law,' even though both are concerned with death. The latter expresses the voluntary decision of a person to abandon the law and to become indifferent to it. 'Death', in this instance is a beneficial event, for it frees one to become alive toward God. The former statement, though, conjures up a situation in which γράμμα is a powerful adversary which overcomes a helpless person. Γράμμα is the donor, and man is the unwilling recipient. This kind of death, in contrast to that of Gal 2.19-20 is not a good happening.

A rather extreme explanation of τὸ γὰρ γράμμα ἀποκτέννει is offered by Käsemann:

> Just as the law is perverted when it is turned into the demand for works, so it perverts the man who falls in with this demand, and delivers him up to the power of death by setting him at a distance from the creator who gives and receives.'[137]

Käsemann, understanding letter as law perverted, assumes that law always and necessarily results in legalism. His approach fails to explain how it is that someone who, in good faith, 'falls in with this demand,' is so

weakened that he unwillingly comes under the sway of death. He also fails to show that there is a reasonable connection between someone's attempt to obey the law of the creator and the consequential distancing of that person from the creator.

A more moderate explanation is that of Furnish, who contends that τὸ γὰρ γράμμα ἀποκτέννει means that the law is an unwilling accomplice of sin and death. Sin is the real culprit. It exerts a fatal attraction on the law, and then it uses the law to effect the death of 'the one who presumes to find life through the law.'[138] The weakness of this explanation is that Furnish uses law, letter, and commandment interchangeably, even though he maintains that there is a distinction between them. Also, he fails to harmonize his view of the unwilling accomplice with his statement that the letter is an enslaving power.[139]

The beginning of a more satisfactory solution is the comment advanced by Collange:

> La loi tue - selon l'enseignement paulinien - parce qu'elle révèle le péché et qu'elle ne permet pas d'accomplir les exigences divines.[140]

This comment is started in the right direction, but a few corrections and additions can make it even more attractive. First, it is important to clarify that Paul says it is the 'letter' (not the 'law') which kills. The law indeed defines and reveals sin. But the law is weak. It has no power to enable its adherents to keep the commandments. The law is like a map. It can direct you to your destination, showing you the route to be taken. The law is not like a car. It cannot actually take you to your destination. The law in this weak and ineffectual state is what Paul calls γράμμα. Γράμμα kills rather indirectly, in that it creates a hazard (sin

which results in death), it warns of the danger, but it cannot rescue one from the predicament. The observation of Lightfoot is worth repeating at this point. 'The law then exercises a double power over those subject to it; it makes them sinners, and it punishes them for being so.'[141] But Paul hesitates to say 'law' when he is speaking of this punishing (death-dealing) function. This he terms 'letter.' It is the *letter* which kills.

The letter kills in two ways. First, natural death is understood as a consequence of man's sin and fallenness. All have sinned, and all will receive death as the wages of their sin. The letter pronounces this verdict on all transgressors. Second, the letter kills because it makes humanity dead toward God. By revealing sin and the sinfulness of humanity, it establishes a gulf between sinful man and holy God. The letter does not build a bridge to span the gulf, but rather it maintains the separation. When death is understood as separation and alienation, then it becomes clear why Paul says the letter kills. It does not make one alive toward God. It does not bring one near God. It just tells one how far from God he really is. The letter kills because it alienates man from the living God, who is the source of life.

'The written code kills, but the Spirit gives life.' The δέ here has adversative, rather than continuative, force, and, even though it is a weak adversative particle, the contrast is clear enough. Πνεῦμα should not be understood as '... göttliche Substanz, sondern als Gottes Gabe, die eigentlich jeder Christ besitzt.'[142] The gift, though, in the Pauline epistles, is not regarded as an object, but rather as a person. 'Primitive Christianity understood by "spirit" the divine energy of miracle and ecstasy.'[143] It is true that power was a distinguishing feature of the early believers' experience of the Spirit, but Paul also designates other

less dramatic functions of the Spirit, such as the bestowal of freedom (2 Cor 3.17) and the ministry of intercessory prayer (Rom 8.26). A provisional understanding of Spirit would be a powerful person whom God sends to be with those who trust him.

The Spirit of God is a metaphorical expression. Πνεῦμα can also mean 'breath' or 'wind'. Πνεῦμα θεοῦ can signify 'breath of God', which is another way of referring to the living God. God is breathing. God is alive. This unusual notion inspired a nineteenth-century hymn writer:

> Breathe on me, Breath of God;
> Fill me with life anew,
> That I may love what thou dost love,
> And do what thou wouldst do.'[44]

The breath of the living God is a powerful life-giving force. It has a vivifying effect upon whomever it falls,. When the breath of God is in a believer, it is indicative of the nearness of God and of the vitality of the recipient.

The wind is a meteorological phenomenon with a wide range of capacities. A light breeze on a hot summer day in Fort Worth or in Jerusalem can be refreshing. A slightly stronger wind can turn the blades of a windmill and therby be converted into mechanical power, for grinding grain or pumping water out of a well. A circular wind like Hurricane Hugo can be deadly and destructive. Such a wind has power. The wind cannot be seen. Neither its origin nor its destination is known. But its effects can be observed. Wind, when predicated of God, is metaphorical. For the early Hebrews, it was a concrete way of talking about the *power* of God. They felt the force of a wind blowing across the Negeb, making it impossible to see their flocks of sheep. They saw sudden windstorms swoop down

on the lake of Galilee and wreak havoc on the boats. Wind is power. The wind of God is the power of God. God's πνεῦμα, in addition to suggesting his nearness and his vitality, also connotes his power.

The verb ζῳοποιέω can mean 'to make alive, to give life to, to bring back to life that which was dead.' When Paul says the Spirit gives life, he implies that God is breathing on those who have been killed by the letter and is bringing them back to life. Such a feat requires power. The excellency of this power comes from God, not man (2 Cor 4.7; cf. 1.9). The same Spirit (2 Cor 4.13) which raised Jesus from the dead also raises Jesus' people from the dead. Of course, these believers were never physically dead nor physically revived. Death and life are metaphorical fictions for describing the work of God with humankind. When a person trusts in Jesus for justification, then God breathes on the person of faith. God comes close to the believer, reversing the alienation and separation brought about by the letter.

God does not abandon those who trust in him. He will never leave nor forsake them. To help pass the time during this 'eternal' relationship, God communicates with his people. 'It is clear that Paul thinks that men can put their ears beside God's mouth and that they can read God's correspondence; it is clear that God may be modelled as speaker or writer.'[145] What is exhalation from God's point of view is inspiration from man's point of view. The Spirit makes alive. The Spirit encourages believers by breathing words of hope (2 Cor 3.12) into their ears. The Spirit raises the quality of their life by bringing them freedom (v. 17). The Spirit is constantly changing believers for the better, transforming them from glory to glory (v. 18). The Spirit at work in a Christian is God acting creatively (again).'[146] The letter kills, but the Spirit makes alive.

Whatever sin does, God undoes and redoes. The Spirit makes Christians come alive by filling them with the breath of God, and by empowering them to live a life of obedience to God and of service to humanity.

In conclusion, then, the Old Testament consistently portrays Yahweh as the living God, in utter contrast to other gods and man-made idols. Rather, he is a God who speaks to his people and acts powerfully on their behalf. The living God is the giver of life, as the Elijah narratives so clearly depict, and a personal God, as seen in the Psalms. When Paul speaks of the living God, he also has these Old Testament themes in mind. He opposes the living God to idols (2 Cor 6.16; 1 Thes 1.9) and portrays him as one who communicates with his people (2 Cor 3.1-3). God is not *dead* to the world. 'Life', understood metaphorically, is an apt term to predicate of God, since it suggests existence, action, communication, and power.

'Life' and 'death' may be attributed metaphorically to man, to express his relationship to God. When anyone is paying attention to sin, law, or other deities, he is alive to sin and dead to the living God. Paul shows that the solution is to die to these entities (or non-entities), that is, to abandon or ignore them. Then one can become dead to them and alive to God. The antithesis of life and death is powerfully expressed in 2 Corinthians 3.6: 'For the written code kills, but the Spirit gives life.' The written code (γράμμα) is not identical with the law, but rather it signifies the law in its weakness and lifelessness and in its collusion with sin and death. The letter kills when it becomes an instrument of sin, and thereby alienates man from God. But the Spirit breathes new life into everyone who believes in Jesus. He restores man to a close relationship wih God. The Spirit shows himself through his powerful action and his

personal communication with God's people.

Life and death are among Paul's most frequent metaphors for redescribing the reality of man's relationship to God. They are 'strong' metaphors.

CHAPTER FOUR. CONCLUSION.

This investigation began with the suspicion that biblical texts are supercharged with a surplus of meaning. In order to subject the intuitive notion to critical enquiry, a particular text (2 Corinthians 3) was selected for examination. The result of this study is to confirm the original hypothesis, that 2 Corinthians 3 in particular and biblical passages in general are open to new interpretations. The excess of signification which they 'contain' can more fully be spelled out by giving careful attention to certain hermeneutical factors.

2 Corinthians 3 was chosen as a 'test' passage for several reasons. It abounds in figurative language. People who are 'letters', missionaries who are 'waiters', and men with 'shining faces' - all of these along with the rest of the chapter seemed to be requesting, indeed requiring, further explanation. Has all that can be said about the religious language in this passage already been said? The present writer, after his first pre-critical reading of the text, replied, 'No'. There were still questions on the table which had not been satisfactorily answered. There were still historical critical issues upon which a consensus of opinion had not yet been reached. There were also new questions waiting to be asked. How could the language of 2 Corinthians 3 be translated or transformed so that it would be meaningful for today's readers? What was the real force of this passage? How could it more forcefully be expressed? These were some of the initial concerns that prompted the present investigation of 2 Corinthians 3.

But what was to be the way into this text? What approach to interpretation could be useful in dealing with these concerns? The general

theory of interpretation expounded by Paul Ricoeur seemed promising in the early stages.

The theory itself has several advantages. It is eclectic. It incorporates features from several different disciplines, including philosophy, history, literary criticism, and contemporary hermeneutical theory. Such an amalgam had the potential for preventing an overemphasis in any one area which might lead to a unnecessarily distorted view of the text. Furthermore, Ricoeur's theory had a sensitivity toward language which was compatible with biblical texts. His recognition of the importance and power of symbols and metaphors made his theory suitable for interpreting biblical passages rich in such language. Finally, his view that meaning is constituted on three levels - word, sentence, work - opened up a variety of ways for analyzing 2 Corinthians 3.

The decision was taken to implement this theory, to apply it to a particular text.

The primary sources for Ricoeur's hermeneutic which have been used here are *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* and *The Rule of Metaphor*. The former book provides the theoretical groundwork for the interpretative notion of the 'world of the text', which has been the subject of Chapter Two. 2 Corinthians 3 was regarded as a 'world' with characters who acted and who related to each other. It was also regarded as a text which projects to the reader a world, a way of living. *The Rule of Metaphor* guided the investigation in Chapter Three, in which Ricoeur's theory of metaphor was reviewed and then applied to three different metaphors in 2 Corinthians 3.

A summary of the present work will now be provided.

Chapter One introduced the topic of interpretation as a general

problem. It was defined as a process of expounding the meaning of a text. It is a process in that it involves the ongoing contributions of both past and present readers. Past readers treasure and preserve texts, and they offer interpretations which serve as starting points for later readers. Each new reader construes for himself the meaning of the text, taking into account the interpretative tradition as well as his own personal concerns. 'Expounding' was taken to be a dialectical event, in which a naïve pre-understanding of the text gave way to a critical explanation, which in turn was followed by comprehension, or a more mature understanding. Expounding 'meaning' requires a concern for the interests of author, text, and reader, for all three contribute to the formation of meaning. A text is a work of discourse which has been committed to writing. It is recognized as a work, the product of human labour.

Interpreting an ancient text, like the Bible, is especially challenging because of the distance between its author and its reader - a spatio-temporal distance, as well as a linguistic and cultural gulf. But the effort is worthwhile, because the Bible is ultimately about one God - the same God worshipped by ancient Israel and the Christian church - and about his dealings with humanity, which is in much the same predicament as it ever was. Ricoeur proposes to recognize the distance between the reader and the writer of the text, and then to deal with it productively through appropriation, making one's own that which was previously foreign. Such a programme is possible, in part, because the meaning of great texts (including the Bible) has an ideal content which can be identified by the original readers and re-identified by later readers.

Grasping the meaning of 2 Corinthians 3 is particularly challenging, because, first of all, there are lexical problems. Κατοπτρίζω, for

example, has been translated in this work as 'behold/reflect', a recognition of its own multivalence as well as of the several levels of interpretation which 2 Corinthians 3 as a whole permits. The interpretation of the whole depends in part upon one's understanding of its structure. Is this chapter a midrash on Exodus 34 (Windisch, Schulz, Georgi)? Or is it rather an apologetic argument which alludes to several Old Testament passages, including Exodus 34 (Furnish)? Or is it a part of a larger passage (2.14-4.6) which exhibits a cyclical or concentric pattern (Lambrecht)? The best possible solution at this time seems to be a modification of Furnish's proposal. The passage (especially verses 7-18) is not properly a midrash, because it does not seek to exegete a given text (Ex 34.29-35) by means of a running commentary. The passage does seem rather to contribute, more or less indirectly, to Paul's apology/polemic *vis-à-vis* certain intruders/opponents. But there are midrashic elements present, though, such as Paul's comments about Moses, the glory, and the veil. 2 Corinthians 3, then, should be regarded as the work of a writer who was steeped in the Hebrew scriptures (and LXX), who, even with no scroll before him, could quote (misquote?), allude to, or interpret the scriptures freely and easily. Paul, through 'the artful manipulation of language' (to borrow a phrase from John Stuart Mill), interprets the Hebrew Bible Christologically, and uses it to promote and defend the work he feels he has to do.

In order to deal with the problems of interpreting ancient texts, the hermeneutic of Ricoeur is employed. The central category of his theory of interpretation is the 'world of the text'. The world of the text provides the reader a new vision of reality, a new way of orienting himself in the world, a challenge to actualize his own possibilities. The world of the

text projects a mode of existence. The text beckons the reader to appropriate its world, to make it his own.

The world of 2 Corinthians 3 is a world where persons live. Chief among these is God. God is creator, creating a universe, a new creation through Christ, and a family for all of his 'children' to live in. God is father of this family. He is a good father - strong, fair, dependable. He assigns chores to his children, and he helps them perform them. Jesus is the eldest brother. He is pre-eminent among all the children. He is also lord, in which case his younger brothers are his slaves. But they do not mind. They willingly become his slaves. If Jesus is the oldest brother, then Paul is next oldest, or he acts like it sometimes, at least in regard to the Corinthians. He is forever telling them how to sort out their problems and how to behave. Though he is their brother, he acts more like their father. Sometimes he calls himself their father. But he is also their slave, not owned by them, but working for their benefit. As a slave of Christ, Paul goes where he is told and does what he is commanded. He does not decide his own itinerary. But he does decide the itinerary of his workmates. He sends them out as his emissaries, to deliver his letters and to smooth out trouble in his churches. Paul himself is an ambassador, and he dispatches others as ambassadors as well. Paul is not idle. He is forever talking about his 'work'. One example of his workmanship, the result of his labour, is the Corinthian church. This congregation is a building for which he has laid a good foundation. It is a field in which he has sown the seed. It is a letter which he has written. Paul has done the work of an apostle, and he wants to be recognized as an apostle, not least by the Corinthians. But the best of all possible authors is God. In fact, for Paul, God is best of all.

God is superordinate in all of his relations with men. Paul is always subordinate to God, but he alternates between superordinate, equal, and subordinate in his relations with the Corinthians. The Corinthians have a rather passive role in the text. They are indeed the addressees, the recipients, the readers of a letter, but they are also themselves a letter. They are a letter which has been written by Paul and are therefore evidence of Paul's apostolic activity. As such, they serve to recommend Paul to all men, or at least to those men who take time to read and know the letter. The world of 2 Corinthians 3 projects God as the ultimate, superordinate authority, the father, with all of the brothers (and sisters [by 2 Cor 6.18, at least]) as equals, though some are more equal than others, since they have a responsibility for building up the churches.

The theory of metaphor put forward by Ricoeur is long and elaborate. He re-interprets Aristotle in such a way as to avoid falling into the trap of an ornamental theory, which states that metaphor is simply substituting an improper decorative word for the more proper (though less elegant) word. By emphasizing Aristotle's notion of ἐπιφορά, Ricoeur is able to undermine the sterile substitution theory and to erect an explanation of metaphor which takes notice of the movement or transference of meaning. Ricoeur also borrows from the pioneering work of I. A. Richards, who proposed an 'interinanimation' theory of metaphor, in which metaphor is seen less as the improper usage of a word and more as the result of the interplay of all the parts of the sentence. Ricoeur's theory was summarized in six propositions:

> 1. Metaphor is a phenomenon of predication, not naming.
> 2. The phenomenon of metaphor occurs at the level of the sentence, not at the level of the word. Thus, there are metaphorical statements but no metaphorical words.
> 3. Metaphor reveals a hitherto unnoticed kinship between

seemingly alien categories.
4. True metaphors exist because of a tension between the literal and the metaphorical interpretation of a sentence.
5. Real metaphors are not translatable. They may be paraphrased, but their innovative meaning can never be fully verbalized.
6. Metaphors generate new information about reality. The unusual predication stimulates the reader to perceive new relationships and new insights.

Ricoeur calls his doctrine of metaphor a 'tension' theory, because it recognizes two different kinds of tension involved in the interpretation of metaphors. First, there is a tension betwee the literal meaning and the metaphorical meaning. In a literal interpretation, the words do not make sense, as they are commonly understood. The literal sense self-destructs in nonsense or contradiction. This necessitates a search for a metaphorical interpretation to rescue the sense of the sentence. A second tension is between the literal reference and the metaphorical reference. In the literal interpretation of a metaphor, the literal reference is abolished along with the literal sense. But since the sense of every sentence presupposes and drives toward a reference, the metaphorical statement must have metaphorical reference to correspond with its metaphorical sense. Thus the meaning of a metaphor (whether it be a poetic, theological, or some other kind of metaphor) cannot be reduced to a mood or a feeling, but rather it must be accorded ontological status. A metaphor says something about reality.

Three metaphors from 2 Corinthians 3 were selected in order to apply the theory of metaphor proposed by Ricoeur. The metaphors of 'letters' were the first example. In verse 2, Paul says of the Corinthians, 'You are our letter'. The literal interpretation of this metaphor breaks down, because people are not letters. This is an aberrant attribution. But the

metaphorical interpretation rescues the sentence, by affirming that these persons are *like* letters. The ontological vehemence of the metaphor pushes the reader to discover the resemblance which makes the metaphor work. This resemblance is revealed in the hitherto unnoticed similarity between people and letters. The surplus of meaning in this metaphor allows for two different but related construals. The Corinthian 'letter' may be regarded as a letter of recommendation. Since commendation is a prevalent theme in the immediate context (3.1-3) and in the epistle as a whole, the notion of a living letter of recommendation is easily established. But 'you are our letter' can also be interpreted as 'you are the result of the work we have performed. You are our workmanship, our craftsmanship.' This interpretation would coincide with another of Paul's arguments in the Corinthian correspondence, namely, that he is an apostle because he has done the work of an apostle.

In verse 3, Paul writes, 'You are a letter of Christ.' The notion of Christ writing a letter (subjective genitive) is as metaphorical as the Corinthians constituting a letter about Christ (objective genitive). The subjective is preferable here, since the context is more concerned with how the letter is written than with what the letter contains. To say that Christ wrote a letter is a means of redescribing the congregation at Corinth. They are a church not because of what they have done but because of what Christ has done. The metaphor suggests that the Corinthians (and all other believers as well) should consider themselves as the literary production of a divine author. This is another example of the power of Christ in bringing forth a new creation. In order to bring forth this 'document', Christ employed the services of his servant Paul. Christ wrote the letter, but Paul was his assistant in the process.

The second metaphor to be examined is 'glory'. To speak of the radiance of a man's face is not a matter of literal fact, though this fiction may be a metaphorical redescription. The language of glory and radiance gave the biblical writers a means of talking about the inexpressible - a direct encounter with the divine. The 'glory of Moses' face', a metaphor introduced in the Pentateuch and affirmed by Paul, suggests that Moses had had a rare experience of beholding the divine glory, that he had been in close contact with God, closer than the ordinary man is allowed. 'The glory of the Lord' is metaphorical also, as is almost all talk of God. This is an attempt to talk about God in terms of the model of the honoured and respected man. Such a man has glory - fame, renown, good reputation. God has a good reputation among his people. They sing praises to his name and give him gifts. But glory also spins off notions of power and majesty. These are characteristics of a king, which is another name for God. If God is a king, as the biblical writers suggest, then he is a unique king, in that he is concerned about the welfare of all of his subjects. Even when they are suffering, the glorious power of the king helps to sustain the people. 'Glory', when attributed to God, opens up many possibilities of discourse. It is a word which allows men to articulate their understanding and experience of God.

The third and final metaphor to be considered is the antithetical pair of life and death. 'Life', when predicated of God, especially by the Old Testament writers in the phrase 'the living God', is another conversation starter, when humans want to talk about God. The survey of the Old Testament usage of 'the living God' reveals that the phrase first distinguishes the true God, the God of Israel, from the false deities, those of the other nations. It also signifies a personal God - one who

speaks to his people and one who acts graciously on their behalf. The living God is the near God - one who is present with his people.

Death, on the other hand, connotes indifference, alienation, lack of personal relationship. When one dies to the law, he becomes indifferent toward it. When one dies to sin, he terminates his relationship with it. Paul's understanding of God seems to be that when one dies to sin and law, then one comes alive toward God. The road to life passes through death. For Paul, the pioneer of the path from death to life is Jesus, who died but was raised from death to life by the glory of the Father (Rom 6.4).

This 'new' life has already begun for believers, because the Spirit causes us to be alive (2 Cor 3.6). The Spirit is also the power which is currently transforming believers from glory to glory (v. 18). It is the Spirit which is instrumental in the writing of the epistle of Christ on the heart. 'Spirit' is another metaphorical name for God. It suggests the breath of God, that which makes God alive. God is known to be alive among his people in part because these people have the Spirit. The Spirit of the Living God is the Spirit which makes men alive. Spirit is thus in some ways an organizing metaphor for 2 Corinthians 3. Πνεῦμα is a term which appears in all four 'paragraphs' of the chapter. For Paul, πνεῦμα is a significant means for talking about the activity of God.

Though the Christian's talk of God is mostly (if not completely) metaphorical, it is not therefore necessarily incoherent or fanciful, because, according to Ricoeur, metaphors *refer*. They say something about reality. When we talk about the 'living God', we are pointing to an extra-linguistic, extra-terrestrial reality. What we say may not have the logical force of a syllogism or the convincing power of empirical evidence, but it may be *true* nonetheless. The world of the biblical text projects a

picture of the living God. And metaphor gives us the ability to begin to speak and to continue to speak, about this God, who is the creator of all things and the father of all believers.

Having completed the investigation and summarized the results, it is appropriate to reflect critically on the overall project.

The notion of the 'world of the text' as proposed by Paul Ricoeur is a useful interpretative notion. It arises out of his reaction against an overemphasis on historicism as the dominant element in hermeneutics and out of his sympathy for and partial agreement with the tenets of structuralism. Without rejecting the value of historical critical research, the Ricoeurian interpreter would stress instead the internal structure of the work and the interplay of its various components. He would temporarily bracket out the world *behind* the text in order to examine more carefully the world *of* the text. Such an interpreter would proceed on the assumption that the meaning of a text may be found in the content and the structure of the text itself, quite apart from any consideration of its historical context.

The implementation of the 'world of the text' in the present investigation permitted partial suspension of reference to real people and events so that the roles and relationships of various 'actors' could be examined. For example, the more historically-orientated problems of Pauline chronology and of the textual integrity of the epistle were de-emphasized. Instead, Paul was considered as he appeared in the text in relation to God and the Corinthians. This approach contributed new insights to the understanding of 2 Corinthians 3, such as Paul's portrayal of himself as being equal to, superior to, and even inferior to the Corinthians.

Ricoeur's notion of the 'world of the text' is compatible with the New

Criticism, French structuralism, and the ideology of the absolute text. It works out rather well when applied to modern narrative texts, especially novels. *David Copperfield*, for example, can be read, enjoyed, and understood (at least partially, anyway) by persons who have little, if any, knowledge of nineteenth century England. This is true in part because the novel presents a world of its own, and it provides enough information about that world to make it understandable. The text then tells a story complete with beginning, middle, and end.

But the application of the 'world of the text' to New Testament epistolography is problematic. The letters refer not to a make-believe world of fictitious characters but rather to the real world and to real people. They do *not* tell a complete story. Instead, they represent one stage in the unfolding of a larger story, a story about God and his people. This is a story which has not yet been completed, neither in Paul's time nor in ours. To some extent, then, the epistles make sense only when viewed in their historical context and in relation to the social and cultural and religious milieu in which they arise.

For this reason, the investigation of the world of 2 Corinthians 3 continually collides with the ideology of the absolute text. The world of this text and of the Pauline epistles in general is not simply about a world designed by the apostle. Rather, this text is grounded in the real world -- it arose out of it, refers to it, and continually leads the reader back to it. 2 Corinthians 3 alludes to the presence of intruders and opponents in the Corinthian church. It was written because Paul had begun a good work, in Paul's view at least, in Corinth and because he continued to be concerned about the believers there. Even Paul's language and concepts are formed by his drawing upon the literature of the Old

Testament. Thus, 2 Corinthians 3 continually refers beyond itself to other persons, events, and situations, and it alludes to other peoples and documents. It is not a self-contained entity.

For these reasons, the study of 2 Corinthians 3 under the rubric of 'world of the text' alone does not completely satisfy. Questions of a historical nature continually arise, and the world behind the text always looms on the horizon of the world of the text. Therefore, it must be concluded that Paul Ricoeur's theory of the 'world of the text' is a useful interpretative category, but it is not fully adequate by itself for the study of the New Testament epistles.

The concept of the 'world of the text' is helpful, then, in that allows the reader to bracket out 'history' and to focus for a while on the 'text'. But when applied to New Testament epistolography its value is limited in that it is sometimes difficult to delineate and to distinguish between the world of the text and the world behind the text.

The present investigation attempted to make this distinction by bracketing out historical reference and by concentrating instead upon actors and upon their roles and relations. This approach is, of course, only one way in which the concept of the 'world of the text' may be implemented. Other possible methods would include, to mention a few, the linguistic approach, which would investigate Paul's drawing upon the language of the Old Testament as well as his own creative use of language, and the cultural approach, which would analyze the cultural codes and other cultural factors which bear upon these texts.

One advantage of utilizing the category of the 'world of the text' is that it portrays the text as projecting a world from itself to the reader. The critic is discouraged from reading into the text his own prejudices and

opinions. Rather, he is challenged to open himself up to the propositions and claims of the text. The final stage in Ricoeur's theory of interpretation is the reader's reception and appropriation of the world of the text into his own world. In this way, the meaning of the text is thrust into the world before the text. When the world of the text merges with the world of the reader, the process of interpretation is complete, though it is not final, for the biblical text is often capable of a plurality of interpretations. This multiplicity of meaning is more compatible with the 'world of the text' approach than with the historical critical approach, because the latter looks backward for the one original meaning of the text while the former looks forward to the possibility of new meaning as new readers in new environments encounter the riches of old texts.

The other major aspect of Paul Ricoeur's theory of interpretation which is discussed in the present work is the theory of metaphor. The six tenets of Ricoeur's theory of metaphor were discussed and then summarized (p. 153). The first point, 'Metaphor is a phenomenon of predication, not naming', is foundational for the further development of his theory. Yet this basic point conflicts at times with Ricoeur's emphasis on the 'is, is not, is like' character of metaphor (see page 168), which implies that metaphor is a naming process. Thus it appears that Ricoeur has proposed two different though related definitions of the essence of metaphor.

This is not surprising, in light of the fact that there are different kinds of metaphor. The most commonly discussed is the 'A is a B' format; for example, 'you are our letter'. On this type of metaphor, the 'is, is not, is like' approach works well, and the accompanying notions of dual sense and dual reference are applicable and appropriate.

But there are other kinds of metaphor. For example, 'a letter written on the heart' is clearly metaphorical but does not fit the 'A is a B' format. Nor are the concepts of dual sense and dual reference relevant here. Soskice's critique of Ricoeur is at this point worthy of consideration. She is correct in saying that in a metaphor of this type there is only one subject, one referent -- the letter. This metaphor can not easily be interpreted on the order of 'is, is not, is like'. It is clearly a metaphor of predication and is best interpreted with reference to the six tenets listed on page 153. Such a metaphor can only make sense when the whole sentence is subjected to a work of interpretation. Metaphors of this type do on a small scale what texts do on a much larger scale -- they project a world which leads the reader to think, to explore, to become articulate. They do more than camouflage the identity of the referent. They challenge the reader to understand new possibilities and to make new connections between things.

Besides a difference in the format of metaphor, there is also a difference between a spoken metaphor and a written metaphor. Ricoeur's theory of the interpretation of metaphors works quite well when one is dealing with metaphors contained in a written text, for much time is often required to apply the tenets of Ricoeur's theory. A reader has the opportunity to stop his reading, ponder similarities and differences, and then continue reading.

This approach does not work so well on metaphors presented orally, because the speaker, of course, continues his message, and the listener does not have the luxury of mulling over all of the possibilities of meaning suggested by the metaphor. In oral discourse, either the meaning of the metaphor comes through quickly and fairly effortlessly, or it is

lost. A listener simply does not have time to apply a method as sophisticated as that of Ricoeur. Thus, Ricoeur's theory of metaphor is better suited to the interpretation of written texts than to the understanding of oral discourse.

This point has some bearing on the interpretation of the Pauline epistles. 2 Corinthians was, of course, composed as a written document. But originally it was probably read aloud to the congregation by a reader, so that it was *heard* as oral discourse and not *seen* as writing by the original addressees. Only in later centuries was the epistle in such wide circulation that it would have been read as a visual experience. Thus, a theory of reading metaphors, such as that of Ricoeur, would probably not have been applied by the Corinthians. To apply such a theory now would possibly yield a somewhat different understanding of the text from that achieved by the first listeners.

Ricoeur's notion of the dual sense and dual reference of a metaphor is a helpful contribution to the understanding of metaphor. Ricoeur would most likely agree with Soskice that each metaphor has only one referent. While Soskice asserts *that* there is only one referent, Ricoeur's theory explains *how* the reader comes to identify this referent. His theory goes through the two steps of rejecting the literal referent and then grasping the metaphorical referent, a process which sometimes is completed instantly in the mind of the reader but at other times involves a span of time and a recognizable effort. Soskice is correct to assert that each metaphor has only one true subject, and Ricoeur does well to point out how the interpreter arrives at his understanding of that subject.

Ricoeur's theory of dual reference is, of course, a reaction against those who would maintain that a metaphor is ornamental and not cognitive

and not at all referential. His theory allows one to go beyond the obviously correct denial of the literal referent and achieve instead the identification of the metaphorical referent. Such a two-stage procedure is not necessary in those cases where the subject is fairly obvious, but it is a helpful tool in other cases where the referent is more concealed. The theory of dual reference is yet another implicit claim by Ricoeur that metaphor is cognitive and not merely ornamental.

Paul Ricoeur has developed his theories of reference even further in his three volume work, *Time and Narrative*. Drawing on his conclusions about the referential power of metaphor in *The Rule of Metaphor*, he applies them on a wider scale to certain selected novels. At this point, his theories of metaphor and of the world of the text converge. While metaphor conveys sense and reference on a small scale, he asserts that narratives project meaning and reference on a larger scale. Both metaphor and narrative are concerned with depicting truth, and both propose a world which the reader is invited to examine and inhabit.

In conclusion, it may be stated that the interpretation of 2 Corinthians 3 may be enhanced by developing and maintaining a sensitivity to both the world behind the text and the world of the text. These two worlds are related yet distinct, though the distinction is at times difficult to establish.

The interpretation of 2 Corinthians 3 demands a sensitivity to the world behind the text, because it is full of references to historical characters, such as Paul and the Corinthians, and Moses and the Israelites. This text functions like a window, giving the reader a glimpse of this ancient world. But the view is neither clear nor complete. Numerous different interpretations are the result.

The world of the text of 2 Corinthians 3 has been explored by means of reference to some of the actors mentioned in it and to their actions and their relationships with each other. God appears as the dominant figure in this text, and Paul is his designated assistant, a role that consists of both service and authority. The Corinthians are the persons under his authority.

The interpretation of 2 Corinthians 3 also requires a sensitivity to religious metaphor, for the passage is replete with figurative language. It speaks of letters written on stones as well as on hearts, of people whose faces radiate light, of dead people who are alive, and of living people who are dead. Such discourse challenges a reader's interpretative ability. The theories of Paul Ricoeur, though sometimes difficult to understand and to apply, have proved to be helpful in coming to grasp something of the meaning of an enigmatic passage written by Paul of Tarsus.

CHAPTER ONE. SECTION A. NOTES FOR PAGES 1-9.

1. *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles; Founded Mainly on the Materials Collected by the Philological Society*, 10 vol., ed. J. A. H. Murray, W. A. Craigie, C. T. Onions (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1928), s.v. 'interpret.'

2. All English Bible quotations are taken from the Revised Standard Version (RSV), and all Greek New Testament quotations are taken from Nestle-Aland 26th edition, unless otherwise stated.

3. F. W. Danker, review of *New Resolutions of Old Conundrums: A Fresh Insight into Luke's Gospel*, by J. D. M. Derrett, in *The Journal of Religion* 68 (October, 1988): 586.

4. D. Jasper, *The New Testament and the Literary Imagination* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1987), p. 21.

5. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), p. 71.

6. Ibid., p. 73.

7. Ibid., p. 72.

8. Ibid., p. 72.

9. J. M. Soskice, *Metaphor and Religious Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, paperback ed.), pp. 51-53.

10. W. H. Kelber, 'Gospel Narrative and Critical Theory,' *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 18 (1988): 130-136.

11. Ibid., p. 130.

12. Ibid., p. 130.

13. Ibid., p. 131.

14. Jasper, p. 94.

15. J. F. Williams, *Gospel Against Parable* (Sheffield: Almond, 1985), p. 57.

16. L. M. Poland, *Biblical Interpretation and Literary Criticism: A Critique of Formalist Approaches* (Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1985), p. 159, succintly summarizes the issue: 'The central difficulty, to restate it briefly, is that the centripetal focus of New Critical theory - its stress on the autonomy, self-sufficiency, and objectivity of the literary work of art - tends to prevent literature from exercising those cognitive and thus transformative powers which this theory also wishes to claim for it.'

17. Kelber, 'Narrative,' p. 132.

18. M. Stocker, 'God in Theory: Milton, Literature, and Theodicy,' *Journal of Literature and Theology* 1 (1987): 74.

19. Kelber, 'Narrative,' p. 132. For an application of reader-response theory to a biblical text, see S. Brown, 'John 3 and the Resistant Reader: The Fourth Gospel After Nicea and the Holocaust' (paper presented to the SNTS, Cambridge, 1988). Brown favors this method because it helps to preserve '... the immediacy which is characteristic of religious literature' (p. 1).

20. Kelber, 'Narrative,' p. 133.

21. A. Blancy, 'Structuralism and Hermeneutics,' in *Structuralism and Biblical Hermeneutics*, ed. Alfred M. Johnson, Jr. (Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1979), p. 80.

22. E. S. Malbon, 'Mythic Structure and Meaning in Mark: Elements of a Lévi-Straussian Analysis,' *Semeia* 16 (1979): 97-132.

23. J. Calloud, *Structural Analysis of Narrative*, trans. D. Patte (Philadelphia: Fortress Press and Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1976), p. 78.

24. Kelber, 'Narrative,' p. 134.

25. Ricoeur discusses Derrida and deconstructionism in *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary studies in the creation of meaning in language*, trans. R. Czerny with K. McLaughlin and J. Costello (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 284-295.

26. Kelber, 'Narrative,' p. 132.

27. D. E. Klemm, *Hermeneutical Inquiry*, 2 vols. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), vol. I, p. 43.

28. R Bultmann, 'Is Exegesis Without Presuppositions Possible?', in *Existence and Faith*, ed. and trans. S. Ogden (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961), pp. 289-296.

29. R. Barthes, *Image Music Text*, ed. and trans. S. Heath (London: Fontana Press, 1977), p. 163.

30. K. Mueller-Vollmer, 'Introduction,' in *The Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition from the Enlightenment to the Present*, ed. with intro. and notes by K. Mueller-Vollmer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 14, summarizing Humboldt's view of interpretation.

31. R. Barthes, *S/Z* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970), p. 157, writes: 'In the text the reader alone speaks.'

32. P. Ricoeur, 'What is a Text?', pp. 135-150, in D. Rasmussen, *Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1971).

33. This summary of the distinctions between object and work is taken from S. M. Schneiders, 'The Foot Washing (John 13: 1-20): An Experiment in Hermeneutics,' *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 43 (1981): 76. For a fuller discussion of the debate, see R. Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969), pp. 3-11; also pp. 242-246.

CHAPTER ONE. SECTION B. NOTES FOR PAGES 10-14.

1. For a fuller discussion of the differences, see Werner H. Kelber, 'Mark and Oral Tradition,' *Semeia* 16 (1979): 7-56; Kelber, *The Oral and the Written Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983); and William A. Graham, *Beyond the Written Word* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Compare also, R. Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969), pp. 15-20.

2. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), p. 26.

3. Ibid., p. 33.

4. Ibid., pp. 38-39, summarizing the view attributed to Socrates.

5. For the scope of the present investigation, this author will accept the authenticity of seven epistles as Pauline: Romans, 1-2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, Philemon.

6. This has been demonstrated decisively concerning Paul's position toward the Torah by Heikki Räisänen, *Paul and the Law* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1983), especially pp. 199-202. However one may attempt to explain or resolve the problem, it must be recognized that there is a conundrum and simple cross-referencing will not solve it.

7. William G. Doty, *Letters in Primitive Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), p. 2.

8. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, p. 18.

9. Kelber, *Oral and Written*, p. xv.

10. Ibid., pp. 13, 34.

11. Ibid., p. 13.

12. As noted by Graham, pp. 141-154.

13. Johannes Weiss, *Die Aufgaben der Neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft in der Gegenwart* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1908), pp. 17-19.

14. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, pp. 43-44.

15. Ibid., p. 92.

16. Ibid., p. 92.

17. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. G. Barden and J. Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975).

18. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, pp. 89-95.

CHAPTER ONE. SECTION C. NOTES FOR PAGES 15-30.

1. For example, see W. H. Bates, 'The Integrity of II Corinthians,' *New Testament Studies* 12 (1965): 56-69; and F. Young and D. Ford, *Meaning and Truth in 2 Corinthians* (London: SPCK, 1987), pp. 28-36.

2. D. Guthrie, *New Testament Introduction: The Pauline Epistles* (London: The Tyndale Press, 1961), pp. 48-66.

3. W. Bauer, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament*, trans. W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich, rev. F. W. Gingrich and F. W. Danker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), s.v. 'ζῳοποιέω'.

4. Ibid., s.v. 'δόξα'.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. P. W. Schmiedel, *Die Briefe an die Thessalonicher und an die Korinther* (Freiburg: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr, 1891), p. 190; and H. Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924), p. 115.

8. R. Bultmann, *Der zweite Brief an die Korinther* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976), p. 84.

9. Ibid. Compare also E. Allo, *Saint Paul Seconde Épître aux Corinthiens* (Paris: J. Gabalda et Cie, 1956), p. 88.

10. Young and Ford, pp. 90-94, give a lengthy and balanced discussion of the debate on the word, eventually leaning towards 'reflect' rather than 'behold'.

11. P. E. Hughes, *Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1962), p. 85.

12. C. J. A. Hickling, 'The Sequence of Thought in II Corinthians, Chapter 3', *New Testament Studies* 21 (1974-5): 382.

13. V. P. Furnish, *II Corinthians* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1984), p. 179.

14. For example, J. Weiss, *Die Aufgaben der Neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft in der Gegenwart* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1908), pp. 29-32; and Bultmann, pp. 75-77.

15. A. Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1915), p. 88.

16. Furnish, p. 200.

17. F. de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, ed. C. Bally and A. Sechehaye in collaboration with A. Reidlinger, trans. W. Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 16; and P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), pp. 6-8.

18. R. Ingarden, 'On the Cognition of a Literary Work of Art', in *The Hermeneutics Reader*, ed. K. Mueller- Vollmer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 194: 'Words and sentences are passageways through which we move toward understanding. One should not focus on a word or sentence for its own meaning but should allow these individual meanings to lead toward and synthesize into an understanding of the text.'

19. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory,* pp. 6-8.

20. K. Plank, *Paul and the Irony of Affliction* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987), p. 1, writes: 'Through a keen use of language the apostle reveals his literary artistry, especially in the Corinthian correspondence. There every concession of inept speech pales before his control of pattern and image. Every protest of ineloquence bows to the force of his masterful irony and paradox. Apart from whatever else may describe his activity in the Corinthian letters, Paul's powerful manipulation of symbolic speech marks him as kin to the poet and literary artist.'

21. P. Wheelwright, *The Burning Fountain* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), p. 4.

22. J. Héring, *La Seconde Épître de Saint Paul aux Corinthiens* (Neuchatel: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1958), p. 35; C. K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1973), p. 51; Bultmann, p. 81; P. Bachmann, *Der Zweite Brief des Paulus an die Korinther* (Leipzig: A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung Nachf., 1909), p. 145; Furnish, p. 201; Hughes, p. 107.

23. Hickling, p. 384.

24. R. Barthes, *Image Music Text*, ed. and trans. S. Heath (London: Fontana Press, 1977), p. 140, refers to the Jacob story in Genesis 32.22-32 as a 'metonymic montage'.

25. Windisch, p. 112. See also H. Lietzmann, *An die Korinther I·II*, ed. and supp. W.-G. Kümmel (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1949), pp. 111-115.

26. S. Schulz, 'Die Decke des Moses. Untersuchungen zu einer vorpaulinischen Überlieferung in II Cor. 3.7-18.' *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 49 (1958): 1-30. D. Georgi, *Die Gegner des Paulus im 2. Korintherbrief* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1964), pp. 274-282. Now in English, translated by the author, as *The Opponents of Paul in Second Corinthians* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1987), pp. 264-271.

27. J. Fitzmyer, 'Glory Reflected on the Face of Christ (2 Cor. 3.7 - 4.6) and a Palestinian Jewish Motif', *Theological Studies* 42 (1981): 631-633.

28. Ibid., p. 634.

29. Ibid., pp. 630-644.

30. Young and Ford, pp. 36-40.

31. Ibid., p. 55.

32. Ibid., pp. 81-84, 105-109.

33. Ibid., p. 108.

34. Furnish, pp. 201-252.

35. Ibid., p. 225.

36. Ibid., p. 230.

37. Ibid., p. 225.

38. Ibid., p. 226.

39. Ibid., p. 242.

40. Ibid., p. 245.

41. J. Lambrecht, 'Structure and Line of Thought in 2 Cor. 2.14 - 4.6', *Biblica* 64 (1983): 344-380.

42. M. Hooker, 'Beyond the Things That are Written? St Paul's Use of Scripture', *New Testament Studies* 27 (1981): 298-299.

43. The phrase is borrowed from P. Ricoeur, *The Conflict of Interpretation: Essays in Hermeneutics*, ed. D. Ihde (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1974).

44. Fitzmyer, p. 633.

45. Young and Ford, p. 105.

46. Hickling, p. 384.

47. H. Räisänen, *The Torah and Christ* (Helsinki: Finnish Exegetical Society, 1986), p. 200.

48. J. Weiss, pp. 31.

CHAPTER ONE. SECTION D. NOTES FOR PAGES 31-34.

1. V. P. Furnish, *II Corinthians* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1984); M. Carrez, *La deuxième Épître de Saint Paul aux Corinthiens* (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1986); H.-J. Klauck, *2 Korintherbrief* (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1986).

2. C. J. A. Hickling, 'The Sequence of Thought in II Corinthians, Chapter Three,' *New Testament Studies* 21 (1974-5): 380-395; J. Fitzmyer, 'Glory Reflected on the Face of Christ (2 Cor 3:7-4:6) and a Palestinian Jewish Motif,' *Theological Studies* 42 (1981): 630-644; and J. Lambrecht, 'Structure and Line of Thought in 2 Cor 2,14-4,6,' *Biblica* 64 (1983): 344-380.

3. D. Georgi, *Die Gegner des Paulus im 2. Korintherbrief* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1964); J. Sumney, 'Paul's Opponents: A Method for Determining Their Identity and a Proposal for the Identity of the Opponents of 2 Corinthians' (Ph. D. dissertation, Southern Methodist University, 1987); J. Murphy-O'Connor, '*Pneumatikoi* and Judaizers in 2 Cor 2:14-4:6,' *Australian Biblical Review* 34 (1986): 42-58; J. Murphy-O'Connor, '*Pneumatikoi* in 2 Corinthians,' *Proceedings of the Irish Biblical Association* 11 (1988): 59-66.

4. For one recent attempt in this field, see F. Young and D. Ford, *Meaning and Truth in 2 Corinthians* (London: SPCK, 1987).

5. As summarized by R. Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 89.

6. Ibid., pp. 86-89.

7. C. J. A. Hickling, 'Is the Second Epistle to the Corinthians a Source for Early Church History,' *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 66 (1975): 284-287, warns of the danger of imposing a historical reconstruction model on the interpretation of 2 Corinthians. Such attempts sometimes proceed on the basis of a 'circularity of reasoning', in which a few statements from the text are used to form a hypothesis, and then the remainder of the text is interpreted in the light of this hypothesis. See also, Young and Ford, p. 49.

8. For example, *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics*, ed. D. Ihde (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1974); and *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976).

9. For example, 'Biblical Hermeneutics,' *Semeia* 4 (1975): 27-148; and *Essays on Biblical Interpretation*, ed. L. Mudge (London: SPCK, 1981).

CHAPTER TWO. SECTION A. NOTES FOR PAGES 35-61.

1. P. Ricoeur, 'The Narrative Function', *Semeia* 13 (1978): 194-5.

2. P. Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, trans. C. Kelbley (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1965), p. 30 and p. 200.

3. Ibid., p. xxiv.

4. P. Ricoeur, 'The Task of Hermeneutics', in *Exegesis*, ed. F. Bovon and G. Rouiller, trans. D. Miller (Pittsburgh: The Pickwick Press, 1978), p. 284.

5. P. Ricoeur, 'Biblical Hermeneutics', *Semeia* 4 (1975): 82.

6. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning*, (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), p. 37. This entry will be referred to in further footnotes as *Interpretation Theory*. For more on Ricoeur's distinction between *Umwelt* and *Welt*, see *Time and Narrative*, 3 vols., trans. K. McLaughlin and D. Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), vol. I, p. 80.

7. D. E. Klemm, *Hermeneutical Inquiry*, 2 vols. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), vol. II, p. 179.

8. P. Ricoeur, 'Biblical Hermeneutics', p. 66.

9. Klemm, vol. II, p. 183.

10. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, pp. 19-22, referring to G. Frege, 'On Sense and Reference', trans. M. Black, in *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, ed. P. Geach and M. Black, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), pp. 56-78.

11. Ibid., p. 20-21.

12. This succinct characteriaztion of their view is expressed by L. Dornisch, 'Symbolic Systems and the Interpretation of Scripture: An Introduction to the Work of Paul Ricoeur', *Semeia* 4 (1975): 12. For Ricoeur's own statement on the subject, see *Time and Narrative*, vol. I, pp. 77-79.

13. P. Ricoeur, 'The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation', in *Exegesis*, ed. F. Bovon and G. Rouiller, trans. D. Miller (Pittsburgh: The Pickwick Press, 1978), pp. 316-317.

14. P. Ricoeur, 'What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding', pp. 135-150 in D. Rasmussen, *Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1971), p. 135.

15. Ibid., p. 136.

16. Ibid., p. 137.

17. P. Ricoeur, 'The Task of Hermeneutics', p. 300, borrowing the phrase from E. Benveniste.

18. P. Ricoeur, 'What is a Text?', p. 136.

19. R. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1938), p. 250.

20. P. Ricoeur, 'What is a Text?', p. 136.

21. F. Young and D. Ford, *Meaning and Truth in 2 Corinthians* (London: SPCK, 1987), p. 44. For an article with a similar position, see C. J. A. Hickling, 'Is the Second Epistle to the Corinthians a Source for Early Church History,' *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 66 (1975): 284-287.

22. P. Ricoeur, 'Biblical Hermeneutics', p. 115.

23. *Time and Narrative*, vol. II, p. 6. For more on the distinction between the world of the text and the world of the reader, see vol. I, pp. 71-82; and vol. II, pp. 99-101.

24. Collingwood, p. 258 writes about the 'coagulating' of words.

25. T. van Leeuwen, *The Surplus of Meaning: Ontology and Eschatology in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1981), p. 87.

26. P. Ricoeur, 'The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation', p. 318.

27. D. Ferguson, *Biblical Hermeneutics: An Introduction* (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1987), p. 179.

28. P. Ricoeur, 'Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text', *Social Research* 38 (1971): 536.

29. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, p. 87.

30. P. Ricoeur, 'The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation', p. 317.

31. Dornisch, p. 7.

32. P. Ricoeur, 'Biblical Hermeneutics', p. 144.

33. P. Ricoeur, 'The Task of Hermeneutics', p. 280.

34. Ibid., p. 285.

35. R. Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1969).

36. Ibid., p. 27.

37. Ibid., p. 30.

38. Ibid., p. 30.

39. Ibid., p. 31.

40. N. Petersen, *Rediscovering Paul: Philemon and the Sociology of Paul's Narrative World* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), p. 7.

41. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, p. 8.

42. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, p. 90: '...a meaning...is not an idea that somebody has in his mind. It is not a psychic content, but an ideal object which can be identified and reidentified by different individuals at different times as being one and the same.'

43. Ibid., p. 12.

44. Ibid., p. 75.

45. W. K. Wimsatt and M. C. Beardsley, 'The Intentional Fallacy,' pp. 3-18 in W. K. Wimsatt, *The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry* (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1970), p. 3.

46. S. Prickett, *Words and the Word: Language, Poetics, and Biblical Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 23.

47. Ibid., p. 24. See also p. 78.

48. C. Scalise, 'The *Sensus Literalis*: A Hermeneutical Key to Biblical Exegesis', *Scottish Journal of Theology* 42 (1989): 64.

49. M. Stocker, 'God in Theory: Milton. Literature, and Theodicy', *Journal of Literature and Theology* 1 (1987): 76.

50. J. McDade, 'Pre-existence Language and the Dynamic of Metaphorical Predication: The Christological Use of Pre-existence Language in the Light of Paul Ricoeur's Theory of Metaphor', (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1986), pp. 11, 45, 284.

51. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, pp. 88-92.

52. Ibid., p. 91.

53. P. Ricoeur, *Essays on Biblical Interpretation*, ed. L. Mudge (London: SPCK, 1981), p. 109.

54. G. Frege, 'On Sense and Reference', trans. M. Black, in *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, ed. P. Geach and M. Black, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), pp. 56-78.

55. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, p. 20.

56. Ibid., p. 13; and P. Ricoeur, 'The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation', p. 315.

57. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, p. 20.

58. Ibid., p. 80.

59. Ibid., p. 81.

60. Ibid., p. 87.

61. Ibid., p. 87.

62. P. Ricoeur, 'The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation', p. 315.

63. Ibid., p. 316.

64. Ibid., p. 305.

65. Ibid., pp. 304-311.

66. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, p. 93.

67. Ibid., p. 93.

68. Palmer, p. 191.

69. Ibid., p. 188, referring to H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, p. 291.

70. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, p. 93.

71. P. Ricoeur, 'The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation', pp. 308-311.

72. Compare also D. Aune, *The New Testament In Its Literary Environment* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1987), p. 13, who writes: 'The original significance that a literary text had for both author and reader is tied to the genre of that text, so that the meaning of the part is dependent on the meaning of the whole.'

73. P. Ricoeur, 'The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation', p. 311.

74. S. Schneiders, 'The Foot Washing (John 13: 1-20): An Experiment in Hermeneutics', *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 43 (1981): 76-92; *idem*, 'Feminist Ideology Criticism and Biblical Hermeneutics', *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 19 (1989): 3-10.

75. P. Ricoeur, 'Philosophical Hermeneutics and Biblical Hermeneutics', in *Exegesis*, ed. F. Bovon and G. Rouiller, trans. D. Miller (Pittsburgh: The Pickwick Press, 1978), pp. 321-339.

76. Ibid., p. 330.

77. Ricoeur's position on revelation is similar to that of Barth. For a fuller comparison and contrast, see M. Wallace, 'The World of the Text: Theological Hermeneutics in the Thought of Karl Barth and Paul Ricoeur', *Union Seminary Quarterly Review* 41 (1986): 1-15.

78. P. Ricoeur, *Essays on Biblical Interpretation*, p. 104.

79. P. Ricoeur, 'Philosophical Hermeneutics and Biblical Hermeneutics', pp. 331-332.

80. A similar view is expressed by J. Reese, *Experiencing the Good News: The New Testament as Communication* (Wilmington, Delaware: M. Glazier, 1984), p. 140: '... religious experience changes the world view of persons so that they see reality in new perspectives, from a new horizon.'

81. J. W. Van Den Hengel, *The Home of Meaning: The Hermeneutics of the Subject of Paul Ricoeur* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1982), pp. 199-200; 242-243.

82. P. Ricoeur, 'Philosophical Hermeneutics and Biblical Hermeneutics', p. 332.

83. *Time and Narrative*, vol. II, p. 100.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. P. Ricoeur, *Essays on Biblical Interpretation*, p. 102.

CHAPTER TWO. SECTION B. NOTES FOR PAGES 62-92.

1. N. Petersen, *Rediscovering Paul: Philemon and the Sociology of Paul's Narrative World* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), pp. 89-93.

2. P. Ricoeur, *Essays on Biblical Interpretation*, ed. L. Mudge (London: SPCK, 1981), p. 78. Ricoeur attributes the phrase to A.-J. Greimas and uses it without any explanatory comment.

3. P. Hughes, *Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (London: Marshall, Morgan, & Scott, 1962), p. 133.

4. V. P. Furnish, *II Corinthians* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1984), pp. 174-175.

5. F. Young and D. Ford, *Meaning and Truth in 2 Corinthians* (London: SPCK, 1987), p. 19.

6. For this conclusion, see Furnish, p. 383. For the arguments on both sides, see his discussion on pp. 371-383.

7. Petersen, p. 207.

8. Ibid., p. 206.

9. Ibid., p. 284.

10. Ibid., p. 261.

11. A. Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1915), p. 77.

12. Petersen, p. 241.

13. R. Bultmann, *Der zweite Brief an die Korinther*, ed. E. Dinkler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976), p. 74. Also, Plummer, p. 77.

14. P. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, 3 vols., trans. K. McLaughlin and D. Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), vol. I, p. 77.

15. Plummer, p. 82.

16. Petersen, p. 123.

17. H. Räisänen, *The Torah and Christ* (Helsinki: Finnish Exegetical Society, 1986), p. 181.

18. For different viewpoints on the debate, see H. Räisänen, *Paul and the Law* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1983); E. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977).

19. C. Barrett, *A Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1973), p. 113.

20. Plummer, p. 79.

21. Ibid., p. 84.

22. G. von Rad, *Moses* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1961), p. 66.

23. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), p. 16.

24. R. Barthes, *Image Music Text*, ed. and trans. S. Heath (London: Fontana Press, 1977), p. 106.

25. The theologian, in speaking of God, must always keep open the possibility that his understanding of God may be mistaken. He must not claim that his conception of God is absolute, but rather that he is committed to faith in God and to speaking of him as best he can. For more on this, see J. Soskice, *Metaphor and Religious Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 139-141.

26. Young and Ford, p. 18; see also F. Young, 'Note on 2 Corinthians 1.17b', *Journal of Theological Studies* 37, n. s. (1986): 404-415.

27. Bultmann, pp. 77-78.

28. Ibid., p. 79.

29. P. Secretan, 'Hermeneutics and Truth', in *Exegesis*, ed. F. Bovon and G. Rouiller, trans. D. Miller (Pittsburgh: The Pickwick Press, 1978), p. 260.

30. Young and Ford, pp. 21-22.

31. Petersen, pp. 243-244.

32. W. Bauer, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament*, tr. W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich, rev. F. W. Gingrich and F. W. Danker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), s.v. 'ζωοποιέω'.

33. J. C. O'Neill, in a lecture, June, 1987, New College, University of Edinburgh, has suggested a different punctuation of the verse and an instrumental meaning here for ἐν, resulting in the following translation of 2 Cor 5.17: 'Therefore, if any one is a new creation by means of Christ, then the old has passed away. Behold, the new has come.'

34. W. Sanday and A. C. Headlam, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, 4th ed., (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1900), p. 198; cf. also 117.

35. Ibid., p. 198-199.

36. Räisänen, *The Torah and Christ*, p. 151, says that, in Romans 7.7-8.4, Paul wants to prove two things: that the law is good and that the law is powerless.

37. Petersen, p. 248.

38. Furnish, 201.

39. Young and Ford, pp. 63-66.

40. Furnish, p. 238.

41. N. T. Wright, 'Reflected Glory: 2 Corinthians 3.18,' pp. 139-150, in *The Glory of Christ in the New Testament*, ed. L. D. Hurst and N. T. Wright (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 146, gives a brief discussion of this text-critical problem. He prefers the majority reading printed in Nestle-Aland, though only after having given careful consideration to P 46. He thinks this old papyrus changed κατοπτριζόμενοι to κατοπτριζόμεθα and μεταμορθούμεθα to μεταμορφούμενοι for theological reasons, the scribe preferring to emphasize the 'beholding' motif more than the 'transformation' motif. In his view, scribal errors account for the appearance of some manuscripts with two participles and others with two main verbs.

42. J.-F. Collange, *Enigmes de la deuxième Épître de Paul aux Corinthiens* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1972), p. 116.

43. Bultmann, pp. 93-97.

44. Hughes, pp. 118-119.

45. M. Carrez, *La deuxième Épître de Saint Paul aux Corinthiens* (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1986), p. 85.

46. Ibid., p. 101.

47. Collange, p. 121, citing: L. Cerfaux, *Le Christ dans la théologie de St Paul* (Paris, 1954), p. 327, n. 1.; and N. Hugedé, *La métaphore du miroir dans les épîtres de Saint Paul aux Corinthiens* (Neuchâtel-Paris, 1957), p. 29, n. 5.

48. For example, Book I, paragraph 57: μεταμορφούμενος εἰς προφητήν. Compare also this extract, cited by Georgi, p. 82, n. 181, from *De virtutibus* 217, concerning Abraham: ὁπότε γοῦν κατασχεθείη, μετέβαλλε πάντα πρὸς βέλτιον, ..., which shows that, even in the active voice, Philo used prepositional phrases, not just a simple accusative, as the complement of his μετα verbs.

49. *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles; Founded Mainly on the Materials Collected by the Philological Society*, 10 vol., ed. J. A. H. Murray, H. Bradley, W. A. Craigie, C. T. Onions (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1928), s. v. 'zeugma'.

50. Plummer, 104-105; and Collange, 115. Opposed to this is Bultmann, p. 93, who says that Moses did not view but only reflected the divine glory. It is of course true that in Ex 34 there is no mention of Moses beholding the glory of God. But there is no reason to suppose that Paul is thinking

only on this passage when writing 2 Corinthians 3. Cf. Ex 33.21-23 and Num 12.8.

51. Contra Collange, p. 119, who insists that the glory of God may be seen on only one face, that of Christ, referring to 2 Cor 4.6. But there is nothing in that verse to suggest that.

52. H.-D. Betz, *2 Corinthians 8 and 9* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), p. 82, cites 2 Cor 8.24 as an example of a present participle with imperatival force (ἐνδεικνύμενοι) being changed, in the later textual tradition, to an aorist imperative (ἐνδείξασθε). He lists the relevant references in the grammars which show that in *koine* Greek, the independent participle is sometimes used as an imperative. See also D. Daube, 'Participle and Imperative in 1 Peter', in E. Selwyn, *The First Epistle of St. Peter* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1946), pp. 467-488.

53. M. Rissi, *Studien zum zweiten Korintherbrief* (Zürich: Zwingli Verlag, 1969), p. 39; also, Bultmann, p. 98.

54. Furnish, p. 241.

55. Barrett, p. 125.

56. Collange, p. 123.

CHAPTER TWO. SECTION C. NOTES FOR PAGES 93-114.

1. 1 Cor 1.10; 1.11; 1.26; 2.1; 3.1; 4.6; 7.24; 7.29; 10.1; 11.33; 12.1; 14.6; 14.20; 14.26; 14.39; 15.1; 15.31; 15.50; 15.58; 16.15; 2 Cor 1.8; 8.1; 13.11.

2. F. Young and D. Ford, *Meaning and Truth in 2 Corinthians* (London: SPCK, 1987), pp. 207-209.

3. V. P. Furnish, *II Corinthians* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1984), p. 157.

4. H. Lietzmann, *An die Korinther I-II*, 4th ed., supp. W.-G. Kümmel (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1949), p. 21.

5. L. Morris, *The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians: An Introduction and Commentary* (London: The Tyndale Press, 1958), p. 83.

6. N. Petersen, *Rediscovering Paul: Philemon and the Sociology of Paul's Narrative World* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), p. 130.

7. Morris, p. 83.

8. Petersen, p. 129.

9. Furnish, p. 361.

10. Ibid., p. 369.

11. C. K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1973), p. 272.

12. Furnish, p. 499.

13. Barrett, p. 323.

14. Petersen, p. 128.

15. Young and Ford, p. 209.

16. D. Georgi, *The Opponents of Paul in Second Corinthians* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1987), p. 40.

17. Petersen, p. 109.

18. Morris, p. 66, along with the RSV, prefers this translation as the more natural, though he acknowledges that it could mean that we are workers together with each other in the service of God.

19. Lietzmann, p. 15.

20. Petersen, p. 110.

21. Ibid., p. 112.

22. Ibid., p. 161.

23. Ibid., p. 114.

24. Ibid., p. 116.

25. So RSV and Barrett, 84, rejecting the possibility that 'co-worker' refers either to Paul's missionary entourage (Furnish, p. 139) or to God (Schlatter).

26. Lietzmann, p. 104.

27. G. Kittel, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1964), s.v. 'ἀποστέλλω'.

28. W. Bauer, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament*, trans. W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich, rev. F. W. Gingrich and F. W. Danker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), s.v. 'ἀπόστολος'.

28. For example, Windisch, p. 95; and Bultmann, p. 65.

29. Georgi, p. 35. Because of this, Georgi concludes, and correctly, I think, '... that at the time of Paul a general and concrete understanding or image of the apostle [as an official church figure] did not yet exist' (p. 35).

30. Furnish, p. 99.

31. A. Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1915), p. 2.

32. P. Hughes, *Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (London: Marshall, Morgan, & Scott, 1961), p. 2.

33. Georgi, p. 38.

34. Ibid., p. 36.

35. Petersen, p. 123.

36. Ibid., p. 124.

37. Kittel, 'ἀποστέλλω', p. 421, cites a rabbinic statement (Gn. r., 78 on 32.23: R. Shim'on [c.150]): 'From the fact that it is written "Let me go" (שַׁלְּחֻנִי Gen 32.27), deduce that the one who sends is greater than the one sent.'

38. G. Kittel, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1964), s.v. 'πρεσβεύω'.

39. Ibid., p. 681, citing Philo, *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit*, 205.

40. J. H. Schütz, *Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 205-206.

41. Petersen, pp. 115-119.

42. Morris, pp. 74, 137.

43. G. Kittel, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1964), s.v. ὑπηρέτης, citing Philo, *Joseph* 241; and Josephus, *Antiquities* 3, 16.

44. Ibid., p. 537.

45. Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich, s.v. 'διάκονος', p. 184.

46. Kittel, 'ὑπηρέτης', p. 533.

47. Morris, p. 65.

48. Georgi, p. 29.

49. For an examination of the Pauline *Peristasenkataloge* and their epistolary context and function, see J. Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988).

50. Furnish, p. 206.

CHAPTER TWO. SECTION D. NOTES FOR PAGES 115-137.

1. J. Schütz, *Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. ix, citing E. Käsemann (no reference given). In a similar vein, W. Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei in Ältesten Christentum*, 2nd ed. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1964), pp. 95-110, contends that the church at Rome used letters, such as *I Clement*, to extend its influence over other congregations. This work has been translated as *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity*, ed. R. A. Kraft and G. Krodel, trans. Philadelphia Seminar on Christian Origins (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1972).

2. N. Petersen, *Rediscovering Paul: Philemon and the Sociology of Paul's Narrative World* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), pp. 61-63.

3. F. C. Baur, *The Church History of the First Three Centuries*, trans. A. Menzies, 3rd ed. (London: Williams & Norgate, 1878), vol. I, pp. 60-65; idem, *Paul the Apostle of Jesus Christ, His Life and Work, His Epistles and His Doctrine. A Contribution to a Critical History of Primitive Christianity*, trans. and ed. E. Zeller, rev. A. Menzies, 2nd ed. (London: Williams & Norgate, 1876), vol. I, pp. 258-295.

4. R. A. Horsley, '"How Can Some of You Say That There is no Resurrection of the Dead?" Spiritual Elitism in Corinth,' *Novum Testamentum* 20 (1978): 203-231.

5. See the listing of references in footnote 1 of Chapter 2, Section C.

6. P. Hughes, *Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (London: Marshall, Morgan, & Scott, 1962), pp. xvi-xix.

7. 2 Cor 1.8: 'For we do not want you to be ignorant, brethren, of the affliction we experienced in Asia; for we were so utterly, unbearably crushed that we despaired of life itself.' 2 Cor 8.1: 'We want you to know, brethren, about the grace of God which has been shown in the churches of Macedonia.' 2 Cor 13.11: Finally, brethren, farewell. Mend your ways, heed my appeal, agree with one another, live in peace, and the God of love and peace will be with you.

8. R. Bultmann, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1953), p. 328.

9. Ibid., pp. 327-330.

10. Petersen, pp. 206-215.

11. V. P. Furnish, *II Corinthians* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1984), pp. 41-44.

12. W. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 18.

13. Petersen, p. 53.

14. F. Young and D. Ford, *Meaning and Truth in 2 Corinthians* (London: SPCK, 1987), p. 144.

15. Petersen, p. 54.

16. Ibid., p. 43.

17. G. Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation Through Rhetorical Criticism* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1984), p. 87, with reference in particular to 2 Cor 1.8-2.13: 'A narration should also be clear, which is not exactly the case here, but of course the Corinthians knew more about the situation than we do.' This lack of clarity about the historical setting justifies, in part, Ricoeur's notion of the autonomy of the text. As an atemporal entity cut loose from its historical moorings, 2 Corinthians is a document that presents to the reader a text, not a historical context.

18. Young and Ford, p. 147.

19. Ibid., pp. 27-28; 36-44.

20. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 68-126, devotes an entire chapter to the importance and implications of genre as a hermeneutical category.

21. R. Morgan with J. Barton, *Biblical Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 236.

22. Young and Ford, pp. 38-39.

23. Ibid., pp. 19-21.

24. Ibid., pp. 38-39, referring to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*.

25. Morgan and Barton, p. 241, note that '...an important dimension of both religious teaching about God, and metaphorical language, is what it *does* to the hearer, not simply what information it communicates.'

26. Ibid., p. 258, citing D. Via, *The Ethics of Mark's Gospel - in the Middle of Time*: '"The text has various qualities which summon the reader's participation in the constitution of its meaning.... What is missing - the gaps in the text - stimulates the reader to fill in the blanks with projections from the imagination. The text then brings the reader to the standpoint from which he or she constructs its meaning"' (pp. 4-5). For a more philosophical approach to the role of the reader, see H. R. Jauss, *Toward an Aesthetic of Reception*, trans. T. Bahti, intro. Paul de Man (Brighton: The Harvesters Press Limited, 1982). He rejects an *essentialist* theory of reading, which states that the meaning inheres in the text and is, therefore, identical for every reader in every age. Instead he suggests that both the sense and the significance of a work is closely connected to both the activity of its current reader and the verdict and tradition of its past readership.

27. Petersen, pp. 206-207.

28. For example, A. Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1915), pp. 76-79.

29. J. Sumney, 'Paul's Opponents: A Method for Determining Their Identity and a Proposal for the Identity of the Opponents of 2 Corinthians,' (Ph. D. dissertation, Southern Methodist University, 1987), pp. 261-262.

30. P. Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1987), pp. 259-277.

31. This is as true now as when observed three hundred years ago by J. Locke in *A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul*, ed. with intro. by A. Wainwright, in *The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke*, gen. ed. J. Yolton (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1987), vol. 1, p. 103.

32. P. W. Schmiedel, *Die Briefe an die Thessalonicher und an die Korinther* (Freiburg: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1891), p. 188.

33. For example, H. Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924), p. 104; H. Lietzmann, *An die Korinther I-II* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1949), p. 110; and Furnish, p. 180.

34. Kennedy, p. 15.

35. Furnish, p. 182.

36. M. Rissi, *Studien zum zweiten Korintherbrief* (Zürich: Zwingli Verlag, 1969), p. 21.

37. Ibid.

38. Furnish, p. 182.

39. Hughes, p. 88.

40. Ibid.

41. R. Bultmann, *Der zweite Brief an die Korinther*, ed. Erich Dinkler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976), p. 75.

42. C. Hickling, 'The Sequence of Thought in II Corinthians, Chapter Three,' *New Testament Studies* 21 (1974-5): 380-395.

43. B. Malina, *The New Testament World* (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1981), pp. 53-60.

CHAPTER 3. SECTION A. NOTES FOR PAGES 138-174.

1. P. Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978). References in this section of Chapter 3 to *The Rule of Metaphor* will usually be made in the text by means of page numbers in parentheses.

2. See, for example, J. Soskice, *Metaphor and Religious Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).

3. Aristotle, *The Poetics*, with trans. W. Fyfe, in *The Loeb Classical Library* (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1927), 1457 b 6-9.

4. J. G. Jennings, *Metaphor in Poetry* (London: Blackie and Son Ltd, 1915), pp. 7-11.

5. Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1410 b 13.

6. Ricoeur, *Metaphor*, with reference to Aristotle, *The Art of Rhetoric*, with trans. J. Freese, in *The Loeb Classical Library* (London: William Heinemann, 1926), 3: 10.

7. Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1410 b 33.

8. P. Fontanier, *Les Figures du discours*, repr. of 1830 ed. (Paris: Flammarion, 1968).

9. Ibid., pp. 99-100.

10. This is Ricoeur's conclusion, which he draws from premises proposed and discussed by Fontanier, pp. 99ff.

11. Soskice, *Metaphor*.

12. Ibid., pp. 3-10.

13. Soskice, p. 16, also emphasizes the need for a distinction between a nominal definition of what metaphor *is* and a real definition (or, in her words, 'functional account') of how metaphor *works*.

14. Ricoeur borrows the terms and the distinctions from J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, ed. J. Urmson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).

15. I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936).

16. P. Ricoeur, 'Biblical Hermeneutics,' *Semeia* 4 (1975): 77.

17. Ibid., p. 77.

18. Ibid., p. 77.

19. Ricoeur, *Metaphor*, p. 183.

20. Ricoeur, 'Biblical Hermeneutics,' p. 93.

21. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), p. 51.

22. Ibid., p. 52.

23. Ricoeur, *Metaphor*, p. 198.

24. Ibid., p. 57.

25. Ibid., pp. 189-190.

26. Ibid., pp. 188-189.

27. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, p. 52.

28. Ricoeur, *Metaphor*, p. 96.

29. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, p. 53.

30. M. Black, *Models and Metaphors* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 236-237.

31. Ibid., p. 46.

32. Soskice, pp. 38-43.

33. Ibid., p. 43.

34. M. Beardsley, *Aesthetics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958).

35. H. Konrad, *Étude sur la métaphore* (Paris: Lavergne, 1939); S. Ullmann, *Semantics: An Introduction to the Science of Meaning* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967); F. de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. W. Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).

36. Ricoeur, *Metaphor*, p. 108, citing Konrad, *Étude*, p. 106.

37. Ricoeur, *Metaphor*, pp. 138-139, referring to G. Genette, *Figures I* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1966), pp. 205-221.

38. J. Cohen, *Structure du langage poétique* (Paris: Flammarion, 1966), pp. 15-23.

39. Groupe μ (J. Dubois, F. Edeline, J. M. Klinkenberg, P. Minguet, F. Pire, H. Trinon, Centre d'études poétiques, Université de Liège), *Rhétorique générale* (Paris: Larousse, 1970).

40. Cohen, pp. 108-114.

41. Ricoeur, *Metaphor*, p. 168.

42. R. Jakobson, 'Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disorders,' in *Selected Writings II: Word and Language* (Paris: Mouton, 1971).

43. Ricoeur, *Metaphor*, p. 179, citing Jakobson, p. 258.

44. Richards, because he is combatting the old substitution theory and its collusion with resemblance, is reluctant to allow similarity much space in his work. But he does, finally, concede that resemblance is a factor in the construction of a new metaphor: 'In general, there are very few metaphors in which disparities between tenor and vehicle are not as much operative as the similarities. Some similarity will commonly be the ostensive ground of the shift, but the peculiar modification of the tenor which the vehicle brings about is even more the work of their unlikeness than of their likeness' (127). In combining both identity *and* difference as characteristics of metaphor, Richards prefigures Ricoeur's conclusion on the role of resemblance in the functioning of metaphor.

45. Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1459 a 5-8.

46. G. Frege, 'On Sense and Reference', trans. M. Black, in *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, ed. P. Geach and M. Black, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), pp. 56-78.

47. Ibid., pp. 62-63.

48. The phrase is that of Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, repr. of 1949 ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1969), p. 16.

49. Cohen, p. 114.

50. M. Black, *Models and Metaphors*; and M. Hesse, *Models and Analogies in Science* (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966).

51. T. Wilkie, '£1bn machine to seek the source of gravitation,' *The Independent*, Tuesday, 12 September 1989, p. 5.

52. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, p. 64.

53. Ricoeur, *Metaphor*, p. 280, citing M. Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund*, p. 89.

54. J. Derrida, 'White Mythology,' trans. F. Moore, *New Literary History* 6 (1974): 5-74.

55. The phrase is from Genette, p. 211.

56. T. Hawkes, *Metaphor* (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1972), p. 91.

57. Ricoeur, *Metaphor*, citing a phrase from Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1411 b 5.

CHAPTER THREE. SECTION B. NOTES FOR PAGES 175-206.

1. For the role of pre-understanding in interpretation, see, for example, R. Bultmann, 'Is Exegesis Without Presuppositions Possible,' in *Existence and Faith*, tr. S. Ogden (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1961), pp. 289-296.

2. L. Mudge, 'Paul Ricoeur on Biblical Interpretation,' in P. Ricoeur, *Essays on Biblical Interpretation*, ed. with intro. by L. Mudge (London: SPCK, 1981), p. 26.

3. A. Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1915), p. 78, thinks this verse implies that the opponents have already left Corinth.

4. P. E. Hughes, *Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (London: Marshall, Morgan, & Scott, 1961), p. 81, thinks the use of letters of recommendation was customary and widespread in the early church.

5. For a discussion of the delegates and their commendation by Paul, see H. D. Betz, *2 Corinthians 8 and 9* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), pp. 70-78.

6. B. M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* (London: United Bible Societies, 1971), p. 577, explains the reason for adopting οἱ πολλοι instead of οἱ λοιποι: 'On the basis of ℵ A B C K P 88 1739 *Byz* it$^{d, 61}$ vg cop$^{sa, bo}$ eth *al* the Committee preferred the reading πολλοί. The reading λοιποί, supported by p46 D^{gr} G^{gr} 326 614 *Lect* syr$^{p, h}$ arm Marcion *al*, appears to be of Western origin; in any case, however, οι λοιποί seems to be too offensive an expression for Paul to have used in the context.'

7. V. P. Furnish, *II Corinthians* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1984), p. 180, believes that it is likely that the τινες of 3.1 are the same as οἱ πολλοί of 2.17.

8. J. Fitzmyer, 'Glory Reflected on the Face of Christ (2 Cor. 3:7-4:6) and a Palestinian Jewish Motif,' *Theological Studies* 42 (1981): 630-644, suggests that the entire chapter proceeds on the basis of the rabbinic phenomenon of catchword bonding.

9. G. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, repr. of 1949 ed. (London: Hutchison, 1969), pp. 13-16, defines a category mistake as attributing an item to a category to which it does not properly belong. The term originated, not in a discussion of metaphor, but in his attempt to overcome the view that there is a 'polar opposition between mind and matter.'

10. R. Bultmann, *Der Zweite Brief an die Korinther*, ed. E. Dinkler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976), p. 76.

11. B. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato Translated into English with Analyses and Introductions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1875), vol. II, pp. 155-156.

12. C. Collins, *Plato*, in *Ancient Classics for English Readers*, ed. W. Collins (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1912), p. 63.

13. D. Jasper, *The New Testament and the Literary Imagination* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1987), p. 32.

14. W. Doty, *Letters in Primitive Christianity*, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), has investigated ancient letter-writing, and classified the different types of letters and the standard forms of each.

15. J. Denney, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1916), pp. 99-111, discusses 'living epistles.'

16. For a fuller discussion of the problem of the addressees of the commendatory letter, see the discussion above in Chapter 2, Section D.

17. P. Ricoeur, 'Biblical Hermeneutics,' *Semeia* 4 (1975): 88.

18. This is the pattern of interpreting metaphors that is suggested by P. Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, tr. R. Czerny, with K. McLaughlin and J. Costello (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 247-256.

19. Furnish, p. 181.

20. Ibid., p. 181.

21. Bultmann, p. 75.

22. J. Weiss, *Die Aufgabe der Neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft in der Gegenwart* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1908), p. 32.

23. Bultmann, p. 75.

24. J. Weiss, p. 31.

25. I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 52-55.

26. Ibid., p. 63: 'The meaning of a word on some occasions is quite as much in what it keeps out, or at a distance, as in what it brings in.'

27. Bultmann, p. 75.

28. Ibid., p. 75.

29. J. Weiss, p. 34.

30. M. Rissi, *Studien zum zweiten Korintherbrief* (Zurich: Zwingli Verlag, 1969), p. 21.

31. Furnish, p. 182.

32. Hughes, p. 88; and W. Kümmel, 'Anhang,' in H. Lietzmann, *An die Korinther I-II*, 4th ed. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1949), p. 199.

33. Bultmann, p. 75.

34. Furnish, p. 195.

35. P. W. Schmiedel, *Die Briefe an die Thessalonicher und an die Korinther* (Freiburg: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1891), p. 188; P. Bachmann, *Der zweite Brief des Paulus an die Korinther* (Leipzig: A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung Nachf., 1909), p. 144; and J. Weiss, p. 32.

36. H. Windisch, *Der Zweite Korintherbrief* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924), p. 105.

37. Furnish, p. 183.

38. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), p. 64.

39. G. Wilson, *I Corinthians: A Digest of Reformed Comment* (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1978), p. 126.

40. G. Bertram, 'ἔργον,' in *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed. G. Kittel, tr. and ed. G. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1964), vol. II, p. 636. For a similar treatment of the word, see also W. Bauer, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament*, tr. W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich, rev. F. W. Gingrich and F. W. Danker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), s. v. 'ἔργον.'

41. M. Dods, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1889), p. 199.

42. L. Morris, *The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians: An Introduction and Commentary* (London: The Tyndale Press, 1958), pp. 131-2.

43. W. Barclay, *The Letters to the Corinthians*, in *The Daily Study Bible Series*, rev. ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975), p. 78.

44. Ibid., p. 78.

45. C. K. Barrett, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1971), p. 201.

46. Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, p. 91.

CHAPTER 3. SECTION C. NOTES FOR PAGES 207-246.

1. For example, C. K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1973), pp. 115-126; and A. Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1915), pp. 89-107.

2. Much of this section is dependent on the article of G. Kittel, 'δόξα,' in *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed. G. Kittel, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1964), vol. II, pp. 233-253.

3. Ibid., p. 238.

4. Ibid., p. 240.

5. Ibid., p. 244.

6. Ibid., p. 237.

7. P. Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, trans. R. Czerny with K. McLaughlin and J. Costello (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 117.

8. J. Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 158-160.

9. P. Bachmann, *Der zweite Brief des Paulus an die Korinther* (Leipzig: A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung Nachf., 1909), pp. 280-1; and H. Lietzmann, *An Die Korinther I-II*, supp. by W. G. Kümmel (Tübingen: Verlag J. C. B. Mohr, 1949), p. 128.

10. Plummer, *2 Corinthians*, pp. 198-199.

11. V. P. Furnish, *II Corinthians* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1984), p. 346. The same contrast of δόξα/ἀτιμία was noticed in Hosea 7.8 (LXX) by J. B. Lightfoot, *Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1878), p. 156.

12. W. Bauer, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament*, trans. W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich, rev. F. W. Gingrich and F. W. Danker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), s.v. 'φθορά' and 'ἀπώλεια'.

13. Ibid., s.v. αἰσχύνη.

14. H. A. W. Meyer, *The Epistles to the Philippians and Colossians*, trans. J. C. Moore, translation rev. and ed. W. P. Dickson (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1879), p. 183.

15. Ibid., p. 188.

16. Lightfoot, *Philippians*, p. 156.

17. W. Scott, *Ivanhoe*, The Melrose Edition (London: The Caxton Publishing Company, n. d.), p. 239.

18. W. Sanday and A. C. Headlam, *The Epistle to the Romans* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1900), p. 81.

19. C. H. Dodd, *The Epistle of Paul to the Romans* (London: Fontana Books, 1960), p. 75.

20. Martin Luther, *A Commentary on Saint Paul's Epistle to the Galatians*, trans. and ed. E. Middleton (London: B. Blake, 1839), p. 27.

21. J. B. Lightfoot, *Saint Paul's Epistle to the Galatians* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1890), p. 75.

22. Meyer, *Philippians and Colossians*, p. 30.

23. Sanday and Headlam, p. 157.

24. W. Barclay, *The Letter to the Romans*, The Daily Study Bible Series (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1975), p. 132.

25. A. Plummer, *A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians* (London: Robert Scott, 1919), p. 106.

26. F. Young and D. F. Ford, *Meaning and Truth in 2 Corinthians*, in Biblical Foundations in Theology, gen. ed. J. D. G. Dunn and J. P. Mackey (London: SPCK, 1987), p. 91.

27. Plummer, *2 Cor*inthians, p. 38.

28. P. E. Hughes, *Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (London: Marshall, Morgan, & Scott, 1962), p. 38.

29. Barrett, p. 78.

30. Plummer, *2 Corinthians*, p. 117.

31. For example, Barrett, p. 132, and Hughes, p. 130.

32. P. W. Schmiedel, *Die Briefe an die Thessalonicher und an die Korinther*, Hand-Commentar zum Neuen Testament, vol. II (Freiburg: J. C. B. Mohr, 1891), pp. 194-196.

33. Hughes, p. 134.

34. Barrett, p. 135.

35. Furnish, p. 422.

36. H. D. Betz, *2 Corinthians 8 and 9*, Hermeneia Series (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), p. 82.

37. Ibid., p. 82.

38. Ibid., p. 82.

39. Furnish, p. 425.

40. Betz, p. 82.

41. H. Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924), p. 112.

42. Dieter Georgi, *Die Gegner des Paulus im 2. Korintherbrief*, Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament, ed. Günther Bornkamm and Gerhard von Rad, vol. 11 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1964), pp. 274-282. Now translated into English by the author as *The Opponents of Paul in Second Corinthians* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1987); see pp. 264-271.

43. H.-J. Klauck, *2. Korintherbrief*, Die Neue Echter Bibel Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, vol. 8 (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1986), p. 39.

44. J. Fitzmyer, 'Glory Reflected on the Face of Christ (2 Cor 3:7-4:6) and a Palestinian Jewish Motif,' *Theological Studies* 42 (1981): 630-644.

45. Furnish, p. 204.

46. M. Hooker, 'ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ,' *New Testament Studies* 35 (1989): 321-342. Note especially her conclusion, p. 341: 'Our study has driven us to the conclusion that the phrase πίστις Χριστοῦ must contain *some* reference to the faith of Christ himself. I suggest that we should think of it not as a polarized expression, which suggests antithesis, but as a *concentric* expression, which begins, always, from the faith of Christ himself, but which includes, necessarily, the answering faith of believers, who claim that faith as their own.'

47. Young and Ford, p. 5: 'A literary text may be - in fact, must be - interpreted, reinterpreted, clarified by new insights, read in new ways, in one generation after another, and these new readings are not necessarily illegitimate. This is not to open up a multiplicity of meanings beyond constraint or to validate any and every interpretation. It is not to give free rein to the subjectivity or vested interests of the interpreter(s). It is simply to acknowledge the possibility of latent meanings discernible only within a subsequent perspective, and to recognize the mutual interaction of worlds involved in reading and responding to a text.'

48. This is the theme of the book by D. Prior, *The Suffering and the Glory* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1985).

49. P. Ricoeur, 'From Existentialism to the Philosophy of Language,' *Philosophy Today* 17 (1973): 95.

50. Ibid., p. 96.

51. P. Ricoeur, 'Creativity in Language: Word, Polysemy, Metaphor,' *Philosophy Today* 17 (1973): 101.

52. Ibid., p. 101.

53. Ibid., p. 107.

54. Ibid., p. 106.

55. Ibid., p. 98.

56. I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 74.

57. For an intensive survey of the references to the glory and the veil of Moses in Jewish literature, see L. Belleville, 'Paul's Polemical Use of the Moses-ΔΟΞΑ Tradition in 2 Corinthians 3:12-18' (Ph.D. diss, Toronto School of Theology, 1986), pp. 13-104.

58. C. Brontë, *Villette* (London: Collins, n. d.), p. 609.

59. D. Carnegie, *Dale Carnegie's Biographical Roundup* (Kingswood, Surrey: The World's Work, Ltd, 1946), p. 178.

60. Max Black, 'More About Metaphor,' pp. 19-43, in *Metaphor and Thought*, ed. A. Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 26. The classification he most prefers, though, is of 'strong' and 'weak' metaphor.

61. J. P. Hyatt, *Commentary on Exodus*, in New Century Bible (London: Oliphants, 1971), p. 326.

62. S. R. Driver, *The Book of Exodus*, in The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges, gen. ed. A. F. Kirkpatrick (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1918), p. 375.

63. See above, p. 7.

64. An example of this overemphasis on the literal interpretation is the article by W. Propp, 'The Skin of Moses' Face - Transfigured or Disfigured?', *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 49 (1987): 375-386.

65. M. Noth, *Exodus: A Commentary*, trans. J. S. Bowden, in The Old Testament Library (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1962), pp. 256-258.

66. Hyatt, p. 327.

67. Ricoeur, 'Creativity,' p. 110.

68. Driver, pp. 363, 375.

69. The following discussion is based on a suggestion made by A. G. Auld in an interview at New College, 27 October 1989.

70. F. F. Bruce, *1 and 2 Corinthians*, in New Century Bible (London: Oliphants, 1971), p. 193.

71. Propp, p. 385-386, goes on to say: 'Since we can at most be sure that *qāran* was a consequence of burning, the best translation we can offer for *qāran ʿōr pānāyw* is "the skin of his face was burnt to the hardness of horn [קרן]." ... Exodus 34. 29-34 describes the lawgiver's disfigurement on the one hand and immunity on the other.' The linguistic method and result of Propp are questionable, but he is certainly correct in his final conclusion (p. 386): 'The story honors Moses as the human most intimate with Yahweh.'

72. Furnish, p. 232.

73. Windisch, p. 119.

74. C. Hickling, 'The Sequence of Thought in II Corinthians, Chapter Three,' *New Testament Studies* 21 (1975): 390-391.

75. This is the definition of δόξα θεοῦ offered by A. Souter, *A Pocket Lexicon to the Greek New Testament*, repr. of 1916 ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), s.v. δόξα.

76. B. Chilton, *The Glory of Israel: The Theology and Provenience of the Isaiah Targum* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1982), p. 76, makes a similar point: 'Both as כבוד and יקרא , 'glory' was a conventional theologoumenon in the Judaism of the rabbinic period.'

77. See above the discussion on pp. 84-90.

78. Young and Ford, pp. 90-94, survey the literature on the translation of this difficult term. They conclude that the evidence for 'behold' and 'reflect' is almost equally weighted, and that either sense of the term is allowable in this context. In the end, though, they prefer 'reflect' as the primary signification, but maintain 'behold' as a implied sense here also.

79. Furnish, p. 214.

80. Black (see above, note 60) uses 'volcano' as a metaphor for 'metaphor'.

81. Noth, p. 109.

82. Noth, p. 257; Hyatt, p. 258.

83. Driver, p. 147.

84. G. B. Caird, *The Language and Imagery of the Bible* (London: Duckworth, 1980), p. 18, writes: 'All, or almost all, of the language used by the Bible to refer to God is metaphor (the one possible exception is the word "holy").'

85. See, for example, Windisch, pp. 112-131; Georgi, pp. 274-282; and S. Schulz, 'Die Decke des Moses,' *Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 49 (1958): 1-30.

86. Belleville, p. 4, summarizes the points at which Paul diverges from the Exodus narrative: 'There is no mention in the Exodus narrative of τὴν δόξαν τοῦ κυρίου, yet Paul assumes his readers' knowledge of this feature and builds his argument on it. Also the Israelites' inability to gaze at Moses' face is not found in Ex 34: 28-35. Furthermore, there is no connection in the Exodus narrative between the Israelites' gazing at Moses' face and his donning of a veil. And finally, the motive for the veiling that Paul gives in v. 13 is lacking in the Exodus passage.

87. This is the conclusion of Belleville, pp. 102-103, 262, 450, who contends further that Paul has not Christianized a pre-existing Jewish midrash (as suggested by Schulz and Georgi), but rather he has Christianized a Moses-δόξα tradition which had been developing for a long time.

88. A. Campbell, 'The Reported Story: Midway between Oral Performance and Literary Art,' *Semeia* 46 (1989): 77-85.

89. Ibid., p. 75.

90. Young and Ford, p. 260.

91. M. Hooker, '"What Doest Thou Here, Elijah?" A Look at St Mark's Account of the Transfiguration,' pp. 59-70 in *The Glory of Christ in the New Testament: Studies in Christology in Memory of George Bradford Caird*, ed. L. D. Hurst and N. T. Wright (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 69-70, states that '... the paradox of glory through death is as valid for Christian ministers as for Christ himself. Furthermore, Mark always links the glory of Jesus with the death of Jesus (8.38, 10.37, 13.26).' J. Muddiman, 'The Glory of Jesus, Mark 10.37,' pp. 51-58 in *The Glory of Christ in the New Testament: Studies in Christology in Memory of George Bradford Caird*, ed. L. D. Hurst and N. T. Wright (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 58, also notes 'the paradox of glory in humiliation' in the crucifixion of Jesus, and adds that Paul would have understood this very well, referring, for example, to 1 Corinthians 2.7-8.

92. H. Räisänen, *The Torah and Christ* (Helsinki: Finnish Exegetical Society, 1986), p. 45, n. 1, thinks that '... the unbelief of the Jews was so incomprehensible to Paul that he had to trace it back to divine hardening (Rom 9) or the veiling of the Scripture (2 Cor 3).'

93. Barr, p. 24, is one who notes this connection, but he cautions against attempts to make too much of the linguistic phenomena in this 'difficult and slippery area.'

94. Furnish, p. 242.

95. Ibid., p. 248.

96. N. T. Wright, 'Reflected Glory: 2 Corinthians 3:18,' pp. 139-150 in *The Glory of Christ in the New Testament: Studies in Christology in Memory of George Bradford Caird*, ed. L. D. Hurst and N. T. Wright (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 149.

CHAPTER THREE. SECTION D. NOTES FOR PAGES 247-294.

1. G. B. Caird, *The Language and Imagery of the Bible* (London: Duckworth, 1980), p. 18

2. J. M. Soskice, *Metaphor and Religious Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. ix, claims that religious language '... is descriptive of a God who cannot be named, except in tropes and figures.'

3. I. T. Ramsey, *Models and Mystery* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 51.

4. Francis A. Schaeffer, *He Is There and He Is Not Silent* (London, 1972).

5. K. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, trans. G. T. Thomson, repr. of 1936 ed. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1969), I (1), p. 426.

6. Ibid.

7. P. Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary studies of the creation of meaning in language*, trans. R. Czerny with K. McLaughlin and J. Costello (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 152.

8. For a discussion of covenant as a literary form, see K. Baltzer, *The Covenant Formulary in the Old Testament, Jewish, and Early Christian Writings*, trans. D. E. Green (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971). He investigates various suzerainty treaties of the Hittites and other ancient Near East peoples, and he concludes that the covenant would have been a familiar literary form to the Israelites. Then he explains how this formula was used and adapted by biblical writers.

9. M. G. Kline, *Treaty of the Great King. The Covenant Structure of Deuteronomy: Studies and Commentary* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1963), pp. 13-20.

10. H. Cunliffe-Jones, *Deuteronomy: Introduction and Commentary*, in Torch Bible Commentaries, gen. ed. J. Marsh, A. Richardson, R. G. Smith (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1951), p. 57.

11. D. F. Payne, *Deuteronomy*, in Daily Study Bible, Old Testament Series, gen. ed. J. C. L. Gibson (Edinburgh: The Saint Andrew Press, 1985), p. 45.

12. S. R. Driver, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Deuteronomy*, in the International Critical Commentary, ed. S. R. Driver, A. Plummer, and C. A. Briggs (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1895), p. 87.

13. A. Mayes, *Deuteronomy*, in New Century Bible Commentary, gen. ed. R. CLements and M. Black (London: Marshall, Morgan, & Scott, 1979), p. 157.

14. A. F. Kirkpatrick, *The First and Second Books of Samuel*, in The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges, gen. ed. for OT A. F. Kirkpatrick (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1930), p. 145.

15. P. R. Ackroyd, *The First Book of Samuel*, in Cambridge Bible Commentary, gen. ed. P. R. Ackroyd, A. Leaney, J. W. Packer (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1971), p. 141.

16. D. F. Payne, *Samuel*, in Daily Study Bible, Old Testament Series, gen. ed. J. C. L. Gibson (Edinburgh: The Saint Andrew Press, 1982), pp. 90-91.

17. P. K. McCarter, Jr., *I Samuel: A New Translation with Introduction, Notes, and Commentary*, in The Anchor Bible, vol. 8, gen. ed. W. F. Albright and D. N. Freedman (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1980), p. 293.

18. W. McKane, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Jeremiah*, in the new International Critical Commentary, gen. ed. J. A. Emerton and C. E. B. Cranfield (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986), p. 218.

19. For a more thorough treatment of Jeremiah's theology, see Adam C. Welch, *Jeremiah: His Time and His Work* (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), esp. ch. 9, 'Jeremiah and the Content of Yahwism', pp. 180-194.

20. E. Nicholson, *The Book of the Prophet Jeremiah Chapters 1-25*, in Cambridge Bible Commentary, gen. ed. P. R. Ackroyd, A. Leaney, J. W. Packer (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1973), p. 102.

21. R. P. Carroll, *Jeremiah: A Commentary* (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1986), pp. 257-258.

22. W. L. Holladay, *Jeremiah I: A Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Jeremiah Chapters 1-25*, in *Hermeneia*, ed. P. D. Hanson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), p. 329.

23. Carroll, pp. 257-258.

24. Ibid., p. 258.

25. Nicholson, p. 202.

26. McKane, p. 600.

27. For a discussion of text critical problems of 2 Kings 18-19 and Isaiah 36-37, see B. Childs, *Isaiah and the Assyrian Crisis*, in Studies in Biblical Theology, 2nd series, 3 (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1967), pp. 137-140.

28. G. H. Jones, *1 and 2 Kings*, in 2 vol., in New Century Bible Commentary, gen. ed. R. CLements and M. Black (London: Marshall, Morgan, & Scott, 1984), vol. II, p. 574.

29. J. T. Greene, *The Role of the Messenger and Message in the Ancient Near East. Oral and Written Communication in the Ancient Near East and in the Hebrew Scriptures: Communications and Communiqués in Context* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), surveys this topic comprehensively. He identifies five major types of messengers (ambassador, emissary-courier, envoy, harbinger, herald), and he defines their tasks. He concludes: 'Messengers

generally are sent by persons of higher authority than themselves. They deliver messages either orally or in writing or both. The execution of the verbatim message does not preclude automatically additional elaborations or gestures by the messenger through their own commentary and/or deeds' (pp. xvi-xvii).

30. J. A. Montgomery, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Books of Kings*, ed. H. S. Gehman, in the International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1951), p. 493.

31. Jones, vol. II, p. 577.

32. J. N. Oswalt, *The Book of Isaiah Chapters 1-39*, in The New International Commentary on the Old Testament, gen. ed. R. K. Harrison (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1986), pp. 646-654.

33. O. Kaiser, *Isaiah 1-39: A Commentary*, trans. R. A. Wilson, in Old Testament Library (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1974), pp. 393-394, adds this comment: 'According to post-exilic religion this [statement that the gods of the conquered nations are nothing] was demonstrated by the very fact that their images were manufactured, a theme which has been rightly recognized as displaying a spirit of enlightenment.'

34. J. Robinson, *The Second Book of Kings*, in Cambridge Bible Commentary, gen. ed. P. R. Ackroyd, A. Leaney, J. W. Packer (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1976), p. 185.

35. J. D. W. Watts, *Isaiah 34-66*, in Word Biblical Commentary, vol. 25, gen. ed. D. A. Hubbard and G. W. Barker (Waco: Word Books, 1987), p. 36.

36. M. H. Woudstra, *The Book of Joshua*, in The New International Commentary on the Old Testament, gen. ed. R. K. Harrison (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1986), p. 83.

37. H. W. Herßberg, *Die Bücher Josua, Richter, Ruth*, in Das Alte Testament Deutsch, vol. 9 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1953), p. 28.

38. J. A. Soggin, *Le Livre de Josué*, in Le Commentaire de l'Ancien Testament, vol. 5a (Neuchatêl: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1970), p. 46. In English as *Joshua: A Commentary*, trans. R. A. Wilson, in Old Testament Library (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1972).

39. Woudstra, p. 84.

40. F. I. Andersen and D. N. Freedman, *Hosea: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, The Anchor Bible, vol. 24 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1980), pp. 199-200.

41. H. W. Wolff, *Hosea: A Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Hosea*, trans. G. Stansell, ed. P. D. Hanson, in Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), p. 27.

42. Andersen and Freedman, pp. 200, 205.

43. Wolff, p. 27.

44. Andersen and Freedman, p. 207.

45. C. A. Briggs and E. G. Briggs, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Psalms*, 2 vol., in the International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1906), vol. I, p. 367, emend *ʾēl ḥāy* to *ʾēl ḥayyay* ('the God of my life'). The former is to be preferred, though, according to M. Dahood, *Psalms*, 3 vol., in The Anchor Bible, vol. 16 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1965), vol. I, p. 256, who thinks that '... the emendation overlooks the allusive power of *ḥāy* which, associated with *ṣām*ʾāh*, "thirsts," is doubtless meant to evoke the image of *mayim ḥayyīm*, "living waters," predicated of God in Jeremiah 2.13.'

46. F. Delitzsch, *Biblical Commentary on the Psalms*, 3 vol., trans. D. Eaton (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1888), vol. 2, p. 61. A. A. Anderson, *The Book of Psalms*, 2 vol., in New Century Bible Commentary, gen. ed. R. CLements and M. Black (London: Marshall, Morgan, & Scott, 1972), vol. I, p. 328, treats Pss 42-43 as a literary unity and regards it as an *individual* lament. S. Mowinckel, *The Psalms in Israel's Worship*, 2 vol., trans. D. R. Ap-Thomas (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), vol. I, p. 219, prefers to classify it as a *national* lament.

47. Briggs and Briggs, vol. I, p. 368, state that '... the taunt is really the occasion of the psalm.'

48. Anderson, vol. I, p. 329.

49. Delitzsch, vol. 2, p. 64.

50. On 'beholding the face of God' (Ps 42.2), see Anderson, vol. I, p. 330, who states that this '... was a technical term for the visiting of the sanctuary, and the idiom may well be older than the Hebrew language itself. Its origin may have been a situation where the god was actually seen, being represented by an image. "To see someone's face" means to be admitted to that person's presence and favour; cf. Gen 43.3; Ps 84.7.'

51. Briggs and Briggs, vol. II, p. 224.

52. Briggs and Briggs, vol. I, p. 226, again emend the text to read 'God of my life' (see above, note 45). But both Dahood, vol. II, p. 280, and Mowinckel, vol. I, p. 6 reject this suggestion and make good sense of the difficult syntax in this verse.

53. Mowinckel, vol. I, p. 6.

54. D. A. Templeton, *Re-Exploring Paul's Imagination: A Cynical Laywoman's Guide to Paul of Tarsus* (Eilsbrunn: KO'AMAR, 1988), p. 26.

55. Ibid., p. 26.

56. Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, p. 249.

57. Ibid., p. 250.

58. Ibid., p. 252.

59. Ibid., p. 251.

60. Ibid., p. 251.

61. Ibid., p. 251.

62. Ibid., p. 254.

63. K. Barth, *The Humanity of God*, trans. J. Thomas and T. Wieser (London: Collins, 1961), p. 45.

64. W. Sanday, *Inspiration: Eight lectures on the early history and origin of the doctrine of Biblical Inspiration*, 3rd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1896), p. 124.

65. Ibid., p. 153.

66. J. Barr, *The Bible in the Modern World* (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1973), p. 179, n. 11.

67. E. Käsemann, *Perspectives on Paul*, trans. M. Kohl, in New Testament Library (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1971), p. 77; see also p. 93.

68. R. Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 29.

69. R. Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, 2 vol., trans. K. Grobel (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1952), vol. I, pp. 69-74.

70. V. P. Furnish, *II Corinthians*, in The Anchor Bible, vol. 32a, gen. ed. W. F. Albright and D. N. Freedman (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1984), pp. 375-383, gives a full and balanced discussion of these issues.

71. C. K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, in Black's New Testament Commentaries, ed. H. Chadwick (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1973), p. 199.

72. Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, pp. 216-256.

73. Soskice, pp. 86-90.

74. Ibid., p. 52.

75. Ibid., p. 52.

76. S. McFague, *Metaphorical Theology* (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1983).

77. D. Cupitt, *The Long-Legged Fly: A Theology of Language and Desire* (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1987), p. 14.

78. Ibid., p. 100.

79. For example, G. B. Madison, 'Reflections on Paul Ricoeur's Philosophy of Metaphor,' *Philosophy Today* 21 (supp. to 4/4 1977): 424-430, has attempted to develop the implications of Ricoeur's theory of metaphor toward a more idealist orientation.

80. See, for example, P. Ricoeur, 'Structure and Hermeneutics,' trans. K. McLaughlin, in *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics*, ed. D. Ihde (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1974), pp. 27-61, in which he acknowledges the legitimacy of structuralism as one among many possible means of explaining the sense of a text. But, for Ricoeur, structuralism can never give the ultimate interpretation because it deals only with the sense of a text and refrains from questions of reference. Thus its value is limited, and, if it is employed at all, it can never be anything more than just one of many steps along the interpretative way. Furthermore, in biblical interpretation, structuralism is reluctant to confront the historicity of the events that gave rise to the texts to be interpreted. This is so, in part, because structuralism has a decided preference for the synchronic over the diachronic.

81. Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, p. 112, endorses the proposal of C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*, 8th ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1946), p. 11, who state that the meaning of a word is a result of the interaction of three factors: the symbol (the visible or audible sign), the thought or reference which is being expressed, and the referent or thing talked about.

82. P. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), pp. 20-21: '... [S]igns only refer to other signs within the system. With the sentence, however, language is directed beyond itself. Whereas the sense is immanent to the discourse, and objective in the sense of ideal, the reference expresses the movement in which language transcends itself. ...[R]eference relates language to the world.' He continues (p. 21) by discussing discourse and 'its intentional pointing toward the extra-linguistic.' See also his essay, 'The Problem of Double Meaning as Hermeneutic Problem and as Semantic Problem,' trans. K. McLaughlin, in The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, ed. D. Ihde (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1974), pp. 62-78, especially p. 65, in which Ricoeur states that '... symbolics is the means of expressing an extralinguistic reality.'

83. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, p. 21.

84. Ibid., pp. 20-21: 'Language is not a world of its own. It is not even a world. But because we are in the world, because we are affected by situations, and because we orient ourselves comprehensively in those situaions, we have something to say, we have experience to bring to language.'

85. For a view of life and death in the larger perspective of the Pauline corpus, see R. C. Tannehill, *Dying and Rising with Christ: A Study in Pauline Theology* (Giessen: Töpelmann, 1967).

86. Furnish, pp. 113-114, 122-125.

87. A. Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians*, in the International Critical Commentary, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1915), p. 17.

88. F. Young and D. Ford, *Meaning and Truth in 2 Corinthians*, in Biblical Foundations in Theology, gen. ed. J. D. G. Dunn and J. P. Mackey (London: SPCK, 1987), p. 65.

89. Bultmann, vol. I, p. 209.

90. Ibid., p. 210.

91. Ibid., p. 246.

92. Templeton, p. 13.

93. J. Ashton, 'The Transformation of Wisdom. A Study of the Prologue of John's Gospel,' *New Testament Studies* 32 (1986): 181, states that the early Christians tried to '... make sense of *their* experience by appealing to his [Christ's]. Paul's most astonishing speculative feat was his existentialisation, as it were, of the events of the first Easter.'

94. Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, p. 233, links very closely the notions of metaphor, fiction, and redescription.

95. M. Luther, *A Commentary on Saint Paul's Epistle to the Galatians*, trans. anon., translation edited, corrected, and revised by E. Middleton (London: B. Blake, 1839), p. 115.

96. J. B. Lightfoot, *Saint Paul's Epistle to the Galatians*, 10th ed. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1890), p. 119, specifically mentions the metaphoricity of death in this passage.

97. E. D. Burton, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians*, in the International Critical Commentary (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), p. 132.

98. Ibid., p. 133.

99. Ibid., p. 133.

100. Lightfoot, p. 117.

101. R. Y. K. Fung, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, in The New International Commentary on the New Testament, gen. ed. F. F. Bruce (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1988), p. 123.

102. W. Sanday and A. C. Headlam, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, 4th ed., in the International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1900), p. 173-174.

103. F. F. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, in New International Greek Testament Commentary, ed. I. H. Marshall and W. W. Gasque (Exeter: The Paternoster Press, 1982), p. 143-144.

104. Luther, p. 116.

105. Ibid., p. 117.

106. Fung, p. 123, n. 69, proposes that the ἵνα, though generally denoting purpose, here expresses result, based on the observation that occasionally there is '... the tendency to confuse consecutive and final clauses.'

107. See, e.g., Burton, p, 134.

108. For a survey of the material and a proposed solution, see H. Räisänen, *Paul and the Law* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1983).

109. D. O. Via, Jr., *The Parables: Their Literary and Existential Dimension* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), p. 104, calls this parable '... a comedy in which tragedy is included and overcome....'

110. For an in-depth analysis of the plot in terms of narrative theory, see R. W. Funk, *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative* (Sonoma, Cal.: Polebridge Press, 1988), pp. 177-183.

111. R. H. Ward, *The Prodigal Son: Some Comments on the Parable* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1968), p. 132. He correctly recognizes that parables are 'works of art' (p. 12) which use not ordinary language but rather 'metaphor, poetry, and paradox' (p. 131).

112. Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory, p. 52.*

113. P. Ricoeur, 'The Metaphorical Process,' Semeia 4 (1975): 87.

114. Via, p. 146, believes that this parable defines the relation of God and man. The transfer from death to life is made possible by the kindness of the father (the grace of God).

115. Ibid., p. 192.

116. Young and Ford, pp. 63-66.

117. On the connection of 2.14-17 with its context, see M. E. Thrall, 'A Second Thanksgiving Period in II Corinthians,' *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 16 (1982): 101-124.

118. Furnish, p. 187.

119. P. E. Hughes, *Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, in the New London Commentary on the New Testament, gen. ed. N. B. Stonehouse (London: Marshall, Morgan, & Scott, 1962), pp. 78-79. Also A. T. Hanson, *The Paradox of the Cross in the Thought of St Paul* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1987), p. 83.

120. R. Bultmann, *Der zweite Brief an die Korinther*, ed. E. Dinkler, in Kritisch-Exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976), pp. 68-69.

121. Käsemann, p. 50.

122. R. P. Martin, *2 Corinthians*, in Word Biblical Commentary, vol. 40, gen. ed., D. A. Hubbard and G. W. Barker (Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1986), p. 48.

123. This view has been advanced by many, including J. Héring, *La Seconde Épître de Saint Paul aux Corinthiens* (Neuchatêl: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1958), p. 37. Furnish, p. 185, for one, explains why it should not be accepted.

124. J. H. Bernard, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, in The Expositor's Greek Testament, vol. III, ed. W. R. Nicoll (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1903), p. 54.

125. E. Kamlah, 'Buchstabe und Geist: Die Bedeutung dieser Antithese für die alttestamentliche Exegese des Apostels Paulus,' *Evangelische Theologie* 14 (1954): 276-282.

126. Räisänen, *Paul and the Law*, p. 25.

127. Idem, *The Torah and Christ: Essays in German and English on the Problem of the Law in Early Christianity* (Helsinki: Finnish Exegetical Society, 1986), p. 180.

128. R. A. Knox, *A New Testament Commentary for English Readers*, 3 vol. (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd, 1954), vol II, p. 183.

129. Furnish, p. 200.

130. Käsemann, p. 142.

131. Ibid., p. 143.

132. Ibid., p. 146.

133. Ibid., p. 164.

134. Ibid., p. 147.

135. Martin, p. 55.

136. For a similar explanation, see H.-J. Klauck, *2. Korintherbrief*, in Die Neue Echter Bibel, ed. J. Gnilka and R. Schnackenburg (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1986), p. 37. Compare also Barrett, p. 113, and J. Moltmann, *The Church in the Power of the Spirit: A Contribution to Messianic Ecclesiology*, trans. M. Kohl (London: SCM Press, Ltd, 1977), p. 89.

137. Käsemann, p. 150-151.

138. Furnish, p. 200.

139. Ibid., p. 199-200.

140. J.-F. Collange, *Enigmes de la deuxième Épître de Paul aux Corinthiens: Étude exegetique de 2 Cor 2.14-7.4*, Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series 18, gen. ed. M. Black (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 65.

141. Lightfoot, p. 118.

142. Kamlah, p. 279.

143. Käsemann, p. 139

144. E. Hatch, 'Breathe on me, Breath of God,' hymn 103, in *The Church Hymnary*, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 35.

145. Templeton, p. 75.

146. Barrett, pp. 112-113.

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